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Conjunction of Ibn Bajja's Intellect with Other Philosophers
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Authored by Frank Redmond, 2006
The ultimate goal of Ibn Bajja's treatise Conjunction of the Intellect with Man is to prove that, one, happiness can be attained on earth, and, two, happiness is attained by knowing and becoming the intelligibles in-and-of-themselves. It is through contemplating and sharing in these intelligibles that man develops wonder, awe, and true joyfulness. However, man can be seduced and stuck in inferior forms of thought, namely the thought patterns of the masses and the natural philosophers. But the question is how did Ibn Bajja come to this determination and who are his influences, some of whom are easily detectable from the text? By summarizing his main points and by finding his main influences, hopefully Ibn Bajja's theory will be better understood and contextualized.
Before embarking to explain his treatise, Ibn Bajja makes sure to tell his intended audience, probably a prince or king of some sort, that he had to keep his treatise brief due to pressures of time. This is important because it prevents Ibn Bajja from being able to fully prove his claims found within the texts via “numerous syllogisms and stronger premises”, thus we must accept the text as it is, flawed or not, in its very skeletal form.
After this qualification, Ibn Bajja begins his discussion by defining what he means by the term 'one'. He says that the 'one' is both what is common to a given universal, like how all plants are of one genus, and what is numerically continuous according to some definite aim, like how a book is a single composition composed of many pages. In this very way, the incorporeal forms are also 'one', but only insofar as they resemble the material instances of 'oneness'. This means that, even if the form is incorporeal, its structure and definition is analogous to the structure and definition of a corporeal form. Now, regarding intelligible objects, they are said to be 'one' if they are given a singular term and are of one existing thing.
As such, “when what is numerically one is a body or of a body (like [the attribute of] white for instance), it is said to belong to an individual” (McGinnis & Reisman 334). However, Ibn Bajja makes the qualification that what is numerically one and abstracted from matter is not an individual, but instead is analogous to individual matter. He uses a metaphor to explain this position. Take, for instance, an individual man, who, as we all know, once existed as a fetus, then as an infant after birth, and then he progressed through many stages till his death. Problematically, even though it is the same person, it would be impossible to recognize him as such, if an observer knew him once when he was in his infancy, and then only knew him again when he was in his old age. Yet he is the same person, even though the observer's senses cannot perceive this fact. If he were to lose limbs or have his eyes plucked out, he would remain the same, as 'one'. “So it is obvious from this discussion that as long as the initial mover remains one and the same, that one existing is one and the same” (335).
This theory of personhood seems to be inspired by Avicenna's psychology, where Avicenna proves the existence of the self. Avicenna's theory is basically states that since body and soul are two separate entities, and since I can imagine myself without bodily members, we apprehend ourselves only through our conduits of thought not sensation. Likewise, Ibn Bajja develops the same thesis by using the analogy of the aging man, from birth to death, to explain his theory. His only flaw is that he does not back up his argument as strongly as Avicenna does (but who can compete with the rigor of Avicenna?).
To continue, what is this 'initial mover'? It is a 'proper thing' which brings about motion in two different ways: corporeally and incorporeally. Regarding corporeality, some of the motions are involuntary, things deriving from the organs like bile, or sinew, and other are voluntary with motion coming from instruments like hands, legs, lungs, etc. The involuntary motions are prior to the voluntary motions. But, together, these parts are considered 'body'. Ibn Bajja goes on to explain that prior to any motion, involuntary or voluntary, 'innate heat', the instrument of instruments, must be present, for “each part existing as body, whether organ or fluid, is related to the innate heat” (336). It is, therefore, this innate heat that sets the being into motion. In humans, this innate heat manifests itself during gestation. While the child is in the womb, it is no different than plants that are at the beginning of their existence, insofar as the child is perfected, takes nourishment, and grows in the womb under the influence of the innate heat. The functions of these parts and processes fulfill the requirements for the possession of a vegetable soul.
We have seen this theory adumbrated similarly by al-Farabi, especially the mention of an 'innate heat' which fuels the instruments of the body. To al-Farabi, this heat emanates from the source in the heart, which moderates the power of the heat by dispensing the heat commensurately throughout the soul. So to both men, in an interesting parallel, the body is governed by an innate heat source.
At any rate, when the child leaves the womb, it begins to develop its animal soul since it moves, desires, and uses its senses like an animal would. To Ibn Bajja, this is due to the incorporeal form becoming imprinted on the common sense and the imagination; from this point onwards, the child now has three distinct faculties: the appetitive, the observable growth, and the imagery (337). (Importantly, these faculties are purely active and possess no privation). It is from this point, birth, that the animal soul develops. One important function of the animal soul is perception, for it is through sensations of incorporeal forms that the animal recognizes the world around it. It is only when the human child first senses that he moves from being potentially animalistic to actually animalistic, and it is this movement that separates animals from plants and elemental mixtures. At this point, the child has gained its animal soul, but is only in a state of potentiality in respect to his human soul, whereby he will be able to engage in discursive thinking. Once the child begins to discursively think only then can it be called actually human, or to more precise, “it is by the possession of the intelligible object in the faculty of discursive reason, not just by having the faculty of or potentiality for discursive reason, that one is human” (339). Yet it is important to note that these intelligibles are not innate parts of the vital spirit, but become incorporated into the imagery at a later time through the faculty of discursive reasoning. It is solely through the apprehension of these intelligibles that we come to understand, even one the most basic of levels, the world around us.
When considering intelligibles it is essential for us to ask whether they are numerically singular or not. The fact is that “whenever we posit that every intelligible is numerically one, […] it will belong to every human as part of the natural course, and thus teaching will not qualitatively different knowledge, but only quantitatively more knowledge” (342). However, this is a 'repugnant' absurdity, for it is merely an assumption, yet the alternative, namely that each intelligible is not one is also absurd. The problem is that the intelligible that you and I share will, in turn, possess another intelligible ad infinitum, but the actual infinite does not exist.
So how does one resolve such a conflict? Clearly the answer, to Ibn Bajja, is that “the intelligibles of existing things (that is, the categories and species) are a composite of something that remains and something transient that passes away” (342). As such, we initially receive of the intelligible insofar as it is a perception of their subjects, and, from this act of perception, we develop a resultant intelligible which is formed from this nexus of relations. For instance, a horse is an intelligible, whereas a unicorn is not since a unicorn cannot have relation to actual subjects sinvcce it does not actually exist. On the other hand, a horse has a relation to numerous subjects, thus the horse is an intelligible under Ibn Bajja's rubric. However, the universal concept denoted as 'horse' becomes intelligible to humans both on an individual basis and in different ways. Given this, we do not possess the intelligible 'horse' until we experience a horse firsthand, as Ibn Bajja notes, “as for myself, since I have experienced [horses], I have an intelligible of them; however, it is tied to the individual that I have experienced” (343). No one is born with the intelligible 'horse' in their intellects. Interestingly, this means that theoretical mathematics is made up of necessarily imperfect intelligibles, thus this makes these intelligibles 'virtually fictional inventions'. Other mathematical endeavours like geometry are more grounded by employing “what is before the eye”. This can be said of the natural philosopher as well, for they conceptualize using only what is directly before their eyes - “so when the natural philosophers1 perceives it's intelligible, they do so only in virtue of those forms as they are corruptible” (345). The obliteration of these corruptible things would therefore make their conceptualization impossible. The ultimate goal for the natural philosopher, which easily can be deduced, is to understand and investigate, rather than just passively observe, the observable intelligibles.
Yet, to Ibn Bajja, there is another intelligible that is above the observable intelligible that is investigated by the natural philosopher: the intelligible in-and-of-itself. An analogy may be of help here. Say there is a reflection of the sun on a lake. There three ways, to Ibn Bajja, that this reflection can be construed: (1) The sun can be seen as a pure reflection. (2) It can be seen as a reflection of a reflection. (3) Or, it can be seen in-and-of-itself merely by looking upwards and seeing it in the sky, rather than being duped into thinking the sun is in or of the lake. Group one is made up of natural philosophers; group two, the 'masses'; and group three, “the rank of the happy”, i.e. the theoretical philosopher. It is these philosophers who enjoy the pleasures and happiness of the Truth and literally, through this acquisition of the knowledge, “they themselves become the thing ~ so, if sight were to alter and so become light, then at that moment, it would arrive at the stage of happiness” (350).
This analogy is obviously Platonic, and is possibly a direct reference to Plato's Republic. The division of people into these three classes with three levels of understanding, which correspond to the three visions of the sun, might be a direct nod to Plato, insofar as Plato in the Republic formulates his theory of knowledge as 'The Simile of the Sun'. Here Plato divides knowledge into two groups: visible and intelligible (by which he means pure objects of thought). He seems to be saying that the visible world is inferior to the intelligible world since it uses a physical faculty, sight, to understand, whereas the intelligible uses a mental faculty, thinking, to understand. Plato's 'Cave' comes to mind as well. While Ibn Bajja's theory is not an exact replica of Plato's - he denies the Theory of Ideas in favor of Aristotle's teaching in the Metaphysics - one can easily see how Plato influenced Ibn Bajja.
At any rate, anyone who puts their corporeality before their incorporeality will perish. He will not become the light which the happy literally become, but will remain an unpolished surface where the light scatters away. And if he becomes more like a polished mirror in which light is seen and other things as well, he will be deemed closer to 'purification' yet must still perish. But in the case of the person who is more like the sun itself, he will neither perish nor corrupt. When he possess this high rank, it is difficult for him to articulate the light which he has come to be, and when this is coupled with the appetitive soul, it evokes a sense of 'wonder' and immense joy.