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Al-Ghazali Argumentation
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Authored by Frank Redmond, 2006
There is no doubt that al-Ghazali's argumentation is weak, ineffective, and only truly convincing to the already convinced. For not only are his arguments 'bad', they are deceptive and try to seduce the reader into believing what is clearly a badly constructed argument through the use of rhetorical tricks and lucid language. Al-Ghazali, to his credit, appeals more the ears and the eyes than to the mind, but as we know, sometimes it is difficult to think past the facade to find the kernel. The goal of this essay is to see past al-Ghazali's philosophical facade in order to unearth the truth and expose his weaknesses. I will be using four different, yet related, arguments put forth by al-Ghazali, along with his proofs for them so we can deconstruct his proofs by either pointing out the one or two fatal flaws found inherently in the argument itself, or by showing the incompleteness of what he is trying to prove and why it falls short of a cogent argument.
I. Al-Ghazali upholds the belief that the world is created, in contrast to the view that the world is eternal, which is upheld by most of the ancients save (possibly?) Plato and the ambivalent Galen. In a nutshell, the ancients believed that the procession of the temporal from the eternal is impossible since when we posit the eternal, the world's existence does not logically follow; rather, the world's existence follows as pure possibility (McGinnis & Reisman 312). The procession of the temporal from the eternal without a change of something pertaining to the eternal itself, like “a power, instrument, moment, intent, or nature, is absurd” (313). This is a strong proof for the existence of the eternity of the world since it never deviates from the definition of what it means to be “eternal”. To be eternal means never being able to produce something like the world ex nihilo since the world is already eternal by definition. The world exists simultaneously with eternity, not before or after, and it cannot be occasioned, or willed, into being - “Inasmuch as the world exists and its temporal creation is impossible, its eternity is necessarily established” (314).
Al-Ghazali counters saying that the temporal exists and the world is something that is occasioned into being by God's will since God is an omnipotent being. The world can exist temporally since it is produced instantaneously with an act of necessitation occasioned by God's will. Therefore, no delay between the manifestation of existence and necessitation exists. Furthermore, “before the world's existence, the one who wills, the will and its relation to the one who wills all existed, and neither did the one who wills, nor the will, nor some relation that did not belong to the will come to be anew, for all of that is to change” (315; my emphasis). Thus, God is permanent, yet can occasion objects into existence from His eternal state. This is opposed to what was said above, namely that when God changes, then He ceases to be eternal. [….] In other words, whatever is willed by God into existence is a new object coming from a state of nothingness since God and his will existed prior to the world's existence. [Cause & Effect discuss]. In human affairs, whenever we intend to do something and we have the power to do it (without obstacles), we can do this something without delay. The eternal will works exactly the same way, for whenever God occasions something, it is instantaneously manifested with no obstacles in His way. To think otherwise is absurd.
There are a myriad of problems with al-Ghazali's “proof” for the world's temporal existence and God's occasionalistic abilities. One major flaw, I think, is al-Ghazali's reliance on example in the construction of his proofs. His use of It is ludicrous to presuppose that we humans think like God does. It is certainly possible that humans actually do think like God, but to presuppose that humans use the same logic and language as God only anchors your argument, from the outset, on shaky ground. Likewise, to think that God occasions things like humans do is preposterous, not because it is absolutely untrue, but because it is totally presumptuous. Also, al-Ghazali has failed to provide us with an adequate
II. Al-Ghazali also tries to counter Avicenna's original ontological proof for the existence of God by attempting to displace Him with his own occasionalistic God. Al-Ghazali puts Avicenna's argument: “A single entity knows all the universals without that knowledge requiring multiplicity and without the knowledge being something additional to the entity and without the knowledge being made multiple despite the multiplicity of objects known” and “Eternal knowledge is not to be compared with temporal knowledge” (318-9). In other words, God is only prior to the world in essence, and not in time. But al-Ghazali goes on to say boldly that this is “inconsistent to the extreme!” since, as can be imagined, this is contrary to his central thesis that God creates and occasions in time. But why? Simply put, al-Ghazali believes that if God only knows Himself, which is a consequence of the ontological proof, then He cannot know what He Himself makes. In this case, “He is what intellects, the intellection and the object of intellection, and the whole is one” (319). [….connect to next PP]
III. This activity of self-intellection has its consequences; this is especially seen in regards to the soul. According to Avicenna and (perhaps?) Aristotle, there are “presently existing things that are individuals varying in description and yet are infinite, namely, the human souls separated from the body by death” (321). These existent things, i.e. souls, are free from numeration, meaning these things cannot be given a finite value, but instead are infinite in value, being as they are free from even and odd attributions [and are thus free from being in time]. Al-Ghazali finds Plato's theory of the soul even more repugnant. Plato, in al-Ghazali's opinion, believes that there is one singular Soul “source” that is divided and placed into bodies, and when the bodies die, the soul returns to the “source” to reunite with it. This is repulsive for four reasons. We cannot have the same “soul” since we know ourselves as separate, not bonded, entities. Then two souls would share in knowledge of each other and understand every relation of the other. It is incomprehensible how two - let alone a million - souls become one “soul”. And, it is incomprehensible how such a large quantity can be divided into such discrete parts only to return to the “source” once again. For these four reasons, it is impossible for the individual bodily soul to be from one singular Soul “source”.
IV. Is it true that the universe cannot be other than according to the way in which it came to exist? Yes, Al-Ghazali asserts, for “the world came to exist when it did and according to the description with which it came to exist and in the place in which it came to exist only by will” (324; my emphasis). This means that God has total and complete power over His decision upon when, how, and where to deploy the universe. God did not merely choose between a myriad of alternatives for this universe since “it is at the pinnacle of improbability to say that the world is specified by some specific design when it could have been according to some other design instead of the one it in fact has, and so its occurring as such would be said to be by chance” (323). God must have by necessity complete control over His own creation, and there must not be any alternative to His design of the universe as it is.