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Avicenna: Against Atomism
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Authored by Frank Redmond, 2006
At first glance it is peculiar that Avicenna's arguments against atomism and his proof for the existence of the soul have anything to do with one another, but at a closer look it becomes clear that there is a relationship between the two. Since Avicenna is trying to prove that the intelligible form (i.e. the soul) has no relationship to corporeality, he must prove that the body is not part of the intelligible form. He finds his best
Avicenna before beginning to link the arguments against atomism with his proof for the existence of the soul must assert that there is a certain existent which encounters and processes intelligibles through reception. This is his first major presupposition. This substance is, he asserts, “neither a body, nor something that subsists in a body in the sense of being a faculty in it or a form belonging to it in any way” (McGinnis & Reisman 342). This is his second major presupposition, namely that the intelligible form cannot be of a particular magnitude and cannot be measured. Why is it important to make these two claims? It is imperative for Avicenna to put forth these premises since it is his intention to prove both presuppositions by disproving their opposites.
So, what if this receptacle, i.e. the intelligible form, was not corporeal, for the sake of experiment, but it were a body possessing a particular magnitude, then would the portion that is intelligible belong to either a single indivisible thing, or a divisible thing? How would one disprove these two ideas?
To disprove the idea that the intelligible form is a single, indivisible body, Avicenna evokes an argument he used in his Physics, namely the argument against “continuity” (cf. III.4, 4). In our case, Avicenna makes the intelligible form, for the sake of convenience, a point (x). He says that if the point (x) were single and indivisible, it would necessarily be a distinct individual thing possessing two sides. So, if two other points (y,z) were to perhaps touch the point (x) on both of its sides yet not touch one another, then the middle point (x) would become divisible. This situation, if put pictographically, would look like this: y|x|z. Thus, point (x) has now become measurable since it rests between two separate points; this contradicts his second major presupposition that an intelligible form cannot be measurable. Due to this inherent contradiction found in this argument, Avicenna dismisses the notion that the intelligible form can be a single, indivisible body.
Avicenna also wants to disprove the notion that the intelligible form is a divisible body where the indivisible are akin to points. Whenever an intelligible form is posited onto a divisible body, the intelligible form becomes (accidentally) divisible, and this leads to parts which can be either be similar or dissimilar in form. If the parts are similar when one adds together two or more similar parts, then the whole which results is not due to the form, but from an increase in size or number (344). Obviously, this would make the intelligible form out to be something numerically measurable, and this is absurd since it contradicts the second presupposition. If the parts happen to be dissimilar, then a number of absurdities result since the parts must be parts of a definition, namely the genera and differences. Avicenna offers four fundamental absurdities with this view. (1) Each part of the body, since they are all divisible things, is subject to be divided infinitely, however, since the disjointed parts are parts of definitions, the genera and differences are also subject to infinite division. This is absurd, for the genera and differences are, by essence, of one thing and not potentially infinite, but actually infinite. (2) It is impossible to imagine a division that would separate the genus and the difference […]. (3) But what if the genus were divided on one side and the difference on the opposite? If one were to further divide these halves into quarters it would result in a half-genus and a half-difference […] (4) The fact of the matter is that not every intelligible can be further subdivided ad infinitum. […]. And so, it is evident that the parts of a divisible thing cannot be similar or dissimilar, which means that the intelligible form cannot be divided in any way whatsoever.
After all this proving, Avicenna has finally come to the conclusion that “the intelligible form cannot be divided nor can it inhere in some indivisible limit of magnitude, but there is something in us that receives it, [thus] the receptacle of the intelligibles is a substance that is not a body, nor is whatever that is in us that encounters them in a faculty in a body” (346). The only part of us that can attain to and encounter the intelligible form must be a whole incorporeal substance, quod erat demonstrandum. It follows, therefore, that each intelligible form is potentially infinite, and this fact precludes intelligible forms from being a body or a faculty of the body since bodies are not infinite.
But why does Avicenna use his arguments against atomism to prove that the soul is incorporeal? What's their significance? Most of Avicenna's arguments against atomism rely on the fact that a corporeal substance cannot be composed of an infinite number of atoms because the atoms can be either counted or measured, whether that be through succession, contiguity, continuity, or interpenetration. All four of these techniques show that it is possible to either count or measure an atom. Thus, a body is not infinite or infinitely divisible by definition if it can be counted or measured by using these techniques. Similarly, since Avicenna wants to prove that the soul is incorporeal and immeasurable, and since the soul by definition is “neither a body, nor something that subsists in a body in the sense of being a faculty in it or a form belonging to it in any way” (342), he has to use arguments stating why a body is not infinite in order to rule out the possibility of the soul being corporeal. For, if he can determine that the body is limited by measurement and number, then it cannot be the seat of the soul since the soul is immeasurable.