It must now be clear to all of you, Athenians, that Philip never concluded a peace with you, but only postponed the war; for ever since he handed Halus1 over to the Pharsalians, settled the Phocian question, and subdued the whole of Thrace, coining false excuses and inventing hollow pretexts, he has been all the time practically at war with Athens, though it is only now that he confesses it openly in the letter which he has sent. [2] I shall, however, try to prove to you that you must not quail before his power nor offer a half-hearted resistance, but must enter the war with an unsparing provision of men, money, and ships—in a word, with all your resources. For first, men of Athens, you may reasonably expect that your mightiest allies and supporters will be those gods whose sanction he has flouted and whose name he has taken in vain through his unjust violation of the peace. [3] Then again, he has at last come to the end of his policy of deception and his lavish promises of future benefit, which before helped him to power. The Perinthians and Byzantines with their allies realize that his aim is to deal with them even as he dealt with the Olynthians before. [4] The Thessalians recognize that he is determined to be their despot and not the president of a confederacy. The Thebans suspect him, because he keeps a garrison at Nicaea and has stolen into the Amphictyonic Council, and because he attracts to his court the embassies of the Peloponnesian powers and secures their allies for himself. Thus of his old friends some are even now his irreconcilable foes, others are no longer his hearty supporters, while all regard him with suspicion and dislike. [5] Then too—nor is this a matter of small importance—quite recently the satraps of Asia Minor sent a force of mercenaries and compelled Philip to raise the siege of Perinthus; but today their hostility is confirmed, the danger, if he reduces Byzantium, is at their very doors, and not only will they eagerly join the war against him, [6] but they will prompt the king of Persia to become our paymaster and he is richer than all the rest together, and his power to interfere in Greece is such that in our former wars with Sparta, whichever side he joined, he ensured their victory, and so, if he sides with us now, he will easily crush the power of Philip. [7]

Now, admitting these great advantages, I cannot deny that Philip has used the peace to forestall us in occupying many fortresses, harbors, and other points of vantage; only I observe that when a league is knit together by goodwill, and when all the allied states have the same interests, then the coalition stands firm; but when, like Philip's, it is based on treachery and greed and maintained by fraud and violence, then on some slight pretext or by some trifling slip it is instantly shattered and dissolved. [8] Moreover, men of Athens, frequent reflection has taught me that not only do Philip's alliances end in suspicion and hostility, but also the various parts of his own kingdom are not united by such satisfactory and intimate ties as people imagine. For although in a general way the Macedonian power carries some weight and value as an auxiliary, yet by itself it is weak and, in face of such a stupendous task, even negligible; [9] and Philip, by his wars and his campaigns and by all those activities to which his greatness might be attributed, has really made it a less trusty weapon to his own hand. For you must not imagine, men of Athens, that his subjects share his tastes; you must rather reflect that he wants glory, but they security. He cannot gain his end without danger; they, thinking of children, parents, and wives left at home, are not so eager to court ruin and danger every day to oblige him. [10] From this you can gauge the feelings of the great body of the Macedonians towards Philip; while as regards his courtiers and captains of his mercenaries you will find that, though they have some repute for valor, they live in greater fear than those who have none; for these have only the enemy to fear, but those dread the sycophants and slanderers of the court more than a pitched battle. [11] These, again, have the whole army to support them when they face the hostile ranks, but those both have to bear the chief burden of the war, and, apart from that, it is their peculiar misfortune to fear the temper of their king. Moreover, if a common soldier is at fault, his punishment is proportioned to his deserts, but it is just when the officers are most successful that they are most exposed to unmerited curses and gibes. [12] And all this no one in his senses would refuse to believe; for those who have resided at his court agree that Philip is so jealous that he wants to take to himself all the credit of the chief successes, and is more annoyed with a general or an officer who achieves something praiseworthy than with those who fail ignominiously. [13] This being so, how is it that they have so long remained loyal to him? Because, men of Athens, at present his prosperity overshadows all such shortcomings, for success has a strange power of obscuring and covering men's failings; but if he trips, all his weakness will be clearly revealed. For it is with the political as with the bodily constitution. [14] As long as a man is in good health, he is conscious of no unsoundness here or here, but when his health breaks down, every part is set a-working, be it a rupture or a sprain or any organ that is not perfectly healthy. So with all monarchies and oligarchies; as long as their arms prosper, few detect their weaknesses, but when they stumble, even as Philip must stumble beneath a burden that is greater than he can bear, then all their disadvantages are plain for all men to see. [15]

Now if any of you, Athenians, seeing Philip's good fortune, considers him a formidable and dangerous opponent, he is exercising a prudent forethought. For fortune is indeed a great weight in the scale; I might almost say it is everything in human affairs. And yet in many respects our good fortune is to be preferred to Philip's. [16] For our prosperity is inherited from our ancestors, and is of an earlier date than the prosperity not only of Philip, but, roughly speaking, of all the kings that have ever reigned in Macedonia. Those kings actually paid tribute to Athens, but Athens never paid tribute to any power in the world. Moreover, we have a more secure claim than Philip upon the favour of heaven, in so far as our conduct has always been guided by greater regard for religion and for justice. [17] Why, then, was he more successful than we in the late war? I will be frank with you, men of Athens. It is because he always takes a personal share in the hardships and dangers of the campaign, never neglects a chance, never wastes any season of the year; while we—for the truth must out—sit here idle; we are always hanging back and passing resolutions and haunting the market-place to learn the latest news. Yet what more startling news could there be than that a Macedonian should insult Athenians, daring to send us such a letter as you have heard read a moment ago? [18] Philip's resources include mercenary soldiers, and also, observe! certain mercenary orators here among us, men who are not ashamed to devote their lives to his service, thinking that they are carrying home his bribes, but blind to the fact that they are bartering all the interests of the State, and their own as well, for a paltry profit. We, on the other hand, make no attempt to foment a revolution in his kingdom, we decline to hire mercenaries, we shrink from taking the field. [19] It is not a strange thing, then, that he has gained ground at our expense in the late war, but rather that we, performing no single duty of a nation at war, think that we are going to defeat one who does everything that a grasping ambition demands. [20]

Bearing this in mind, Athenians, and reflecting that it is not even in our power to pretend that we are at peace, for Philip has already issued a declaration of war and followed it up by active hostilities, it is necessary to spare no expense, public or private, to take the field eagerly and in full force, wherever the opportunity occurs, and to employ abler generals than before. [21] For none of you must assume that the same policy that weakened the power of Athens will suffice to restore and advance it, nor suppose that, if you are as half-hearted as before, others will be zealous in defence of your interests. Reflect, rather, what a disgrace it would be if your fathers faced many hardships and great dangers in fighting the Lacedaemonians, [22] but you should refuse to defend with vigor those advantages which they justly won and bequeathed to you; what a disgrace if one, with only the tradition of Macedonia behind him, so cheerfully courts danger that, in the task of extending his sway, he has been wounded in every limb on the battle-field, but Athenians, whose ancestral boast it is in war to yield to none and conquer all, should renounce, through indolence or cowardice, alike the deeds of their ancestors and the interests of their fatherland. [23]

Not to detain you longer, I say that we must be prepared for war, and must urge the Greek states, by our action rather than by our appeals, to join our alliance; for all words divorced from action are futile, especially words from Athenian lips, in proportion as we are reputed to be more ready of speech than all other Greeks.

1 A town in the south of Thessaly on the Pagasaean Gulf; not to be confused with Halonnesus.

Philip to the Council and People of Athens, greeting.

To the embassies that I have repeatedly dispatched to ensure the observance of our oaths and agreements you have paid no attention, so that I am forced to send you a statement of the matters in which I consider myself wronged. But you must not be surprised at the length of the letter, for I have many charges to prefer, and it is necessary to put them all clearly and frankly. [2]

In the first place, when Nicias, my herald, was kidnapped1 from my territory, you not only failed to bring the law-breakers to justice, but you kept the victim a prisoner for ten months, and the letters from me, of which he was the bearer, you read before your Assembly. Next, when the Thasians opened their harbor to the Byzantine war-galleys and to any pirates that chose to touch there, you ignored the incident, in spite of the clauses expressly denouncing such acts as hostile. [3] Furthermore, about the same date, Diopithes2 attacked Crobyle and Tiristasis and enslaved the inhabitants, laying waste the adjacent parts of Thrace. But his crowning act of lawlessness was the arrest of Amphilochus, the ambassador sent to negotiate for the captives; he subjected him to the severest torture and wrung from him a ransom of nine talents. And this he did with the approval of your Assembly. [4] Yet violation of the rights of heralds and ambassadors is regarded by all men as an act of impiety, and by none more than by you, if I may judge from the fact that, when the Megarians arrested Anthemocritus,3 your Assembly went to the length of excluding them from the celebration of the mysteries, and actually erected a statue before the city gates to commemorate the outrage. Yet is it not monstrous that you are now yourselves notoriously guilty of acts which, when you were the victims, excited in you such detestation of the perpetrators? [5] Again, your general, Callias,4 captured the cities on the Pagasaean Gulf, every one of them, though they were protected by treaty with you and were in alliance with me all merchants sailing to Macedonia he regarded as enemies and sold them into slavery. And for this you passed him a vote of thanks! So I am at a loss to say what difference it will make if you admit that you are at war with me, for when we were openly at variance, then too you used to send out privateers, enslave merchants trading with us, help my adversaries, and lay waste my territory. [6]

Not content with this, you have shown your contempt for right and your hostility to me by actually sending an embassy to urge the king of Persia to declare war on me. This is the most amazing exploit of all; for, before the king reduced Egypt and Phoenicia,5 you passed a decree calling on me to make common cause with the rest of the Greeks against him, in case he attempted to interfere with us; [7] and today you have such a superabundance of hatred for me that you negotiate with him for a defensive alliance. Yet I am given to understand that your fathers of old punished the sons of Pisistratus for inviting the Persians to invade Greece. You are not ashamed to do what you have always made a matter of indictment against your tyrants. [8]

But there is more to come. In your decrees you order me in so many words to leave Thrace to the rule of Teres6 and Cersobleptes, because they are Athenians. But I am not aware that these two had any share with you in the terms of peace, or that their names were included in the inscription set up, or that they are really Athenians. On the contrary, I know that Teres fought with me against you, and that Cersobleptes was quite ready in private to take the oath of allegiance to my ambassadors, but was prevented by your generals, who denounced him as an enemy of the Athenians. [9] And yet is it fair and right that, when it suits your convenience, you should call him an enemy of your state, but, when you want to bully me, the same man should be described as your fellow-citizen; and that on the death of Sitalces,7 on whom you did confer your citizenship, you should at once cultivate the friendship of his murderer, and pick a quarrel with us to shield Cersobleptes? And all the time you know perfectly well that of those who receive such honors at your hands not one cares a jot for your laws or your decrees. [10] However, if I may mention two instances to the exclusion of the rest, you gave your citizenship to Evagoras8 of Cyprus and to Dionysius9 of Syracuse, to them and their descendants. Now, if you can persuade either of these peoples to restore their exiled tyrants, then you may apply to me for as much of Thrace as was ruled by Teres and Cersobleptes. But if you have not a word to say against those who overthrew Evagoras and Dionysius, but persist in harassing me, have I not a perfect right to defend myself against you? [11]

Now I prefer to pass over many complaints that I might justly make, but I admit that I am helping the Cardians,10 for I was their ally before the peace, and you refused to submit your claim to arbitration, though you were often pressed to do so by me, and not infrequently by the Cardians. Should I not be utterly contemptible if I threw over my allies and paid more regard to you, who are harassing me in every way, than to those who have always been my staunch friends? [12]

The following affront also should not be passed over. Though formerly you confined yourselves to the charges I have mentioned, your arrogance is now such that, when the people of Peparethus11 complained of the latest “outrage,” you instructed your general to demand redress from me on their behalf. I actually punished them less rigorously than they deserved, for they seized Halonnesus in time of peace and refused to restore either the fortress or the garrison in spite of my repeated remonstrances. [13] But you, with full knowledge of the facts, ignored their offences against me, and only considered their punishment. Yet I robbed neither them nor you of the island, but only the pirate chief, Sostratus. Now, if you say that you handed it over to Sostratus, you admit that you employ pirates; if he captured it against your wishes, why this indignation against me for taking it and making the district safe for traders? [14] In my regard for the interests of your city, I offered you the island, but your statesmen urged you to refuse it as a gift and demand it as an act of restitution, in order that, if I submit to their dictation, I may thereby confess that I have no right to the place, but if I do not give it up, I may arouse the suspicions of your democracy. Conscious of this, I challenged you to submit our claims to arbitration, so that if the island was adjudged to be mine, I might give it to you; if yours, then I might restore it to your people. [15] I repeatedly demanded a trial, but you paid me no attention, and the Peparethians occupied the island. What, then, was I to do? Was I not to punish those who had violated their oaths? Was I not to take vengeance for such a wanton outrage? For if the island belonged to the Peparethians, what right had the Athenians to demand it back? If it was yours, why are you not angry with the Peparethians for seizing the territory of others? [16]

Our mutual hostility has become so acute that, when I wanted to convey my fleet to the Hellespont, I was compelled to escort it with my army through the Chersonese, because your settlers there were at war with us in accordance with the decree of Polycrates,12 backed up by your resolutions, and your general was inciting the Byzantines and publicly announcing that your orders were to make war on me, if he got the chance. In spite of this provocation, I kept my hands off the fleets and the territory of your state, though I was strong enough to seize most, if not all, of these, and I have not ceased to appeal to you to have the points in dispute between us settled by arbitration. [17] Yet consider which is the more honorable—to settle the dispute by arms or by arguments, to be yourselves the umpires or to win the verdict from others. Also reflect how unreasonable it is that Athenians should force Thasians and Maronites13 to submit to arbitration about Stryme, but should not themselves in this way settle with me the points on which we are at variance, especially when you realize that, if you lose the verdict, you will sacrifice nothing, and if you win it, you will gain territory which is now in my possession. [18]

But the crowning absurdity, I think, is that, though I sent ambassadors from all my allies to attend as witnesses, and was willing to come to a just agreement with you in the interests of the Greek world, you turned a deaf ear to the representations of the ambassadors, when you might perfectly well have relieved the fears of those who attributed sinister motives to me, or else have proved me beyond all doubt the most worthless of mankind. [19] Such a course was indeed in the interests of your people, but it would not have paid your talkers. For those who have any experience of your constitution say that to the orators peace means war and war means peace; because they always manage to make something out of the generals either by backing them up or by blackmailing them, and also, by abusing from the Public platform your most prominent citizens and the most esteemed of your foreign residents, they win a reputation with the mob for democratic zeal. [20]

Now it would be easy for me, at a trifling expense, to stop their abuse and set them singing my praises. But I should be ashamed if I were known to purchase your goodwill from men who, besides their other faults, have reached such a height of impudence that they even venture to dispute with me about Amphipolis, to which I think I can advance a far better claim than my rivals. [21] For, if it belongs to the original conquerors, have not we a right to hold it? It was my ancestor, Alexander,14 who first occupied the site, and, as the first-fruits of the Persian captives taken there, set up a golden statue at Delphi. Or if anyone disputes this and claims it for its later owners, here again the right is mine, because I besieged and captured the city, after its inhabitants had expelled you and accepted the Lacedaemonians as their founders.15 [22] Yet we all of us occupy our cities either by inheritance from our ancestors or by right of conquest in war. But you, who were not the first to take Amphipolis, who do not possess it today, and who made the briefest sojourn in that district, now lay claim to the city, and that in spite of your own most solemn assurances in my favour. For I wrote to you again and again on the subject, and you acknowledged that I was in the right by making peace with me at a time when I was in occupation of the city, and subsequently by concluding an alliance with me on the same terms. [23] Yet what stronger title to possession could there be than that the city was originally inherited by me from my ancestors, was again captured by me in war, and thirdly was conceded to me by you, who are in the habit of claiming even that to which you have no shadow of a right?

Such are the complaints I have to make. As you were the aggressors and, thanks to my forbearance, are making still further attacks on my interests and doing me all the harm in your power, I shall defend myself, with justice on my side, and, calling the gods to witness, I shall bring my dispute with you to an issue.

1 Nothing is known of this incident. The letters were obviously not intended for Athenian ears.

2 See Dem. 8. Crobyle is not mentioned elsewhere; Tiristasis was in the Chersonese.

3 The incident is narrated by Plutarch （Plut. Per. 30）. A. was sent to remonstrate with the Megarians for cultivating sacred ground. The statute was still to be seen in the time of Pausanias （Paus. 1.36.3）.

4 Of Chalcis in Euboea. Originally an ally of Philip, he changed sides and helped Phocion's expedition in 341, which cleared Oreus and Eretria of tyrants. The captured cities, as allies of Philip, were included in the Peace of Philocrates （346）.

5 These two provinces, together with Cyprus, revolted in 346 and were recovered by Artaxerxes Ochus. Greek mercenaries formed the backbone of the armies on both sides. See Grote, chap. 90. Nothing is known of any such Athenian decree.

6 Not otherwise known.

7 Apparently a mistake. Sitalces, king of the Odrysae, was an ally, but not a citizen, of Athens, and was killed in battle against the Triballi in 424 （Thuc. 4.101）. The description here exactly suits Cotys.

8 If this is the younger Evagoras, Philip's history is inaccurate. He was expelled from Cyprus, and helped Artaxerxes to recover the island after the revolt, but he was never reinstated. His grandfather, of the same name, the friend and helper of Conon, was made an Athenian citizen.

9 The younger, expelled by Dion in 356 and by Timoleon in 343.

10 See Dem. 8

11 See Dem. 7

12 Unknown; apparently the author of the decree by which the colony was sent out.

13 Maronea and Stryme were neighboring towns on the coast of Thrace, eastward from the island of Thasos. Maronea laid claim to Stryme, which was a colony of Thasos.

14 Readers of Herodotus will remember Alexander, who after Salamis tried to tempt the Athenians to desert the Greek cause （Hdt. 8.140）, but made amends by revealing to them the decision of the Persians before Plataea （Hdt. 9.44）; and also the statue erected at Delphi from the plunder of Salamis （Hdt. 8.121）. But Amphipolis was not in existence at the time, nor were the Persians in their retreat attacked by Macedonians but by Thracians （Hdt. 9.89）. Perhaps the Macedonians had their own history of the Persian invasion.

15 Brasidas, after his death in 422, was worshipped at Amphipolis as hero and founder in place of Hagnon （Thuc. 5.11）.

In dealing with the sum of money under discussion and the other matters referred to this Assembly, I see no difficulty, men of Athens, in either of two methods: I may attack the officials who assign and distribute the public funds and may thus gain credit with those who regard this system as detrimental to the State, or I may approve and commend the right to receive these doles and so gratify those who are especially in need of them. For neither class has the interest of the State in view, when they approve or complain of the system, but they are prompted respectively by their poverty or their affluence. [2] I myself would neither propose such a distribution of the doles, nor oppose the right to receive them; but I do urge you to reflect seriously in your own minds that while the sum of money you are discussing is a trifle, the habit of mind that it fosters is a serious matter. Now if you so organize the receipt of money that it is associated with the performance of duties, so far from injuring, you will actually confer on the State and on yourselves the greatest benefit; but if a festival or any other pretext is good enough to justify a dole, and yet you refuse even to listen to the suggestion that there is any obligation attached to it, beware lest you end by acknowledging that what you now consider a proper practice was a grievous error. [3] My idea of our duty—do not drown with your clamor what I am about to say, but hear me before you judge—my idea is that, as we have devoted a meeting of the Assembly to the question of receiving the dole, so we ought also to devote a meeting to organization and to equipment for war; and everyone must show himself not merely ready to hear what is said, but also willing to act, so that you may depend on yourselves, Athenians, for your hopes of success, and not be always asking what service this individual or that is rendering. [4] The total revenues of the State, including your own resources, now squandered on unnecessary objects, and the contributions of your allies, must be shared by each citizen equally, as pay by those of military age and as overseers' fees, or whatever you like to call it, by those beyond the age-limit; and you must serve in person and not resign that duty to others, [5] but our army must be a national force, equipped from the resources I have named, so that you may be well provided for the performance of your task, and that we may have no repetition of what usually happens now, when you are always bringing your generals to trial and the net result of your exertions is the announcement that “So-and-so, the son of So-and-so, has impeached So-and-so.” [6] But what is to be the result for you? In the first place, that your allies may be kept loyal, not by maintaining garrisons among them, but by making their interests identical with yours; next, that our generals may not lead mercenaries to the plunder of our allies without even coming in sight of the enemy, so that the profit is all their own, while the State at large incurs the hatred and the abuse, but that they may have their own citizens at their back, and may so deal with our enemies as they now deal with our friends. [7] But apart from this, many operations demand your actual presence, and beside the advantage of using a national force in a national quarrel, this is necessary on every other ground. For if you were content to let things slide and not worry about the state of Greece, it would be another matter. [8] But, as it is, you claim to take the lead and to determine the rights of other states; yet neither in the past nor today have you furnished a sufficient force to superintend and secure this claim. On the contrary, it was when you stood utterly aloof and indifferent that the democracies of Mytilene and of Rhodes were destroyed. “Yes, but Rhodes was our enemy,” you may say. [9] But you should consider, men of Athens, that our hostility towards oligarchies, purely on the ground of principle, is stronger than our hostility towards democracies on any grounds whatever. But to return to my point. My view is that you must be brought under a system, and there must be a uniform scheme for receiving public money and for performing necessary services. I have addressed you before on this subject and have described the method of organizing you, whether you serve in the infantry or the cavalry or in other ways, and also how ample provision may be ensured for all alike. [10] I will tell you without any concealment what has caused me most disappointment. It is that though the many reforms proposed were all of them important and honorable, no one remembers any of them, but everyone remembers the two obols.1 Yet these can never be worth more than two obols, but the other reforms, together with those that I proposed, are worth all the wealth of the Great King—that a city, so well provided with infantry, triremes, cavalry, and revenues, should be duly organized and equipped. [11]

Why then, you may ask, do I choose the present time for these remarks? Because I think that, as the principle that all citizens should serve for pay is displeasing to some people, and yet the advantage of organization and equipment is approved by all, you ought to begin the business at this point, giving everyone a chance of stating his views on the subject. For the case stands thus: if you are convinced that now is the opportunity for these reforms, all things will be ready when the need of them arrives, but if you pass over the opportunity as unsuitable, then, just when you want to use them, you will be compelled to begin your preparations. [12]

It has been before now remarked, men of Athens, by some speaker—not one of the great body of citizens, but one of those who are likely to have a fit if these reforms are carried out—“What good have we ever got from the speeches of Demosthenes? He comes forward, whenever he thinks well, fills our ears with phrases, denounces our present state, extols our ancestors, and then descends from the platform after raising our hopes and inflating our pride.” [13] But if I could only induce you to accept any of my proposals, I think that I should confer such benefits on the State that if I tried to describe them now, many of you would disbelieve them, as being too good to be true. And yet even this too I consider no mean benefit, if I accustom you to listen to the best advice. For he who would benefit the State, Athenians, must first purge your ears, for they have been poisoned; so many lies have you been accustomed to hear—anything, in fact, rather than the best advice. [14] Let me give you an instance, and let no one interrupt me till I have finished my story. You know that a day or two ago the treasury of the Parthenon2 was broken into. So the speakers in the Assembly, one and all, cried that the democracy was overthrown, that the laws were null and void, and so on. And yet, Athenians, though the culprits—mark whether my words are true—deserved death, it is not through them that the democracy is endangered. Again, a few oars were stolen. “Scourge the thieves torture them,” cried the orators; “the democracy is in danger.” But what is my opinion I say, like the others, that the thief deserves death, but not that the democracy is endangered by such means. [15] The real danger to democracy no one is bold enough to name; but I will name it. It is in danger when you, men of Athens, are wrongly led, when in spite of your numbers you are helpless, unarmed, unorganized and at variance, when no general or anyone else pays any heed to your resolutions, when no one cares to tell you the truth or set you right, when no one makes an effort to remedy this state of things. And that is what always happens now. [16] Yes, by heavens, men of Athens, and there are other phrases, false and injurious to the State, that have passed into your common speech, such as “In the law-courts lies your salvation,” and “It is the ballot-box that must save the State.” I know that these courts are sovereign to uphold the rights of citizen against citizen, but it is by arms that you must conquer the enemy, and upon arms depends the safety of the State. [17] For resolutions will not give your men victory in battle, but those who with the help of arms conquer the enemy shall win for you power and security to pass resolutions and to do what you will. For in the field you ought to be terrible, but in the courts sympathetic. [18]

If my speeches seem to be greater than my own worth, that is itself a virtue in them. For a speech, if it is to be delivered on behalf of this great city and our wide interests, ought always to appear greater than the individual who utters it; it ought to approximate to your reputation, not to the reputation of the speaker. But none of the men whom you delight to honor speaks like that, and I will tell you what their excuse is. [19] Men who aim at office and at official rank go to and fro cringing to the favours of the electorate; each one's ambition is to join the sacred ranks of the generals, not to do a man's work. If anyone is really capable of undertaking a job, he thinks that by exploiting the reputation and renown of Athens, profiting by the absence of opposition, holding out hopes to you and nothing but hopes, he will be sole inheritor of your advantages—and so he is; but if you act as your own agents in every case, he will only have his equal share with the rest, both in the labours and also in their results. [20] The politicians, absorbed in their profession, neglect to devise the best policy for you and have joined the ranks of the office-seekers; and you conduct your party-politics as you used to conduct your tax-paying—by syndicates.3 There is an orator for chairman, with a general under him, and three hundred to do the shouting. The rest of you are attached now to one party and now to another. Hence all that you gain is that So-and-so has a public statue and So-and-so makes his fortune—just one or two men profiting at the expense of the State. The rest of you are idle witnesses of their prosperity, surrendering to them, for the sake of an easy life from day to day, the great and glorious prosperity which is yours by inheritance. [21]

Yet consider how things were managed in the days of your ancestors, for you need not go abroad for examples to teach you your duty. Take Themistocles, who was your general in the sea-fight at Salamis, and Miltiades, who commanded at Marathon, and many more whose good services were far greater than those of our present generals: verily our ancestors put up no bronze statues to them, but rewarded them as men in no way superior to themselves. [22] For truly, men of Athens, they never robbed themselves of any of their achievements, nor would anyone dream of speaking of Themistocles' fight at Salamis, but of the Athenians' fight, nor of Miltiades' battle at Marathon, but of the Athenians' battle. But now we often hear it said that Timotheus took Corcyra, that Iphicrates cut up the Spartan detachment, or that Chabrias won the sea-fight off Naxos.4 For you seem to waive your own right to these successes by the extravagant honors which you have bestowed on each of these officers. [23] Rewards to citizens, rightly thus granted by our ancestors, are wrongly granted by you. But how about foreigners? When Meno of Pharsalus gave twelve talents of silver towards the war at Eion near Amphipolis5 and supported us with two hundred cavalry of his own vassals, our ancestors did not vote him the citizenship, but only gave him immunity from taxes. [24] On an earlier occasion, when Perdiccas,6 who was king of Macedonia at the time of the Persian invasions, destroyed the barbarians who were retreating after their defeat at Plataea and so completed the discomfiture of the Great King, they did not vote him the citizenship, but only gave him immunity from taxes; because, I presume, they regarded their own country as great, glorious, and venerable, and as something greater than any service rendered. But now, Athenians, you make citizens of the scum of mankind, menial sons of menial fathers, charging a price for it as for any other commodity. [25] You have got into the habit of acting thus, not because in ability you are inferior to your ancestors, but because it was second nature with them to have a high opinion of themselves, while you, Athenians, have lost that virtue. You cannot, I suppose, have a proud and chivalrous spirit, if your conduct is mean and paltry, any more than your spirit can be mean and humble, if your conduct is honorable and glorious; for whatever a man's pursuits are, such must be his spirit. [26]

But reflect on what might be named as the outstanding achievements of your ancestors and of yourselves, if haply the comparison may yet enable you to become your own masters. For five and forty years7 they commanded the willing obedience of the Greeks; more than ten thousand talents did they accumulate in our Acropolis; many honorable trophies for victories on sea and on land did they erect, in which even yet we take a pride. Yet remember that they erected them, not that we might wonder as we gaze at them, but that we might also imitate the virtues of the dedicators. [27] Thus did our ancestors; but as for us, who have gained, as you all see, a clear field, consider whether we can match them. Have we not wasted more than fifteen hundred talents on the needy communities of Greece?8 Have we not squandered our private estates, our public funds, and the contributions of our allies? Have not the allies gained in war been lost in the peace? [28] But, it may be said, in these respects alone things were better then than now, but in other respects worse. Far from it; but let us examine any instance you please. The buildings which they left behind them to adorn our city—temples, harbors, and their accessories—were so great and so fair that we who come after must despair of ever surpassing them; the Propylaea yonder, the docks, the porticoes and the rest, with which they beautified the city that they have bequeathed to us. [29] But the private houses of those who rose to power were so modest and so in accordance with the style of our constitution that the homes of their famous men, of Themistocles and Cimon and Aristides, as any of you can see that knows them, are not a whit more splendid than those of their neighbors. [30] But today, men of Athens, while our public works are confined to the provision of roads and fountains, whitewash and balderdash （and I blame, not those who introduced these improvements—far from it!—but you, if you imagine that these are all that is required of you）, private individuals, who control any of the State-funds, have some of them reared private houses, not merely finer than the majority, but more stately than our public edifices, and others have purchased and cultivated estates more vast than they ever dreamed of before. [31] The cause of all this change is that then the people controlled and dispensed everything, and the rest were well content to accept at their hand honor and authority and reward; but now, on the contrary, the politicians hold the purse-strings and manage everything, while the people are in the position of lackeys and hangers-on, and you are content to accept whatever your masters dole out to you. [32]

Such, in consequence, is the state of our public affairs that if anyone read out your resolutions and then went on to describe your performances, not a soul would believe that the same men were responsible for the one and for the other. Take for instance the decrees that you passed against the accursed Megarians,9 when they appropriated the sacred demesne, that you should march out and prevent it and forbid it; in favour of the Phliasians, when they were exiled the other day, that you should help them and not give them up to their murderers, and should call for volunteers from the Peloponnese. [33] That, Athenians, was all very noble and right and worthy of our city; but the resultant action was simply of no account. So your hostility is expressed in your decrees, but action is beyond your control. Your decrees accord with the traditions of Athens, but your powers bear no relation to your decrees. [34] I, however, would advise you—do not be angry with me—either to humble yourselves and be content to mind your own affairs, or else to get ready a more powerful force. If I felt sure that you were Siphnians or Cythnians10 or people of that sort, I should counsel you to be less proud, but since you are Athenians, I urge you to get your force ready. For it would be a disgrace, men of Athens, a disgrace to desert that post of honor which your ancestors bequeathed to you. [35] But besides it is no longer in your power, even if you wished it, to hold aloof from Greek affairs. For you have many exploits to your credit from the earliest times, and it would be disgraceful to abandon the friends you have, while it is impossible to trust your enemies and allow them to grow powerful. In short, you stand in the same position as your statesmen stand to you—they cannot retire when they would; for you are definitely involved in the politics of Greece. [36]

This, Athenians, is the sum of all that I have said. Your orators never make you either bad men or good, but you make them whichever you choose; for it is not you that aim at what they wish for, but they who aim at whatever they think you desire. You therefore must start with a noble ambition and all will be well, for then no orator will give you base counsel, or else he will gain nothing by it, having no one to take him at his word.

1 The charge for admission to the theater defrayed by the State.

2 The chamber at the back of the cella of the Parthenon was used as a treasury.

3 See Dem. 2.29.

4 In 376, 390,and 376 respectively.

5 Presumably in 424, but Themistocles does not mention it. The historical examples here are borrowed from Dem. 23

6 According to Herodotus, it was the Thracians, not the Macedonians, who harassed the retreating Persians, and the king of Macedonia was Alexander, the father of Perdiccas.

7 Between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars.

8 No one knows to what this refers; but the passage is only a parody of the Third Olynthiac.

9 Neither this nor the following allusion can be determined with certainty.

10 Siphnos and Cythnos are two of the Cyclades, S.E. of Athens. Perhaps the speaker remembered the retort of Themistocles to the man of Seriphos （Plut. Them. 18）.

Those who praise your ancestors, men of Athens, seem to me to choose an acceptable theme, which yet fails to do any real service to those whom they eulogize; for when they attempt to speak about achievements to which no words could possibly do justice, they earn for themselves the reputation of clever speakers, but leave their hearers with a lower estimate of the merits of those famous men. Indeed, I think the best testimony to their merits is the length of time that has elapsed, during which no other men have been able to surpass their achievements. [2] For my own part, however, I shall confine myself to pointing out how you can best prepare for war. For this is how things stand. Even if all of us who are to address you should prove capable speakers, you would, I am sure, be no better off; but if someone, whoever he may be, could come forward and point out convincingly the nature and size of the force that will be serviceable to the city, and show how it is to be provided, all our present fears will be relieved. This is what I will try to do, if only I am able, first giving you briefly my views about our relations with the Great King. [3]

I admit that he is the common enemy of all the Greeks; yet I would not on that account advise you to undertake a war against him by yourselves apart from the rest, for I observe that the Greeks themselves are by no means common friends of one another, but that certain of them repose more confidence in the King than in some of their neighbors. From this state of things I conclude that it is to your interest to be careful that your grounds for entering on war shall be equitable and just, but to proceed with all the necessary preparations, making that the foundation of your policy. [4] For I believe, Athenians, that if there were clear and unmistakable signs of the King's hostile intentions, the other Greeks would join with us, and would be deeply grateful to those who would stand up for them and with them against his attacks; but if we force on a war, while his aims are still obscure, I am afraid, men of Athens, that we shall be obliged to encounter, not only the King, but also those whom we are minded to protect. [5] For the King, suspending his designs—if he really intends to invade Greece—will distribute money among them and tempt them with offers of friendship, while they, anxious to bring their private quarrels to a successful issue and keeping that object in view, will overlook the common safety of all. Into such a welter of confusion and folly I beseech you not to plunge our country. [6] For indeed, as regards your policy towards the King, I see that you are by no means on the same footing as the other Greeks; for many of them it is, I suppose, possible to pursue their private interests and abandon the cause of their countrymen, but for you, even when wronged by them, it would not be honorable to exact such a penalty from the wrong-doers as to leave any of them under the heel of the barbarian. [7] But as long as this is so, we must take care that we are not involved in war at a disadvantage, and that the King, whom we believe to have designs against the Greeks, does not win the credit of appearing as their friend. How then can this be ensured? If we make it plain to all that our forces are already marshalled and equipped, but equally plain that our policy is founded on sentiments of justice. [8] To your rash advisers, who are so eager to hurry you into war, I have this to say, that it is not difficult, when deliberation is needed, to gain a reputation for courage, nor when danger is at hand, to display skill in oratory; but there is something that is both difficult and essential—to display courage in the face of danger, and in deliberation to offer sounder advice than one's fellows. [9] I believe, men of Athens, that the war with the King is a difficult undertaking for our city, though any conflict which the war involved might prove easy enough.1 Why so? Because the first requisites for every war are necessarily, I suppose, fleets and money and strong positions, and I find that the King is more fully supplied with these than we are; but for the actual conflict I observe that nothing is needed so much as brave soldiers, and of these we and those who share the danger with us have the better supply. [10] That is why I advise that we should not on any grounds be the first to plunge into war, but for the conflict we must be properly equipped from the start. If indeed there were one kind of force suitable for defence against Persians and another for defence against Greeks, then we might reasonably be suspected of marshalling ourselves against the King; [11] but when all preparation for war is on the same lines and the main objects of an armed force are the same—to be strong enough to repel the enemy, to assist one's allies, and to preserve one's own possessions-why, having open enemies enough, must we be looking out for another? Let us rather make our preparations against them, and then we shall defend ourselves against him too, if he ventures to molest us. [12] Moreover you are now calling on the Greeks to join you; but if you refuse to do their bidding—and your relations with some of them are not cordial—how can you expect any of them to answer your call? “Because,” you say, “we shall warn them that the King has designs on them.” But seriously, do you imagine that they cannot detect that for themselves? I am sure they can. But as yet their fear of Persia is subordinate to their feuds with you and, in some cases, with one another. Therefore your ambassadors will only go round repeating their heroics.2 [13] But later on, if what we now deem probable comes to pass, surely no Greek community has such a good conceit of itself that when they see that you have a thousand cavalry and as many infantry as one could desire and three hundred ships, they will not come as our suitors, feeling that with such support their safety is assured. Therefore to invite them at once means that you are the suppliants and, if unsuccessful, have failed utterly, but to wait and at the same time complete your own preparations means saving them at their request, and being well assured that they will all join you. [14]

Therefore, men of Athens, moved by this and similar considerations, I was unwilling to compose a confident oration or one of futile length, but I have been at very great pains to consider the best and speediest method of completing our equipment. I venture to think that you ought to hear my plan and vote for it, if it satisfies you. Now the first and most important step in our equipment, men of Athens, is that you should be filled with such resolution that everyone shall be willing and eager to do his part. [15] For you will notice, men of Athens, that whenever you have collectively formed some project, and thereafter each individual has realized that it was his personal duty to carry it out, nothing has ever escaped your grasp; but whenever you have formed your project and thereafter have looked to one another to carry it out, each expecting to do nothing while his neighbor worked, then nothing has succeeded with you. [16] But seeing you thus resolved and enthusiastic, I propose that the register of the twelve hundred3 should be filled up and enlarged to two thousand by the addition of eight hundred names; for if you fix on that number, I believe that you will get your twelve hundred persons, after striking out wards, orphans, settlers in colonies, joint holders of estates, and anyone otherwise ineligible. [17] Then I propose to divide these into twenty boards, as at present, each containing sixty persons. Each of these boards I would subdivide into five groups of twelve men, always attaching to the wealthiest man those who are poorest, to keep the balance. That is how I propose to arrange these persons; you will understand why, when you have heard the whole of the arrangement. [18] Now what about the war-galleys? I propose to fix the total number at three hundred, divided into twenty squadrons of fifteen ships each, assigning to each squadron five of the first hundred,4 five of the second, and five of the third; and next to allot a squadron of fifteen to each board, and the board must assign three vessels to each of its own groups. [19] When these preliminaries are settled, I propose that your wealth also should be organized, and that as the ratable value of the country is six thousand talents, this sum should be divided into a hundred parts of sixty talents each, and that then five of these parts should be allotted to each of the twenty full boards, and that the board itself should assign one part, consisting of sixty talents,5 to each of its own five groups. [20] Thus, if you want a hundred war-galleys the cost of each will be covered by the sixty talents and there will be twelve trierarchs for each; if you want two hundred, there will be thirty talents to cover the cost and six persons to serve as trierarchs; if you want three hundred, there will be twenty talents for the cost and four persons to serve. [21] In the same way I propose, men of Athens, that all ships' gear now on loan should be valued and divided according to the inventory into twenty parts, and then that one part of the debtors liable for it should be allotted to each of the full boards, and that each board should assign an equal share to each of its own groups; and that the twelve members of the group should exact the same from the debtors, and so provide, fully equipped, as many galleys as they are severally responsible for. [22] That, I think, would be the best way of providing and organizing the money, the hulls, the trierarchs, and the calling in of the ships' gear.6

I now proceed to describe a clear and easy way of manning the ships. I suggest that the generals should divide the dockyards into ten areas, so arranging it that there may be dock-room in each for thirty ships, as close together as possible, and that when they have done this, they should apportion two boards and thirty galleys to each area, and then assign the tribes by lot to the areas. [23] And each brigade-commander7 must divide into three parts whatever area his tribe has taken over, and the ships in the same way, and then he must allot the thirds of his tribe in such a way that of the whole space of the dockyards each tribe may have one area and each third of a tribe a third of an area; so that you can know at once, if necessary, where each tribe and each third of a tribe is stationed, who are the trierarchs and what ships they have, and that so each tribe may have thirty ships and each third of a tribe ten. For if we can only get this started, any detail at present omitted （for it is perhaps difficult to provide for everything） will be discovered by the actual working of the plan, and we shall have a uniform system both for the whole navy and for every part of it. [24]

But as regards money and a ready supply of it at once, I am aware that I am going to make a startling proposal. The proposal shall, however, be made, because I am confident that if you take the right point of view, it will be clear that I alone have told you the truth, as it is and as it will be. My view is that we ought not to talk about money now; for if we need it, we have a source of supply, abundant, honorable and fair; if we look for it at once, we shall fail so utterly to supply it now that we shall conclude that it is not even in reserve for our future use, but if we leave it alone, it will be there. What, then, is this supply, which is not now, but will be hereafter? [25] That sounds like a riddle, but I will explain. Look at the great city that lies around you, men of Athens. In that city there is wealth, I might almost say, equal to that of all the other Greek cities together. But that wealth is in the hands of men whose temper is such that if all our orators started a scare that the King is coming, that he is close at hand, that the report must be true, and if the orators were backed by an equal number of oracle-mongers, not only would they fail to contribute, but they would refuse to declare or acknowledge their wealth. [26] But if once they saw that what alarms them now as a mere rumor was actually taking place, none of them is so foolish that he would not be the first to pay his contribution; for who will choose to sacrifice life and property sooner than contribute a fraction to ensure his person and the remainder of his wealth? The money, I say, we have when it is really needed, but not before. Therefore I advise you not to seek it out, for the whole sum that you could raise, if you insisted on raising it, would be more ridiculous than nothing at all. [27] For consider; will anyone propose a tax of one per cent now? Then we get sixty talents. Or double it and make it two per cent? Still only a hundred and twenty talents. And what is that to the twelve hundred camels laden, as our friends here tell us, with the King's treasure? Then would you have me assume that we shall contribute a twelfth of your wealth, or five hundred talents? But you would not submit to such a tax, nor if you paid up, would the money be sufficient for the war. [28] You must therefore make all your other preparations, but let the money remain for the present in the hands of its owners, for it could not be in better keeping, for the benefit of the State; but if ever the threatened crisis comes, then accept it as a voluntary contribution.

These proposals, men of Athens, are both practicable and honorable and advantageous, fit to be reported of you to the King and calculated to inspire him with no little alarm. [29] He knows that with two hundred galleys, of which we provided one hundred, our ancestors destroyed a thousand of his ships, and he will hear that we have three hundred of our own ready for sea, so that even if he were raving mad, he would scarcely think it a light thing to incur the hostility of our city. But indeed, if he bases his confidence on his wealth, he will find this too a less sure foundation than yours. [30] He is bringing, they say, gold in plenty. But if he disburses it, he will look in vain for more; for even springs and wells have a way of failing, if one draws from them constantly and lavishly. But he will hear that our resources consist of the ratable value of our country, and how we can fight in defence of it against invaders from his land, those ancestors of his who fought at Marathon best know; but as long as we are victorious, there is surely no prospect of money failing us. [31]

Again, what frightens some of you—that his wealth will attract a large mercenary army—does not strike me as true. For although I believe that many Greeks would consent to serve in his pay against the Egyptians and Orontes8 and other barbarians, not so much to enable him to subdue any of those enemies as to win for themselves wealth and relief from their present poverty, yet I do not think that any Greek would attack Greece. For where would he retire afterwards? Will he go to Phrygia and be a slave? [32] For the objects at stake in a war against the barbarian are nothing less than our country, our life, our habits, our freedom, and all such blessings. Who, then, is so desperate that he will sacrifice himself, his ancestors, his sepulchres, and his native land, all for the sake of a paltry profit? I cannot think that there is such a man. Moreover, it is not even to the King's advantage that mercenaries should beat the Greeks, for the men who shall beat us have been his masters long ago.9 No; his object is not, after destroying us, to find himself in the power of others, but to rule all the world, if he can, or if not, at least those who are now his slaves. [33]

Now, if anyone expects the Thebans to take our side, it is difficult to speak to you about them, because you have such a hearty dislike of them that you would not care to hear any good of them, even if it were true; but yet, when dealing with grave matters, one must not on any pretext pass over an important consideration. For my part, I believe that the Thebans are so little likely to join the King in an attack on Greece that they would pay a large sum, [34] if they had it, to get a chance of expiating their former sins against the Greeks.10 If, however, some think that the Thebans are fated always to be on the wrong side, at any rate you all know this, that if the Thebans stand by the King, their enemies are bound to stand by the Greeks. [35]

I believe, then, that the cause of justice and those who defend it will prove stronger than the traitors and the barbarian against all opposition. Therefore I say that we must not be unduly alarmed, nor must we be tempted to commence hostilities. And indeed I cannot see that any of the other Greeks have reason to dread this war. [36] For who of them does not know that as long as they were of one mind and regarded the Persian as their common enemy, they could count on many advantages, but ever since they thought of him as a friend to fall back on and were torn asunder by their own private quarrels, they have suffered such disasters as no one would have devised for them even in an imprecation. If that is so, are we to fear this man, whom fortune and the voice of Heaven proclaim to be an unprofitable friend and an auspicious foe? Never! Yet let us do him no wrong either, both in our own interests and in view of the unrest and disloyalty of the other Greeks. [37] If indeed we could attack him with unanimity, all banded against one, I should not count it wrong in us to do him wrong.11 But since this is impossible, I suggest that we ought to be careful not to give the King an opportunity to pose as the champion of the other Greeks; for as long as you remain quiet, any such action on his part would excite suspicion, but if you are the aggressors, he will seem naturally anxious to befriend the rest, because they are hostile to you. [38] Do not, then, expose the weakness of the Greeks by issuing a summons which they will not obey and declaring a war which you cannot wage; but in quietness and confidence go on with your preparations, and be content that this report of you be brought to the King's ears, not （Heaven forbid!） that all the Greeks, including the Athenians, are helpless, [39] terrified and distracted—that is far from being the case—but that if falsehood and perjury were not as disgraceful in the eyes of the Greeks as they are respectable in his, you would long ago have marched against him; that as it is, you will not for your own sakes do this, but you pray to all the gods that he may be smitten with the same infatuation as were his ancestors of old. And if it comes into his mind to reflect on this; he will find that your resolutions are not carelessly taken. [40] He knows that the wars we fought against his ancestors have made our city prosperous and powerful, but that the policy of inaction that she once pursued gave her no such supremacy over any of the other Greek states as she enjoys today. And indeed he sees that the Greeks stand in need of a peacemaker, whether voluntary or involuntary, and he knows that in that character he would himself appear to them, if he tried to stir up war. Therefore he will find the reports that reach him easy to understand and easy to believe. [41]

To spare you the tedium of a lengthy speech, men of Athens, I will sum up my suggestions and step down. I recommend you to equip your forces against your existing enemies, but I add that you must employ those same forces in self-defence against the King and against all who venture to do you wrong, though you must not set the example of wrong, either in word or in deed; and you must see to it that our actions, rather than the speeches delivered from this platform, are worthy of our fathers. If you act thus, you will be acting for the good both of yourselves and also of those who give you the contrary advice, since you will not have to be angry with them hereafter for errors you have committed now.

1 In Dem. 9.52 he notes that the reverse would be the case in a contest with Philip.

2 The ambassadors are compared to rhapsodists, the wandering professional reciters of epic poetry, whose art was falling into contempt in an age of wider education.

3 The wealthiest citizens （συντελεῖς）.

4 Ships of the first rate, apparently.

5 i.e. by a tax on this fraction, one hundredth, of the whole ratable value. The actual cost of a trierarchy was from 40 minae to one talent. The value of a mina （=100 drachmae） is usually put at £4 and that of a talent at £240: but the actual value must have been much greater, as a drachma was the average wage of an artisan.

6 The following table may make this paragraph clearer. Column A represents the totals, B the boards, C the groups.

A B C 300 15 No. of ships required 200 10 2 100 5 1 No. of trierarchs 1200 60 12 Capital represented (in talents) 6000 300 60

7 Each of the ten taxiarchs commanded the infantry belonging to his tribe.

8 Egypt had been in revolt for many years, and in 363 most of the satraps of western Asia, including Orontes, satrap of Mysia, joined in the rebellion. Agesilaus, Iphicrates and Chabrias were among the Greek generals who took part on one side or the other.

9 i.e. by beating us they will show that at any time they could have beaten him.

10 Their “Medism” during the Persian wars.

11 A curious piece of casuistry.

Your duty, men of Athens, when debating such important matters, is, I think, to allow freedom of speech to every one of your counsellors. Personally, I never thought it a difficult task to point out to you the best policy—for, to speak plainly, you all seem to me to have discerned it already—but rather to induce you to put it into operation; for when a resolution has been approved and passed, it is no nearer accomplishment than before it was approved. [2] Now, it is one of the blessings for which, I think, the gods deserve your gratitude, that the same men who not long ago attacked you in the wantonness of their pride, now find in you alone the hope of their salvation. You ought to be delighted at your present opportunity, because, if you decide aright, you will in fact succeed, with honor to yourselves, in silencing the evil tongues that traduce our city. [3] For we were charged by the Chians, Byzantines and Rhodians with plotting against them, and that was why they concerted the last war against us; but we shall be able to prove that whereas Mausolus, the prime mover and instigator in the business, while calling himself the friend of the Rhodians, has robbed them of their liberty, and whereas the Chians and Byzantines, who posed as their allies, never helped them in distress, [4] it is to you, whom they dreaded, to you alone of all the states that they owe their deliverance. By making this clear to all, you will teach the democrats in every state to consider friendship with you as the pledge of their safety, and no greater advantage could you have than to win from all men their voluntary and unsuspecting goodwill. [5]

I am surprised to see the same men urging the city, in the interests of the Egyptians, to oppose the King of Persia, but dreading him where the Rhodian democracy is concerned. Yet everyone knows that the Rhodians are Greeks, while Egypt is a division of the Persian Empire. [6] Some of you, I suppose, remember that when you were discussing Persian affairs, I was the first to come forward with advice,1 and I believe I was the only speaker, or perhaps one out of two, to say that I should think it prudent in you not to make your hostility to the King the pretext for your preparations, but while equipping yourselves against your existing enemies, to defend yourselves against him too, if he attempted to do you wrong. Nor did I fail to convince you that I was right, but you, too, approved of my suggestion. [7] My present speech, then, is the sequel of my former one. For indeed, if the King admitted me to his presence and asked me for my advice, I should give him the same that I gave you—to defend his own subjects, if any of the Greeks attacked them, but to claim no sovereignty over those who owed him no allegiance. [8] Now if you make it a general principle, men of Athens, to abandon to the King all places that he has got into his power, whether by surprise or by deceiving some of the inhabitants, then your principle is, I think, a wrong one; but if you feel that in the cause of justice you are bound to go to war and face the consequences, then, in the first place, the more you are determined on such action, the less frequently will it be necessary, and secondly, you will be showing the proper spirit. [9]

To prove that there is precedent both for my proposal to free the Rhodians and for your action, if you adopt it, I will remind you of some things that you have done, and that successfully. You are the men, Athenians, who once sent Timotheus to the help of Ariobarzanes,2 adding this clause to your instructions, “provided that he does not violate our treaty with the King.” Timotheus, seeing that Ariobarzanes was in open revolt from the King and that Samos was garrisoned by Cyprothemis, who had been stationed there by Tigranes, the King's viceroy, abandoned his intention of helping the satrap, but invested the island and used his force to liberate it; [10] and to this very day you have not been involved in war on those grounds. For no one would go to war as readily for aggrandizement as for the defence of his own possessions; but while all men fight desperately to keep what they are in danger of losing, it is not so with aggrandizement men make it, indeed, their aim, but if prevented, they do not feel that they have suffered any injustice from their opponents. [11]

But since I believe that neither would Artemisia now oppose this action on our part, if our State were once committed to it, give me your attention for a little and consider whether my reasoning is sound or not. I think that if the King's designs in Egypt were meeting with any success, Artemisia would make a big effort to secure Rhodes for him, not from any goodwill towards him, but because, while he is in her neighborhood, she would like to put him under a great obligation, so that he may give her as cordial a recognition3 as possible. [12] But if the reports are true and he has failed in all his attempts, she must argue that this island would be of no use to him at present-which is true enough—but might serve as a fortress to overawe Caria and check any move on her part. Therefore I think she would rather that you had the island, if not too obviously surrendered by her, than that he should get it. I do not, indeed, expect that she will send any help to the Rhodian government, or if she does, it will be feeble and half-hearted; [13] while as to the King, I should not like to say that I know what he is actually going to do, but that it is to our advantage that he should at once make it clear whether he is going to claim Rhodes or not—that I should maintain positively. For when he does claim it, you will have to take counsel, not for the Rhodians only, but for yourselves and all the Greeks. [14]

And yet, even if the party at present in possession held Rhodes by their own strength, I should not have advised you to take their side, even if they promised to do everything you wished. For I notice that at the start, in order to overthrow the democracy, they enlisted some of the citizens on their side, and when they had succeeded, sent them into banishment again. Now men who have been faithful to neither side could never, I am sure, become steadfast allies to you. [15] Moreover I should never have made this proposal, had I thought that it would benefit the Rhodian democrats alone, for I am not the official patron of that party, nor do I count any of them among my private friends. Yet even if both these motives had been present, I should not have proposed it, if I had not thought that it would benefit you, since I share in your satisfaction at the fate of the Rhodians—if one who is pleading for their deliverance may be permitted to say so. For they grudged you the recovery of your rights, and now they have lost their own liberty; they spurned an alliance with you who are Greeks and their betters, and now they are slaves of barbarians, slaves of slaves, whom they admitted into their citadels. [16] I am almost inclined to say, if you choose to help them, that this has been a salutary lesson for them; for in prosperity I doubt whether they would ever have chosen to show their good sense, being Rhodians, but when tested by experience and taught that folly is in most cases a fruitful source of evil, they may perhaps with luck grow more sensible for the future; and that I regard as no small advantage for them. Accordingly, I say that it is your duty to try to save them and to let bygones be bygones, remembering that you too have in many cases been led by schemers into errors, for none of which you would yourselves admit that you ought to pay the penalty. [17]

You may also observe, Athenians, that you have been engaged in many wars both with democracies and with oligarchies. You do not need to be told that; but perhaps none of you considers what are your motives for war with either. What, then, are those motives? With democracies, either private quarrels, when they could not be adjusted by the State, or a question of territory or boundaries, or else rivalry or the claim to leadership; with oligarchies you fight for none of these things, but for your constitution and your liberty. [18] Therefore I should not hesitate to say that I think it a greater advantage that all the Greeks should be your enemies under democracy than your friends under oligarchy. For with free men I do not think that you would have any difficulty in making peace whenever you wished, but with an oligarchical state I do not believe that even friendly relations could be permanent, for the few can never be well disposed to the many, nor those who covet power to those who have chosen a life of equal privileges. [19]

Seeing that Chios and Mytilene are ruled by oligarchs, and that Rhodes and, I might almost say, all the world are now being seduced into this form of slavery, I am surprised that none of you conceives that our constitution too is in danger, nor draws the conclusion that if all other states are organized on oligarchical principles, it is impossible that they should leave your democracy alone. For they know that none but you will bring freedom back again, and of course they want to destroy the source from which they are expecting ruin to themselves. [20] Now, all other wrongdoers must be considered the enemies of those only whom they have wronged, but when men overthrow free constitutions and change them to oligarchies, I urge you to regard them as the common enemies of all who love freedom. [21] Then again, Athenians, it is right that you, living under a democracy, should show the same sympathy for democracies in distress as you would expect others to show for you, if ever—which God forbid!-you were in the same plight. Even if anyone is prepared to say that the Rhodians are served right, this is not the time to exult over them, for prosperous communities ought always to show themselves ready to consult the best interests of the unfortunate, remembering that the future is hidden from all men's eyes. [22]

I have repeatedly heard it said in this Assembly that when misfortune befell our democracy,4 there were some people who urged that it should be restored, and of them I will here mention the Argives only, and that briefly. For I should be sorry if you, who are renowned for rescuing the unfortunate, should prove yourselves in this instance worse men than the Argives. They, being the immediate neighbors of the Lacedaemonians and seeing them masters of land and sea, did not hesitate or fear to show their goodwill to you, but actually carried a decree that the envoys, who, we are told, had come from Sparta to claim the persons of some of your refugees, should be denounced as enemies unless they took their departure before the setting of the sun. [23] Then would it not be discreditable, men of Athens, if when the commons of Argos feared not the authority of the Lacedaemonians in the day of their might, you, who are Athenians, should fear one who is at once a barbarian and a woman? Indeed, the Argives might have pleaded that they had often been defeated by the Lacedaemonians, but you have beaten the King again and again, and have never been beaten either by his slaves or by their master himself; for if ever the King has gained some slight advantage over our city, he has done it by bribing the most worthless of the Greeks, the traitors to their cause, and never in any other way. [24] And even that success has not benefited him, but you will find him at one and the same time using the Lacedaemonians to cripple our city, and struggling for his own crown against Clearchus and Cyrus.5 So he has never beaten us in the field, nor have his intrigues gained him any advantage. I observe that some of you are wont to dismiss Philip as a person of no account, but to speak with awe of the King as formidable to those whom he marks as his enemies. If we are not to stand up to the one because he is contemptible, and if we yield to the other because he is formidable, against whom, Athenians, shall we ever marshal our forces? [25]

There are some among you, Athenians, who are very clever at pleading the rights of others against you, and I would just give them this piece of advice—to find something to say for your rights against others, so that they themselves may set the example of doing what is proper; since it is absurd for a man to lecture you about rights when he is not doing what is right himself, and it is not right that a citizen should have given his attention to all the arguments against you and to none in your favour. [26] I beg you, in Heaven's name, to consider this point: why is there no man in Byzantium to dissuade his country-men from seizing Chalcedon, which belongs to the King and was once held by you, while the Byzantines have no shadow of a claim to it? Or from taking Selymbria, once an ally of yours, and making it tributary to themselves, and including it in the territory of Byzantium, contrary to all oaths and agreements which guarantee the autonomy of those cities? [27] No one has come forward to dissuade Mausolus when he was alive, or Artemisia since his death, from seizing Cos and Rhodes and various other Greek states, which the King, their overlord, ceded by treaty to the Greeks, and for which the Greeks of those days faced many dangers and won much honor in the field. At any rate, if there is anyone to give advice to either of these powers, there are none, it seems, to profit by his advice. [28] In my opinion it is right to restore the Rhodian democracy; yet even if it were not right, I should feel justified in urging you to restore it, when I observe what these people are doing. Why so? Because, men of Athens, if every state were bent on doing right, it would be disgraceful if we alone refused; but when the others, without exception, are preparing the means to do wrong, for us alone to make profession of right, without engaging in any enterprise, seems to me not love of right but want of courage. For I notice that all men have their rights conceded to them in proportion to the power at their disposal. [29] I can cite an instance that is familiar to you all. The Greeks have two treaties6 with the King, one made by our city and commended by all; and the later one made by the Lacedaemonians, which is of course condemned by all; and in these two treaties rights are diversely defined. Of private rights within a state, the laws of that state grant an equal and impartial share to all, weak and strong alike; but the international rights of Greek states are defined by the strong for the weak. [30]

Now, as you have already made up your minds to do right, you must take care that it is in your power to carry out your purpose; and it will be in your power, if you are accepted as the common champions of Greek liberty. But, inevitably, I think, it is very difficult for you to do all that is required. All other states have only their open enemies to contend with, and if they can beat them, there is nothing to hinder them from enjoying their advantage; [31] but you, Athenians, have two struggles before you; one is the same that awaits the rest, but there is another and more serious struggle that comes before it, for you have got to defeat in your debates the faction that deliberately opposes the interests of your city. When, therefore, owing to this opposition, you can get nothing done without a struggle, the natural consequence is that you miss many advantages. [32] If, however, there are many politicians who recklessly take up this position, perhaps the pay they receive from their employers is chiefly responsible, but nevertheless you too must bear some of the blame. For you ought to have the same feeling about the post a man occupies in politics as about the post he occupies in war. What feeling do I refer to? You consider that the man who deserts the post where his general has stationed him deserves to be disfranchised and deprived of his share in our common privileges. [33] Then those who, by adopting oligarchical principles, abandon the post taken over by us from our ancestors, ought to be disqualified from ever giving you advice. As it is, you consider that those allies are most devoted to you who have sworn to regard your friends and your enemies as their own, but where politicians are concerned, you take as your most trusted advisers the men who, to your certain knowledge, have thrown in their lot with the enemies of the State. [34]

But indeed it is not difficult to find matter of accusation against these politicians or of reproach against the rest of you, but our real task is to find by what arguments and by what course of action our present faults may be amended. Perhaps it does not suit the present occasion to deal with every side of the question, but if you can by some fitting action give effect to the policy you have adopted, then there might possibly be, step by step, a general improvement. [35] My own view is that you ought to grapple with these problems vigorously and act as becomes Athenians, remembering how gladly you hear a speaker praising your ancestors, describing their exploits and enumerating their trophies. Reflect, then, that your ancestors set up those trophies, not that you may gaze at them in wonder, but that you may also imitate the virtues of the men who set them up.

1 In the speech On the Navy-boards., Dem. 14

2 The satrap of Phrygia, who joined the revolt of the satraps in 362. He was soon afterwards betrayed and crucified.

3 Acknowledging her as the successor of Mausolus.

4 Under the Thirty Tyrants.

5 The Spartan Clearchus commanded the Greek mercenaries who marched with Cyrus the Younger to the battle of Cunaxa, 401.

6 The first is probably the so-called peace of Callias about 448; the second is certainly that of Antalcidas in 387.

Both sides seem to be in error, men of Athens, both those who have spoken in favor of the Arcadians and those who have done the same for the Lacedaemonians; for, just as though they had come from one or other of those states and were not citizens of Athens, to which both embassies are addressed, they are indulging in mutual abuse and recrimination. That, indeed, might be a task for our visitors; but to take a broad view of the question and to explore the best policy, with a regard for your interests and yet without party-spirit, that is the task of men who claim to offer advice in this Assembly. [2] As it is, apart from the fact that they were known persons and spoke Attic, I think myself that many would have taken them for Arcadians or Laconians. But I see how difficult it is to recommend the wisest course, because, when you share the delusions of your advisers, some wanting this and others that, anyone who attempts to suggest a middle course and finds you too impatient to be instructed, will please neither party and will be discredited with both. [3] All the same, if that is to be my fate, I will choose rather to be charged with talking nonsense than allow you to be misled by certain speakers, contrary to what I judge to be best for the city. Other points I will, with your permission, discuss later, but now, starting from principles admitted by all, I will try to explain what I consider the best policy. [4]

Now no one would deny that our city is benefited by the weakness of the Lacedaemonians and of the Thebans yonder.1 The position of affairs, then, if one may judge from statements repeatedly made in your Assembly, is such that the Thebans will be weakened by the refounding of Orchomenus, Thespiae and Plataea, but the Lacedaemonians will regain their power, if they get Arcadia into their hands and destroy Megalopolis. [5] Our duty, then, is to take care lest the Lacedaemonians grow strong and formidable before the Thebans are weaker, and lest their increase of power should, unperceived by us, out-balance the diminution of the power of Thebes, which our interests demand. For this at least we should never admit, that we would sooner have the Lacedaemonians for our rivals than the Thebans, nor is that our serious aim, but rather to put it out of the power of either to do us harm, for in that way we shall enjoy the most complete security. [6]

But perhaps we shall admit that that is how matters ought to stand, but feel that it is monstrous to choose as our allies the men whose ranks we faced at Mantinea,2 and even to help them against those with whom we shared the dangers of that battle. And I too am of that opinion, but I think we must add the saving clause, “if the others consent to do what is just.” [7] If, then, all the powers consent to keep peace, we will not help the Megalopolitans, for it will be unnecessary, so that there will be no question of our opposing our comrades in arms; some of them, indeed, already profess to be our allies, and the others will now come into line. And what more could we desire? [8] But if the Lacedaemonians act unjustly and insist on fighting, then, on the one hand, if the only question to be decided is whether we shall abandon Megalopolis to them or not, just indeed it is not, but I for my part agree to allow it and to offer no opposition to the people who shared the same dangers with us3; but, on the other hand, if you are all aware that the capture of Megalopolis will be followed by an attack on Messene, I ask any of those who are now so hard on the Megalopolitans to tell me what he will advise us to do then. [9] But I shall get no answer. Yet you all know that, whether these speakers advise it or not, you are bound to help the Messenians, both for the sake of your sworn agreement with them and for the advantage that you derive from the preservation of their city. Just ask yourselves at what point you would begin to make your stand against Lacedaemonian injustice with more honor and generosity—with the defence of Megalopolis or with the defence of Messene? [10] In the one case, you will show yourselves ready to help the Arcadians and eager to confirm the peace for which you faced danger on the field of battle. In the other case, everyone will see clearly that you wish to preserve Messene less for the sake of justice than for fear of the Lacedaemonians. But the proper course is in all things to find out what is right and then do it, though at the same time we must take care that what we do is expedient as well. [11]

Now my opponents argue that the recovery of Oropus is something that we ought to attempt, but that if we make enemies of those who would have helped us to recover it, we shall have no allies. I too think that we ought to recover Oropus, but to say that the Lacedaemonians will be our enemies as soon as we make allies of those Arcadians who are willing to be our friends—I think the only men who have no right even to suggest that are the men who persuaded you to help the Lacedaemonians in their hour of danger. [12] For when all the Peloponnesians came to you and called on you to lead them against the Lacedaemonians, it was not by such arguments that these men persuaded you not to receive them—（and that was why they took the only remaining course of applying to the Thebans）—but to contribute funds and risk your lives for the safety of the Lacedaemonians. Yet you would surely never have consented to save them, if they had announced to you that when saved they would owe you no thanks for your help, unless you allowed them as before to commit whatever act of injustice they chose. [13] Moreover, even if our alliance with the Arcadians is a serious impediment to the designs of the Lacedaemonians, yet surely they ought to be more grateful for the safety that we won for them, when they were in the gravest peril, than angry because of the wrongs that they are now prevented from committing. How, then, can they refuse to help us at Oropus without proving themselves the basest of mankind? By heavens! I see no escape for them. [14]

Then there is another argument that astonishes me; that if we make an alliance with the Arcadians and act upon it, our city will seem to be changing its policy and breaking faith. For to me, men of Athens, the exact opposite seems to be the case. How so? Because I do not think any one man would deny that Athens has saved the Lacedaemonians, and the Thebans before them, and the Euboeans recently,4 and has afterwards made alliance with them, having always one and the same object in view. [15] And what is that? To save the victims of injustice. If, then, this is so, it is not we who are inconsistent, but those who refuse to abide by the principles of justice; and it will be manifest that the circumstances are always changing, through the policy of ambitious men, but our city changes not. [16]

The policy of the Lacedaemonians seems to me to be very sharp practice. For they now say that Elis ought to receive parts of Triphylia, and Phlius the district of Tricaranum, and certain Arcadian tribes the land belonging to them, and that we ought to have Oropus, not because they want to see each of us enjoying our own, far from it—（that would be a tardy exhibition of philanthropy）— [17] but they want it to be generally supposed that they are co-operating with each state to recover the territory that it claims, so that when they march against Messene on their own account, all the others will join heartily in the expedition, or else will put themselves in the wrong by making no adequate return for the support they have enjoyed in regaining what each state claimed as its own. [18] But my own impression is that, in the first place, without subjecting any of the Arcadians to Sparta, our city may recover Oropus with the help both of the Lacedaemonians, if they choose to act justly, and of all who think they ought not to let the Thebans keep other people's property. But supposing, on the other hand, it should become clear to us that unless we let the Lacedaemonians subdue the whole of the Peloponnese, we shall not be able to take Oropus, then I think it the better policy, if I may say so, to let Oropus go, rather than sacrifice Messene and the rest of the Peloponnese to the power of Sparta. For I do not think that Oropus would be the only subject of dispute between us, but also—. However, I will pass over what I intended to say; only I fancy there are many dangers ahead of us.5 [19]

But further, with regard to any acts which they say the Megalopolitans have committed for the sake of the Thebans somewhat against your interests, it is ridiculous to make these now the count of an indictment, but when they want to become friends and make you some reparation, to look askance at them and devise means of preventing this, and not to realize that the more zealous they show themselves to have been in the cause of the Thebans, the more justly would these very speakers incur your anger, if they deprived the city of such useful allies, when they came to you before applying to Thebes. [20] But these, I take it, are the allegations of men who want once again to drive the Megalopolitans elsewhere for an alliance. Now I know, as far as reasoning and conjecture can teach me, and I think that most of you will agree with me, that if the Lacedaemonians take Megalopolis, Messene will be in danger; and if they take Messene also, I say that we shall find ourselves in alliance with Thebes. [21] Surely it is more honorable and satisfactory that we should win the alliance of the Thebans on our own account and resist Spartan ambition, than that we should shrink from rescuing the allies of Thebes and abandon them now, only to rescue the Thebans in the end, and to be kept moreover in perpetual alarm for ourselves. [22] For I cannot regard it as a pledge of our security, that the Lacedaemonians should seize Megalopolis and grow great once more, seeing as I do that even now they have not taken up arms to avenge an injury, but to recover the power that once was theirs; and what their ambition was in the day of their power, you know perhaps better than I, and will distrust them accordingly. [23]

I should like to ask those speakers who profess hatred of the Thebans and of the Lacedaemonians, whether they hate them in either case for your sake and in your interests, or whether they hate the Thebans for the sake of the Lacedaemonians and the Lacedaemonians for the sake of the Thebans respectively. If the latter, you must not take the advice of either party, because they are both mad; but if they allege your interests, why do they unduly forward the interests of those other states? [24] For it is surely possible to humble the Thebans without strengthening the Lacedaemonians; nay, it is much easier. How it can be done, I will try to explain.

Everyone knows this much, that all men, even against their wishes, are, up to a certain point, ashamed not to do what is just, but make a display of opposition to injustice, especially in cases where there are definite victims; and we shall find that what ruins everything—the root in fact of all evil—is unwillingness to act justly under all circumstances. [25] In order, then, that this unwillingness may not stand in the way of the weakening of Thebes, let us admit that Thespiae, Orchomenus and Plataea ought to be restored, and let us co-operate with their inhabitants and appeal to the other states, for it is a just and honorable policy not to allow ancient cities to be uprooted; but at the same time let us not abandon Megalopolis and Messene to their oppressors, nor allow the restoration of Plataea and Thespiae to blind us to the destruction of existing and established states. [26] Moreover, if we proclaim this policy, there is none but will be glad that the Thebans should cease to hold other people's territory; if we do not, we shall not only find the Thebans, naturally enough, hostile to the other proposal, as soon as they reflect that the restoration of those cities means ruin to themselves, but we shall also involve ourselves in endless trouble; for what limit indeed can there be, if we are always sanctioning the destruction of existing cities, and demanding the restoration of those that are destroyed? [27]

Now those who seem to argue most fairly demand of the Megalopolitans that they shall destroy the pillars6 that record their treaty with the Thebans, if they are to be our trusted allies. But they reply that with them friendship is based, not on inscribed pillars, but on mutual advantage, and they count as their allies those who are their helpers. But, granting the fairness of these speakers, my own view is this. I say that we must at the same time call upon them to destroy the pillars and upon the Lacedaemonians to keep the peace. If they refuse—whichever of the two it may be—then at once we side with those who consent. [28] If the Megalopolitans, though peace is secured for them, still cling to the Theban alliance, it will of course be obvious to all that they prefer the ambition of Thebes to the claims of justice; or if, while the Megalopolitans join our alliance in all sincerity, the Lacedaemonians refuse to keep the peace, then it will be equally obvious that the object of their activities is not merely to restore Thespiae, but to subjugate the Peloponnese while the Thebans are engrossed in the war. [29] I am surprised that some of you are afraid of the enemies of Sparta becoming allies of Thebes, and yet see nothing to fear in their subjugation by the Lacedaemonians, forgetting the practical lesson to be learned from the past, that the Thebans always use these allies against the Lacedaemonians, whereas the Lacedaemonians, when they had them at command, used them against us. [30]

Then again I think that you must bear this in mind, that if you reject the Megalopolitans and they are overthrown and decentralized,7 the Lacedaemonians can at once be a great power, or if they do escape destruction—for such miracles have happened before now—they are bound to be the staunch friends of Thebes; but if you accept them as allies, Megalopolis will indeed owe its immediate deliverance to you, but we must put on one side all calculation of risk, and consider what will be the effect upon our relations with Thebes and Sparta. [31] Now if the Thebans are finally beaten, as they deserve to be, there will be no undue increase in the power of the Lacedaemonians, because there are their neighbors, the Arcadians, to balance it; but if the Thebans after all recover and are saved, at any rate they will be the weaker because we shall have gained these allies, saved by our help. Therefore it is in every way expedient that the Arcadians should not be abandoned, and that if they do survive, they should not seem to owe their preservation to themselves or to any other people than you. [32]

Men of Athens, I solemnly assure you that I am not prompted by private friendship or enmity for either party, but have said what I consider expedient for you; and I urge you not to abandon the Megalopolitans, and, as a general principle, never to sacrifice the weak to the strong.

1 A gesture reminds his hearers how near neighbors the Thebans were.

2 The Athenians fought on the left wing of the Lacedaemonians at Mantinea against Thebans, Arcadians and other allies of Thebes.

3 At Mantinea.

4 The references are to the battle of Mantinea （362）, the alliance with Thebes against Sparta in 378, and the deliverance of Euboea from the Thebans in 357.

5 He seems to contemplate a renewed attempt of Sparta to establish her supremacy, involving perhaps a second Peloponnesian war. He over-estimates Sparta's power of recovery.

6 The terms of an alliance were inscribed on a slab or pillar, set up in some public place, and to take down the pillar was symbolically to dissolve the alliance （cf. Dem. 20.37）. The Arcadians are unwilling to risk a complete rupture with the Thebans.

7 By destroying their metropolis and compelling them to live in scattered and unwalled villages.

Our hearty assent, men of Athens, is due to those who insist that we should abide by our oaths and covenants, provided that they do so from conviction; for I believe that nothing becomes a democratic people more than zeal for equity and justice. Those, therefore, who are so emphatic in urging you to this course should not keep wearying you with speeches which are belied by their practice, but after submitting now to full inquiry, should either for the future be sure of your assent in these matters, or else make way for the counsels of those who show a truer conception of what is just, [2] so that you may either voluntarily submit to wrong, making the wrongdoer a free gift of your submission, or having definitely resolved to put justice before all other claims, may pursue your own interests, clear from all reproach, without further hesitation. But from the very terms of the compact and from the oaths which ratified the general peace, you may at once see who are its transgressors; and that those transgressions are serious, I will prove to you concisely. [3]

Now if you were asked, men of Athens, what form of compulsion would most rouse your indignation, I think that if the sons of Pisistratus1 had been alive at the present time and someone tried to compel you to restore them, you would snatch up your weapons and brave any danger rather than receive them back, or if you did consent, you would be slaves, as surely as if you had been bought for money; nay, more so, inasmuch as no one would intentionally kill his own servant, but the victims of tyranny may be seen executed without trial, as well as outraged in the persons of their wives and children. [4] Therefore when Alexander, contrary to the oaths and the compacts as set forth in the general peace, restored those tyrants, the sons of Philiades,2 to Messene, had he any regard for justice? Did he not rather give play to his own tyrannical disposition, showing little regard for you and the joint agreement? [5] It is surely wrong that you should be highly indignant when you are the victims of such coercion, but should neglect all safeguards if it is employed somewhere else, contrary to the sworn agreement with you, and that we here at Athens should be urged by certain speakers to abide by the oaths, while they grant this liberty of action to the men who have so notoriously made those oaths of no effect. [6] But this can never happen, if you are willing to see justice done; for it is further stipulated in the compact that anyone who acts as Alexander has acted shall be the enemy of all the other parties to the compact, and his country shall be hostile territory, and all the parties shall unite in a campaign against him. So if we carry out the agreement, we shall treat the restorer of the tyrants as an enemy. [7]

But these champions of tyranny might urge that the sons of Philiades were tyrants of Messene before the compact was made, and that that was why Alexander restored them. But it is a ridiculous principle to expel the Lesbian tyrants on the ground that their rule is an outrage—I mean the tyrants of Antissa and Eresus, who established themselves before the agreement—and yet to imagine that it is a matter of indifference at Messene, where the same harsh system prevails. [8]

Again, the compact at the very beginning enjoins that the Greeks shall be free and independent. Is it not, then, the height of absurdity that the clause about freedom should stand first in the compact, and that one who has enslaved others should be supposed not to have acted contrary to the joint agreement? Therefore, men of Athens, if we are going to abide by our oaths and covenants and do what is just （for it is to this that these speakers, as I have said, are urging you）, it is our bounden duty to seize our arms and take the field against the transgressors with all who will join us. [9] Or do you think that opportunity sometimes so prevails that men pursue expediency even apart from justice—and yet now, when justice and opportunity and expediency all concur, will you actually wait for some other season to claim your liberties and the liberties of all the Greeks? [10]

I come to another claim sanctioned by the compact. For the actual words are, “If any of the parties shall overthrow the constitution established in the several states at the date when they took the oaths to observe the peace, they shall be treated as enemies by all the parties to the peace.” But just reflect, men of Athens, that the Achaeans in the Peloponnese enjoyed democratic government, and one of their democracies, that of Pellene, has now been overthrown by the Macedonian king, who has expelled the majority of the citizens, given their property to their slaves, and set up Chaeron, the wrestler, as their tyrant. [11] But we ourselves are parties to the peace, which instructs us to treat as enemies those who are guilty of such acts. Now in view of this, are we to obey these joint instructions and treat them as enemies, or will anyone be blackguard3 enough to say no—one of the hirelings in the pay of the Macedonian king, one of those who have grown rich at your expense? [12] For you may be sure they are not ignorant of these facts; but they have grown so insolent, with the tyrant's troops for their bodyguard, that they insist on your observing the already violated oaths, as if Alexander's absolute sovereignty extended over perjury also; and they compel you to rescind your own laws, releasing men who have been condemned in your courts and forcing you to sanction numberless other illegalities. [13] And their conduct is natural; for men who have sold themselves to a policy antagonistic to the interests of their country cannot trouble themselves about laws and oaths; they are to them mere terms which they employ to lead astray the citizens who come to the Assembly for diversion and not for careful inquiry, and who forget that present inaction will some day result in wild confusion. [14] My own advice, as I said at the start, is to believe them when they say that we ought to abide by the joint agreement, unless, when they insist on our abiding by the oaths, they interpret them as not forbidding any act of injustice, or imagine that no one will be sensible of the change from democracy to tyranny or of the overthrow of a free constitution. [15]

Now for a still greater absurdity. For it is provided in the compact that it shall be the business of the delegates at the Congress and those responsible for public safety to see that in the states that are parties to the peace there shall be no executions and banishments contrary to the laws established in those states, no confiscation of property, no partition of lands, no cancelling of debts, and no emancipation of slaves for purposes of revolution. But these speakers are so far from seeking to prevent any of these evils, that they join in promoting them. And do they not then deserve death—the men who promote in the various states those terrible calamities which, because they are so serious, this important body has been commissioned to prevent4 [16]

I will point out a further breach of the compact. For it is laid down that it shall not be lawful for exiles to set out, bearing arms, from the states which are parties to the peace, with hostile intent against any of the states included in the peace; but if they do, then that city from which they set out shall be excluded from the terms of the treaty. Now the Macedonian king has been so unscrupulous about bearing arms that he has never yet laid them down, but even now goes about bearing arms, as far as is in his power, and more so indeed now than ever, inasmuch as he has reinstated the professional trainer at Sicyon by an edict, and other exiles elsewhere. [17] Therefore if we are to keep this joint agreement, as these speakers say, the states that are guilty of these offences are excluded from our treaty. If, indeed, we ought to hush the matter up, we must never say that they are the Macedonian states5; but if the men who are subservient to the Macedonian king against your interests never cease urging us to carry out the joint agreement, let us take them at their word, since their contention is just, and let us, as our oath demands, exclude the guilty parties from the treaty, and form a plan for dealing with men whose temper is so brutally dictatorial, and who are constantly either plotting or acting against us and mocking at the general peace. [18] What, I ask you, can they urge against the correctness of this view? Will they claim that the agreement stands good as against our city, but demur to it where it protects our interests? Does it really seem fair that this should be so? And if there is anything in the treaty that favors our enemies against our city, will they always make the most of it, but if there is anything that tells the other way and is at once just and advantageous to us, will they think that unremitting opposition is their peculiar duty? [19]

But to prove to you still more clearly that no Greeks will accuse you of transgressing any of the terms of the joint agreement, but will even be grateful to you for exposing the real transgressors, I will just touch upon a few of the many points that might be mentioned. For the compact, of course, provides that all the parties to the peace may sail the seas, and that none may hinder them or force a ship of any of them to come to harbor,6 and that anyone who violates this shall be treated as an enemy by all the parties to the peace. [20] Now, men of Athens, you have most distinctly seen this done by the Macedonians; for they have grown so arrogant that they forced all our ships coming from the Black Sea to put in at Tenedos, and under one pretence or another refused to release them until you passed a decree to man and launch a hundred war-galleys instantly, and you put Menestheus in command. [21] Is it not, then, absurd that others should be guilty of so many serious transgressions, but that their friends in Athens, instead of restraining the transgressors, should urge us to abide by the terms thus lightly regarded? As if there were a clause added, permitting some to violate them, but forbidding others even to defend their rights! [22] But was not the conduct of the Macedonians as stupid as it was lawless, when they committed such a gross violation of their oaths as deservedly went near to cost them their right to command at sea?7 Even as it is, they have supplied us with this unquestionable claim against them, whenever we choose to press it. For surely their violation of the joint agreement is not lessened because they have now ceased to offend. [23] But they are in luck, because they can make the most of your supineness, which prefers to take no advantage even of your due rights.

The greatest humiliation, however, that we have suffered is that all the other Greeks and barbarians dread your enmity, but these upstarts8 alone can make you despise yourselves, sometimes by persuasion, sometimes by force, as if Abdera or Maronea,9 and not Athens, were the scene of their political activities. [24] Moreover, while they weaken your cause and strengthen that of your enemies, they at the same time admit unconsciously that our city is irresistible, because they bid her uphold justice by injustice, as though she could easily vanquish her enemies, if she preferred to consult her own interests.10 [25] And they have taken up a reasonable attitude; for as long as we, single-handed, can maintain an unchallenged supremacy at sea, we can devise other and stronger defences on land in addition to our existing forces, especially if by good fortune we can get rid of these politicians, who have for their bodyguard the hosts of tyranny, and if some of them are destroyed and others conclusively proved to be worthless. [26]

Such then, in the matter of the ships, has been the violation of the compact by the Macedonian king, in addition to the other cases mentioned. But the most insolent and overbearing exploit of the Macedonians was that performed quite recently, when they dared to sail into the Piraeus, contrary to our mutual agreement. Moreover, men of Athens, because it was only a single war-galley, it must not be regarded as a slight matter, but as an experiment made to see whether we should overlook it, so that they could repeat it on a larger scale, and also as a proof that they cared as little for these terms of agreement as for those that have been already mentioned. [27] For that it was an encroachment little by little and was meant to accustom us to suffering such intrusions into our harbors, is plain from the following consideration. For the mere fact that the man who sailed the ship in, and whom you ought to have put out of existence at once, galley and all, asked permission to build small boats in our harbor—does it not make it perfectly plain that their scheme was not so much to enter the harbor as to be inside it from the first? And if we tolerate small craft, a little later it will be war-galleys as well; and if at first we sanction a few, there will soon be many. [28] For they cannot allege as their excuse that there is plenty of timber for shipbuilding at Athens, where we import it with great trouble from distant parts, but that it is scarce in Macedonia, where there is a cheap supply for all who want it. No, they thought that they would build their ships here and also furnish them with crews in our harbor, though it is expressly stipulated in the joint agreement that nothing of the kind should be permitted; and they thought too that it would always be more and more in their power to do this. Thus on every hand they treat our city with contempt, thanks to their prompters here, who suggest to them everything they should do; [29] and thus with their help they have discovered that there is an indescribable slackness and feebleness in our city, and that we take no thought for the morrow, and that it never occurs to us to consider how the tyrant is carrying out the joint agreement. [30]

That agreement, men of Athens, I urge you to keep in the way that I have explained, and I would confidently assure you, with the authority that my age11 confers, that we shall at once be exercising our undoubted rights, and also making the safest use of those opportunities which impel us to secure our interests. For, indeed, there is this clause appended to the agreement, “if it is our wish to share in the common peace.” But the words “if it is our wish” mean also the opposite—if it is ever our duty to abandon our disgraceful submission to the dictates of others, or even our forgetfulness of those high ideals, which from time immemorial we have cherished in greater measure than any other people.12 Therefore, if you approve, Athenians, I will now propose that, as the agreement directs, we declare war on the transgressors.

1 Hippias and his family were driven from Athens by the help of the Spartans in 510.

2 Tyrant of Messene in the time of Philip. His sons, Neon and Thrasymachus, were expelled but restored by Alexander. Polybius, himself an Arcadian, born a century and a half later, enters a vigorous protest against Demosthenes' condemnation of these and other “traitors” in Dem. 18.295, and claims that they had rendered valuable service in freeing the Peloponnesian states from the yoke of Sparta and ensuring their prosperity under the aegis of Macedonia （Polybius 17.14.）.

3 This is one of the words which Libanius thought more the style of Hyperides than of Demosthenes.

4 “It appears that a standing military force, under Macedonian orders, was provided to enforce observance of the convention; and that the Synod of Deputies was contemplated as likely to meet periodically.”—Grote （c. 91）. The subject ofἐπέταξανis apparentlyαἱ συνθῆκαι.

5 i.e. the states under the immediate control of Alexander.

6 See Dem. 5.25.

7 The Congress gave Alexander the command of the Greek forces on sea as well as on land. If the Macedonians provoked the Athenians, who provided the greater part of a united Greek fleet, he might lose this command.

8 Literally nouveaux riches, another word condemned by Libanius as un-Demosthenic.

9 Two cities of Thrace. The former was the Greek Gotham.

10 The disloyal politicians wish to put Athens at a disadvantage by urging her to keep the compact justly while allowing the Macedonians to break it unjustly. Now if Athens can afford to do this and yet keep her position, it proves that she could easily beat her enemies if she concentrated on her own interests.

11 Demosthenes would be about fifty at the probable date of this speech.

12 This vague and clumsy sentence admits of no satisfactory interpretation. Theἀλλάof the Mss. conveys no meaning, and it will be noticed thatπαύσασθαιis apparently constructed both with a participle and with an infinitive. The Greek needs, but hardly deserves, emendation.

Let me begin, men of Athens, by beseeching all the Powers of Heaven that on this trial I may find in Athenian hearts such benevolence towards me as I have ever cherished for the city and the people of Athens. My next prayer is for you, and for your conscience and honor. May the gods so inspire you that the temper with which you listen to my words shall be guided, not by my adversary— [2] that would be monstrous indeed!— but by the laws and by the judicial oath, by whose terms among other obligations you are sworn to give to both sides an impartial hearing. The purpose of that oath is, not only that you shall discard all prejudice, not only that you shall show equal favor, but also that you shall permit every litigant to dispose and arrange his topics of defence according to his own discretion and judgement. [3]

Among many advantages which Aeschines holds over me in this contention, there are two, men of Athens, of great moment. In the first place, I have a larger stake on the issue; for the loss of your favor is far more serious to me than the loss of your verdict to him. For me, indeed—but let me say nothing inauspicious at the outset of my speech: I will only say that he accuses me at an advantage. Secondly, there is the natural disposition of mankind to listen readily to obloquy and invective, and to resent self-laudation. [4] To him the agreeable duty has been assigned; the part that is almost always offensive remains for me. If as a safeguard against such offence, I avoid the relation of my own achievements, I shall seem to be unable to refute the charges alleged against me, or to establish my claim to any public distinction. Yet, if I address myself to what I have done, and to the part I have taken in politics, I shall often be obliged to speak about myself. Well, I will endeavor to do so with all possible modesty; and let the man who has initiated this controversy bear the blame of the egoism which the conditions force upon me. [5]

You must all be agreed, men of Athens, that in these proceedings I am concerned equally with Ctesiphon, and that they require from me no less serious consideration. Any loss, especially if inflicted by private animosity, is hard to bear; but to lose your goodwill and kindness is the most painful of all losses, as to gain them is the best of all acquisitions. [6] Such being the issues at stake, I implore you all alike to listen to my defence against the accusations laid, in a spirit of justice. So the laws enjoin—the laws which Solon, who first framed them, a good democrat and friend of the people, thought it right to validate not only by their enactment but by the oath of the jury; [7] not distrusting you, if I understand him aright, but perceiving that no defendant can defeat the charges and calumnies which the prosecutor prefers with the advantage of prior speech, unless every juryman receives with goodwill the pleas of the second speaker, as an obligation of piety to the gods by whom he has sworn, and forms no final conclusion upon the whole case until he has given a fair and impartial hearing to both sides. [8]

It appears that I have today to render account of the whole of my private life as well as of my public transactions. I must therefore renew my appeal to the gods; and in your presence I now beseech them, first that I may find in your hearts such benevolence towards me as I have ever cherished for Athens, and secondly that they will guide you to such a judgement upon this indictment as shall redound to the good repute of the jury, and to the good conscience of every several juryman. [9]

If then Aeschines had confined his charges to the matters alleged in the prosecution, I should have immediately addressed my defence to the resolution of the Council; but as he has wastefully devoted the greater part of his speech to irrelevant topics, mostly false accusations, I conceive it to be both fair and necessary, men of Athens, to say a few words first on those matters, lest any of you, misled by extraneous arguments, should listen with estrangement to my justification in respect of the indictment. [10]

To his abusive aspersion of my private life, I have, you will observe, an honest and straightforward reply. I have never lived anywhere but in your midst. If then you know my character to be such as he alleges, do not tolerate my voice, even if all my public conduct has been beyond praise, but rise and condemn me incontinently. But if, in your judgement and to your knowledge, I am a better man and better born than Aeschines, if you know me and my family to be, not to put it offensively, as good as the average of respectable people, then refuse credence to all his assertions, for clearly they are all fictitious, and treat me today with the same goodwill which throughout my life you have shown to me in many earlier contentions. [11] Malicious as you are, Aeschines, you were strangely innocent when you imagined that I should turn aside from the discussion of public transactions to reply to your calumnies. I shall do nothing of the sort: I am not so infatuated. Your false and invidious charges against my political life I will examine; but later, if the jury wish to hear me, I will return to your outrageous ribaldry. [12]

The crimes he has laid to my charge are many, and to some of them the law has assigned severe and even capital punishment. But the purpose of this prosecution goes further: it includes private malice and violence, railing and vituperation, and the like; and yet for none of these accusations, if made good, is there any power at all in the state to inflict an adequate penalty, or anything like it. [13] It is not right to debar a man from access to the Assembly and a fair hearing, still less to do so by way of spite and jealousy. No, by heavens, men of Athens, it is neither just, nor constitutional, nor honest! If he ever saw me committing crimes against the commonwealth, especially such frightful crimes as he described just now so dramatically, his duty was to avail himself of the legal penalties as soon as they were committed, impeaching me, and so putting me on my trial before the people, if my sins deserved impeachment, or indicting me for breach of the constitution, if I had proposed illegal measures. For, of course, if he prosecutes Ctesiphon now on my account, it is impossible that he would not have indicted me, with a certain hope of conviction! [14] Yet if he detected me in any of the acts which he has recounted to my prejudice, or in any other iniquity, there are statutes dealing with those offences, punishments, legal processes, trials involving severe penalties and heavy fines; and any of these proceedings he might have taken. Had he so acted, had he in that way employed the methods applicable to my case, his denunciations would have been consistent with his conduct; [15] but in fact he has deserted the path of right and justice, he has flinched from the proof of recent guilt, and then, after a long interval, he makes a hotchpotch of imputation and banter and scurrility, and stands on a false pretence, denouncing me, but indicting Ctesiphon. He sets in the forefront of the controversy his private quarrel with me, in which he has never confronted me fairly; yet he is avowedly seeking to disfranchise somebody else. [16] There are many other arguments, men of Athens, to be pleaded on Ctesiphon's behalf, but this surely is eminently reasonable, that the honest course was to fight out our own quarrels by ourselves, not to turn aside from our antagonism and try to find some one else to injure. That is carrying iniquity too far! [17]

It is a fair inference that all his accusations are equally dishonest and untruthful. I wish, however, to examine them one by one, and especially the falsehoods he told to my discredit about the peace and the embassy, attributing to me what was really done by himself with the aid of Philocrates. It is necessary, men of Athens, and not improper, to remind you of the position of affairs in those days, so that you may consider each transaction with due regard to its occasion. [18]

When the Phocian war began—not by my fault, for I was still outside politics—you were at first disposed to hope that the Phocians would escape ruin, although you knew that they were in the wrong, and to exult over any misfortune that might befall the Thebans, with whom you were justly and reasonably indignant because of the immoderate use they had made of the advantage they gained at Leuctra. The Peloponnesus was divided. The enemies of the Lacedaemonians were not strong enough to destroy them; and the aristocrats whom the Lacedaemonians had put into power had lost control of the several states. In those states and everywhere else there was indiscriminate strife and confusion. [19] Philip, observing these conditions, which were apparent enough, spent money freely in bribing traitorous persons in all the cities, and tried to promote embroilment and disorder. He based his designs on the errors and follies of others, and the growth of his power was perilous to us all. When it was evident that the Thebans, now fallen from arrogance to disaster, and much distressed by the prolongation of the war, would be compelled to seek the protection of Athens, Philip, to forestall such an appeal and coalition, offered peace to you and succor to them. [20] Now what contributed to his success, when he found you ready to fall into his trap almost eagerly, was the baseness, or, if you prefer the term, the stupidity, or both, of the other Greek states. You were fighting a long and incessant war for purposes in which, as the event has proved, they were all concerned, and yet they helped you neither with money, nor with men, nor with anything else; and so, in your just and natural indignation, you readily accepted Philip's suggestion. The peace conceded to him at that time was due to the causes I have named, and not, as Aeschines maliciously insists, to me; and the misdeeds and the corruption of Aeschines and his party during that peace will be found, on any honest inquiry, to be the true cause of our present troubles. [21] These distinctions and explanations I offer merely for the sake of accuracy; for if you should suppose that there was any guilt, or ever so much guilt, in that peace-making business, the suspicion does not concern me. The first man to raise the question of peace in a speech was Aristodemus, the actor, and the man who took up the cue, moved the resolution, and, with Aeschines, became Philip's hired agent, was Philocrates of Hagnus—your confederate, Aeschines, not mine, though you lie till you are black in the face. Their supporters in the debate were Eubulus and Cephisophon—on whose motives I have at present nothing to say. I never spoke in favor of the peace. [22] And yet, though the facts are such and demonstrated to be such, he has the amazing impudence to tell you that I am to blame for the terms of peace, and that I stopped the city from arranging the terms in conjunction with a congress of the Greek states. Why, you, you—but I can find no epithet bad enough for you—was there any single occasion when you, having observed me in your presence trying to rob the state of a negotiation and of an alliance which you have just described as of the greatest importance, either made any protest, or rose to give the people any information whatsoever about the proceeding which you now denounce? [23] Yet if I had really intrigued with Philip to stop a Panhellenic coalition, it was your business not to hold your peace, but to cry aloud, to protest, to inform the people. You did nothing of the sort. No one ever heard that fine voice of yours. Of course not; for at that time there was no embassy visiting any of the Greek states, but all the states had long ago been sounded, and there is not an honest word in his whole story. [24] Moreover, his falsehoods are the worst of slanders upon Athens. If at one and the same time you were inviting the Greeks to make war and sending envoys to Philip to negotiate peace, you were playing a part worthy of Eurybatus1 the impostor, not of a great city or of honest men. But it is false; it is false! For what purpose could you have summoned them at that crisis? For peace? They were all enjoying peace. For war? You were already discussing terms of peace. Therefore it is clear that I did not promote, and was in no way responsible for, the original peace, and that all his other calumnies are equally false. [25]

Now observe what policy we severally adopted after the conclusion of peace. You will thereby ascertain who acted throughout as Philip's agent, and who served your interests and sought the good of the city. I proposed in the Council that the ambassadors should sail without delay to any place where they might learn that Philip was to be found, and there receive from him the oath of ratification; but in spite of my resolution they refused to go. What was the reason of that refusal? [26] I will tell you. It suited Philip's purposes that the interval should be as long, and ours that it should be as short as possible; for you had suspended all your preparations for war, not merely from the day of ratification, but from that on which you first began to expect peace. That was just what Philip was contriving all the time, expecting with good reason that he would hold safely any Athenian possessions which he might seize before the ratification, as no one would break the peace to recover them. [27] Foreseeing that result, and appreciating its importance, I moved that the embassy should repair to the place where they would find Philip and swear him in without delay, in order that the oath might be taken while your allies the Thracians were still holding the places about which Aeschines was so sarcastic—Serrium, Myrtenum, and Ergisce—and that Philip might not get control of Thrace by seizing the positions of advantage and so providing himself amply with men and money for the furtherance of his ulterior designs. [28] That decree Aeschines neither cites nor reads; though he mentions to my discredit that I suggested in Council that the Macedonian ambassadors should be introduced. What ought I to have done? Objected to the introduction of men who had come expressly to confer with you? Ordered the lessee not to give them reserved seats in the theatre? But they could have sat in the threepenny seats, if I had not moved my resolution. Or was it my business to take care of the public pence, and put up the state for sale, like Aeschines and his friends? Surely not. Please take and read this decree, which the prosecutor omitted, though he knows it well. [29] “Decree of Demosthenes

[In the archonship of Mnesiphilus, on the thirtieth day of Hecatombaeon, the tribe Pandionis then holding the presidency, Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes, of Paeania, proposed that, whereas Philip has sent ambassadors and has agreed to articles of peace, it be resolved by the Council and People of Athens, with a view to the ratification of the peace as accepted by vote of the first Assembly, to choose at once five ambassadors from all the citizens; and that those so elected repair without delay wheresoever they ascertain Philip to be, and take and administer to him the oaths with all dispatch according to the articles agreed on between him and the People of Athens, including the allies on either side. The ambassadors chosen were Eubulus of Anaphlystus, Aeschines of Cothocidae, Cephisophon of Rhamnus, Democrates of Phlya, Cleon of Cothocidae.]” [30]

My object in moving this decree was to serve Athens, not Philip. Nevertheless these excellent envoys took so little heed of it that they loitered in Macedonia for three whole months, until Philip returned from Thrace, having subdued the whole country; though they might have reached the Hellespont in ten or perhaps in three or four days, and rescued the outposts by receiving the oaths of ratification before Philip captured them. He dared not have touched them in our presence, or we should not have accepted his oath, and so he would have missed his peace, instead of gaining both his objects—peace and the strongholds as well. [31]

Such then is the history of the first act of knavery on Philip's part, and venality on the part of these dishonest men at the time of the embassy. For that act I avow that I was then, am still, and ever shall be their enemy and their adversary. I will next exhibit an act of still greater turpitude which comes next in order of time. [32] When Philip had sworn to the peace, having first secured Thrace because of their disobedience to my decree, he bribed them to postpone our departure from Macedonia until he had made ready for his expedition against the Phocians. He was afraid that, if we reported that he intended and was already preparing to march, you would turn out and sail round with your fleet to Thermopylae, and block the passage, as you did before; and his object was that you should not receive our report until he had reached this side of Thermopylae and you were powerless. [33] He was so nervous, and so much worried by the fear that, in spite of his Thracian success, his enterprise would slip from his fingers if you should intervene before the Phocians perished, that he made a new bargain with this vile creature—all by himself this time, no t in common with his colleagues— to make that speech and to render that report to you, by which all was lost. [34] I earnestly beg you, men of Athens, to bear in mind throughout this trial that, if Aeschines had not gone outside the articles of indictment in his denunciation of me, I too would not have digressed; but as he has resorted to every sort of imputation and slander, I am compelled to reply briefly to all his charges in turn. [35] What then were the speeches he made at that crisis—the speeches that brought everything to ruin? He told you that you need not be excited because Philip had passed Thermopylae; that, if only you kept quiet, you would get all you wanted, and would within two or three days learn that Philip was now the friend of those to whom he came as enemy, and the enemy of those to whom he came as friend. The bonds of amity, he declared, with his most impressive eloquence, are fortified not by words but by community of interest; and it was an interest common to Philip, to the Phocians, and to all of you alike, to be quit of the unfeeling and offensive behavior of the Thebans. [36] Some of you were delighted to hear these remarks, for at that time we all disliked the Thebans. What was the result—not the distant, but the immediate result? That the Phocians perished and their cities were demolished; that you took his advice and kept quiet—and before long were carrying in your chattels from the country; and that Aeschines pocketed his fee. A further result was that Athens got all the ill will of the Thebans and Thessalians, and Philip all their gratitude for these transactions. [37] To prove the truth of these statements, please read the decree of Callisthenes and Philip's letter, which will make every point clear.“Decree

[In the archonship of Mnesiphilus, at an extraordinary assembly convened by the Generals and the Presidents, with the approval of the Council, on the twenty-first day of Maemacterion, Callisthenes, son of Eteonicus of Phalerum, proposed that no Athenian be allowed upon any pretext whatsoever to pass the night in the country, but only in the City and Peiraeus, except those stationed in the garrison; that the latter keep each the post assigned to him, leaving it neither by day nor by night.” [38] “Any person disobeying this decree shall be liable to the statutory penalty for treason, unless he can prove inability to obey in his own case, such plea of inability to be judged by the General of the Infantry, the Paymaster-General, and the Secretary of the Council. All property in the country shall be immediately removed, if within a radius of 120 furlongs, to the City and Peiraeus; if outside this radius, to Eleusis, Phyle, Aphidna, Rhamnus, or Sunium. Proposed by Callisthenes of Phalerum.]”

Was it with such expectation that you made the peace? Were these the promises of this hireling? [39]

Now read the letter sent to Athens afterwards by Philip.“Letter

[Philip, King of Macedonia, to the Council and People of Athens, greeting. Know that we have passed within the Gates, and have subdued the district of Phocis. We have put garrisons in all the fortified places that surrendered voluntarily; those that did not obey we have stormed and razed to the ground, selling the inhabitants into slavery. Hearing that you are actually preparing an expedition to help them, I have written to you to save you further trouble in this matter. Your general policy strikes me as unreasonable, to agree to peace, and yet take the field against me, and that although the Phocians were not included in the ill terms upon which we agreed. Therefore if you decline to abide by your agreements, you will gain no advantage save that of being the aggressors.]” [40]

Though the letter is addressed to you, it contains, as you hear, a distinct intimation intended for his own allies: “I have done this against the wishes and the interests of the Athenians. Therefore, if you Thebans and Thessalians are wise, you will treat them as your enemies, and put your confidence in me.” That is the meaning conveyed, though not in those words. By such delusions he carried them off their feet so completely that they had no foresight nor any inkling whatever of the sequel, but allowed him to take control of the whole business; and that is the real cause of their present distresses. [41] And the man who was hand-in-glove with Philip, and helped him to win that blind confidence, who brought lying reports to Athens and deluded his fellow-citizens, was this same Aeschines who to day bewails the sorrows of the Thebans and recites their pitiful story, being himself guilty of those sorrows, guilty of the distresses of the Phocians, guilty of all the sufferings of every nation in Greece. Yes, Aeschines, beyond a doubt, you are sincerely grieved by that tale of woe, you are wrung with pity for the poor Thebans, you, who hold estates in Boeotia, you, who till the farms that once were theirs; it is I who exult—I, who was at once claimed as a victim by the perpetrator2 of those wrongs! [42]

However, I have digressed to topics that will perhaps be more appropriately discussed later on. I return to my proof that the misdeeds of these men are the real cause of the present situation.

When you had been deluded by Philip through the agency of the men who took his pay when on embassy and brought back fictitious reports, and when the unhappy Phocians were likewise deluded, and all their cities destroyed, what happened? [43] Those vile Thessalians and those ill-conditioned Thebans regarded Philip as their friend, their benefactor, and their deliverer. He was all in all to them; they would not listen to the voice of any one who spoke ill of him. You Athenians, though suspicious and dissatisfied, observed the terms of peace, for you could do nothing. The rest of the Greeks, though similarly overreached and disappointed, observed the peace; and yet in a sense the war against them had already begun; [44] for when Philip was moving hither and thither, subduing Illyrians and Triballians, and some Greeks as well, when he was gradually getting control of large military resources, and when certain Greek citizens, including Aeschines, were availing themselves of the liberty of the peace to visit Macedonia and take bribes, all these movements were really acts of war upon the states against which Philip was making his preparations. That they failed to perceive it is another story, and does not concern me. [45] My forebodings and expostulations were unceasing; I uttered them in the Assembly and in every city to which I was sent. But all the cities were demoralized. The active politicians were venal and corrupted by the hope of money: the unofficial classes and the people in general were either blind to the future or ensnared by the listlessness and indolence of their daily life; in all the malady had gone so far that they expected the danger to descend anywhere but upon themselves, and even hoped to derive their security at will from the perils of others. [46] In the result, of course, the excessive and inopportune apathy of the common people has been punished by the loss of their independence, while their leaders, who fancied they were selling everything except themselves, discover too late that their own liberty was the first thing they sold. Instead of the name of trusty friend, in which they rejoiced when they were taking their bribes, they are dubbed toad-eaters and scoundrels, and other suitable epithets. What did they expect? [47] Men of Athens, it is not because he wants to do a traitor a good turn that a man spends his money; nor, when he has once got what he paid for, has he any further use for the traitor's counsels. Otherwise treason would be the most profitable of all trades. But it is not so. How could it be? Far from it! As soon as the man who grasps at power has achieved his purpose, he is the master of those who sold him his mastery; and then—yes, then!—knowing their baseness, he loathes them, mistrusts them, and reviles them. [48] Look at these instances, because, though the right time for action is past, for wise men it is always the right time to understand history. Lasthenes was hailed as friend—until he betrayed Olynthus; Timolaus, until he brought Thebes to ruin; Eudicus and Simus of Larissa, until they put Thessaly under Philip's heel. Since then the whole world has become crowded with men exiled, insulted, punished in every conceivable way. What of Aristratus at Sicyon? or Perilaus3 at Megara? Are they not outcasts? [49] From these examples it may be clearly discerned that the man who is most vigilant in defence of his country and most vigorous in his opposition to treason—he is the man, Aeschines, who provides you traitors and mercenaries with something that you can betray for a bribe; and, if you are still secure and still drawing your pay, you owe this to the great majority of these citizens, and to those who thwarted your purposes—for your own efforts would long ago have brought you to destruction. [50]

I could say much more about the history of that time, but I suppose that what has been said is more than enough. My antagonist is to blame, for he has so bespattered me with the sour dregs of his own knavery and his own crimes, that I was obliged to clear myself in the eyes of men too young to remember those transactions. But it has perhaps been wearisome to you, who, before I said a word, knew all about his venality. [51] However, he calls it friendship and amity; and only just now he spoke of “the man who taunts me with the friendship of Alexander.” I taunt you with the friendship of Alexander! Where did you get it? How did you earn it? I am not out of my mind, and I would never call you the friend either of Philip or Alexander, unless we are to call a harvester or other hired laborer the friend of the man who pays him for his job. [52] But it is not so. How could it be? Far from it! I call you Philip's hireling of yesterday, and Alexander's hireling of today, and so does every man in this Assembly. If you doubt my word, ask them; or rather I will ask them myself. Come, men of Athens, what do you think? Is Aeschines Alexander's hireling, or Alexander's friend? You hear what they say. [53]

I propose then at last to come to my defence against the actual indictment, and to a recital of my public acts, that Aeschines may hear from me what he knows perfectly well, the grounds on which I claim that I deserve even larger rewards than those proposed by the Council. Please take and read the indictment. [54] “Indictment

[In the archonship of Chaerondas, on the sixth day of Elaphebolion, Aeschines, son of Atrometus, of Cothocidae, indicted Ctesiphon, son of Leosthenes, of Anaphlystus, before the Archon for a breach of the constitution, in that he proposed an unconstitutional decree, to wit, that Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes, of Paeania should be crowned with a golden crown, and that proclamation should be made in the theatre at the Great Dionysia, when the new tragedies are produced, that “the People crown Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes, of Paeania, with a golden crown for his merit and for the goodwill which he has constantly displayed both towards all the Greeks and towards the people of Athens, and also for his steadfastness, and because he has constantly by word and deed promoted the best interests of the people, and is forward to do whatever good he can,”” [55] “all these proposals being false and unconstitutional, inasmuch as the laws forbid, first, the entry of false statements in the public records; secondly, the crowning of one liable to audit （now Demosthenes is Commissioner of Fortifications and a trustee of the Theatrical Fund）; thirdly, the proclamation of the crown in the Theatre at the Dionysia the day of the new tragedies; but if the crowning is by the Council, it shall be proclaimed in the Council-house, if by the State, in the Assembly on the Pnyx. Fine demanded: fifty talents. Witnesses to summons: Cephisophon, son of Cephisophon, of Rhamnus, Cleon, son of Cleon, of Cothocidae.]” [56]

These are the clauses of the decree against which this prosecution is directed; but from these very clauses I hope to prove to your satisfaction that I have an honest defence to offer. For I will take the charges one by one in the same order as the prosecutor, without any intentional omission. [57] Now take first the clause which recites that in word and deed I have constantly done my best for the common weal, and that I am ever zealous to do all the good in my power, and which commends me on those grounds. Your judgement on that clause must, I take it, depend simply on my public acts, by examining which you will discover whether Ctesiphon has given a true and proper, or a false, description of my conduct. [58] As for his proposing that a crown should be given to me, and the decoration proclaimed in the Theatre, without adding the words, “provided he shall first have rendered his accounts,” I conceive that that also is related to my public acts, whether I am, or am not, worthy of the crown and of the proclamation before the people; but I have, however, also to cite the statutes that authorize such a proposal. In this way, men of Athens, I am resolved to offer an honest and straightforward defence. I will proceed at once to the history of my own actions; [59] and let no one imagine that I am straying from the indictment if I touch upon Hellenic policy and Hellenic questions; for by attacking as mendacious that clause of the decree which alleges that in word and deed I have acted for the common good, it is Aeschines who has made a discussion of the whole of my public life necessary and pertinent to the indictment. Further, out of many spheres of public activity I chose Hellenic affairs as my province, and therefore I am justified in taking Hellenic policy as the basis of my demonstration. [60]

Well, I pass by those successes which Philip achieved and maintained before I became a politician and a public speaker, as I do not think that they concern me. I will, however, remind you of enterprises of his which were thwarted after the day on which I entered public life. Of these I will render an account, premising only that Philip started with this enormous advantage. [61] In all the Greek states—not in some but in every one of them—it chanced that there had sprung up the most abundant crop of traitorous, venal, and profligate politicians ever known within the memory of mankind. These persons Philip adopted as his satellites and accomplices. The disposition of Greeks towards one another was already vicious and quarrelsome and he made it worse. Some he cajoled; some he bribed; some he corrupted in every possible way. He split them into many factions, although all had one common interest—to thwart his aggrandizement. [62] Now seeing that all Greece was in such a plight, and still unconscious of a gathering and ever-growing evil, what was the right policy for Athens to adopt, and the right action for her to take? That is the question, men of Athens, which you ought to consider, and that is the issue on which I ought to be called to account; for I was the man who took up a firm position in that department of your public affairs. [63] Was it the duty of our city, Aeschines, to abase her pride, to lower her dignity, to rank herself with Thessalians and Dolopians, to help Philip to establish his supremacy over Greece, to annihilate the glories and the prerogatives of our forefathers? Or, if she rejected that truly shameful policy, was she to stand by and permit aggressions which she must have long foreseen, and knew would succeed if none should intervene? [64] I would now like to ask the man who censures our past conduct most severely, what party he would have wished our city to join. The party that shares the guilt of all the disasters and dishonors that have befallen Greece,—the party, as one may say, of the Thessalians and their associates? Or that which permitted those disasters in the hope of selfish gain, the party in which we may include the Arcadians, the Messenians, and the Argives? [65] Why, the fate of many, indeed of all, of those nations is worse than ours. For if, after his victory, Philip had at once taken himself off, and relapsed into inactivity, harassing neither his own allies nor any other Greeks, there might have been some reason for finding fault with the opponents of his enterprises; but seeing that, wherever he could, he destroyed the prestige, the authority, the independence, and even the constitution of every city alike, who can deny that you chose the most honor able of all policies when you followed my advice? [66]

To resume my argument: I ask you, Aeschines, what was the duty of Athens when she perceived that Philip's purpose was to establish a despotic empire over all Greece? What language, what counsels, were incumbent upon an adviser of the people at Athens, of all places in the world, when I was conscious that, from the dawn of her history to the day when I first ascended the tribune, our country had ever striven for primacy, and honor, and renown, and that to serve an honor able ambition and the common welfare of Greece she had expended her treasure and the lives of her sons far more generously than any other Hellenic state fighting only for itself; [67] and knowing as I did that our antagonist Philip himself, contending for empire and supremacy, had endured the loss of his eye, the fracture of his collar-bone, the mutilation of his hand and his leg, and was ready to sacrifice to the fortune of war any and every part of his body, if only the life of the shattered remnant should be a life of honor and renown? [68] Surely no man will dare to call it becoming that in a man reared at Pella, then a mean and insignificant city, such lofty ambition should be innate as to covet the dominion of all Greece, and admit that aspiration to his soul, while you, natives of Athens, observing day by day, in every speech you hear and ill every spectacle you behold, memorials of the high prowess of your forefathers, should sink to such cowardice as by a spontaneous, voluntary act to surrender your liberty to a Philip. [69] No one will make that assertion. The only remaining, and the necessary, policy was to resist with justice all his unjust designs. That policy was adopted by you from the start in a spirit that well became you, and forwarded by me in all my proposals, according to the opportunities of my public life. I admit the charge. Tell me; what ought I to have done? I put the question to you, Aeschines, dismissing for the moment everything else—Amphipolis, Pydna, Potidaea, Halonnesus. I have no recollection of those places. [70] Serrium, Doriscus, the sack of Peparethus, and all other injuries of our city—I ignore them utterly. Yet you told us that I entangled the citizens in a quarrel by my talk about those places, though every resolution that concerned them was moved by Eubulus, or Aristophon, or Diopeithes, not by me; only you allege so glibly whatever suits your purpose! [71] Even now I will not discuss them. But here was a man annexing Euboea and making it a basis of operations against Attica, attacking Megara, occupying Oreus, demolishing Porthmus, establishing the tyranny of Philistides at Oreus and of Cleitarchus at Eretria, subjugating the Hellespont, besieging Byzantium, destroying some of the Greek cities, reinstating exiled traitors in others: by these acts was he, or was he not, committing injustice, breaking treaty, and violating the terms of peace? Was it, or was it not, right that some man of Grecian race should stand forward to stop those aggressions? [72] If it was not right, if Greece was to present the spectacle, as the phrase goes, of the looting of Mysia,4 while Athenians still lived and breathed, then I am a busybody, because I spoke of those matters, and Athens, too, is a busybody because she listened to me; and let all her misdeeds and blunders be charged to my account! But if it was right that some one should intervene, on whom did the duty fall, if not on the Athenian democracy? That then was my policy. I saw a man enslaving all mankind, and I stood in his way. I never ceased warning you and admonishing you to surrender nothing. [73]

The peace was broken by Philip, when he seized those merchantmen; not by Athens, Aeschines. Produce the decrees, and Philip's letter, and read them in their proper order. They will show who was responsible for each several proceeding.“Decree

[In the archonship of Neocles, in the month Boedromion, at an extraordinary meeting of the Assembly convened by the Generals, Eubulus, son of Mnesitheus, of Coprus, proposed that, whereas the generals have announced in the assembly that the admiral Leodamas and the twenty ships under his command, sent to the Hellespont to convoy corn, have been removed to Macedon by Philip's officer, Amyntas, and are there kept in custody, it shall be the concern of the presidents and of the generals that the Council be convened and ambassadors chosen to go to Philip;” [74] “that on their arrival they shall confer with him about the seizure of the admiral and the ships and the soldiers, and, if Amyntas acted in ignorance, they shall say that the people attach no blame to him; or, if the admiral was caught exceeding his instructions, that the Athenians will investigate the matter, and punish him as his carelessness shall deserve; if, on the other hand, neither of these suppositions is true, but it was a deliberate affront on the part either of the officer or of his superior, they shall state the same, in order that the people, being apprised of it, may decide what course to take.]” [75]

This decree was drawn up by Eubulus, not by me; the next in order by Aristophon; then we have Hegesippus, then Aristophon again, then Philocrates, then Cephisophon, and so on. I proposed no decree dealing with these matters. Go on reading.“Decree

[In the archonship of Neocles, on the thirtieth day of Boedromion, by sanction of the Council, the Presidents and Generals introduced the report of the proceedings in the Assembly, to wit, that the People had resolved that ambassadors be chosen to approach Philip concerning the removal of the vessels, and instructions be given them in accordance with the decrees of the Assembly. The following were chosen: Cephisophon, son of Cleon, of Anaphlystus, Democritus, son of Demophon, of Anagyrus, Polycritus, son of Apemantus, of Cothocidae. In the presidence of the tribe Hippothontis, proposed by Aristophon, of Collytus, a president.]” [76]

As I cite these decrees, Aeschines, you must cite some decree by proposing which I became responsible for the war. But you cannot cite one; if you could, there is no document which you would have produced more readily just now. Why, even Philip's letter casts no blame upon me in respect of the war: he imputes it to other men. Read Philip's actual letter. [77] “Letter

[Philip, King of Macedonia, to the Council and People of Athens, greeting.—Your ambassadors, Cephisophon and Democritus and Polycritus, visited me and discussed the release of the vessels commanded by Leodamas. Now, speaking generally, it seems to me that you will be very simple people if you imagine that I do not know that the vessels were sent ostensibly to convey corn from the Hellespont to Lemnos, but really to help the Selymbrians, who are being besieged by me and are not included in the articles of friendship mutually agreed upon between us.” [78] “These instructions were given to the admiral, without the cognizance of the Athenian People, by certain officials and by others who are now out of office, but who were anxious by every means in their power to change the present friendly attitude of the people towards me to one of open hostility, being indeed much more zealous for this consummation than for the relief of the Selymbrians. They conceive that such a policy will be a source of income to themselves; it does not, however, strike me as profitable either for you or for me. Therefore the vessels now in my harbors I hereby release to you; and for the future, if, instead of permitting your statesmen to pursue this malicious policy, you will be good enough to c ensure them, I too will endeavor to preserve the peace. Farewell.]” [79]

In this letter there is no mention of the name of Demosthenes, nor any charge against me. Why does he forget my acts, when he blames others? Because he could not mention me without recalling his own transgressions, on which I fixed my attention, and which I strove to resist. I began by proposing the embassy to Peloponnesus, when first he tried to get a footing there; then the embassy to Euboea, when he was tampering with Euboea; then an expedition— not an embassy—to Oreus, and again to Eretria, when he had set up tyrants in those cities. [80] Subsequently I dispatched all those squadrons by which the Chersonese was rescued from him, and Byzantium, and all our allies. By this policy you gained much glory, receiving commendations, eulogies, compliments, decorations, and votes of thanks from the recipients of y our favors. Of the nations that suffered aggression, those who followed your advice gained their salvation, while those who scorned it have had many occasions since to remember your warnings, and to acknowledge not only your goodwill but your sagacity and foresight, for everything has turned out as you predicted. [81] Now that Philistides would have paid a large sum for possession of Oreus, and Cleitarchus for possession of Eretria, and Philip himself to get those advantages of position against you, or to escape conviction in other matters or any inquiry into his wrongdoing in every quarter, is well known to all—and to no one better than to you, Aeschines. [82] For the ambassadors who came here from Cleitarchus and Philistides lodged at your house and you entertained them. The government expelled them as enemies, and as men whose proposals were dishonest and unacceptable; but to you they were friends. Well, no part of their business was successful,—you backbiter, who tell me that I hold my tongue with a fee in my pocket, and cry aloud when I have spent it! That is not your habit; you cry aloud without ceasing, and nothing will ever stop your mouth,—except perhaps a sentence of disfranchisement this very day. [83]

Although at that time you decorated me for my services, although Aristonicus drafted the decree in the very same terms that Ctesiphon has now used, although the decoration was proclaimed in the theatre, so that this is the second proclamation of my name there, Aeschines, who was present, never opposed the decree, nor did he indict the proposer. Take and read the decree in question. [84] “Decree

[In the archonship of Chaerondas, son of Hegemon, on the twenty-fifth day of Gamelion, the tribe Leontis holding the presidency, Aristonicus of Phrearrii proposed that, whereas Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes, of Paeania, has conferred many great obligations on the People of Athens, and has aided many of the Allies by his decrees both heretofore and upon the present occasion, and has liberated some of the cities of Euboea, and is a constant friend of the Athenian People, and by word and deed does his utmost in the interests of the Athenians themselves as well as of the other Greeks, it be resolved by the Council and People of Athens to commend Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes, of Paeania, and to crown him with a golden crown, and to proclaim the crown in the Theatre at the Dionysia at the performance of the new tragedies, the proclamation of the crown being entrusted to the tribe holding the presidency and to the steward of the festival. Proposed by Aristonicus of Phrearrii.]” [85]

Is any one of you aware of any dishonor, contempt, or ridicule that has befallen the city in consequence of that decree, such as he now tells you will follow, if I am crowned? While acts are still recent and notorious, they are requited with gratitude, if good, and with punishment, if evil, and from this decree it appears that I received on that occasion gratitude, not censure nor punishment. [86]

Therefore, up to the date of those transactions it is shown by common consent that my conduct was entirely beneficial to the commonwealth. The proofs are, that my speeches and motions were successful at your deliberations; that my resolutions were carried into effect; that thereby decorations came to the city and to all of you as well as to me; and that for these successes you thanked the gods with sacrifices and processions. [87]

When Philip was driven out of Euboea by your arms, and also,—though these men choke themselves with their denials,—by my policy and my decrees, he cast about for a second plan of attack against Athens; and observing that we consume more imported corn than any other nation, he proposed to get control of the carrying trade in corn. He advanced towards Thrace, and the first thing he did was to claim the help of the Byzantines as his allies in the war against you. When they refused, declaring with entire truth that the terms of alliance included no such obligation, he set up a stockade against their city, planted artillery, and began a siege. [88] I will not further ask what was your proper course in those circumstances,—the answer is too obvious. But who sent reinforcements to the Byzantines and delivered them? Who prevented the estrangement of the Hellespont at that crisis? You, men of Athens; and when I say you, I mean the whole city. Who advised the city, moved the resolutions, took action, devoted himself wholeheartedly and without stint to that business? [89] I did; and I need not argue how profitable my policy was, for you know it by experience. The war in which we then engaged, apart from the renown it brought to you, made all the necessaries of life more abundant and cheaper than the peace we now enjoy, the peace which these worthies cherish to the disadvantage of the city, in view of future expectations! May those expectations fail! May they share only the blessings for which you men of honest intent supplicate the gods! And may they never bestow upon you any share in the principles they have chosen! Now read of the crowns of the Byzantines and of the Perinthians, conferred by them upon the city for these services. [90] “Decree of the Byzantines

[In the recordership of Bosporichus, Damagetus proposed in the Assembly, with the sanction of the Council, that, whereas the Athenian People in former times have been constant friends of the Byzantines and of their allies and kinsmen the Perinthians, and have conferred many great services upon them, and recently, when Philip of Macedon attacked their land and city to exterminate the Byzantines and Perinthians, burning and devastating the land, they came to our aid with a hundred and twenty ships and provisions and arms and infantry, and extricated us from great dangers, and restored our original constitution and our laws and our sepulchres,” [91] “it be resolved by the People of Byzantium and Perinthus to grant to the Athenians rights of intermarriage, citizenship, tenure of land and houses, the seat of honor at the games, access to the Council and the people immediately after the sacrifices, and immunity from all public services for those who wish to settle in our city; also to erect three statues, sixteen cubits in height, in the Bosporeum, representing the People of Athens being crowned by the Peoples of Byzantium and Perinthus; also to send deputations to the Panhellenic gatherings, the Isthmian, Nemean, Olympian, and Pythian games, and there to proclaim the crown wherewith the Athenian People has been crowned by us, that the Greeks may know the merits of the Athenians and the gratitude of the Byzantines and the Perinthians.]” [92]

Read also of the crowns awarded by the inhabitants of the Chersonese.“Decree of the Chersonesites

[The peoples of the Chersonesus inhabiting Sestus, Elaeus, Madytus, and Alopeconnesus, do crown the Council and People of Athens with a golden crown of sixty talents' value,5 and erect an altar to Gratitude and to the People of Athens, because they have been a contributory cause of all the greatest blessings to the peoples of the Chersonesus, having rescued them from Philip and restored their fatherland, their laws, their freedom, and their temples; also in all time to come they will not fail to be grateful and to do them every service in their power. This decree was passed in Confederate Council.]” [93]

Thus my considered policy was not only successful in delivering the Chersonese and Byzantium, in preventing the subjugation of the Hellespont to Philip, and in bringing distinction to the city, but it exhibited to mankind the noble spirit of Athens and the depravity of Philip. For he, the ally of the Byzantines, was besieging them in the sight of all men: could anything be more discreditable and outrageous? [94] But you, who might with justice have found fault with them for earlier acts of trespass, so far from being vindictive and deserting them in their distress, appeared as their deliverers, and by that conduct won renown,—the goodwill of the whole world. Moreover all know that you have awarded crowns to many politicians; but no one can name any man—I mean any statesman or orator—except me, by whose exertions the city itself has been crowned. [95]

I wish to show you that the attack Aeschines made on the Euboeans and the Byzantines by raking up old stories of their disobliging conduct towards you, was mere spiteful calumny,—not only because, as I think you all must know, those stories are false, but because, even if they were entirely true, the merits of my policy are not affected,—by relating, with due brevity, two or three of the noble actions of your own commonwealth; for the public conduct of a state, like the private conduct of a man, should always be guided by its most honor able traditions. [96] When the Lacedaemonians, men of Athens, had the supremacy of land and sea, and were holding with governors and garrisons all the frontiers of Attica, Euboea, Tanagra, all Boeotia, Megara, Aegina, Ceos, and the other islands, for at that time Athens had no ships and no walls, you marched out to Haliartus,6 and again a few days later to Corinth. The Athenians of those days had good reason to bear malice against the Corinthians and the Thebans for their conduct during the Decelean War; but they bore no malice whatever. [97] Yet in making both these expeditions, Aeschines, they were not requiting benefits received, and they knew they were taking risks. They did not use those pleas as excuses for deserting men who had sought their protection. For the sake of honor and glory they willingly encountered those perils,—a righteous and a noble resolve! For every man death is the goal of life, though he keep himself cloistered in his chamber; but it behoves the brave to set their hands to every noble enterprise, bearing before them the buckler of hope, and to endure gallantly whatever fate God may allot. [98] So your forefathers played their part; so also did the elder among yourselves. The Lacedaemonians were no friends or benefactors of ours; they had done many grievous wrongs to our commonwealth; but when the Thebans, after their victory at Leuctra, threatened to exterminate them, you balked that revenge, without fear of the prowess and high repute of the Thebans, without thought of the past misdeeds of the people for whom you imperilled yourselves. [99] And so you taught to all Greece the lesson that, however gravely a nation may have offended against you, you keep your resentment for proper occasions, but if ever their life or their liberty is endangered, you will not indulge your rancor or take your wrongs into account.

Not only towards the Lacedaemonians have you so demeaned yourselves; but when the Thebans were trying to annex Euboea, you were not indifferent; you did not call to mind the injuries you had suffered from Themiso and Theodorus in the matter of Oropus; you carried aid even to them. That was in the early days of the volunteer trierarchs, of whom I was one; but I say nothing of that now. [100] Your deliverance of the island was a generous act, but still more generously, when you had their lives and their cities at your mercy, you restored them honestly to men who had sinned against you, forgetting your wrongs where you found yourselves trusted. I pass over ten thousand instances I could cite,—battles by sea, expeditions by land, campaigns of ancient date and of our own times, in all of which Athens engaged herself for the freedom and salvation of Greece. [101] Having before my eyes the spectacle of a city in all those great enterprises ready to fight the battles of her neighbors, what advice was I to give and what policy to urge, when her deliberations in some measure concerned herself? To bear malice against men who were seeking deliverance? To search for excuses for deserting the common cause? Should I not have deserved death if even in word I had sought to tarnish our honor able traditions? In word, I say; for the deed you would never have done. Of that I am well assured, for if you so wished, what stood in your way? Was it not in your power? Were not Aeschines and his friends there to advise you? [102]

I will now return to my next ensuing public actions; consider them once again in relation to the best interests of the commonwealth. Observing that the navy was going to pieces, that the wealthy were let off with trifling contributions, while citizens of moderate or small means were losing all they had, and that as a result the government was missing its opportunities, I made a statute under which I compelled the wealthy to take their fair share of expense, stopped the oppression of the poor, and, by a measure of great public benefit, caused your naval preparations to be made in good time. [103] Being indicted for this measure, I stood my trial before this court and was acquitted, the prosecutor not getting the fifth part of the votes. Now how much money do you think the first, second, and third classes of contributors on the Naval Boards offered me not to propose the measure, or, failing that, to put it on the list and then drop it on demurrer7?\b It was so large a sum, men of Athens, that I hardly like to name it. [104] It was natural that they should make this attempt. Under the former statutes they might discharge their public services in groups of sixteen, spending little or nothing themselves, but grinding down the needy citizens, whereas by my statute they had to return the full assessment according to their means, and a man who was formerly one of sixteen contributors to a single trireme—for they were dropping the term trierarch and calling themselves contributors-might have to furnish two complete vessels. They offered any amount to get the new rules abrogated and escape their just obligation. [105] Read first the decree,.for which I was indicted and tried, and then the schedules as compiled under the old statute under my statute.“Decree

[In the archonship of Polycles, on the sixteenth of the month Boëdromion, the tribe Hippothontis holding the presidency, Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes, of Paeania, introduced a bill to amend the former law constituting the syndicates for the equipment of triremes. The bill was passed by the Council and the People, and Patrocles of Phlya indicted Demosthenes for a breach of the constitution, and, not obtaining the required proportion of votes, paid the fee of five hundred drachmas.]”

Now read that fine schedule.“Schedule

[The trierarchs to be called up, sixteen for each trireme, from the associations of joint contributors, from the age of twenty-five to that of forty, paying equal contributions to the public service.]” [106]

Now read for comparison the schedule under my statute.“Schedule

[The trierarchs to be chosen according to the assessment of their property at ten talents to a trireme; if the property be assessed above that sum, the public service shall be fixed proportionately up to three triremes and a tender. The same proportion shall be observed where those whose property is under ten talents form a syndicate to make up that sum.]” [107]

Do you think it was a trifling relief I gave to the poor, or a trifling sum that the rich would have spent to escape their obligation? I pride myself not only on my refusal of compromise and on my acquittal, but also on having enacted a beneficial law and proved it such by experience. During the whole war, while the squadrons were organized under my regulations, no trierarch made petition as aggrieved, or appeared as a suppliant in the dockyard temple,8 or was imprisoned by the Admiralty, and no ship was either abandoned at sea and lost to the state, or left in harbor as unseaworthy. [108] Such incidents were frequent under the old regulations, because the public services fell upon poor men, and impossible demands were often made. I transferred the naval obligations from needy to well-to-do people, and so the duty was always discharged. I also claim credit for the very fact that all the measures I adopted brought renown and distinction and strength to the city, and that no measure of mine was invidious, or vexatious, or spiteful, or shabby and unworthy of Athens. [109] You will find that I maintained the same character both in domestic and in Hellenic policy. At home I never preferred the gratitude of the rich to the claims of the poor; in foreign affairs I never coveted the gifts and the friendship of Philip rather than the common interests of all Greece. [110]

My remaining task, I think, is to speak of the proclamation and of the audit; for I hope that what I have already said has been sufficient to satisfy you that my policy was the best, and that I have been the people's friend, and zealous in your service. Yet I pass by the most important of my public actions, first, because I conceive that my next duty is to submit my explanations in respect of the actual charge of illegality, secondly, because, though I say nothing further about the rest of my policy, your own knowledge will serve my purpose equally well. [111]

As for Aeschines' topsy-turvy miscellany of arguments about the statutes transcribed for comparison,9 I vow to Heaven that I do not believe that you understand the greater part of them, and I am sure they were quite unintelligible to me. I can only offer a plain, straightforward plea on the rights of the matter. So far from claiming, as he invidiously suggested just now, that I am not to be called to account, I fully admit that all my life long I have been accountable for all my official acts and public counsels; [112] but for the donations that I promised and gave at my own expense I do say that I am not accountable at any time— you hear that, Aeschines—nor is any other man, though he be one of the nine archons. Is there any law so compact of iniquity and illiberality that, when a man out of sheer generosity has given away his own money, it defrauds him of the gratitude he has earned, drags him before a set of prying informers, and gives them authority to hold an audit of his free donations? There is no such law. If he contradicts me, let him produce the law, and I will be satisfied and hold my peace. [113] But no, the law does not exist, men of Athens; only this man, with his pettifogging spite, because, when I was in charge of the theatric fund, I added gifts of my own to that fund, says, “Ctesiphon gave him a vote of thanks before he had rendered his accounts.” Yes, but the vote of thanks did not concern the accounts which I had to render; it was for my own donations, you pettifogger! “But you were also a Commissioner of Fortifications.” Why, that is how I earned my vote of thanks: I made a present of the money I had spent, and did not charge it to the public account. The account requires an audit and checkers; the benefaction deserves gratitude and formal thanks, and that is the very reason for Ctesiphon's proposition. [114] That this distinction is recognized both in the statutes and in your moral feelings I can prove by many instances. Nausicles, for example, has been repeatedly decorated by you for the money he spent out of his own pocket when serving as military commander. When Diotimus, and on another occasion Charidemus, had made a present of shields, they were crowned. Then there is our friend Neoptolemus, who has received distinctions for donations given by him as Commissioner for sundry public works. It would be quite intolerable that it should either be illegal for a man holding any office to make presents to the government, or that, when he has made them, instead of receiving thanks, he should be subjected to an audit. [115] To prove the truth of my statement, please take and read the actual words of the decrees made in the cases I have cited. Read.“Decree

[Archonship of Demonicus of Phlya, on the twenty-sixth day of Boedromion, with sanction of Council and People: Callias of Phrearrii proposed that the Council and People resolve to crown Nausicles, the commander of the infantry, because, when Philo, the official paymaster, was prevented by storms from sailing with pay for the two thousand Athenian infantry serving in Imbros to assist the Athenian residents in that island, he paid them from his private means, and did not send in a claim to the people; and that the crown be proclaimed at the Dionysia at the performance of the new tragedies.]” [116] “Another Decree[Proposed by Callias of Phrearrii, and put to vote by the presidents, with sanction of Council: that, whereas Charidemus, dispatched to Salamis in command of the infantry, and Diotimus, commanding the cavalry, when in the battle at the river some of the soldiers had been disarmed by the enemy, did at their own expense arm the younger men with eight hundred shields, it be resolved by the Council and People to crown Charidemus and Diotimus with a golden crown, and to proclaim it at the great Panathenaea during the gymnastic contest, and at the Dionysia at the performance of the new tragedies; and that the proclamation be entrusted to the judicial archons, the presidents, and the stewards of the festival.]” [117]

Every one of the persons mentioned, Aeschines, was liable to audit in respect of the office he held, but not of the services for which he was decorated. It follows that I am not liable; for, surely, I have the same rights under the same conditions as anybody else! I made donations. For those donations I am thanked, not being subject to audit for what I gave. I held office. Yes, and I have submitted to audit for my offices, though not for my gifts. Ah, but perhaps I was guilty of official misconduct? Well, the auditors brought me into court—and no complaint from you! [118]

To prove that Aeschines himself testifies that I have been crowned for matters in which I was audit-free, take and read the whole of the decree that was drawn in my favor. The proof that his prosecution is vindictive will appear from those sentences in the provisional decree which he has not indicted. Read.“Decree

[In the archonship of Euthycles, on the twenty-third day of Pyanepsion, the tribe Oeneis then holding the presidency, Ctesiphon, son of Leosthenes, of Anaphlystus, proposed that, whereas Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes, of Paeania, having been appointed superintendent of the repair of the fortifications, and having spent upon the works three talents from his private means, has made the same a benevolence to the people; and whereas, having been appointed treasurer of the Theatrical Fund, he gave to the representatives of all the tribes one hundred minas for sacrifices, it be resolved by the Council and People of Athens to commend the said Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes, of Paeania, for his merits and for the generosity which he has constantly displayed on every occasion towards the People of Athens, and to crown him with a golden crown, and to proclaim the crown in the theatre at the Dionysia at the performance of the new tragedies and that the proclamation be entrusted to the steward of the festival.]” [119]

Here, then, are my donations, in the decree—but not in your indictment. Your prosecution is directed to the rewards which the Council says that I ought to receive for them. Acceptance of gifts you admit to be legal; gratitude for gifts you indict for illegality. In Heaven's name, what do we mean by dishonesty and malignity, if you are not dishonest and malignant? [120]

As for the proclamation in the Theatre, I will not insist that thousands of names have been a thousand times so proclaimed, nor that I myself have been crowned again and again before now. But, really now, are you so unintelligent and blind, Aeschines, that you are incapable of reflecting that a crown is equally gratifying to the person crowned wheresoever it is proclaimed, but that the proclamation is made in the Theatre merely for the sake of those by whom it is conferred? For the whole vast audience is stimulated to do service to the commonwealth, and applauds the exhibition of gratitude rather than the recipient; and that is the reason why the state has enacted this statute. Please take and read it.“Law

[In cases where crowns are bestowed by any of the townships, the proclamation of the crown shall be made within the respective townships, unless the crown is bestowed by the People of Athens or by the Council, in which case it shall be lawful to proclaim it in the Theatre at the Dionysia.]” [121]

You hear, Aeschines, how the statute expressly makes an exception: “persons named in any decree of the Council or the Assembly always excepted. They are to be proclaimed.” Then why this miserable pettifogging? Why these insincere arguments? Why do you not try hellebore for your complaint? Are you not ashamed to prosecute for spite, not for crime; misquoting this statute, curtailing that statute, when they ought to be read in their entirety to a jury sworn to vote according to their direction? [122] And, while behaving like that, you treat us to your definition of all the qualities proper to a patriotic politician—as though you had bespoken a statue according to specification, and it had been delivered without the qualities specified ! As though talk, not deeds and policy, were the criterion of patriotism ! And then you raise your voice, like a clown at a carnival,10 and pelt me with epithets both decent and obscene, suitable for yourself and your kindred, but not for me. [123]

Here is another point, men of Athens. The difference between railing and accusation I take to be this: accusation implies crimes punishable by law; railing, such abuse as quarrelsome people vent upon one another according to their disposition. These law courts, if I am not mistaken, were built by our ancestors, not that we should convene you here to listen to us taunting one another with the secret scandal of private life, but that we should here bring home to the guilty offences against the public weal. [124] Aeschines knows that as well as I do; but he has a keener taste for scurrility than for accusation. However, even in that respect he deserves to get as good as he gives. I will come to that presently; meantime I will ask him just one question. Are we to call you the enemy of Athens, Aeschines, or my enemy? Mine, of course. Yet you let slip your proper opportunities of bringing me to justice on behalf of the citizens, if I had done wrong, by audit, by indictment, by any sort of legal procedure; [125] but here, where I am invulnerable on every ground, by law, by lapse of time, by limitation, by many earlier judgements covering every point, by default of any previous conviction for any public offence, here, where the country must take her share in the repute or disrepute of measures that were approved by the people, here you have met me face to face. You pose as my enemy; are you sure you are not the enemy of the people? [126]

A righteous and conscientious verdict is now sufficiently indicated; but I have still, as it seems—not because I have any taste for railing, but because of his calumnies—to state the bare necessary facts about Aeschines, in return for a great many lies. I must let you know who this man, who starts on vituperation so glibly—who ridicules certain words of mine though he has himself said things that every decent man would shrink from uttering—really is, and what is his parentage. [127] Why, if my calumniator had been Aeacus, or Rhadamanthus, or Minos, instead of a mere scandalmonger, a market-place loafer, a poor devil of a clerk, he could hardly have used such language, or equipped himself with such offensive expressions. Hark to his melodramatic bombast: “Oh, Earth! Oh, Sun! Oh, Virtue,” and all that vaporing; his appeals to “intelligence and education, whereby we discriminate between things of good and evil report”—for that was the sort of rubbish you heard him spouting. [128] Virtue! you runagate; what have you or your family to do with virtue? How do you distinguish between good and evil report? Where and how did you qualify as a moralist? Where did you get your right to talk about education? No really educated man would use such language about himself, but would rather blush to hear it from others; but people like you, who make stupid pretensions to the culture of which they are utterly destitute, succeed in disgusting everybody whenever they open their lips, but never in making the impression they desire. [129]

I am at no loss for information about you and your family; but I am at a loss where to begin. Shall I relate how your father Tromes was a slave in the house of Elpias, who kept an elementary school near the Temple of Theseus, and how he wore shackles on his legs and a timber collar round his neck? or how your mother practised daylight nuptials in an outhouse next door to Heros the bone-setter,11 and so brought you up to act in tableaux vivants and to excel in minor parts on the stage? However, everybody knows that without being told by me. Shall I tell you how Phormio the boatswain, a slave of Dio of Phrearrii, uplifted her from that chaste profession? But I protest that, however well the story becomes you, I am afraid I may be thought to have chosen topics unbecoming to myself. [130] I will pass by those early days, and begin with his conduct of his own life; for indeed it has been no ordinary life, but such as is an abomination to a free people. Only recently— recently, do I say? Why it was only the day before yesterday when he became simultaneously an Athenian and an orator, and, by the addition of two syllables, transformed his father from Tromes to Atrometus, and bestowed upon his mother the high sounding name of Glaucothea, although she was universally known as the Banshee, a nickname she owed to the pleasing diversity of her acts and experiences—it can have no other origin. [131] You were raised from servitude to freedom, and from beggary to opulence, by the favor of your fellow-citizens, and yet you are so thankless and ill-conditioned that, instead of showing them your gratitude, you take the pay of their enemies and conduct political intrigues to their detriment. I will not deal with speeches which, on a disputable construction, may be called patriotic, but I will recall to memory acts by which he was proved beyond doubt to have served your enemies. [132]

You all remember Antiphon, the man who was struck off the register, and came back to Athens after promising Philip that he would set fire to the dockyard. When I had caught him in hiding at Peiraeus, and brought him before the Assembly, this malignant fellow raised a huge outcry about my scandalous and undemocratic conduct in assaulting citizens in distress and breaking into houses without a warrant, and so procured his acquittal. [133] Had not the Council of the Areopagus, becoming aware of the facts, and seeing that you had made a most inopportune blunder, started further inquiries, arrested the man, and brought him into court a second time, the vile traitor would have slipped out of your hands and eluded justice, being smuggled out of the city by our bombastic phrase-monger. As it was, you put him on the rack and then executed him, and you ought to have done the same to Aeschines. [134] In fact, the Council of the Areopagus knew well that Aeschines had been to blame throughout this affair, and therefore when, after choosing him by vote to speak in support of your claims to the Temple at Delos, by a misapprehension such as has often been fatal to your public interests, you invited the cooperation of that Council and gave them full authority, they promptly rejected him as a traitor, and gave the brief to Hypereides. On this occasion the ballot was taken at the altar, and not a single vote was cast for this wretch. [135] To prove the truth of my statement, please call the witnesses.“Witnesses

[We, Callias of Sunium, Zeno of Phlya, Cleon of Phalerum, Demonicus of Marathon, on behalf of all the councillors, bear witness for Demosthenes that, when the people elected Aeschines state-advocate before the Amphictyons in the matter of the temple at Delos, we in Council judged Hypereides more worthy to speak on behalf of the state, and Hypereides was accordingly commissioned.]” [136]

Thus by rejecting this man from his spokesmanship, and giving the appointment to another, the Council branded him as a traitor and an enemy to the people.

So much for one of his spirited performances. Is it not just like the charges he brings against me? Now let me remind you of another. Philip had sent to us Pytho of Byzantium in company with an embassy representing all his allies, hoping to bring dishonor upon Athens and convict her of injustice. Pytho was mightily confident, denouncing you with a full spate of eloquence, but I did not shrink from the encounter. I stood up and contradicted him, refusing to surrender the just claims of the commonwealth, and proving that Philip was in the wrong so conclusively that his own allies rose and admitted I was right; but Aeschines took Philip's side throughout, and bore witness, even false witness, against his own country. [137]

Nor did that satisfy him. At a later date he was caught again in the company of the spy Anaxinus at the house of Thraso. Yet a man who secretly met and conversed with a spy sent by the enemy must have been himself a spy by disposition and an enemy of his country. To prove the truth of my statement, please call the witnesses.“Witnesses

[Teledemus, son of Cleon, Hypereides, son of Callaeschrus, Nicomachus, son of Diophantus, bear witness for Demosthenes, and have taken oath before the Generals that to their knowledge Aeschines, son of Atrometus, of Cothocidae, comes by night to the house of Thraso and holds communication with Anaxinus, who has been proved to be a spy from Philip. These depositions were lodged with Nicias on the third day of Hecatombaeon.]” [138]

I omit thousands of stories that I could tell you about him. The fact is, I could cite many clear instances of his conduct at that time, helping the enemy and maligning me; only it is not your way to score up such offences for accurate remembrance and due resentment. You have a vicious habit of allowing too much indulgence to anyone who chooses by spiteful calumnies to trip up the heels of a man who gives you good advice. You give away a sound policy in exchange for the entertainment you derive from invective; and so it is easier and safer for a public man to serve your enemies and pocket their pay than to choose and maintain a patriotic attitude. [139]

Though it was a scandalous shame enough, God knows, openly to take Philip's side against his own country even before the war, make him a present, if you choose, make him a present of that. But when our merchantmen had been openly plundered, when the Chersonese was being ravaged, when the man was advancing upon Attica, when there could no longer be any doubt about the position, but war had already begun—even after that this malignant mumbler of blank verse can point to no patriotic act. No profitable proposition, great or small, stands to the credit of Aeschines. If he claims any, let him cite it now, while my hour-glass12 runs. But there is none. Now one of two things: either he made no alternative proposal because he could find no fault with my policy, or he did not disclose his amendments because his object was the advantage of the enemy. [140]

Did he then refrain from speech as well as from moving resolutions, when there was any mischief to be done? Why, no one else could get in a word! Apparently the city could stand, and he could do without detection, almost anything; but there was one performance of his that really gave the finishing touch to his earlier efforts. On that he has lavished all his wealth of words, citing in full the decrees against the Amphissians of Locri, in the hope of distorting the truth. But he can never disguise it. No, Aeschines, you will never wash out that stain; you cannot talk long enough for that! [141]

In your presence, men of Athens, I now invoke all the gods and goddesses whose domain is the land of Attica. I invoke also Pythian Apollo, the ancestral divinity of this city, and I solemnly beseech them all that, if I shall speak the truth now, and if I spoke truth to my countrymen when first I saw this miscreant putting his hand to that transaction—for I knew it, I knew it instantly—they may grant to me prosperity and salvation. But if with malice or in the spirit of personal rivalry I lay against him any false charge, I pray that they may dispossess me of everything that is good. [142]

This imprecation I address to Heaven, and this solemn averment I now make, because, though I have letters, deposited in the Record Office, enabling me to offer absolute proof, and though I am sure that you have not forgotten the transaction, I am afraid that his ability may be deemed inadequate for such enormous mischief. That mistake was made before, when by his false reports he contrived the destruction of the unhappy Phocians. [143] The war at Amphissa, that is, the war that brought Philip to Elatea, and caused the election, as general of the Amphictyons, of a man who turned all Greece upside down, was due to the machinations of this man. In his own single person he was the author of all our worst evils. I protested instantly; I raised my voice in Assembly; I cried aloud, “You are bringing war into Attica, Aeschines, an Amphictyonic war;” but a compact body of men, sitting there under his direction, would not let me speak, and the rest were merely astonished and imagined that I was laying an idle charge in private spite. [144] Men of Athens, you were not allowed to hear me then; but now you must and shall hear what was the real nature of that business, what was the purpose of the conspiracy, and how it was accomplished. You will see how skilfully it was contrived; you will get the benefit of new insight into your own politics and you will form an idea of the supreme craftiness of Philip. [145]

For Philip there could be no end or quittance of hostilities with Athens unless he should make the Thebans and Thessalians her enemies. Now, aIthough your commanders were conducting the war against him without ability and without success, he was vastly distressed both by the campaign and by the privateers; for he could neither export the products of his own country, nor import what he needed for himself. [146] At that time he had no supremacy at sea, nor could he reach Attica by land unless the Thessalians followed his banner and the Thebans gave him free passage. In spite of his successes against the commanders you sent out, such as they were—I have nothing to say of their failure—he found himself in trouble by reason of conditions of locality and of the comparative resources of the two combatants. [147] Now, if he should invite the Thebans or the Thessalians to take up his private quarrel and march against you, he could expect no attention; but if he should espouse their joint grievances and be chosen as their leader, he might hope to succeed by a mixture of deception and persuasion. Very well; he sets to work—and observe how cleverly he managed it—to throw the Pylaean Congress into confusion and to implicate the Amphictyonic Council in warfare, feeling certain that they would immediately beg him to deal with the situation. [148] If, however, the question should be introduced by any of the commissioners of religion sent by him or by any allies of his, the Thebans and Thessalians, as he expected, would be suspicious and all on their guard; but, if the operator should be an Athenian, representing his opponents, he conceived that he would easily escape detection. And such was the actual result. [149]

How did he manage it? By hiring Aeschines. Nobody, of course, had any inkling; nobody was watching— according to your usual custom! Aeschines was nominated for the deputation to Thermopylae; three or four hands were held up, and he was declared elected. He repaired to the Council, invested with all the prestige of Athens, and at once, putting aside and disregarding everything else, addressed himself to the business for which he had taken pay. He concocted a plausible speech about the legendary origin of the consecration of the Cirrhaean territory, and by this narration induced the commissioners, men unversed in oratory and unsuspicious of consequences, [150] to vote for a tour of survey of the land which the Amphissians said they were cultivating because it belonged to them, while Aeschines accused them of intruding on consecrated ground. It is not true that these Locrians w ere meditating any suit against Athens, or any other action such as he now falsely alleges in excuse. You will find a proof of his falsehood in this argument:—Of course it was not competent for the Locrians to take proceedings against Athens without serving a summons. Well, who served it? From what office was it issued? Name anyone who knows; point him out. You cannot; it was a false and idle pretext of yours. [151]

With Aeschines as their trusty guide, the Amphictyons began their tour of the territory; but the Locrians fell upon them, were within an ace of spearing the whole crowd, and did actually seize and carry off the sacred persons of several commissioners. Complaints were promptly laid, and so war against the Amphissians was provoked. At the outset Cottyphus was commander of an army composed of Amphictyons; but some divisions never joined, and those who joined did nothing at all. The persons engaged in the plot, mostly scoundrels of old standing from Thessaly and other states, prepared to put the war into Philip's hands at the next congress. [152] They found a plausible pretext: you must either, they said, pay contributions to a war-chest, maintain mercenary forces, and levy a fine on all recusants, or else elect Philip as commander-in-chief: and so, to cut a long story short, elected he was on this plea. He lost no time, collected his army, pretended to march to Cirrha, and then bade the Cirrhaeans and the Locrians alike good-bye and good luck, and seized Elatea. [153] When the Thebans saw the trick, they promptly changed their minds and joined our side; otherwise the whole business would have descended upon Athens like a torrent from the hills. In fact, the Thebans checked him for the moment; and for that relief, men of Athens, you have first and chiefly to thank the kindness of some friendly god, but in a secondary degree, and so far as one man could help, you have to thank me. Hand me those decrees, with the dates of the several transactions. They will show you what a mass of trouble this consummate villain provoked; and yet he was never punished. [154] Please read the decrees.“Resolution of the Amphictyons

[In the priesthood of Cleinagoras, at the spring session, it was resolved by the Wardens and the Assessors of the Amphictyons, and by the General Synod of the Amphictyons, that, whereas Amphissians are encroaching upon the sacred territory and are sowing and grazing the same, the Wardens and Assessors shall attend and mark out the boundaries with pillars, and shall forbid the Amphissians hereafter to encroach.]” [155] “Another Resolution

[In the priesthood of Cleinagoras, at the spring session, it was resolved by the Wardens, Assessors, and General Synod that whereas the Amphissians who have occupied the sacred territory are tilling and grazing the same, and, when forbidden to do so, have appeared in arms and resisted the common assembly of the Greeks by force, and have actually wounded some of them, the general appointed by some of the Amphictyons, Cottyphus the Arcadian, shall go as an ambassador to Philip of Macedon and request him to come to the help of Apollo and the Amphictyons, that he may not suffer the god to be outraged by the impious Amphissians; he shall also announce that Philip is appointed General with full powers by the Greeks who are members of the Assembly of the Amphictyons.]”

Now read the dates of these transactions. They are all dates at which he was or spokesman at the Congress of Thermopylae.“Record of Dates

[Archonship of Mnesitheides, on the sixteenth of the month Anthesterion.]” [156]

Now hand me the letter which Philip dispatched to his Peloponnesian allies, when the Thebans disobeyed him. Even that letter will give you a clear proof that he was concealing the true reasons of his enterprise, namely his designs against Greece, and especially against Thebes and Athens, and was only pretending zeal for the national interests as defined by the Amphictyonic Council. But the man who provided him with that basis of action and those pretexts was Aeschines. Read. [157] “Letter

[Philip, king of Macedonia, to the public officers and councillors of the allied Peloponnesians and to all his other Allies, greeting. Since the Ozolian Locrians, settled at Amphissa, are outraging the temple of Apollo at Delphi and come in arms to plunder the sacred territory, I consent to join you in helping the god and in punishing those who transgress in any way the principles of religion. Therefore meet under arms at Phocis with forty days' provisions in the next month, styled Lous by us, Boedromion by the Athenians, and Panemus by the Corinthians. Those who, being pledged to us, do not join us in full force, we shall treat as punishable. Farewell.]” [158]

You see how he avoids personal excuses, and takes shelter in Amphictyonic reasons. Who gave him his equipment of deceit? Who supplied him with these pretexts ? Who above all others is to blame for all the ensuing mischief? Who but Aeschines? Then do not go about saying, men of Athens, that these disasters were brought upon Greece by Philip alone. I solemnly aver that it was not one man, but a gang of traitors in every state. [159] One of them was Aeschines; and, if I am to tell the whole truth without concealment, I will not flinch from declaring him the evil genius of all the men, all the districts, and all the cities that have perished. Let the man who sowed the seed bear the guilt of the harvest. I marvel that you did not avert your faces the moment you set eyes on him; only, as it seems, there is a cloud of darkness between you and the truth. [160]

In dealing with his unpatriotic conduct I have approached the question of the very different policy pursued by myself. For many reasons you may fairly be asked to listen to my account of that policy, but chiefly because it would be discreditable, men of Athens, that you should be impatient of the mer e recital of those arduous labors on your behalf which I had patience to endure. [161] When I saw that the Thebans, and perhaps even the Athenians, under the influence of the adherents of Philip and the corrupt faction in the two states, were disregarding a real danger that called for earnest vigilance, the danger of permitting Philip's aggrandizement, and were taking no single measure of precaution, but were ready to quarrel and attack each other, I persistently watched for opportunities of averting that danger, not merely because my own judgement warned me that such solicitude was necessary, [162] but because I knew that Aristophon, and after him Eubulus, had always wished to promote a good understanding between Athens and Thebes. In that regard they were always of one mind, despite their constant disagreement on other points of policy. While those statesmen were alive, Aeschines, you pestered them with your flattery, like the sly fox you are; now they are dead, you denounce them, unaware that, when you reproach me with a Theban policy, your censure does not affect me so much as the men who approved of a Theban alliance before I did. But that is a digression. [163] I say that, when Aeschines had provoked the war in Amphissa, and when his associates had helped him to aggravate our enmity towards Thebes, the result was that Philip marched against us, in pursuance of the purpose for which they had embroiled the states, and that, if we had not roused ourselves a little just in time, we could never have retrieved our position; so far had these men carried the quarrel. You will better understand the state of feeling between the two cities, when you have heard the decrees and the answers sent thereto. Please take and read these papers. [164] “Decree

[In the archonship of Heropythus, on the twenty-fifth day of the month Elaphebolion, the tribe Erechtheis then holding the presidency, on the advice of the Council and the Generals: whereas Philip has captured so me of the cities of our neighbors and is besieging others, and finally is preparing to advance against Attica, ignoring our agreement with him, and is meditating a breach of his oaths and of the peace, violating all mutual pledges, be it resolved by the Council and People to send ambassadors to confer with him and to summon him to preserve in particular his agreement and compact with us, and, failing that, to give the City time for decision and to conclude an armistice until the month of Thargelion. The following members of Council were chosen: Simus of Anagyrus, Euthydemos of Phylae, Bulagoras of Alopece.]” [165] “Another Decree

[In the archonship of Heropythus, on the thirtieth of the month Munychion, on the advice of the Commander-in-chief: whereas Philip aims at setting the Thebans at variance with us, and has prepared to march with all his forces to the parts nearest to Attica, violating his existing arrangements with us, be it resolved by the Council and People to send a herald and ambassadors to request and exhort him to conclude an armistice, in order that the People may decide according to circumstances; for even now the People have not decided to send a force if they can obtain reasonable terms. The following were chosen from the Council: Nearchus, son of Sosinomus, Polycrates, son of Epiphron; and as herald from the People, Eunomus of Anaphlystus.]” [166]

Now read the replies. “Reply to the Athenians

[Philip, King of Macedonia, to the Council and People of Athens, greeting.—I am not ignorant of the policy which you have adopted towards us from the first, nor of your efforts to win over the Thessalians and Thebans, and the Boeotians as well. They, however, are wiser, and will not submit their policy to your dictation, but take their stand upon self-interest. And now you change your tactics, and send ambassadors with a herald to me, reminding me of our compact and asking for an armistice, though we have done you no wrong. However, after hearing your ambassadors, I accede to your request, and am ready to conclude an armistice, if you will dismiss your evil counsellors, and punish them with suitable degradation. Farewell.]” [167] “Reply to the Thebans

[Philip, King of Macedonia, to the Council and People of Thebes, greeting.—I have received your letter, in which you renew goodwill and peace with me. I understand, however, that the Athenians are displaying the utmost eagerness in their desire to win your acceptance of their overtures. Now formerly I used to blame you for a tendency to put faith in their hopes and to adopt their policy; but now I am glad to learn that you have preferred to be at peace with me rather than to adopt the opinions of others. Especially do I commend you for forming a safer judgement on these matters and for retaining your goodwill toward us, which I expect will be of no small advantage to you, if you adhere to this purpose. Farewell.]” [168]

Having, through the agency of these men, promoted such relations between the two cities, and being encouraged by these decrees and these replies, Philip came with his forces and occupied Elatea, imagining that, whatever might happen, you and the Thebans would never come to agreement. You all remember the commotion that ensued at Athens; nevertheless let me recount some small but essential details. [169]

Evening had already fallen when a messenger arrived bringing to the presiding councillors13 the news that Elatea had been taken. They were sitting at supper, but they instantly rose from table, cleared the booths in the marketplace of their occupants, and unfolded the hurdles,14 while others summoned the commanders and ordered the attendance of the trumpeter. The commotion spread through the whole city. At daybreak on the morrow the presidents summoned the Council to the Council House, and the citizens flocked to the place of assembly. Before the Council could introduce the business and prepare the agenda, the whole body of citizens had taken their places on the hill. [170] The Council arrived, the presiding Councillors formally reported the intelligence they had received, and the courier was introduced. As soon as he had told his tale, the marshal put the question, Who wishes to speak? No one came forward. The marshal repeated his question again and again, but still no one rose to speak, although all the commanders were there, and all the orators, and although the country with her civic voice was calling for the man who should speak for her salvation; for we may justly regard the voice, which the crier raises as the laws direct, as the civic voice of our country. [171] Now had it been the duty of every man who desired the salvation of Athens to come forward, all of you, aye, every Athenian citizen, would have risen in your places and made your way to the tribune, for that salvation, I am well assured, was the desire of every heart. If that duty had fallen upon the wealthy, the Three Hundred would have risen; if upon those who were alike wealthy and patriotic, the men who thereafter gave those generous donations which signalized at once their wealth and their patriotism. [172] But, it seems, the call of the crisis on that momentous day was not only for the wealthy patriot but for the man who from first to last had closely watched the sequence of events, and had rightly fathomed the purposes and the desires of Philip; for anyone who had not grasped those purposes, or had not studied them long beforehand, however patriotic and however wealthy he might be, was not the man to appreciate the needs of the hour, or to find any counsel to offer to the people. [173] On that day, then, the call was manifestly for me. I came forward and addressed you; and I will now ask your careful attention to the speech I then made, for two reasons: first, that you may understand that I, alone among your orators and politicians, did not desert the post of patriotism in the hour of peril, but approved myself as one who in the midst of panic could, both in speech and in suggestion, do what duty bade on your behalf; and secondly, because at the cost of a few minutes of study you may gain experience which will stand you in good stead for your policy in times to come. [174]

What I said was this. “In my judgement the present position of affairs is misunderstood by those who are so much alarmed by the apprehension that all Thebes is at the disposal of Philip. If that were true, I am quite certain that we should have heard of him not at Elatea but on our own frontiers. But I know with certainty that he has come to complete his preparations at Thebes. Let me tell you how he is situated. [175] He has at his command all those Thebans whom he was able to win by fraud or corruption; but he cannot by any means prevail upon those who have resisted him from the first and who are still his opponents. His present object, and the purpose for which he has occupied Elatea, is that, by an exhibit ion of his power in the neighborhood of Thebes, and by bringing up armed forces, he may encourage and embolden his friends, and overawe his adversaries, hoping that the latter will yield to intimidation or to compulsion and will so concede what at present they refuse. [176] If,” I added, “at this crisis we are determined to remember all the provocative dealings of the Thebans with us in past time, and to distrust them still on the score of enmity, in the first place, we shall be acting exactly as Philip would beg us to act; and secondly, I am afraid that, if his present opponents give him a favorable reception, and unanimously become Philip's men, both parties will join in an invasion of Attica. If, however, you will listen to my advice, and apply your minds to consideration, but not to captious criticism, of what I lay before you, I believe that you will find my proposals acceptable, and that I shall disperse the perils that overhang our city. [177] Let me then tell you what to do. In the first place, get rid of your present terror; or rather direct it elsewhere, and be as frightened as you will for the Thebans. They lie nearer to peril; the danger threatens them first. Next, let all men of military age, and all the cavalry, march out to Eleusis, and show the world that you are under arms. Then your partisans at Thebes will have equal freedom to speak their minds for righteousness' sake, knowing that, just as the men who have sold their country to Philip are supported by a force at Elatea ready to come to their aid, so also you are in readiness to help men who are willing to fight for independence, and will come to their aid, if they are attacked. [178] In the next place, I would have you appoint ten ambassadors, and give them authority, in consultation with the military commanders, to determine the time of the march to Thebes and the conduct of the campaign. Now for my advice on the treatment of the difficulty after the arrival of the ambassadors at Thebes. I beg your careful attention to this. Do not ask any favor of the Thebans: for that the occasion is not creditable. Pledge yourselves to come to their aid at their call, on the ground that they are in extremities, and that we have a clearer foresight of the future than they. And so, if they accept our overtures and take our advice, we shall have accomplished our desires and have acted on a principle worthy of our traditions; while, if success does not fall to our lot, they will have themselves to blame for their immediate blunder, and we shall have done nothing mean or discreditable.” [179]

In those words, or to that effect, I spoke, and left the tribune. My speech was universally applauded, and there was no opposition. I did not speak without moving, nor move without serving as ambassador, nor serve without convincing the Thebans. I went through the whole business from beginning to end, devoting myself ungrudgingly to your service in face of the perils that encompassed our city. Please produce the decree made at that time. [180]

What part do you wish me to assign to you, Aeschines, and what to myself, in the drama of that great day? Am I to be cast for the part of Battalus,15 as you dub me when you scold me so scornfully, and you for no vulgar role but to play some hero of legendary tragedy, Cresphontes, or Creon, or, shall we say, Oenomaus, whom you once murdered by your bad acting at Collytus? Anyhow, on that occasion Battalus of Paeania deserved better of his country than Oenomaus of Cothocidae. You were utterly useless; I did everything that became a good citizen. Please read the decree. [181] “Decree of Demosthenes

[In the archonship of Nausicles, the tribe Aeantis then holding the presidency, on the sixteenth day of Scirophorion, Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes, of Paeania, proposed that, whereas Philip of Macedon is proved in the past to have violated the terms of peace agreed to between him and the People of Athens, disregarding his oaths and the principles of equity as recognized among all the Greeks: and whereas he appropriates cities not belonging to him, and has captured in war some that actually belonged to the Athenians without provocation from the Athenian people, and is today making great advances in violence and cruelty,” [182] “for of some Greek cities he overthrows the constitution, putting a garrison in them, others he razes to the ground, selling the inhabitants into slavery, others he colonizes with barbarians instead of Greeks, handing over to them the temples and the sepulchres, acting as might be expected from his nationality and his character and making insolent use of his present fortune, forgetful of how he rose to greatness unexpectedly from a small and ordinary beginning;” [183] “and whereas, so long as the People of Athens saw him seizing barbarian states, belonging to themselves alone, they conceived that their own wrongs were of less account, but now, seeing Greek states outraged or wiped out, they consider it a scandal and unworthy of the reputation of their ancestors to suffer the Greeks to he enslaved;” [184] “therefore be it resolved by the Council and People of Athens, after offering prayers and sacrifices to the gods and heroes who guard the city and country of the Athenians, and after taking into consideration their ancestors' merits, in that they ranked the preservation of the liberties of Greece above the claims of their own state, that two hundred ships be launched, and that the Admiral sail into the Straits of Thermopylae, and that the General and commander of the cavalry march out with the infantry and cavalry to Eleusis; also that ambassadors be sent to the other Greeks, but first of all to the Thebans, because Philip is nearest to their territory,” [185] “and exhort them not to be dismayed at Philip, but to hold fast to their own liberty and the liberty of the other Greeks, assuring them t hat the people of Athens, harboring no ill will for previous mutual differences between the states, will help them with troops, money, ammunition, and arms, knowing that, while it is an honor able ambition for Greeks to dispute with each other for the hegemony, yet to be ruled by a man of alien race and to be robbed by him of that hegemony is unworthy both of the reputation of the Greeks and of the merits of their ancestors.” [186] “Furthermore, the People of Athens regard the people of Thebes as in no way alien either in race or in nationality. They remember the services rendered by their own ancestors to the ancestors of the Thebans, for, when the sons of Heracles were dispossessed by the Peloponnesians of their paternal dominion, they restored them, overcoming in battle those who were trying to oppose the descendants of Heracles; and we harbored Oedipus and his family when they were banished; and many other notable acts of kindness have we done to the Thebans.” [187] “Therefore now also the people of Athens will not desert the cause of Thebes and the other Greeks. An alliance shall be arranged with them, and rights of intermarriage established, and oaths exchanged. —Ambassadors appointed: Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes, of Paeania, Hypereides, son of Cleander, of Sphettus, Mnesitheides, son of Antiphanes, of Phrearrii, Democrates, son of Sophilus, of Phlya, Callaeschrus, son of Diotimus, of Cothocidae.]” [188]

Such was the first beginning and such the basis of our negotiations with Thebes; the first, I say, for hitherto the two cities had been dragged by these men into mutual enmity, hatred, and distrust. The decree was made, and the danger that environed the city passed away like a summer cloud. Then was the time therefore for an honest man to point, if he could, to a better way; now cavilling comes too late. [189] That is the salient difference between the statesman and the charlatan, who are indeed in all respects unlike one another. The statesman declares his judgement before the event, and accepts responsibility to his followers, to fortune, to the chances of the hour, to every critic of his policy. The charlatan holds his peace when he ought to speak, and then croaks over any untoward result. [190] That then, as I said, was the opportunity for any man who cared for Athens or for honest discussion. But I will make a large concession. If even now any man can point to a better way, nay, if any policy whatever, save mine, was even praticable, I plead guilty. If anyone has now discerned any course which might have been taken profitably then, I admit that I ought not to have missed it. But if there is none, if there never was any, if to this very day no one is able to name any, what was a statesman to do? Surely to choose the best policy among those that were visible and feasible. [191] That is what I did, Aeschines, when the marshal put the question, “Who wishes to speak?” He did not ask, “Who wishes to rake up old grievances?” or, “Who wishes to be answerable for the future?” In those days you sat speechless at every assembly; I came forward and spoke. You had nothing to say then; very well,—show us our duty now. Tell me what plan I ought to have discovered. Tell me what favorable opportunity was lost to the state by my default. Tell me of any alliance, or any negotiation, to which I ought by preference to have introduced the people. [192]

Bygones are bygones, all the world over. No one proposes deliberation about the past; it is the present and the future that call the statesman to his post. And at that time, as we all thought, there were future perils and there were present perils. Look at the policy I chose in the light of those perils; do not carp at results. The issue depends on the will of a higher Power; the mind of the statesman is manifested in his policy. [193] You must not accuse me of crime, because Philip happened to win the battle; for the event was in God's hands, not mine. Show me that I did not adopt, as far as human calculation could go, all the measures that were practicable, or that I did not carry them out with honesty and diligence, and with an industry that overtaxed my strength; or else show me that the enterprises I initiated were not honor able, worthy of Athens, and inevitable. Prove that, and then denounce me; but not till then. [194] If the hurricane that burst upon us has been too strong, not for us alone, but for every Hellenic state,—what then? As if a shipowner, who had done everything in his power for a prosperous voyage, who had equipped his craft with every appliance he could think of to ensure her safety, should encounter a great storm, and then, because his tackle was overstrained or even shattered, should be accused of the crime of shipwreck! “But,” he might say, “I was not at the helm”—nor was I in command of the army—“and I could not control fortune, but fortune controls all.” [195]

Here is another point for your consideration. If we were destined to disaster when we fought with the Thebans at our side, what were we to expect if we had lacked even that alliance, and if they had joined Philip, a union for which he exerted all his powers of appeal? And if, after a battle fought three days' march from the frontier, such danger and such alarm beset the city, what must we have expected after suffering the same defeat within our own borders? Do you not see that, as it was, one, or two, or three days gave the city time for resistance, concentration, recovery, for much that made for deliverance; as it might have been—but I will not mention an experience that we were spared by divine favor, and by the protection of that very alliance which you denounce. [196]

Gentlemen of the jury, all this long story is intended for you, and for that circle of hearers outside the barrier. For this contemptible fellow, I have a short, plain, and sufficient answer. Aeschines, if the future was revealed to you and to nobody else, you should have given us the benefit of your predictions when we were deliberating; if you had no foreknowledge, you are open to the charge of ignorance just like the rest of us. Then what better right have you to denounce me than I to denounce you? [197] In respect of the business of which I am speaking— and at present I discuss nothing else—I am a better citizen than you, in so far as I devoted myself to a course of action that was unanimously approved, neither shirking nor even counting any personal danger. You made no more acceptable suggestion, otherwise mine would not have been adopted; and in carrying out mine you were not of the slightest use. You are proved after the event to have behaved throughout like a worthless and most unpatriotic citizen; and now, by a strange coincidence, those thorough-going enemies of Athens, Aristratus at Naxos and Aristolaus at Thasos, are bringing the friends of Athens to trial, while at Athens itself Aeschines is accusing Demosthenes. [198] And yet he who built his reputation on the accumulated misfortunes of Greece deserves rather to perish himself than to prosecute his neighbor; and the man who has found his profit in the same emergencies as his country's foes can make no claim to patriotism. You stand revealed in your life and conduct, in your public performances and also in your public abstinences. A project approved by the people is going forward. Aeschines is speechless. A regrettable incident is reported. Aeschines is in evidence. He reminds one of an old sprain or fracture: the moment you are out of health it begins to be active. [199]

As he lays so much stress on results, let me venture on a paradox. If it seems extravagant, I beg that you will not be surprised, but that you will still give friendly consideration to what I am saying. Suppose that the future had been revealed to all of us, that every one had known what would happen, and that you, Aeschines, had predicted and protested, and shouted and stormed—though in fact you never opened your mouth—even then the city could not have departed from that policy, if she had any regard for honor, or for our ancestors, or for the days that are to come. [200] All that can be said now is, that we have failed and that is the common lot of humanity, if God so wills. But then, if Athens, after claiming the primacy of the nations, had run away from her claims, she would have been held guilty of betraying Greece to Philip. If, without striking a blow, she had abandoned the cause for which our forefathers flinched from no peril, is there a man who would not have spat in your face? In your face, Aeschines: not at Athens, not at me! [201] How could we have returned the gaze of visitors to our city, if the result had been what it is—Philip the chosen lord paramount of all Greece—and if other nations had fought gallantly to avert that calamity without our aid, although never before in the whole course of history had our city preferred inglorious security to the perils of a noble cause? [202] There is no man living, whether Greek or barbarian, who does not know that the Thebans, or the Lacedaemonians, who held supremacy before them,16 or the king of Persia himself, would cheerfully and gratefully have given Athens liberty to keep what she had and to take what she chose, if only she would do their behest and surrender the primacy of Greece. [203] But to the Athenians of old, I suppose, such temporizing was forbidden by their heredity, by their pride, by their very nature. Since the world began, no man has ever prevailed upon Athens to attach herself in the security of servitude to the oppressors of mankind however formidable: in every generation she has striven without a pause in the perilous contention for primacy, and honor, and renown. [204] Such constancy you deem so exemplary, and so congenial to your character, that you still sing the praises of those of your forefathers by whom it was most signally displayed. And you are right. Who would not exult in the valor of those famous men who, rather than yield to a conqueror's behests, left city and country and made the war-galleys their home; who chose Themistocles, the man who gave them that counsel, as their commander, and stoned Cyrsilus17 to death for advising obedient submission? Aye, and his wife also was stoned by your wives. [205] The Athenians of that day did not search for a statesman or a commander who should help them to a servile security: they did not ask to live, unless they could live as free men. Every man of them thought of himself as one born, not to his father and his mother alone, but to his country. What is the difference? The man who deems himself born only to his parents will wait for his natural and destined end; the son of his country is willing to die rather than see her enslaved, and will look upon those outrages and indignities, which a commonwealth in subjection is compelled to endure, as more dreadful than death itself. [206]

If I had attempted to claim that you were first inspired with the spirit of your forefathers by me, every one would justly rebuke me. But I do not: I am asserting these principles as your principles; I am showing you that such was the pride of Athens long before my time,—though for myself I do claim some credit for the administration of particular measures. [207] Aeschines, on the other hand, arraigns the whole policy, stirs up your resentment against me as the author of your terrors and your dangers, and, in his eagerness to strip me of the distinction of a moment, would rob you of the enduring praises of posterity. For if you condemn Ctesiphon on the ground of my political delinquency, you yourselves will be adjudged as wrongdoers, not as men who owed the calamities they have suffered to the unkindness of fortune. [208] But no; you cannot, men of Athens, you cannot have done wrongly when you accepted the risks of war for the redemption and the liberties of mankind; I swear it by our forefathers who bore the brunt of warfare at Marathon, who stood in array of battle at Plataea, who fought in the sea-fights of Salamis and Artemisium, and by all the brave men who repose in our public sepulchres, buried there by a country that accounted them all to be alike worthy of the same honor —all, I say, Aeschines, not the successful and the victorious alone. So justice bids: for by all the duty of brave men was accomplished: their fortune was such as Heaven severally allotted to them. [209]

And then a disreputable quill-driver like you, wanting to rob me of a distinction given me by the kindness of my fellow citizens, talked about victories and battles and ancient deeds of valor, all irrelevant to the present trial. But I, who came forward to advise my country how to retain her supremacy—tell me, you third-rate tragedian, in what spirit did it beseem me to ascend the tribune? As one who should give to the citizens counsel unworthy of their traditions? [210] I should have deserved death! Men of Athens, you jurymen are not to judge public and private causes in the same temper. You look at contracts of everyday business in the light of relevant statutes and facts, but at questions of public policy with due regard to the proud traditions of our forefathers. If you feel bound to act in the spirit of that dignity, whenever you come into court to give judgement on public causes, you must bethink yourselves that with his staff and his badge every one of you receives in trust the ancient pride of Athens. [211]

However, in touching upon the achievements of our ancestors, I have passed by some of my decrees and other measures. I will now therefore return to the point at which I digressed.

When we reached Thebes we found ambassadors from Philip and from the Thebans and others of his allies already there, our friends panic-stricken, and his friends full of confidence. To prove that this is not a statement made today to serve my own turn, please read the dispatch which the ambassadors sent at the time. [212] The prosecutor is so extraordinarily malicious that he gives the credit of any duty successfully performed not to me but to opportunity, but holds me and my bad luck responsible for everything that miscarried. I am a speaker and a statesman, yet it would seem that, in his view, I am to have no credit for the results of the discussion and deliberation, but am solely responsible for all the misadventures of our arms and of our generalship. Can you imagine a cruder or more abominable calumny? Read the dispatch.“ Letter ” [213]

When the Thebans held their assembly, they introduced Philip's ambassadors first, on the ground that they were in the position of allies. They came forward and made their speech, full of eulogy of Philip, and of incrimination of Athens, and recalled everything you had ever done in antagonism to Thebes. The gist of the speech was that they were to show gratitude to Philip for every good turn he had done to them, and to punish you for the injuries they had suffered, in whichever of two ways they chose— either by giving him a free passage, or by joining in the invasion of Attica. They proved, as they thought, that, if their advice were taken, cattle, slaves, and other loot from Attica would come into Boeotia, whereas the result of the proposals they expected from us would be that Boeotia would be ravaged by the war. They added many other arguments, all tending to the same conclusion. [214] I would give my life to recapitulate the reply that we made: but I am afraid that, as that crisis is long past, and as you may think that all those transactions are now obliterated as by a flood, you would regard any discussion of them as useless and vexatious. I will only ask you to hear how far we prevailed upon them, and what answer they returned. Take and read this document.“ Reply of the Thebans ” [215]

After that, the Thebans invited you to join them. You marched out: you reinforced them. I pass over the incidents of the march: but their reception of you was so friendly that, while their own infantry and cavalry lay outside the walls, they gave you access to their homes, to their citadel, to their wives and children and most precious possessions. On that day the Thebans publicly paid three fine compliments—to your valor, to your righteousness, and to your sobriety. When they decided to fight on your side rather than against you, they adjudged you to be braver men than Philip, and your claim to be more righteous than his; and when they put into your power what they, like all other men, were most anxious to safeguard, namely their wives and their children, they exhibited their confidence in your sobriety. [216] And thereby, men of Athens, they showed a just appreciation of your character. After the entry of your soldiers no man ever laid even a groundless complaint against them, so soberly did you conduct yourselves. Fighting shoulder to shoulder with them in the two earliest engagements,—the battle by the river, and the winter battle,—you approved yourselves irreproachable fighters, admirable alike in discipline, in equipment, and in determination. Your conduct elicited the praises of other nations, and was acknowledged by yourselves in services of thanksgiving to the gods. [217] I should like to ask Aeschines a question: when all that was going on, when the whole city was a scene of enthusiasm and rejoicing and thanksgiving, did he take part in the worship and festivity of the populace, or did he sit still at home, grieving and groaning and sulking over public successes? If he was present as one of the throng, surely his behavior is scandalous and even sacrilegious, for after calling the gods to witness that certain measures were very good, he now asks a jury to vote that they were very bad—a jury that has sworn by the gods! If he was not present, he deserves many deaths for shrinking from a sight in which every one else rejoiced. Please read these decrees.“ Decrees appointing a Public Thanksgiving ” [218]

So we were engaged in thanksgiving, and the Thebans in the deliverance that they owed to us. The situation was reversed, and a nation that, thanks to the intrigues of Aeschines and his party, seemed on the verge of suing for aid, was now giving aid in pursuance of the advice which you accepted from me. But indeed, what sort of language Philip gave vent to at that time, and how seriously he was discomposed, you shall learn from letters sent by him to Peloponnesus. Please take and read them, that the jury may learn the real effect of my perseverance, of my journeys and hardships, and of that profusion of decrees at which Aeschines was just now scoffing. [219]

Men of Athens, there have been many great and distinguished orators in your city before my time,—the famous Callistratus, Aristophon, Cephalus, Thrasybulus, and thousands more; but no one of them ever devoted himself to any public business without intermission; the man who moved a resolution would not go on embassy, and the man who went on embassy would not move a resolution. Each of them used to leave himself some leisure, and at the same time some loop-hole, in case anything happened. [220] “What!” some one may say, “were you so much stronger and bolder than others that you could do everything by yourself?” That is not what I mean: but I was so firmly persuaded that the danger which overhung the city was very serious, that it did not seem to me to leave me any room for taking my personal safety into account; but a man, I thought, must be content, without neglecting anything, to do his duty. [221] As for myself, I was convinced, presumptuously, perhaps, but convinced I was, that there was no one more competent either to make sound proposals, or to carry them into effect, or to conduct an embassy diligently and honestly: and therefore I took my place in every field of action. Read Philip's letters.“ Letters ” [222]

To these straits had my policy, Aeschines, reduced Philip: and such was then the language uttered by a man who had hitherto lifted his voice vauntingly against Athens. And for that reason I was deservedly decorated by the citizens. You were present, but said nothing in opposition; and Diondas, who arraigned the grant, did not get the fifth part of the votes. Please read the decrees which were then by that acquittal validated, and which Aeschines never even arraigned.“ Decrees ” [223]

These decrees, men of Athens, exhibit the same wording and phrasing as those proposed formerly by Aristonicus, and now by Ctesiphon. Aeschines did not prosecute them himself, nor did he support the accusation of the man who did arraign them. And yet if there is any truth in his present denunciation, he might then have prosecuted Demomeles, the proposer, and Hypereides, with more reason than Ctesiphon, [224] who can refer to these precedents, to the decision of the courts, to the observation that Aeschines himself did not prosecute persons who made the same proposals, to the statutory prohibition of repeated prosecution in such cases, and so forth; whereas at that time the issue would have been tried on its merits without such presumptions. [225] On the other hand, at that time, I imagine, there was no chance of doing what he does now, when out of a lot of old dates and decrees he selects for slanderous purposes any that nobody knew beforehand or would expect to hear cited today, transposes dates, substitutes fictitious reasons for the true reasons of transactions, and so makes a show of speaking to the point. [226] That trick was not possible then. All speeches must have been made on a basis of truth, within a short time of the facts, when the jury still remembered details and almost knew them by heart. That is why, after shirking inquiry at the time when the events were recent, he has returned to the issue today, expecting, I suppose, that you will conduct a forensic competition rather than an inquiry into political conduct, and that the decision will turn upon diction rather than sound policy. [227]

Then he resorts to sophistry, and tells you that you must ignore any opinion of himself and me which you brought with you from home; and that, as, when you cast up a man ' s accounts, though you anticipate a surplus, you acquiesce in the result if the totals balance, so you must now accept the result of the calculation. Every dishonest contrivance, you will observe, is rotten to the core. [228] By his ingenious apologue he has admitted that we are both here as acknowledged advocates—I of our country, he of Philip; for if such had not been the view you take of us, he would not have been at pains to convert you. [229] I shall prove without difficulty that he has no right to ask you to reverse that opinion—not by using counters, for political measures are not to be added up in that fashion, but by reminding you briefly of the several transactions, and appealing to you who hear me as both the witnesses and the auditors of my account. We owe it to that policy of mine which he denounces that, instead of the Thebans joining Philip in an invasion of our country, as everyone expected, they fought by our side and stopped him; [230] that, instead of the seat of war being in Attica, it was seven hundred furlongs away on the far side of Boeotia; that, instead of privateers from Euboea harrying us, Attica was at peace on the sea-frontier throughout the war; and that, instead of Philip taking Byzantium and holding the Hellespont, the Byzantines fought on our side against him. [231] Do you see any resemblance between this computation of results and your casting up of counters? Are we to cancel the gains to balance the losses,18 instead of providing that they shall never be forgotten? I need not add that other nations have had experience of that cruelty which is always observable whenever Philip has got people under his heel, whereas you have been lucky enough to enjoy the fruits of that factitious humanity in which he clothed himself with an eye to the future. But I pass that by. [232]

I will not shrink from observing that any man who wished to bring an orator to the proof honestly, and not merely to slander him, would never have laid such charges as you have alleged, inventing analogies, and mimicking my diction and gestures. The fate of Greece, forsooth, depended on whether I used this word or that, or moved my hand this way or that way! [233] No; he would have considered, in the light of actual facts, the means and resources possessed by the city when I entered on administration, and those accumulated by me when at the head of affairs; and also the condition of our adversaries. If I had impaired our resources, he would have proved that the fault lay at my door: if I had greatly increased them, he would have spared his slanders. As you avoided this test, I will apply it; and the jury will see whether I state the case fairly. [234]

For resources, the city possessed the islanders—but not all, only the weakest, for neither Chios, nor Rhodes, nor Corcyra was on our side; a subsidy of forty-five talents, all collected in advance; and not a single private or trooper apart from our own army. But what was most alarming to us, and advantageous to the enemy, Aeschines and his party had made all our neighbors, Megarians, Thebans, and Euboeans, more disposed to enmity than to friendship. [235] Such were the means of the city: and I defy anyone to name anything else. Now consider those of our antagonist Philip. In the first place, he was the despotic commander of his adherents: and in war that is the most important of all advantages. Secondly, they had their weapons constantly in their hands. Then he was well provided with money: he did whatever he chose, without giving notice by publishing decrees, or deliberating in public, without fear of prosecution by informers or indictment for illegal measures. He was responsible to nobody: he was the absolute autocrat, commander, and master of everybody and everything. [236] And I, his chosen adversary—it is a fair inquiry—of what was I master? Of nothing at all! Public speaking was my only privilege: and that you permitted to Philip's hired servants on the same terms as to me. Whenever they had the advantage of me—and for one reason or another that often happened—you laid your plans for the enemy's benefit, and went your ways. [237] In spite of all these drawbacks, I made alliance for you with Euboeans, Achaeans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megarians, Leucadians, and Corcyraeans: and from those states there was assembled a foreign division of fifteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, not counting their citizen-soldiery. I also obtained from them in money the largest subsidy I could. [238] When you talk about fair terms with the Thebans, Aeschines, or with the Byzantines and the Euboeans, and raise at this time of day the question of equal contributions, in the first place, you must be unaware that of that famous fleet of three hundred galleys that fought for Greece19 in former days, our city supplied two hundred; and that she did not show any sign of complaining that she was unfairly treated, or impeaching the statesmen whose advice she took, or airing her dissatisfaction. That would have been discreditable indeed! No, she gave thanks to the gods that, when all the Greeks alike were encompassed by a great peril, she had contributed twice as much as all the rest to the common deliverance. [239] Secondly, when you grumble at me, you are doing an ill turn to your fellow-citizens. Why do you tell them today what they ought to have done then? You were in Athens and at the Assembly: why did you not offer your suggestions at the time—if indeed they could possibly be offered during an imminent crisis, when we had to accept, not all that we wanted, but all that the conditions allowed? There was a man lying in wait who was bidding against us, and was ready to welcome any allies we drove away, and pay them into the bargain. [240]

If I am accused today for what was actually done, suppose that, while I was haggling over nice calculations, these cities had marched off and joined Philip—suppose he had become suzerain o f Euboea, Thebes, and Byzantium— what do you think these unprincipled men would have done or said then? [241] Would they not have told you that we had made Philip a present of our allies? That they had been driven away when they wanted to join us? That through the Byzantines he had gained the mastery of the Hellespont, and control of the corn-supply of all Greece? That by means of the Thebans Attica had become the scene of a distressing war with her own neighbors? That the sea had become useless for ships because of privateers with Euboea for their base? Would they not have made all those complaints, and plenty more? [242] Oh, men of Athens, what a vile monster is the calumniator, gathering malice from everywhere, always backbiting! But this fellow is by very nature a spiteful animal, absolutely incapable of honesty or generosity; this monkey of melodrama, this bumpkin tragedy-king, this pinchbeck orator! What use has all your cleverness ever been to your country? [243] What! talk about bygones today? It is as though a physician visiting his patients should never open his mouth, or tell them how to get rid of their complaint, so long as they are ill; but, as soon as one of them dies, and the obsequies are celebrated, should follow the corpse to the grave, and deliver his prescription at last from the tombstone: “If our departed friend had done this or that, he would never have died!” You lunatic! what is the use of talking now? [244]

You will find that even our defeat, if this reprobate must needs exult over what he ought to have deplored, did not fall upon the city through any fault of mine. Make your reckoning in this way: wherever I was sent as your representative, I came away undefeated by Philip's ambassador—from Thessaly, from Ambracia, from the Illyrians, from the kings of Thrace, from Byzantium, from every other place, and finally from Thebes; but wherever Philip was beaten in diplomacy, he attacked the place with an army and conquered it. [245] And for those defeats, Aeschines, you call me to account! Are you not ashamed to jeer at a man for cowardice, and then to require that same man to overcome the whole power of Philip single-handed, and to do it by mere words? For what else had I at my disposal? Certainly not the personal courage of each man, not the good fortune of the troops engaged, not that generalship for which you are unreasonable enough to hold me responsible. Make as strict an inquiry as you will into everything for which an orator is responsible; I ask no indulgence. [246] But for what is he responsible? For discerning the trend of events at the outset, for forecasting results, for warning others. That I have always done. Further, he ought to reduce to a minimum those delays and hesitations, those fits of ignorance and quarrelsomeness, which are the natural and inevitable failings of all free states, and on the other hand to promote unanimity and friendliness, and whatever impels a man to do his duty. All that also I have made my business: and herein no man can find any delinquency on my part. [247] Let any man you like be asked by what means Philip achieved most of his successes: the universal reply will be, by his army and by bribing and corrupting politicians. Well, I had no control or authority over your forces, and therefore no question of their performances can touch me. Moreover, in the matter of corruption or purity I have beaten Philip. In bribery, just as the purchaser has vanquished the seller, whenever the bargain is struck, so the man who refuses the price and remains incorruptible has vanquished the purchaser. Therefore, in my person, Athens is undefeated. [248]

These, and such as these, with many others are the grounds furnished by my conduct to justify the proposal of the defendant. I will now mention grounds furnished by all of you. Immediately after the battle, in the very midst of danger and alarm, at a time when it would not have been surprising if most of you had treated me unkindly, the people, with a full knowledge of all my doings, in the first place, adopted by vote my proposals for the safety of the city. All those measures of defence—the disposition of outposts, the entrenchments, the expenditure on the fortifications—were taken on resolutions moved by me. In the second place, they appointed me Food Controller, selecting me from the whole body of citizens. [249] Then the men who made it their business to injure me formed a cabal, and set in motion all the machinery of indictments, audits, impeachments, and the like—not at first by their own agency, but employing persons by whom they imagined they would be screened. You will remember how, during that early period, I was put on my trial every day; and how the recklessness of Sosicles, and the spite of Philocrates, and the frenzy of Diondas and Melantus, and everything else, were turned to account by them for my detriment. Nevertheless, by the favor, first of the gods, and secondly of you and the rest of the Athenians, I came through unscathed. And so I deserved. Yes; that is true, and to the credit of juries that had taken the oath and gave judgement according to their oath. [250] When, on my impeachment, you acquitted me, and did not give the prosecutors the fifth part of your votes, your verdict implied approval of my policy. When I was indicted, I satisfied you that my proposals and my speeches had been constitutional. When you put the seal on my accounts, you further admitted that I had done my business honestly and without corruption. That being so, what description could Ctesiphon properly and honestly have applied to my conduct, other than that which he had seen applied by the whole nation and by sworn juries, and confirmed by the truth in the eyes of all men? [251]

Ah, says he, but look at that glorious boast of Cephalus—never once indicted! Yes, glorious, and also lucky. But why should a man who has been often indicted but never convicted be the more justly open to reproach? However, men of Athens, so far as Aeschines is concerned, I can repeat that glorious boast: for he never indicted me or prosecuted me on indictment; and so, by his own admission, I am no worse a citizen than Cephalus. [252]

At every point his morose and spiteful temper is conspicuous, and especially in what he said about fortune. As a general remark, I must say that it is a stupid thing for any human being to reproach his brother man on the score of fortune. Seeing that a man who thinks he is doing very well and regards himself as highly fortunate, is never certain that his good fortune will last till the evening, how can it be right to boast about it, or use it to insult other people? But, since Aeschines has treated this topic, like many others, so vaingloriously, I beg you to observe, men of Athens, that my discourse on fortune will be more veracious, and more suitable to a mere man, than his. [253] I attribute good fortune to our city, and so, I observe, does the oracle of Zeus at Dodona; but the present fortune of all mankind I account grievous and distressing. Is there a man living, Greek or barbarian, who has not in these days undergone many evils? [254] I reckon it as part of the good fortune of Athens that she has chosen the noblest policy, and that she is better off than the Greeks who expected prosperity from their betrayal of us. If she has been unsuccessful, if everything has not fallen out as we desired, I regard that as our appointed share in the general ill-fortune of mankind. [255] My personal fortune, or that of any man among you, must, I imagine, be estimated in the light of his private circumstances. That is my view of fortune: a just and correct view, as it seems to me, and, I think, also to you. But he declares that a poor, insignificant thing like my individual fortune has been more powerful than the great and good fortune of Athens. Now how is that possible? [256]

If, Aeschines, you are determined at all costs to investigate my fortune, compare it with your own; and, should you find mine to be better than yours, stop your vilification. Begin your inquiry then at the beginning. And I beg earnestly that no one will blame me for want of generosity. No sensible man, in my judgement, ever turns poverty into a reproach, or prides himself on having been nurtured in affluence. But I am compelled by this troublesome man's scurrility and backbiting to deal with these topics; and I will treat them with as much modesty as the state of the case permits. [257]

In my boyhood, Aeschines, I had the advantage of attending respectable schools: and my means were sufficient for one who was not to be driven by poverty into disreputable occupations. When I had come of age, my circumstances were in accordance with my upbringing. I was in a position to provide a chorus, to pay for a war-galley, and to be assessed to property-tax. I renounced no honor able ambition either in public or in private life: and rendered good service both to the commonwealth and to my own friends. When I decided to take part in public affairs, the political services I chose were such that I was repeatedly decorated both by my own country and by many other Grecian cities and even my enemies, such as you, never ventured to say that my choice was other than honor able. [258] Such has been my fortune throughout my career. I could tell you more, but I forbear, fearing to weary you with details in which I take some pride.

But do you—you who are so proud and so contemptuous of others— compare your fortune with mine. In your childhood you were reared in abject poverty. You helped your father in the drudgery of a grammar-school, grinding the ink, sponging the benches, and sweeping the school-room, holding the position of a menial, not of a free-born boy. [259] On arriving at manhood you assisted your mother in her initiations,20 reading the service-book while she performed the ritual, and helping generally with the paraphernalia. At night it was your duty to mix the libations, to clothe the catechumens in fawn-skins, to wash their bodies, to scour them with the loam and the bran, and, when their lustration was duly performed, to set them on their legs, and give out the hymn:

Here I leave my sins behind,

Here the better way I find; and it was your pride that no one ever emitted that holy ululation so powerfully as yourself. I can well believe it! When you hear the stentorian tones of the orator, can you doubt that the ejaculations of the acolyte were simply magnificent? [260] In day-time you marshalled your gallant throng of bacchanals through the public streets, their heads garlanded with fennel and white poplar; and, as you went, you squeezed the fat-cheeked snakes, or brandished them above your head, now shouting your Euoi Saboi! now footing it to the measure of Hyes Attes! Attes Hyes!—saluted by all the old women with such proud titles as Master of the Ceremonies, Fugleman, Ivy-bearer, Fan-carrier; and at last receiving your recompense of tipsy-cakes, and cracknels, and currant-buns. With such rewards who would not rejoice greatly, and account himself the favorite of fortune? [261]

After getting yourself enrolled on the register of your parish—no one knows how you managed it; but let that pass—anyhow, when you were enrolled, you promptly chose a most gentlemanly occupation, that of clerk and errand-boy to minor officials. After committing all the offences with which you now reproach other people, you were relieved of that employment; and I must say that your subsequent conduct did no discredit to your earlier career. [262] You entered the service of those famous players Simylus and Socrates, better known as the Growlers. You played small parts to their lead, picking up figs and grapes and olives, like an orchard-robbing costermonger, and making a better living out of those missiles than by all the battles that you fought for dear life. For there was no truce or armistice in the warfare between you and your audiences, and your casualties were so heavy, that no wonder you taunt with cowardice those of us who have no experience of such engagements. [263]

However, passing by things for which your poverty may be blamed, I will address myself to actual charges against your way of living. When in course of time it occurred to you to enter public life, you chose such a line of political action that, so long as the city prospered, you lived the life of a hare, in fear and trembling and constant expectation of a sound thrashing for the crimes that burdened your conscience: although, when every one else is in distress, your confidence is manifest to all men.21 [264] What treatment does a man, who recovered his high spirits on the death of a thousand of his fellow-citizens, deserve at the hands of the survivors? I shall omit a great many other facts that I might relate; for I do not think that I ought to recount glibly all his discreditable and infamous qualities, but only such as I may mention without discredit to myself. [265]

And now, Aeschines, I beg you to examine in contrast, quietly and without acrimony, the incidents of our respective careers: and then ask the jury, man by man, whether they would choose for themselves your fortune or mine. You were an usher, I a pupil; you were an acolyte, I a candidate; you were clerk-at-the-table, I addressed the House; you were a player, I a spectator; you were cat-called, I hissed; you have ever served our enemies, I have served my country. [266] Much I pass by; but on this very day, I am on proof for the honor of a crown, and acknowledged to be guiltless; you have already the reputation of an informer, and the question at hazard for you is, whether you are still to continue in that trade, or be stopped for ever by getting less than your quota of votes. And that is the good fortune enjoyed by you, who denounce the shabbiness of mine! [267]

Let me now read to you the testimony of the public services I have rendered, and you shall read for comparison some of the blank-verse you used to make such a hash of:

  “ From gates of gloom and dwellings of the dead,22
  ”
  Eur. Hec. 1

or,

  “ Tidings of woe with heavy heart I bear,
  ”
  Unknown

or,

  “ Oh cruel, cruel fate!
  ”
  Unknown

Such a fate may the gods first, and the jury afterwards, allot to you—for your citizenship is as worthless as your mummery. Read the depositions.“ Depositions ” [268]

Such has been my character in public life. In private life, if any of you are not aware that I have been generous and courteous, and helpful to the distressed, I do not mention it. I will never say a word, or tender any evidence about such matters as the captives I have ransomed, or the dowries I have helped to provide, or any such acts of charity. [269] It is a matter of principle with me. My view is that the recipient of a benefit ought to remember it all his life, but that the benefactor ought to put it out of his mind at once, if the one is to behave decently, and the other with magnanimity. To remind a man of the good turns you have done to him is very much like a reproach. Nothing shall induce me to do anything of the sort; but whatever be my reputation in that respect, I am content. [270]

I have finished with private matters, but I have still some trifling remarks to offer on public affairs. If you, Aeschines, can name any human being, Greek or barbarian, on whom yonder sun shines, who has escaped all injury from the domination, first of Philip, and today of Alexander, so be it: I grant you that my fortune— or my misfortune, if you prefer the word—has been the cause of the whole trouble. [271] But if many people, who have never set eyes on me or heard the sound of my voice, have been grievously afflicted—I do not mean as individuals, but whole cities and nations—I say it is vastly more honest and candid to attribute these calamities to the common fortune of mankind, or to some distressing and untoward current of events. [272] Yet you dismiss those causes, and put the blame upon me, who only took part in politics by the side of my fellow-citizens here, although you must be conscious that a part, if not the whole, of your invective is addressed to all of them, and particularly to yourself. If I had held sole and despotic authority when I offered my counsels, it would have been open to you other orators to incriminate me: [273] but inasmuch as you were present at every assembly, as the state proposed a discussion of policy in which every one might join, and as my measures were approved at the time by every one, and especially by you,—for it was in no friendly spirit that you allowed me to enjoy all the hopes and enthusiasm and credit that were attached to my policy, but obviously because truth was too strong for you, and because you had nothing better to suggest—it is most iniquitous and outrageous to stigmatize today measures which at the time you were unable to amend. [274]

Among other people I find this sort of distinction universally observed.—A man has sinned willfully: he is visited with resentment and punishment. He has erred unintentionally: pardon takes the place of punishment. Suppose that he has committed no sin or error at all, but, having devoted himself to a project approved by all, has, in common with all, failed of success. In that case he does not deserve reproach or obloquy, but condolence. [275] This distinction will be found not only embodied in our statutes, but laid down by nature herself in her unwritten laws and in the moral sense of the human race. Now Aeschines so far surpasses all mankind in savagery and malignity that he turns even misadventures, which he has himself cited as such, into crimes for which I am to be denounced. [276]

To crown all—as though all his own speeches had been made in a disinterested and patriotic spirit—he bids you be on your guard against me, for fear I should mislead and deceive you, calling me an artful speaker, a mountebank, an impostor, and so forth. He seems to think that if a man can only get in the first blow with epithets that are really applicable to himself, they must be true, and the audience will make no reflections on the character of the speaker. [277] But I am sure you all know him well, and will regard those epithets as more appropriate to him than to me. I am also sure that my artfulness—well, be it so; although I notice that in general an audience controls the ability of a speaker, and that his reputation for wisdom depends upon your acceptance and your discriminating favor. Be that as it may, if I do possess any skill in speaking, you will all find that that skill has always been exercised on public concerns and for your advantage, never on private occasions and to your detriment. On the other hand the ability of Aeschines is applied not only to speaking on behalf of your enemies, but to the detriment of anyone who has annoyed or quarrelled with him. He never uses it honestly or in the interests of the commonweal. [278] No upright and honor able citizen must ever expect a jury impanelled in the public service to bolster up his own resentment or enmity or other passions, nor will he go to law to gratify them. If possible he will exclude them from his heart: if he cannot escape them, he will at least cherish them calmly and soberly. In what circumstances, then, ought a politician or an orator to be vehement? When all our national interests are imperilled; when the issue lies between the people and their adversaries. Then such is the part of a chivalrous and patriotic citizen. [279] But for a man who never once sought to bring me to justice for any public, nor, I will add, for any private offence, whether for the city's sake or for his own, to come into court armed with a denunciation of a crown and of a vote of thanks, and to lavish such a wealth of eloquence on that plea, is a symptom of a peevish, jealous, small-minded, good-for-nothing disposition. And the exhibition of his turpitude is complete when he relinquishes his controversy with me, and directs the whole of his attack upon the defendant. [280] It really makes me think, Aeschines, that you deliberately went to law, not to get satisfaction for any transgression, but to make a display of your oratory and your vocal powers. But it is not the diction of an orator, Aeschines, or the vigor of his voice that has any value: it is supporting the policy of the people, and having the same friends and the same enemies as your country. [281] With such a disposition, a man's speeches will always be patriotic: but the man who pays court to those from whom the state apprehends danger to herself, is not riding at the same anchor as the people, and therefore does not look to the same quarter for his security. I do; mark that! My purposes are my countrymen's purposes; I have no peculiar or personal end to serve. [282] Can you say the same? No, indeed! Why, immediately after the battle you went on embassy to visit Philip, the author of all the recent calamities of your country, although hitherto you had notoriously declined that employment. And who is the deceiver of his country? Surely the man who does not say what he thinks. For whom does the marshal read the commination? For him. What graver crime can be charged to an orator than that his thoughts and his words do not tally? In that crime you were detected; [283] and yet you still raise your voice, and dare to look your fellow citizens in the face! Do you imagine that they do not know who you are? that they are sunk in such slumber and oblivion that they do not remember the harangues you made while the war was still going on, when you protested with oaths and curses that you had no dealings with Philip— that I had laid that charge against you out of private malice, and that it was not true? [284] But no sooner had the news of the battle reached us than you ignored all your protests, and confessed, or rather claimed, that you were Philip's friend and Philip's guest—a euphemism for Philip's hired servant; for with what show of equality or honesty could Philip possibly be the host or the friend or even the acquaintance of Aeschines, son of Glaucothea the tambourinist ? I cannot see: but the truth is, you took his pay to injure the interests of your countrymen. And yet you, a traitor publicly convicted on information laid by yourself after the fact, vilify and reproach me for misfortunes for which you will find I am less responsible than any other man. [285]

Our city owes to me, Aeschines, both the inception and the success of many great and noble enterprises; nor was she unmindful. It is a proof of her gratitude that, when the people wanted one who should speak over the bodies of the slain, shortly after the battle, you were nominated but they did not appoint you, in spite of your beautiful voice, nor Demades, although he had recently arranged the peace, nor Hegemon, nor any of your party: they appointed me. Then you came forward, and Pythocles with you—and, gracious Heavens! how coarsely and impudently you spoke!—making the very same charges that you have repeated today; but, for all your scurrility, they appointed me nevertheless. [286] You know very well why; but you shall hear the reason again from me. They were conscious both of the patriotism and energy with which I had conducted their business, and also of the dishonesty of you and your friends; for, when the city had made a false step, you had acknowledged relations which you had strenuously denied on oath in the days of prosperity. They conceived that men who found impunity for their ambitions in our national calamities had long been their secret, and were now their declared, enemies. [287] They thought it becoming that the orator who should speak over the bodies of the slain, and magnify their prowess, should not be one who had visited the homes and shared the loving cup of their adversaries; that the man who in Macedonia had taken part with their murderers in revels and songs of exultation over the calamities of Greece, should not be chosen for high distinction at Athens; and that the chosen speaker should not lament their fate with the feigning voice of an actor, but express the mourning of his very soul. Such sympathy they discerned in themselves, and in me; but not in your party; and that is why they appointed me, and did not appoint you. [288] The sentiments of the people were shared by those fathers and brothers of the dead who were chosen by the people to conduct the obsequies. In obedience to the custom that requires the funeral feast to be held in the home of the nearest relative of the dead, they ordered it to be held at my house; and with good reason. Each hero had some kinsman who by the ties of blood stood nearer to himself, but to the whole company of the fallen no man was nearer of kin than I. When they had met with their untimely fate, he who was most deeply concerned in their safety and their success, claimed the chief share in mourning for them all. [289]

Read for his benefit the epitaph, which the state resolved by public vote to inscribe upon their monument. Even from these verses, Aeschines, you may learn something of your own callousness, and malignity, and brutality. Read.“ Epitaph Here lie the brave, who for their country's right Drew sword, and put th' insulting foe to flight. Their lives they spared not, bidding Death decide Who flinched and lived, and who with courage died. They fought and fell that Greece might still be free, Nor crouch beneath the yoke of slavery. Zeus spoke the word of doom; and now they rest Forspent with toil upon their country's breast. God errs not, fails not; God alone is great; But man lies helpless in the hands of fate. ”unknown [290]

Do you hear this admonition, that it is the gods alone who err not and fail not? It attributes the power of giving success in battle not to the statesman, but to the gods. Accursed slanderer! why do you revile me for their death? Why do you utter words which I pray the gods to divert to the undoing of your children and yourself? [291]

Among all the slanders and lies which he launched against me, men of Athens, what amazed me most was that, when he recounted the disasters that befell our city at that time, his comments were never such as would have been made by an honest and loyal citizen. He shed no tears; he had no emotion of regret in his heart; he vociferated, he exulted, he strained his throat. He evidently supposed himself to be testifying against me, but he was really offering proof against himself that in all those distressing events he had had no feeling in common with other citizens. [292] Yet a man who professes such solicitude, as he has professed today, for our laws and constitution, whatever else he lacks, ought at least to possess the quality of sympathizing both with the sorrows and the joys of the common people; and, in choosing his political principles, he ought not to range himself with their enemies. But that is clearly what he has done, when he declares that I am responsible for everything, and that the city has fallen into trouble by my fault. [293] Your policy of bearing succor to the Greeks did not originate in my statesmanship and my principles. If you were to acknowledge that my influence caused you to resist a despotism that threatened the ruin of Greece, you would bestow on me a favor greater than all the gifts you have ever conferred on anyone. I do not claim that favor; I cannot claim it without injustice to you: and I am certain that you will not grant it. If Aeschines had acted an honest part, he would never have indulged his spite against me by impairing and defaming the noblest of your national glories. [294]

But why reproach him for that imputation, when he has uttered calumnies of far greater audacity? A m an who accuses me of Philippism— Heaven and Earth, of what lie is he not capable? I solemnly aver that, if we are to cast aside lying imputations and spiteful mendacity, and inquire in all sincerity who really are the men to whom the reproach of all that has befallen might by general consent be fairly and honestly brought home, you will find that they are men in the several cities who resemble Aeschines, and do not resemble me. [295] At a time when Philip's resources were feeble and very small indeed, when we were constantly warning, exhorting, admonishing them for the best, these men flung away their national prosperity for private and selfish gain; they cajoled and corrupted all the citizens within their grasp, until they had reduced them to slavery. So the Thessalians were treated by Daochus, Cineas, Thrasydaus, the Arcadians by Cercidas, Hieronymus, Eucampidas, the Argives by Myrtis, Teledamus, Mnaseas, the Eleians by Euxitheus, Cleotimus, Aristaechmus, the Messenians by the sons of that god-forsaken Philiades, Neon and Thrasylochus, the Sicyonians by Aristratus and Epichares, the Corinthians by Deinarchus and Demaretus, the Megarians by Ptoeodorus, Helixus, Perilaus, the Thebans by Timolaus, Theogeiton, Anemoetas, the Euboeans by Hipparchus, Cleitarchus, and Sosistratus. [296] I could continue this catalogue of traitors till the sun sets. Every one of them, men of Athens, is a man of the same way of thinking in the politics of his own country as Aeschines and his friends are in ours. They too are profligates, sycophants, fiends incarnate; they have mutilated their own countries; they have pledged away their liberty in their cups, first to Philip, and now to Alexander. They measure their happiness by their belly and their baser parts; they have overthrown for ever that freedom and independence which to the Greeks of an earlier age were the very standard and canon of prosperity. [297]

Of this disgraceful and notorious conspiracy, of this wickedness, or rather, men of Athens, if I am to speak without trifling, this betrayal of the liberties of Greece, you—thanks to my policy—are guiltless in the eyes of the world, as I am guiltless in your eyes. And then, Aeschines, you ask for what merit I claim distinction! I tell you that, when all the politicians in Greece, starting with you, had been corrupted, first by Philip, and now by Alexander, [298] neither opportunity, nor civil speeches, nor large promises, nor hope, nor fear, nor any other inducement, could provoke or suborn me to betray the just claims and the true interests of my country, as I conceived them; and that, whatever counsels I have offered to my fellow-citizens here, I have not offered, like you, as if I were a false balance with a bias in favor of the vendor. With a soul upright, honest and incorruptible, appointed to the control of more momentous transactions than any statesman of my time, I have administered them throughout in all purity and righteousness. [299] On those grounds I claim this distinction. As for my fortifications, which you treated so satirically, and my entrenchments, I do, and I must, judge these things worthy of gratitude and thanks; but I give them a place far removed from my political achievements. I did not fortify Athens with masonry and brickwork: they are not the works on which I chiefly pride myself. Regard my fortifications as you ought, and you will find armies and cities and outposts, seaports and ships and horses, and a multitude ready to fight for their defence. [300] These were the bastions I planted for the protection of Attica so far as it was possible to human forethought; and therewith I fortified, not the ring-fence of our port and our citadel, but the whole country. Nor was I beaten by Philip in forethought or in armaments; that is far from the truth. The generals and the forces of the allies were beaten by his good fortune. Have I any proofs of my claim? Yes, proofs definite and manifest. I ask you all to consider them. [301]

What course of action was proper for a patriotic citizen who was trying to serve his country with all possible prudence and energy and loyalty? Surely it was to protect Attica on the sea-board by Euboea, on the inland frontier by Boeotia, and on the side towards Peloponnesus by our neighbors in that direction; to make provision for the passage of our corn-supply along friendly coasts all the way to Peiraeus; [302] to preserve places already at our disposal, such as Proconnesus, Chersonesus, Tenedos, by sending succor to them and by suitable speeches and resolutions; to secure the friendship and alliance of such places as Byzantium, Abydos, and Euboea; to destroy the most important of the existing resources of the enemy, and to make good the deficiencies of our own city. All these purposes were accomplished by my decrees and my administrative acts. [303] Whoever will study them, men of Athens, without jealousy, will find that they were rightly planned and honestly executed; that the proper opportunity for each several measure was never neglected, or ignored, or thrown away by me: and that nothing within the compass of one man's ability or forethought was left undone. If the superior power of some deity or of fortune, or the incompetence of commanders, or the wickedness of traitors, or all these causes combined, vitiated and at last shattered the whole enterprise,—is Demosthenes guilty? [304] If in each of the cities of Greece there had been some one man such as I was in my appointed station in your midst, nay, if Thessaly had possessed one man and Arcadia one man holding the same sentiments that I held, no Hellenic people beyond or on this side of Thermopylae would have been exposed to their present distresses: [305] they would still be dwelling prosperously in their own countries, in freedom and independence, securely and without fear, grateful to you and to all the Athenians for the great and manifold blessings they owed to me. To prove that, as a precaution against envy, I am using words that do less than justice to my deeds, please take these papers, and read the list of expeditions sent in pursuance of my decrees.“ Number of Expeditions in Aid ” [306]

It was the duty, Aeschines, of an upright and honor able citizen to take these or similar measures. If they had been successful, we should have been, beyond controversy, the greatest of nations and a nation that deserved its greatness: and, though they have failed, there remains the result that our reputation stands high, and that no man can find fault with Athens or her policy, but lays the blame on the fortune that so ordered the issue. [307] Assuredly it was not the duty of such a citizen to abandon the cause of his country, to take the hire of her adversaries, to wait on the occasions, not of Athens, but of her enemies. It was not his duty to look with an evil eye upon a man who had made it his business to support or propose measures worthy of our traditions, and was resolved to stand by such measures; nor to treasure vindictively the memory of private annoyances. Nor was it his duty to hold his peace dishonestly and deceptively, as you so often do. [308] There is, indeed, a silence that is honest and beneficial to the city, such as is observed in all simplicity by the majority of you citizens. Not such, but far, far different, is the silence of Aeschines. Withdrawing himself from public life whenever he thinks fit—and that is very frequently—he lies in wait for the time when you will be weary of the incessant speaker, or when some unlucky reverse has befallen you, or any of those vexations that are so frequent in the life of mortal men; and then, seizing the occasion, he breaks silence and the orator reappears like a sudden squall, with his voice in fine training; he strings together the words and the phrases that he has accumulated, emphatically and without a pause; but, alas, they are all useless, they serve no good purpose, they are directed to the injury of this or that citizen, and to the discredit of the whole community. [309] Yet if all that assiduous practice, Aeschines, had been conducted in a spirit of honesty and of solicitude for your country's well-being, it should have yielded a rich and noble harvest for the benefit of us all—alliances of states, new revenues, development of commerce, useful legislation, measures of opposition to our avowed enemies. [310] In days of old all those services afforded the recognized test of statesmanship: and the time through which you have passed supplied to an upright politician many opportunities of showing his worth; but among such men you won no position—you were neither first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, nor anywhere in the race—at least when the power of your country was to be enlarged. [311] What alliance does Athens owe to your exertions? What auxiliary expedition, what gain of amity or reputation? What embassy or service, by which the credit of the city has been raised? What project in domestic, Hellenic, or foreign policy, of which you took charge, has ever been successful? What war-galleys, or munitions, or docks, or fortifications, or cavalry, do we owe to you? Of what use in the wide world are you? What public-spirited assistance have you ever given to rich or to poor? None whatever. [312] But come, sir, without any of these things a man may show patriotism and zeal. Where? When? Why, you incorrigible knave, even at the time when every man who ever spoke from the tribune gave freely to the national defence, when at last even Aristonicus gave the money he had collected to redeem his citizenship, you never came forward and put your name down for a farthing. And yet you were certainly not without means, for you had inherited more than five talents from the estate of your father-in-law Philo, and you had a present of two talents, subscribed by the chairmen of the Navy Boards, as a reward for spoiling the Navy Reform Bill. [313] However, I will pass that by, for fear I should stray from my immediate purpose by telling one story after another. It is clear that you refused to contribute, not because you were poor, but because you were careful not to do anything in opposition to the party you serve in politics. Then on what occasions are you a man of spirit? When are you a shining light? Whenever something is to be said in prejudice of your fellow-citizens; then your voice is magnificent, then your memory is wonderful; then we hear the great tragedian, the Theocrines23 of the legitimate drama. [314]

Then you remind us of the heroes of past generations. Quite right: but it is not fair, men of Athens, to take advantage of the affection you cherish for the departed, and analyze me, who am still living in your midst, by comparing me with them. [315] Everybody knows that against the living there is always an undercurrent of more or less jealousy, while the dead are no longer disliked even by their enemies. Such is human nature; am I then to be criticized and canvassed by comparison with my predecessors? Heaven forbid! No, Aeschines; that is unfair and unjust: compare me with yourself, or with any living man you choose, whose principles are identical with yours. [316] Consider this question: is it more decent and patriotic that for the sake of the services of men of old times, enormous as they were, nay, great beyond expression, the services that are now being rendered to the present age should be treated with ingratitude and vituperation, or that every man who achieves anything in a spirit of loyalty should receive some share of the respect and consideration of his fellow-citizens? [317] If I must deal with that subject, I say that, if my policy and my principles are considered, they will be found to resemble in spirit and purpose those of the venerated names of antiquity. Yours are like those of the men who maligned them: for it is certain that, even in their days, there were men who were always carping at the living and commending the dead—a spiteful vocation, and just like yours. You tell me I am not at all like those great men. [318] Are you like them, Aeschines? Or your brother? Or any other orator of this generation? In my opinion, none. Then, my honest friend— to call you nothing worse—assay a living man by the standard of living men, men of his own time. That is the test you apply to everything else—to dramatists, to choruses, to athletes. [319] Philammon did not leave Olympia without a crown, because he was not so strong as Glaucus of Carystus, or other bygone champions: he was crowned and proclaimed victor, because he fought better than the men who entered the ring against him. You must compare me with the orators of today; with yourself, for instance, or anyone you like: I exclude none. [320] When the commonwealth was at liberty to choose the best policy, when there was a competition of patriotism open to all comers, I made better speeches than any other man, and all business was conducted by my resolutions, my statutes, my diplomacy. Not one o f you ever put in an appearance— except when you must needs fall foul of my measures. But when certain deplorable events had taken place, and there was a call, not for counsellors, but for men who would obey orders, who were ready to injure their country for pay, and willing to truckle to strangers, then you and your party were at your post, great men with gorgeous equipages.24 I was powerless, I admit; but I was still the better patriot. [321]

There are two traits, men of Athens, that mark the disposition of the well-meaning citizen;—that is a description I may apply to myself without offence. When in power, the constant aim of his policy should be the honor and the ascendancy of his country; and on every occasion and in all business he should preserve his loyalty. That virtue depends on his natural disposition: ability and success depend upon other considerations. [322] Such, you will find, has been my disposition, abidingly and without alloy. Look at the facts. They demanded that I should be given up; they arraigned me before the Amphictyonic Council; they tried me with threats, they tried me with promises; they set these miscreants to worry me like a pack of wolves; but through it all I never renounced my loyalty to you. At the very outset of my career I had chosen once for all the path of political uprightness and integrity, and resolved to support, to magnify, and to associate myself with the honor, the power, and the glory of my native land. [323] I do not perambulate the marketplace, gaily exulting in the good fortune of the alien, holding out my right hand, and telling the glad tidings to anyone I think likely to send word over yonder. When I hear of my country's successes, I do not shudder, and sigh, and hang down my head, like those blasphemers, who traduce Athens, forgetting that thereby they are traducing themselves; who turn their eyes abroad, and, when the alien has prospered by the distresses of Greece, applaud his good fortune, and declare that we must try to preserve it for ever. [324]

Never, O ye Powers of Heaven, never vouchsafe to them the fulfillment of that desire. If it be possible, implant even in them a better purpose and a better spirit; but, if their malady is incurable, consign them, and them alone, to utter and untimely destruction by land and sea, and to us who remain grant speedy deliverance from the terrors that hang over our heads, and a salvation that shall never fail.

1 Eurybatus, of Ephesus, a proverbial knave, gave to Cyrus military money entrusted to him by Croesus.

2 the perpetrator: Alexander, who, in the year 335, destroyed Thebes, and then demanded from Athens the surrender of Demosthenes. See Introd. p. 4.

3 Perilaus: so MSS. here, and, with variations, in 295; according to Greek lexicographers the name was Perillus.

4 looting of Mysia, by pirates; the proverbial example of cowardly non-resistance.

5 These can hardly be standard talents. Perhaps they were the later conventional talents, mentioned by Philemon, which were equal to three gold staters or didrachmas （say 4s. 6d.）; or perhaps the Chersonesus had an unknown standard of its own; or perhaps the forger of these documents was generous in disbursing other people's gold.

6 Haliartus, 395 B.C.; Corinth, 394 B.C.; Decelean war, the last period, 4l3-404, of the Peloponnesian war, when the Spartans held the fortified position of Decelea in Attica.

7 ὑπωμοσία, in general an affidavit to arrest proceedings; here the oath taken in the Assembly by the party engaging to prosecute the author of a law or a decree for violation of the constitution. Its effect was to keep the law in abeyance, at whatever stage it had arrived, until the suit was decided.

8 dockyard temple: lit. temple of （Artemis） Munichia: the “Bluejackets' Church” at Peiraeus.

9 The laws alleged to be violated were posted in court side by side with the law or decree which was the object of the prosecution.

10 like a clown at a carnival: lit., as from a wagon, in the procession at a Dionysiac festival, when coarse raillery was customary. A similar expression is used in Dem. 18.11 and Dem. 18.124.

11 Heros the bone-setter: this interpretation is doubtful; it assumes （1） identity with a person called, more respectfully, Heros the physician, in a similar passage of the speech On the Embassy, Dem. 19; （2） thatκαλαμίτηςmay mean one who uses splints （κάλαμοι）. Otherwise: near the shrine （or statue） of the hero Calamites— unknown elsewhere, but perhaps identical with the Lycian “Hero Physician.” See Essay 6. in Goodwin's edition.

12 hour-glass, the clepsydra or water-clock, used to measure the time allowed by the court to each speaker.

13 presiding councillors: the fifty representatives on the Council of that one of the ten tribes within whose term of administrative duty the meeting fell.

14 unfolded the hurdles: they were tied together hinge-wise, and, when unfolded, formed barriers, either to keep out strangers （Dem. 59.90） or to block streets leading from the marketplace elsewhere than to the Pnyx, where the assembly met （Schol. on Aristoph. Ach. 22）. Unfolded is a conjectural reading derived from the scholium cited; but no satisfactory explanation is forthcoming of the reading of all MSS., set fire to the hurdles.

15 Battalus, perhaps stammerer, a nickname of the nursery; capable also of an indecent interpretation, and therefore maliciously revived by Aeschines.

16 The Spartan hegemony lasted from 404 to 371, the Theban from 371 to 362.

17 stoned Cyrilus: at Salamis, 479 B.C., when Athens was held by the Persians; see Hdt. 9.5, where, however, the name is Lycides. Not 480 B.C., as Cicero, Off. 3.11.48, implies; though the rest of the sentence refers to the conditions of that year.

18 The metaphors here are taken from calculations on the abacus, where subtraction of counters from one side of the board would serve instead of addition to the other. Instead of showing the gains of Athens side by side with her losses, Aeschines would record only the adverse balance.

19 that fought for Greece: at Salamis, 480 B.C.

20 in her initiations: she was an expert in Bacchic or Sabazian rites imported from Phrygia.

21 Since the battle of Chaeronea.

22 Eur. Hec. 1. The other quotations are unknown.

23 Theocrines, a notorious informer; prosecuted in a speech attributed to Demosthenes.

24 To keep a stud of horses, whether for racing purposes or for use in the cavalry, was at Athens the favorite method for displaying wealth.

Citizens of Athens, I do not doubt that you are all pretty well aware that this trial has been the center of keen partisanship and active canvassing, for you saw the people who were accosting and annoying you just now at the casting of lots.1 But I have to make a request which ought to be granted without asking, that you will all give less weight to private entreaty or personal influence than to the spirit of justice and to the oath which you severally swore when you entered that box. You will reflect that justice and the oath concern yourselves and the commonwealth, whereas the importunity and party spirit of advocates serve the end of those private ambitions which you are convened by the laws to thwart, not to encourage for the advantage of evil-doers. [2]

Now I observe that men who enter public life with honest intentions, even after they have submitted to scrutiny, do still acknowledge a perpetual responsibility. But Aeschines, the defendant, reverses this practice. Before coming into court to justify his proceedings, he has put out of the way one of the men who called him to account, and the others he is constantly threatening. So he is trying to introduce into politics a most dangerous and deplorable practice; for if a man who has undertaken and administered any public function can get rid of accusers not by his honesty but by the fear he inspires, the people will soon lose all control of public affairs. [3]

While I have entire confidence that I shall prove that this man is guilty of serious delinquencies, and that he deserves the most severe punishment, yet, in spite of that assurance, I have a misgiving, which I will explain to you quite frankly. It appears to me, men of Athens, that the trials which come before you are affected quite as much by the conditions of the hour as by the facts; and I am afraid that the long lapse of time since the embassy has inclined you to forget or to acquiesce in these iniquities. [4] I will, then, suggest a method by which you may nevertheless reach a just conclusion and give a righteous verdict today. By consideration among yourselves, gentlemen, you should form a true conception of what should be included in the vindication which the state requires of any ambassador. He is responsible then, in the first place, for the reports he has made; secondly, for the advice he has offered; thirdly, for his observance of your instructions; then there is the question of times and opportunities; and, to crown all, whether he has done his business corruptly or with integrity. [5] Why are these the topics of inquiry? Your conclusions are derived from the ambassador's reports: you reach a right decision if they are true, a wrong decision if they are false. The advice of ambassadors you regard as the more trustworthy because it is given by men who presumably understand their own mission. [6] No ambassador, then, ought ever to be convicted of defective or mischievous counsels. Thirdly, when he has been expressly instructed what to say and what to do by resolution of the Assembly, it is his duty to conduct his business according to such instructions. Very well; but how does the question of time arise? Because, men of Athens, in important transactions opportunities are often short-lived: once willfully surrendered and betrayed to the enemy, they cannot be recovered, do what you will. [7] Next, as for the question of bribery or no bribery, of course you are agreed that it is a scandalous and abominable offence to accept money for acts injurious to the commonwealth. The author of the statute, however, made no such distinction; he forbade the acceptance of rewards absolutely, holding, as I suppose, that the man who takes them and is thereby corrupted can no longer be trusted by the state as a judge of sound policy. [8] If, then, I can establish by clear proofs that the reports of the defendant, Aeschines, were entirely untruthful, and that he prevented the Assembly from hearing the truth from me; that his counsels were totally opposed to your true interests; that he disobeyed all your instructions when on embassy; that by his waste of time many important opportunities were lost to the city; and finally that for all these delinquencies he, as well as Philocrates, accepted presents and rewards; pronounce him guilty and exact a penalty adequate to his crimes. But if I fail to prove all these five charges, or any one of them, then call me an impostor, and acquit him. [9]

I have many further charges to add, such as must excite universal abhorrence; but, by way of preface, I will first remind you of what doubtless most of you remember,—of the party with which Aeschines at first ranged himself in politics, and of the speeches which he thought fit to make in opposition to Philip. In this way I hope to satisfy you that his early acts and speeches supply abundant proof of his present corruption. [10] Aeschines, then, was the first man in Athens, as he claimed at the time in a speech, to perceive that Philip had designs against Greece, and was corrupting some of the magnates of Arcadia. It was he who, with Ischander, son of Neoptolemus, as his understudy, addressed the Council, and addressed the Assembly, on this subject, and persuaded them to send ambassadors to all the Greek states to convene a conference at Athens for the consideration of war with Philip. [11] It was he who afterwards, on his return from Arcadia, gave a report of the fine long orations which he said he had delivered as your spokesman before the Ten Thousand at Megalopolis in reply to Philip's champion Hieronymus, and he made a long story of the enormous harm which corrupt statesmen in the pay of Philip were doing not only to their own countries but to the whole of Greece. [12] So on the strength of his policy at that time, and of the sample he had exhibited of his conduct, he was actually appointed as one of the ambassadors when you were induced by Aristodemus, Neoptolemus, Ctesiphon and others, who had brought entirely misleading reports from Macedonia, to send an embassy to negotiate peace with Philip. He was chosen, not as one who would make traffic of your interests, not as one who had any confidence in Philip, but as one of the party that was to keep an eye on the rest, for in view of his early speeches, and of his known hostility to Philip, it was natural that you should all have such an opinion of the man. [13] Then he came to me and proposed that we should act together on the embassy, being especially urgent that we should jointly keep watch upon that infamous scoundrel Philocrates. And until after our return from the first embassy I at least, men of Athens, had no suspicion that he was corrupt and had already sold himself. For apart from the speeches which, as I said, he had made on former occasions, he rose at the first of the two assemblies at which you discussed terms of peace, and began with an exordium which I believe I can repeat to you in the very words he used: [14] “If Philocrates, men of Athens, had given many days to studying how best he could thwart the peace, I do not think he could have found a better way than the present proposal. Such a peace as this I for one will never advise the city to make, so long as a single Athenian remains alive; yet I do say that we ought to make peace.” In such terms he spoke, concisely and with moderation. [15] And then on the next day, when the peace was to be ratified, when I supported the resolutions of our allies, and did what I could to secure fair and equitable terms, and when the people sympathized with my purpose and refused to hear a word from the contemptible Philocrates, up jumped the very man who had made the speech I have quoted in the head of all of you only the day before, and addressed you in support of Philocrates, [16] using language for which, as Heaven is my witness, he deserves to die many times over. He told you that you ought to forget the achievements of your forefathers; that you should not tolerate all that talk about old trophies and sea-fights; and that he would draft and enact a law forbidding aid to any Greeks who had not previously brought aid to you. This speech the shameless reprobate found courage to make while the ambassadors, whom you summoned from the Greek cities at his own suggestion, before he had sold himself, were standing at his elbow and listening to what he said. [17]

Well, you appointed him a second time, men of Athens, as an envoy to receive the oath of ratification; and I shall shortly have to tell you how he again wasted time, mishandled all the affairs of the commonwealth, and repeatedly fell out with me in regard to them when I tried to stand in his way. However, by reason of the persistent misconduct of these men, and their disobedience to instructions, we came back from the embassy for the oaths—that is the embassy which is the subject of the present scrutiny—without having realized any single one, great or small, of the advantages which were promised or expected when you approved the peace,—with nothing but deception and disappointment. Then we repaired to the Council. There are many eye-witnesses of what I am about to relate, for the Council-house was thronged with spectators. [18] I came forward and reported the whole truth to the Council. I denounced these men, and told the whole story, point by point, beginning with those earlier hopes created by the reports of Ctesiphon and Aristodemus, going on to the more recent orations of Aeschines at the approval of the peace, and showing to what straits they had reduced the city. There remained the question of the Phocians and Thermopylae, and we must not—such was my advice—we must not repeat our experience, and throw them overboard, and so, in reliance upon a succession of idle hopes and assurances, allow ourselves to fall into the last extremity of disaster. I convinced the Council; [19] but when the Assembly met, and we had to address the whole body of citizens, Aeschines took the first turn of all of us. And here I most earnestly entreat you to verify my account by your own recollections; for I am now relating transactions which ultimately brought your affairs to complete and final ruin. He utterly ignored the duty of giving a report of the doings of the embassy. He never mentioned the speeches made to the Council, or told you whether he disputed the truth of my statement. But he made such a fine speech, so full of big promises, that he carried you all away with him. [20] For he declared that he had completely converted Philip to the interests of Athens in respect of the Amphictyonic question and of everything else. He went through a long diatribe against the Thebans, which he said he had addressed to Philip himself, recapitulating the main points. He offered you a calculation that, thanks to his diplomacy, without leaving your homes, without any campaigning or worry, within two or three days you would hear the news of the beleaguerment of Thebes, independently of the rest of Boeotia, [21] of the repopulation of Thespiae and Plataea, and of the recovery of Apollo's treasure, not from the Phocians, but from the Thebans, who had planned the seizure of the temple. It was himself, he added, who had instructed Philip that those who contrived the project were quite as sacrilegious as the men by whose hands it was executed; and therefore the Thebans had set a price on his head! [22] He had even heard some Euboeans, who were thoroughly frightened by the friendship that had been cemented between Philip and Athens, utter these very words: “Gentlemen of the Embassy, we know all about the terms on which you have concluded peace with Philip, and we are aware that you have given up Amphipolis to him, and that he has agreed to hand over Euboea to you.” He had also, he said, settled another matter, but he thought it better not to mention it just yet—some of his colleagues were already so jealous of him. This was a veiled allusion to Oropus. [23] And so, in all the glory of these disclosures, with everybody regarding him as a grand speaker and a marvellous man, he descended from the tribune in his most majestic manner. Then I rose, and said that the whole story was news to me. I attempted to repeat the statement I had made to the Council; but Aeschines and Philocrates posted themselves one on either side of me—shouting, interrupting, and finally jeering. You were all laughing; you would not listen to me, and you did not want to believe anything except what Aeschines had reported. [24] And I must say that your feeling was quite natural. For how could anyone, filled with anticipation of those wonderful benefits, be patient of a speaker who told you that you would never get them, and even denounced the conduct of the benefactors? At the moment, I imagine, everything else was thrown into the shade by the hopes and expectations that were suggested to you; contradiction seemed to be mere annoyance and malice; and these great achievements were thought amazingly fine and most beneficial to the commonwealth. [25]

Why have I begun by reviving these memories and quoting those old speeches? My first and chief object, men of Athens, is that, when you hear me relate some performance that seems to you atrocious and incredible, no one may ask in surprise: “Then why did you not speak out and give us this information instantly?” [26] but that, by recalling the assurances by which on every occasion these men stopped others from getting your attention, and that magnificent promise of Aeschines, you may realize that you have to thank him for this crowning injury,—that you were precluded from learning the truth promptly and at the proper time, being cheated by hopes and impostures and vain assurances. [27] That, I say, is my first and main purpose in this narration. What is my second purpose? It is one of no less importance. I want you to remind yourselves of that policy of precaution and distrust of Philip which this man deliberately chose when he was still unbribed, and to compare the confidence and friendship that afterwards sprang up so suddenly; [28] and then, if the fair reports he laid before you have really proved true, and if all the results have been fortunate, to admit the view that that friendship was formed for truth's sake and in the best interests of the city; but, if the sequel has given the lie to all his predictions, if it has involved the city in much dishonor and in grievous perils, then be assured that his own sordid greed has prompted this change of front, because he has sold the truth for a bribe. [29]

Having allowed myself to refer to those old speeches, I wish to relate first of all how these men took the business of the Phocians out of your hands. Gentlemen of the jury, I hope that none of you will regard my charges and accusations as too big for the calibre of the defendant, measuring him against the magnitude of the transactions. Reflect rather that, if any man soever, placed by you in the position he filled, and trusted to deal with the occasions that arose, had taken hire, and had sought to deceive and mislead you as Aeschines did, he would have brought about exactly the same disaster as Aeschines. [30] For though you often employ insignificant men for public business, it does not follow that those affairs are insignificant for which the rest of the world acknowledges our competence. Assuredly not. Again, it was Philip, of course, who really destroyed the Phocians; but these men co-operated. The question on which you are to fix your minds is whether they purposely wasted and threw away any chances that came to the embassy of saving the Phocians. I do not suggest that Aeschines destroyed the Phocians all by himself. How could he? [31]

Give me the resolution which the Council adopted on my report, and the evidence of the member who moved it on that occasion. These documents will satisfy you that I did not hold my peace then, to run away from my actions now,—for I was laying my complaint, and trying to forecast results, at the first opportunity; and also that the Council, not being debarred from hearing the truth from me, did not give these men either a vote of thanks, or an invitation to the public dinner in the Town Hall. We are told that these compliments had never before been withheld from any ambassadors since the foundation of Athens—not even from Timagoras,2 whom the Assembly condemned to death. These men, however, had to go without them. [32] Read first the deposition, and then the resolution, to the jury.“ Deposition ”“ Resolutions ”

Here is no commendation, no invitation from the Council to the ambassadors to dine in the Town Hall. If Aeschines says that such a thing exists, let him produce and exhibit it, and I will sit down. But no; there is none. Now, if all the envoys acted alike, the Council was right in thanking nobody,—for we had all in very truth behaved scandalously indeed. But if some acted rightly and others wrongly, the well-conducted, it would seem, must submit to a discourtesy provoked by those who had played the rogue. [33] How then can you find an easy answer to the question, Who was the rogue? Consult your own recollections, and mark who denounced the transactions at the outset. For it is clear that, if the evil-doer could hold his peace, escape immediate detection, and never afterwards allow himself to be called to account, that was good enough for him; whereas the man with a good conscience bethought himself that it would be very hard if by keeping silence he should become a reputed accomplice in scandalous and wicked actions. Well then, it was I who denounced these men from the outset, and none of them denounced me. [34]

Well, the Council adopted this resolution. When the Assembly met, Philip was already at Thermopylae. For that is the beginning of their misdeeds; they had surrendered control to Philip and then,—although the right course for you was, first to hear the facts, next to decide, and finally to carry out your decision,—you heard nothing until he was already on the spot, and it was no easy matter to advise you what to do. [35] Further, no one read the resolution to the Assembly, and the people never heard it. However, Aeschines rose and delivered that oration which I have already described, about the wonderful advantages he had induced Philip to grant to you, and the price set on his head by the Thebans in consequence; and so, although you were at first alarmed at Philip's approach, and indignant that the ambassadors had given you no warning, you became as mild as lambs, expecting to get all that you desired, and refused to hear a word from me or anyone else. [36] Then the letter from Philip was read. It had been composed by Aeschines without our knowledge, and was in fact a downright, explicit written defence of the errors these men had committed. For it alleges that Philip stopped them when they wanted to visit the towns and receive the oaths, and that he detained them in order that they might help him to reconcile the Halians with the Pharsalians; Philip takes on his own shoulders the burden of all their delinquencies: [37] but of the Phocians and the Thespians, and of all the promises reported to you by Aeschines,—not a word! The job was not managed in this fashion by mere accident. For derelictions of duty, for which they ought to have been brought to justice, and for their failure to do their work according to your instructions, Philip takes all the blame. He tells you it was his fault,—and of course you were never likely to have any opportunity of punishing him! [38] On the other hand, all the matters in which he was trying to cheat you and overreach you were left for Aeschines to report by word of mouth, so that you might never have it in your power to incriminate Philip or throw any blame on him, as the assertions were not to be found in the letter or in any other direct communication of his. Read to the jury the letter written by Aeschines and dispatched by Philip. You will observe that it agrees exactly with my description. Read.“ Letter ” [39]

You hear the letter, men of Athens,—such a nice, courteous letter! But about the Phocians, about the Thebans, about everything that Aeschines reported—not a scrape of the pen! There is nothing in it that is honest, as you shall see at once. For he tells you that he detained them that they might help him to reconcile the Halians. Well, the reconciliation of the Halians consisted in their being cast out of their homes, and their country devastated. As for the prisoners, this man, who wanted to know what he could do to oblige you, declares that the idea of getting them liberated never entered his head. [40] You know that evidence has already been given before the Assembly,—and that evidence shall now be repeated,—that I had started with a talent in my pocket for their ransom; and therefore, to rob me of a patriotic act, Aeschines persuaded Philip to write these words. Now for the most important point. The man who, in the first letter, which we brought home, wrote these words: “I would write more explicitly of the benefits I intend to confer on you, if I were certain that the alliance will be made,”—this man, now that the alliance has been made, says that he does not know how he can gratify you. Not know the very thing he promised! Why, he must have known it, unless he was hoodwinking us throughout. To prove, however, that he did so write at that time, please take and read the actual passage from the first letter,—beginning here. Read.“ Excerpt from the letter ” [41]

You see that, before he got his peace, he covenanted that, if you should make alliance with him as well, he would specify in writing the great benefits that he would confer on Athens. But now that both peace and alliance are concluded, he says that he does not know what he can do to oblige you, but that, if you will tell him, he will do anything “that is consistent with his own honor and reputation”—taking refuge in this saving clause, and leaving himself a loophole in case you make any proposal or are induced to ask any favor. [42]

All this chicanery, and much besides, might have been instantly detected, and you might have been informed and spared the sacrifice of your interests, if you had not been cheated out of the truth by that story of Thespiae and Plataea and the imminent punishment of the Thebans. Yet if Philip's promises were merely for show, and if the city was to be deluded, it was right to mention them; if, on the other hand, they were really to be fulfilled, it was best to say nothing about them. For if the project was so far matured that the Thebans could gain nothing by hearing of it, why has it not been executed? But if it has been thwarted because they had news of it in time, who let the secret out? [43] Aeschines? Oh no; it was never meant to come off, and he neither wanted it nor expected it; let him be quit of the imputation of blabbing! The truth is that his purpose required that you should be hoodwinked by that talk; that you should refuse to hear the truth from me and should stay at home; and that they should triumphantly carry a decree ensuring the destruction of the Phocians. That is why this tissue of lies was woven; that is why it was made the theme of a popular harangue. [44]

Now when I heard him making all these fine promises, and knew to a certainty that he was lying,—but let me tell you why I knew. First, because, when Philip was on the point of swearing the oath of ratification, the Phocians were expressly excluded from the treaty by these men and that exclusion should have been passed over in silence, if the Phocians were to be delivered;3 and secondly because none of the ambassadors from Philip, nor Philip's own letter, but only Aeschines, mentioned the promises. [45] So drawing my conclusions, I rose and presented myself, and made an attempt to reply. When you refused me a hearing, I held my peace, except that I protested—and I entreat that you will recall this—that I had no knowledge of the promises, nothing to do with them, and, I added, no faith in them. At the words “no faith in them,” you became exasperated; and I proceeded: “If any of these promises come true, men of Athens, be sure you give thanks and honors and decorations to these gentlemen; but not to me. If, however, things turn out otherwise, see that it is on them that you vent your wrath. I stand aside.” [46] “Not now,” said Aeschines, interrupting me, “do not stand aside now; only do not put in your claim then.” “Agreed;” said I, “if I do, I shall be in the wrong.” Then Philocrates rose, and said, in a very supercilious manner: “No wonder Demosthenes and I disagree, men of Athens. He drinks water; I drink wine.” And then you all laughed. [47]

Now look at the decree, which Philocrates afterwards drafted and handed to the clerk. It sounds well enough to the ear; but if you will take into account the occasion on which it was proposed, and the promises which Aeschines was making at the time, it will be clear that they were simply handing over the Phocians to Philip and the Thebans—I might almost say, with shackles on their wrists. Read the decree.“ Decree ” [48]

You observe, men of Athens, how full the decree is of compliments and fine phrases; that it provides that the peace, and also the alliance, made with Philip shall be extended to his posterity; and that thanks are given to Philip for his promise of just dealings. But it was not Philip who had made any promises; so far from promising he says that he does not know what to do to oblige you. [49] It was Aeschines who was Philip's spokesman and gave undertakings. Then Philocrates, taking advantage of your ready acceptance of Aeschines' words, inserts in the decree a clause providing that, if the Phocians should not do what was right and give up the temple to the Amphictyonic Council, the Athenian people should send a force to coerce the recalcitrants. [50] And so, men of Athens, as you stayed at home instead of taking the field, as the Lacedaemonians had discerned Philip's treachery and withdrawn, and as no members of the Council were on the spot except the Thessalians and the Thebans, he really has proposed, with the utmost civility, to hand the temple over to them. The wording is, “to the Amphictyons;” but what Amphictyons? There were none there except Thessalians and Thebans. He makes no such proposal as that the Amphictyonic Council should be convened, or that operations should be suspended until it meets, or that Proxenus should march against the Phocians, or that the Athenians should take the field. [51] Philip, however, did send you two letters of summons. Yes, but not with the intention that you should take the field. That is certain; otherwise he would not have destroyed your opportunity of going out before he summoned you, nor would he have detained me when I wanted to sail home, nor ordered Aeschines to make statements calculated to deter you from going out. No, his object was that you, in the belief that he would do all that you wanted, should make no decree prejudicial to him, and the Phocians might not stand their ground and hold out in reliance upon hopes afforded by you, but might make unconditional surrender to him in sheer desperation. Read Philip's actual letters.“ Letters ” [52]

These letters, then, do summon you,—yes, indeed, at last!4 But if there had been any honesty in the letters, it was clearly the duty of these men to exhort you to take the field, and to propose that Proxenus, whom they knew to be in those parts, should at once march to the aid of Philip. Their actual policy was very different. Naturally; for they did not apply their minds to the phrasing of the letter; they were in the secret of the intention with which it was written, and with that intention they concurred and cooperated. [53]

When therefore the Phocians learned your policy from the proceedings of the Assembly, received the decree of Philocrates, and were informed of the report and promises of Aeschines, their ruin was complete. Just consider. There were some men in Phocis, sensible men, who had no confidence in Philip. They were induced to trust him. Why? Because they conceived that, though Philip had deceived them ten times over, he would never have dared to deceive Athenians and envoys of the Athenian people, that the report of Aeschines was true, and that destruction had overtaken not themselves but the Thebans. [54] There were others who were ready at all hazards to hold out to the end; but even they were mollified by the persuasion that Philip was their friend, and that, if they refused compliance, you, from whom they were expecting succor, would turn against them. A third party supposed that you regretted your treaty of peace with Philip; but they were now informed that you had actually decreed an extension of the treaty to Philip's descendants, and so they abandoned all hope of your assistance. And that is why these men packed all those provisions into one decree. [55] In my judgement they could not have done you a more grievous injury. To turn their treaty of peace with a mortal man, a mere potentate of occasion, into a covenant of immortal ignominy for the commonwealth; to strip their city of all she had, even of the largess of her good fortune; in the veriest extravagance of malice to heap injuries not only on the Athenians of today but upon all who shall hereafter be Athenians,—is not that an appalling iniquity? [56] Never would you have consented to add to the treaty by afterthought the words “and to his posterity,” but for your confidence in the promises alleged by Aeschines. In those promises the Phocians confided,—and perished! They surrendered themselves to Philip; of their own accord they put their cities at his mercy; and their treatment has exactly contradicted all the assurances of Aeschines. [57]

To give you the clearest proof that that destruction was effected in this way by the contrivance of these men, I will submit a reckoning of the dates of the several transactions. If any of the defendants challenges my calculation, let him stand up and speak in the time5 allotted to me. Now the treaty was made on the nineteenth of Elaphebolion, and we were abroad receiving the oaths for three entire months. During the whole of that time the Phocians were safe. [58] We returned from the oath-taking embassy on the thirteenth of Scirophorion, when Philip was already at Thermopylae and making promises to the Phocians which they were not disposed to believe. The proof of that is that otherwise they would not have resorted to you. Then the Assembly, at which these men brought the whole business to ruin with their lies and cajolery, was held on the sixteenth of Scirophorion. [59] Now I calculate that the news from Athens reached the Phocians on the fourth day after that date, for there were Phocian envoys in the city, and they were interested in knowing what report these men would submit and what decree you would adopt. Therefore the twentieth was the day on which we reckon that the Phocians received the news, that is, the fourth day after the sixteenth. Then followed the twenty-first, twenty-second, twenty-third; and on the twenty-third the convention was made, and the fortunes of Phocis perished and came to an end. [60] How, then, is this date proved? On the twenty-seventh, when you were holding an assembly at Peiraeus to discuss dockyard business, Dercylus arrived from Chalcis with the intelligence that Philip had put the whole affair into the hands of the Thebans, and he computed that it was then the fourth day after the convention. Twenty-three, twenty-four, twenty-five, twenty-six, twenty-seven: that makes it the fourth day. Therefore these dates, together with their own reports and decrees, all convict these men of having co-operated with Philip, and they share with him the guilt of the destruction of the Phocians. [61] Again, the consideration that not a city of the Phocians was taken forcibly, whether by blockade or assault, and yet that they were all brought to utter ruin under the convention, is a convincing proof that they perished because they had been persuaded through these men that Philip would deliver them; for about his character they had no illusions. Now give me our treaty with the Phocians, and the Amphictyonic decrees, under which they dismantled their defences. These documents will show you on what footing you stood with them, and what treatment they have received by the fault of these wicked men. Read.“ Alliance of the Phocians and the Athenians ” [62]

These are the relations that subsisted between you and them—friendship, alliance, succor. Now hear what they have suffered through the man who thwarted the succor you owed them. Read.“ Convention between Philip and the Phocians ”

You hear it, men of Athens. A convention between Philip and the Phocians, it says, not between the Thebans and the Phocians, or the Thessalians and the Phocians, or the Locrians, or any other of the nationalities then present. Again, it says that the Phocians are to surrender their cities to Philip, not to the Thebans, or the Thessalians, or any other people. [63] Why? Because you had been assured by Aeschines that Philip had come to deliver the Phocians. In Aeschines they had confidence; to Aeschines they looked for aid; with Aeschines they were making their peace. Read the other documents. Now you shall see to what sufferings they were brought by that confidence. Does the story agree with, does it in any way resemble, those reports of Aeschines? Read.“ Decrees of the Amphictyonic Council ” [64]

Men of Athens, nothing more awful or more momentous has befallen in Greece within living memory, nor, as I believe, in all the history of the past. Yet through the agency of these men all these great and terrible transactions have been dominated by a single individual, though the city of Athens is still in being, the city whose ancestral prerogative it was to stand forth as the champion of the Hellenic race, and declare that such things shall not be. In what fashion these unhappy Phocians have perished you may learn, not from the decrees alone, [65] but from the deeds that have been wrought—a spectacle, men of Athens, to move us to terror and pity indeed! Not long ago, when we were travelling to Delphi, necessity compelled us to look upon that scene—homesteads levelled with the ground, cities stripped of their defensive walls, a countryside all emptied of its young men; only women, a few little children, and old men stricken with misery. No man could find words adequate to the woes that exist in that country today. And yet these are the people—you take the words out of my mouth—these are the people who in the day of our trial6 openly cast their vote against the Thebans, when the question was the enslavement of us all! [66] Then what vote, what judgement, men of Athens, do you think that our forefathers would give, if they could recover consciousness, at the trial of the men who devised the destruction of the Phocians? I conceive that they would account even those who should stone them to death with their own hands to be free of all bloodguiltiness. For is it not an ignominy—or use a stronger word if such there be—that, by the fault of these men, the people who saved us at that crisis, and gave for us the verdict of deliverance, have received evil in requital of good, and have been abandoned to the endurance of afflictions such as no people of the Greeks has ever known? And who is the author of those wrongs? Who is the contriver of that deception? Who but Aeschines? [67]

Men of Athens, Philip has many claims to congratulation on his good fortune, but beyond them all he might well be especially congratulated for one thing, in which I solemnly declare that I can name no man of our time who has been equally fortunate. Such achievements as the capture of great cities and the subjugation of a vast territory are, I suppose, enviable, as they are undoubtedly imposing; yet we could mention many other men who have done the like. [68] But the stroke of good fortune I have in mind is peculiar to him and has befallen no other man. What is it? It is that, when he needed scoundrels for his purposes, he found bigger scoundrels than he wanted. For surely that is a fair description of the men who deceived you, hiring themselves out for lies which Philip, in spite of the great interests at issue, did not dare to tell on his own account, which he never wrote in any letter or put into the mouth of ambassadors of his own. [69] Antipater and Parmenio, though they were in the service of a hard taskmaster, and though they were not likely to fall in with you again, nevertheless claimed exemption from serving as the agents of your beguilement; and yet citizens of Athens, the appointed envoys of the freest of all cities, men who must needs encounter you and look you in the face, who must live with you all the rest of their life, who would have to render you a strict account of their actions, accepted a commission to beguile you! Could any men be more wicked or more lost to all sense of shame? [70]

To show you that this man is already accursed by you, and that religion and piety forbid you to acquit one who has been guilty of such falsehoods,—recite the curse.7 Take and read it from the statute: here it is.“ Prayer ”

This imprecation, men of Athens, is pronounced, as the law directs, by the marshal on your behalf at every meeting of the Assembly, and again before the Council at all their sessions. The defendant cannot say that he is not familiar with it, for, when acting as clerk to the Assembly and as an officer of the Council, he used to dictate the statute to the marshal. [71] Would you not have acted absurdly and preposterously if today, when the power is in your own hands, you should preclude yourselves from doing what you enjoin, or rather require, the gods to do on your behalf; if you should yourselves release a man whom you have implored them to extirpate along with his household and his kindred? Never! Leave the undetected sinner to the justice of the gods; but about the sinner whom you have caught yourselves, lay no further injunctions on them. [72]

I am informed that he has become so proficient in effrontery and hardihood that he will disavow all his acts—his reports, his promises, his deceptions of the city—as though he were not on trial before a jury that knows the whole truth, and that he will denounce first the Lacedaemonians,then the Phocians, and then Hegesippus. That is buffoonery, nay, barefaced impudence. [73] Whatever he may say just now about the Phocians or the Lacedaemonians or Hegesippus,—that they did not receive Proxenus, that they are irreligious, that they are—anything he can say to their disadvantage,—surely all that was finished and done with before the return of the envoys to Athens, and therefore could not have stood in the way of the deliverance of the Phocians. Who says so? Why, Aeschines here, the defendant himself. [74] For he did not allege in his report that, but for the Lacedaemonians, but for their refusal to receive Proxenus, but for Hegesippus, but for this or that, the Phocians would have been delivered. He passed over all that, and declared explicitly that before his return he had persuaded Philip to deliver the Phocians, to repopulate Boeotia, and to put the whole business into your hands; that it would all be accomplished within two or three days, and that in revenge the Thebans had set a price upon his head. [75] Do not, then, listen to anything that had been done by Lacedaemonians or Phocians before he made his report; do not let him talk about it; do not permit him to denounce the Phocians and call them rascals. You saved the Lacedaemonians in old time, and those accursed Euboeans lately, and many other peoples, not because they were virtuous, but because their safety profited Athens, as that of the Phocians would today. What transgression did the Phocians or the Lacedaemonians or you or anyone else commit after Aeschines' speech, that the promises made by him to you then should not be fulfilled? [76] Ask him that question. He can point to none. For he made his lying report, you believed it, the Phocians heard of it, surrendered, and perished, all within a period of five days only. Hence it is clearly evident that the ruin of the Phocians was nothing but a concoction of deceit and artifice. For during the time when Philip was unable to march by reason of the peace, but was already laying his plans, he sent for the Lacedaemonians, promising to do everything for them, so that the Phocians might not, through your agency, secure their help. [77] But when he had reached Thermopylae, and when the Lacedaemonians, detecting the snare, had withdrawn, he sent Aeschines as his agent in advance for your deception, lest, when you discovered that he was acting in the interest of the Thebans, he should be involved once more in delays and fighting and waste of time with the Phocians resisting him, and you helping them. In this way he hoped to obtain complete mastery without a struggle. And so it fell out. Aeschines, then, must not escape punishment for deceiving you, merely because Philip deceived the Lacedaemonians and the Phocians. That would be unjust indeed. [78]

If as an offset to the Phocians and Thermopylae and all our other losses he tells you that the city still retains the Chersonese, I adjure you not to accept that excuse. In addition to the wrongs he has done you by his embassy, you must not suffer him by his defence also to fasten upon the city the reproach that, while stealthily securing some of your own possessions, you made sacrifice of the safety of your allies. You did no such thing. Peace was concluded; the Chersonese was secure; and then for the four ensuing months the Phocians were not imperilled, until you were deceived, and the Phocians destroyed, by this man's mendacity. [79] Moreover, you will find that the Chersonese is in greater danger now than then. When would it have been easier to punish Philip for wrongful aggression upon that country—before he forestalled us at Thermopylae, or today? Surely far easier then! What, then, does it profit us that we still retain the Chersonese, if the man, who would have invaded it if he could, is freed from the apprehensions and perils that deterred him? [80]

I hear of another argument he will use: he will wonder why his accuser is Demosthenes and not one of the Phocians. I had better explain at once how the matter stands. The best and most respectable of the expatriated Phocians, being exiled and in distress, are living peaceably, and none of them would be willing to incur private animosity on account of the misfortunes of the nation, while those who might have done anything for a fee find that there is no one to pay it them. [81] For I would never pay a man a farthing to stand here by my side and make an outcry about his sufferings, since truth and fact cry out loudly enough. Nay more, the commonalty of the Phocians are in such an evil and pitiable plight that there is no question with them of prosecuting at an Athenian scrutiny—only of living like slaves in mortal terror of Thebans and of Philip's mercenaries, who are billeted on them after they have been disarmed and distributed among villages. [82] Do not allow this plea. No, Aeschines must prove either that the Phocians are not ruined, or that he did not promise that Philip would protect them. These are the questions for a scrutiny of an embassy: What has been accomplished? What did you report? If the truth,—go in peace; if falsehood,—take your punishment. What matter if the Phocians are not in court? You have played your part in reducing them to such straits that they can neither help their friends nor repel their enemies. [83]

Moreover, apart from the discredit and infamy attached to these transactions, it is easy to show that they have involved the commonwealth in very serious perils. You all know that the prowess of the Phocians, and their control of the pass of Thermopylae, gave us security against the Thebans, and ensured that neither Philip nor the Thebans would invade either the Peloponnesus, or Euboea, or Attica. [84] But, overborne by the impostures and falsehoods of these men, you have flung away the security of position and circumstances which the city enjoyed. That security was fortified by arms and an unbroken front, by strongholds of our allies and a broad territory; and you have acquiesced in its devastation. Your former expedition to Thermopylae, made at a cost of more than two hundred talents, if you include the private expenses of the troops, has gone to waste; and so have all your hopes respecting the Thebans. [85] But of all the many shameful services rendered by Aeschines to Philip, let me mention the one that really implied the most insolent disdain of the city and of you all. Philip was resolved from the first to do for the Thebans all that he has done, but Aeschines by the perversions of his report revealed your repugnance, and so intensified both your hostility and Philip's friendliness towards the Thebans. How could the man have treated you more arrogantly? [86]

Now take and read the decrees of Diophantus and of Callisthenes. They will show you how, when you did your duty, you made it an occasion of services of praise and thanksgiving, both at Athens and abroad; but when you had been led astray by these men, you brought your wives and children in from the country, and ordered the festival of Heracles to be held within the walls, in time of peace. It makes me wonder whether you will release unpunished a man who has deprived even the gods of immemorial observances. Read the decree.“ Decree ”

So you decreed at that time, men of Athens, agreeably to your achievements. Now read the next.“ Decree ” [87]

That is the decree you then made; and you owe it to these men. It was not with such expectations that you either made the first draft of the peace and alliance, or subsequently consented to add the words, and to his posterity, but in the hope of marvellous benefits through their agency. Yes, and since then you all remember how many times you have been agitated by news of Philip's army and auxiliaries at Porthmus or at Megara. True, he has not yet set foot in Attica; but you must not look only at that and abate your vigilance,—you must bear in mind that, thanks to these men, he has it in his power to do so whenever he chooses. You must keep that danger before your eyes, and abhor and punish the author and purveyor of that power. [88]

No doubt Aeschines will eschew a direct reply to the charges alleged, and in his desire to lead you as far as possible away from the facts, he will dilate on the great blessings that peace brings to the world and set against them the evils of war. He will eulogize peace in general terms, and that will be his defence. But all those considerations tell against him. For, if peace, which brings blessings to others, has brought so much vexation and bewilderment to you, what are we to say except that these men with their bribe-taking have perverted to evil a thing in itself excellent? What next? [89] Perhaps he will ask: “Do you not retain, and shall you not retain through the peace, three hundred war-galleys with stores and money for them?”

In reply to that, you have to reflect that Philip also has greatly strengthened his position owing to the peace, as regards his material resources in arms, in territory, in revenues, which last have increased largely. [90] And so indeed have ours, to some extent. But as to those other resources, of policy and of alliance,—and it is by them that all nations hold advantages for themselves or for stronger states—in our case, bartered away by these men, they have perished, or at least deteriorated: his are now formidable and far greater. It is surely unfair that, while Philip, thanks to these men, enjoys extended alliances and increased revenues, the advantages that we should in any case have gained from the peace should be reckoned by them as a set-off against those that they have sold. For our gains are not a compensation for our losses; far from it! No; what we now have would equally have been ours, and what we have not would have been added to us, but for these men. [91]

Speaking generally, men of Athens, you will doubtless agree that, however many misfortunes have befallen the city, if Aeschines had no hand in them, they ought not to be visited upon him. On the other hand, if the right policy has been taken by others, it is not fair that their success should save him. Take into account everything to which he contributed; requite him with gratitude, if he deserves it, with resentment, if his conduct provokes resentment. [92] How then will you reach a right conclusion? Do not allow him to make a hotch-potch of the faults of the generals, the war with Philip, the blessings of peace; but consider one thing at a time. For example, we were at war with Philip. True. Does anyone blame Aeschines for that? Does anyone wish to arraign him for the events of the war? Not a single man. Then so far he is acquitted; he need not say a word. A defendant should adduce witnesses and submit proofs on the issues in dispute, not mislead the jury by addressing his defence to points of agreement. You are not to say anything about the war, Aeschines. No one blames you for that. [93] Afterwards certain persons advised us to make peace; we took their advice; we sent ambassadors; and they brought back to Athens envoys authorized to conclude peace. Here again no one blames Aeschines. Does anyone allege that he broached the question of peace? Or that he acted wrongly when he brought the delegates here? Not a single man. Then about the mere fact that the city made peace he need not say a word; for that he is not chargeable. [94] Suppose I am asked: “What do you mean, sir? At what point do you begin your accusations?” I begin at this point, men of Athens—at the time when you were deliberating, not whether peace should or should not be made—that question was already decided—but what sort of peace. Then he contradicted men who spoke honestly, and he supported the mover of a venal resolution, being himself bribed. Afterwards, when appointed to receive the oaths of ratification, he disobeyed every one of your instructions; he brought to ruin allies of ours whose safety had never been imperilled in time of war; and he told lies which both in quantity and quality exceed all records of human mendacity before or since. At the outset, until Philip got a hearing on the question of peace, Ctesiphon and Aristodemus undertook the first initiation of the imposture, but, when the business was ripe for action, they passed it on to Philocrates and the defendant, who took it over, and completed the enterprise of destruction. [95] And now that he is answerable for his misdeeds, and must stand his trial, being as he is a knave, a scoundrel, and—a government clerk,8 he will conduct his defence as if he were on trial for the peace, not to make his justification broader than his indictment—that would be folly—but because he can see in his own acts nothing that is good, nothing that is not criminal, while a defence of the peace, if it has no other merit, will enable him to pose as a Friend of Humanity. [96]

Speaking of the peace, I fear, men of Athens, I sadly fear that we are unconsciously enjoying it like men who borrow money at a high rate of interest. For these men have betrayed the security and guarantee of the peace—the Phocians and Thermopylae. Anyhow, we have not to thank the defendant for peace. What I am going to say is strange, but quite true. If any man is really pleased with the peace, let him be grateful to those generals whom everyone denounces. For, had they fought to your satisfaction, you would have scorned the very name of peace. [97] Peace, then, we owe to the generals; a perilous, insecure, and precarious peace to these men and their venality. Put a stop, then, to his eloquence about the peace. Make him address himself to his own performances. Aeschines is not on trial for the peace; the peace is discredited through Aeschines. That is easily proved. Suppose that the peace had been concluded, and that you had not thereafter been deluded, and none of your allies destroyed—what human being would the peace have aggrieved? I mean, apart from the consideration that it was not a glorious peace. For that fault Aeschines is indeed partly to blame, as he supported Philocrates. However, in the case supposed, no incurable mischief would have been done. As the case stands, he is answerable for a great deal. [98]

Well, I suppose that you are satisfied that all this ruin and mischief was shamefully and wickedly perpetrated by these men. For my part, gentlemen of the jury, I am so reluctant to play the informer in these matters, or to ask you to do so, that, if we are dealing with blunders due to stupidity or simplicity or any other sort of ignorance, I acquit Aeschines, and invite you to do the like. [99] And yet ignorance is not a fair excuse in public life; no man is required or compelled by you to handle politics. When a man puts himself forward with a persuasion of his own ability, you receive his advances, as kindly and courteous people should, with goodwill and without jealousy; you give him appointments and entrust him with public business. [100] If he succeeds, he will be honored, and so far will gain an advantage over ordinary people; but if he fails, shall he put forward excuses and apologies? That would be unfair. For it would be very poor consolation indeed to our ruined allies, or to their wives and children and the rest, to be told that their sufferings were due to stupidity on my part, not to say on his. [101] Nevertheless, I ask you to overlook even the scandalous and outrageous misconduct of Aeschines, if it is shown that he did all this mischief because he was simple-minded or otherwise ignorant. But if he maliciously accepted money and rewards, and if that is clearly proved from the facts of the case, put him to death if possible, or, failing that, make him a living example to other malefactors. Now consider the proof of these matters and its justice, among yourselves. [102]

Assuming that, when Aeschines made those speeches about the Phocians and Thespiae and Euboea, he had not sold himself, and was not wilfully deceiving you, we are reduced to one of two suppositions. Either he had taken an explicit promise from Philip that he would do and perform certain acts, or else, being spellbound and deluded by Philip's habitual courtesy, he honestly expected him to do them. There is no third alternative. [103] Now, on either of those suppositions, he ought, of all men in the world, to detest Philip. Why? Because, thanks to Philip, he has fallen into the utmost danger and ignominy. He has deceived you; his reputation is shattered; he is on his trial. If he had been treated as he deserves, he would have been impeached long ago; but, in fact, by your simplicity and placability, he is only submitting to the usual scrutiny, and has chosen his own time. Is there then any man in that box who has ever heard the voice of Aeschines denouncing Philip, or has known him to press home, or even mention, his grievance against Philip?9 [109] Not a man! Every man in Athens is more ready than he is to denounce Philip, even casual people, who have suffered no personal wrong. I was expecting him, if he had not sold himself, to make this speech: “Men of Athens, deal with me as you choose. I was credulous; I was deceived; I made a blunder; I admit it. Beware of that man, men of Athens; he is double-faced, a trickster, a scoundrel. See how he has behaved to me; see how he has made me his dupe.” But no; I have never heard him talk like that, nor have you. [110] Why? Because he was not cajoled and hoodwinked; he had sold himself, and pocketed the money, before he made his speech and betrayed us to Philip. To Philip he has been a trusty and well-beloved hireling; to you a treacherous ambassador and a treacherous citizen, worthy of threefold destruction. [111]

That is not the only proof that he was paid for all that he said. The other day there came to you some Thessalians, and envoys of Philip with them, to ask you to vote for Philip's admission to the Amphictyonic Council. Who ought to have been the very first to oppose them? Aeschines. Why ? Because Philip's acts had falsified his report. [112] For he had told you that Philip would fortify Thespiae and Plataea, would not destroy the Phocians, and would put a stop to the aggressions of the Thebans; but Philip has made the Thebans dangerously strong, he has exterminated the Phocians, and, instead of fortifying Thespiae and Plataea, he has enslaved Orchomenus and Coronea as well. Could contradiction go further? Yet Aeschines offered no opposition; he never opened his lips or made a single objection. That was bad—but not bad enough for him. He did what no other man in all Athens did—he spoke in support of the envoys. Even that miscreant Philocrates durst not go so far as that—only this man Aeschines. When you raised a clamor, and refused to hear him, [113] he came down from the tribune, exclaiming, in order to cut a figure before Philip's ambassadors—you cannot have forgotten it:—“Plenty of shouters, but very few fighters, when it comes to fighting!”—being himself, I suppose, such a marvellous fighter. O heavens! [114]

Here is another point: if we were unable to prove that any one man among the ambassadors received anything, or if that were not as clear as daylight, we might have had recourse to torture10 or the like. But when Philocrates not only confessed his gains repeatedly in the Assembly, but paraded them before your eyes, dealing in wheat, building houses, boasting that he would go abroad even if you did not appoint him, importing timber, changing his gold openly at the bankers,—he assuredly cannot deny that he has taken money, after that admission and that display. [115] Think then of a man, who had it in his power to be counted among the innocent, choosing to fall out with them and to be accused as an adherent of Philocrates, merely to let Philocrates make money, while he accepts only the discredit and the peril! Could any human being be so senseless, or so unlucky? No, indeed. You will find here, men of Athens, if you will only look at it in the right way, a strong and sufficient proof that Aeschines did take bribes. [116]

Now look at a recent, but most convincing, proof that he sold himself to Philip. You know, I am sure, that, not long ago, when Hypereides impeached Philocrates, I rose and said that I was dissatisfied with the impeachment in one respect: it implied that all these grave misdemeanors had been committed by Philocrates alone, and not by any of the other nine ambassadors. That, I remarked, was impossible; for by himself Philocrates would have counted for nothing, if he had none of his colleagues to act with him. [117] “I do not wish,” I said, “either to acquit or to accuse any man; I want the guilt to be detected and the innocent cleared by plain fact. Therefore let any man who chooses stand up and come forward, and declare that he had no part in Philocrates' doings, and does not approve them. Every man who does this,” I added, “I acquit.” No doubt you remember the incident. Well, no one came forward or presented himself. The rest had various excuses: [118] one was not legally accountable; another was not present; a third had a brother-in-law in Macedonia. Aeschines had no such excuse. The truth is, he has sold himself once for all. Not only has he taken hire for past actions, but it is evident that, if he escapes now, he will henceforward, as against you, be Philip's man; and so, for fear of uttering a single word injurious to Philip, even when you acquit him he does not accept acquittal. He prefers disrepute, prosecution, any punishment this court may inflict rather than to do anything disagreeable to Philip. [119] But why this fellow-feeling? Why this concern for Philocrates? Though all his acts on embassy had been consistent with honor and sound policy, if Philocrates admitted, as he did admit, that he had taken bribes, an incorruptible ambassador would have taken infinite pains to avoid and disavow all association with him. Aeschines has not done so. Is not that a plain argument, men of Athens? Does it not proclaim aloud that he has taken bribes, and that from first to last he went wrong for money's sake,—not through stupidity, or ignorance, or blundering? [120]

“What witness,” he will ask, “testifies that I have taken bribes?” A brilliant argument! Facts, Aeschines, the most credible of all witnesses. You cannot find fault with facts, and say that they are what they are in deference to somebody, or to oblige somebody. They are what your treachery and perversion have made them, and such they appear on examination. But I have another witness besides the facts. You shall this very moment give evidence against yourself. Come here: stand up and answer me!—Nothing to say? You cannot plead inexperience. You, who take up a new prosecution as easily as you study a new play, and convict your man without witnesses and under a time-limit, you must be an uncommonly clever speaker!11 [121]

Among the many flagrant misdeeds committed by Aeschines, the singular baseness of which I think you all appreciate, there is none more flagrant, in my judgement, than the action I am about to relate, none that will more palpably prove him to have taken bribes and sold everything. When for the third time you sent your ambassadors to Philip, for the fulfilment of those magnificent expectations which Aeschines had guaranteed, you reappointed most of the former envoys, including Aeschines and me. [122] I immediately declined the appointment on affidavit,12 and when certain persons were clamorous and insisted that I should go, I declared that I would not leave Athens; but the nomination of Aeschines was still valid. After the dispersal of the Assembly, the envoys met and discussed which of them should be left behind,13 for the whole business was still in the clouds, and the future uncertain, and all sorts of conferences and discussions were going on in the market-place. [123] They were afraid that an extraordinary meeting of the Assembly might suddenly be convened, and that then, on hearing the truth from me, you might adopt some acceptable resolution in favor of the Phocians, and that so Philip might lose control. One friendly resolution, one gleam of hope, and the Phocians might have been saved. If you had not fallen into the trap, it was impossible—yes, impossible—for Philip to remain at Thermopylae. There was no corn in the country, as the war had prevented sowing; and the conveyance of corn was impossible so long as your fleet was there and commanded the sea. The Phocian cities were numerous, and not easy of capture, unless by protracted siege. Even if Philip had taken a city a day, there were twenty-two of them. [124] For all these reasons they left Aeschines at home, fearing that you might be undeceived and change your policy. Now to decline an appointment on affidavit with no reason alleged was a strange move and very suspicious. “What do you mean? Are you declining the embassy? Are you not going to Macedonia to realize all those grand benefits which you announced yourself?” However, he had to remain. What was to be done? He pleaded ill-health; and his brother, taking Execestus the physician with him, repaired to the council-house, made affidavit of the illness, and received the appointment himself. [125] But afterwards, when within five or six days the Phocians were destroyed, when Aeschines' wages stopped as such things do, when Dercylus had returned from Chalcis and had informed you, at the assembly held at Peiraeus, of the destruction of the Phocians, when that news filled you with indignation on their account and alarm on your own, when you were resolving to bring in your women and children from the country, to reinstate the frontier fortresses, to fortify the Peiraeus, and to hold the festival of Heracles within the walls,— [126] then at last, at that crisis, when the city was encompassed with confusion and terror, off marched this wise, clever, smooth-tongued gentleman, without waiting for Council or Assembly to reappoint him, on his embassy to the court of the chief malefactor. He forgot that he had sworn that he was too ill to travel; forgot that another ambassador had been chosen in his stead, and that the law visits such conduct with death; forgot that, with the Thebans not only holding all Boeotia but in possession of the territory of Phocis, [127] it was a very odd thing for a man, who had solemnly announced that the Thebans had set a price upon his head, to walk straight into the middle of Thebes and the Theban encampment. Nevertheless, he was so excited, his appetite for moneymaking and bribe-taking was so keen, that he put aside and ignored all these obstacles, and off he went. [128]

That was a remarkable proceeding, but far stranger still was his behavior after his arrival in Macedonia. While you who are here and all other Athenians regarded the treatment of the Phocians as scandalous and outrageous, insomuch that you would not send any member of council or any judge to represent you at the Pythian games, but relinquished that time-honored delegation, Aeschines attended the service of thanksgiving which the Thebans and Philip held to celebrate their victory and their political success, was a guest at the banquet, and took part in the libations and doxologies with which Philip thanked Heaven for the destruction of the fortresses, the territory, and the armies of your allies. He even joined Philip in wearing garlands and singing the Hymn of Praise, and drank to his health in the loving-cup. [129]

Of these proceedings it is not possible for the defendant to give an account differing from mine. As for the affidavit of refusal, there is an entry in the record-office at the Temple of Demeter, of which the public caretaker is in charge, and a decree in which he is mentioned by name. As for his conduct over yonder, his own colleagues who were present, and from whom I got my information, will give evidence against him. I was not one of his colleagues, as I had declined on oath. [130] Read the decree and the records, and call the witnesses.“ Decree ”“ Records ”“ Witnesses ”

What do you imagine were the prayers offered by Philip when he made libation? Or by the Thebans? Surely they implored strength and victory for themselves and their allies, weakness and defeat for the allies of the Phocians. In that prayer Aeschines joined. He invoked a curse on his own fatherland. It is for you to make that curse recoil upon his own head. [131]

So, when he took his departure, he was breaking a law whose penalty is death; after his arrival, he is again proved guilty of conduct that deserves death; and his earlier misconduct of this business of the embassy had been bad enough to bring him to death. You have therefore to consider what punishment shall be rigorous enough to afford a retribution adequate to all these transgressions. [132] For assuredly, men of Athens, when all of you and the whole nation passed censure upon all the results of the peace, when you refused participation in the doings of the Amphictyonic Council, when your attitude towards Philip is still one of anger and suspicion, marking the whole of his conduct as sacrilegious and shameful, as well as unjust and injurious to yourselves,—it would be discreditable that you, who have entered this court to adjudicate at the scrutiny of those transactions, and have taken the judicial oath on behalf of the commonwealth, that you, I say, when the author of these wrongs has been placed in your power, caught red-handed after perpetrating such crimes, should return a verdict of acquittal. [133] Is there a man among your fellow-citizens, nay, in all Greece, who will not justly upbraid you if he sees you venting your wrath upon Philip, whose offence admits of much excuse—for he was making peace after war, and buying his ways and means from willing sellers—and acquitting this man, who made infamous traffic of your interests, in defiance of laws that visit such offences with the severest retribution? [134]

Perhaps some such argument as this will be addressed to you,—that, if you condemn the diplomatists who negotiated the peace, it will be the beginning of enmity with Philip. If that is true, I do not think I could bring any more damaging charge against the defendant. If the potentate who spent his money to get the peace has indeed become so powerful and formidable that you are to ignore justice and the oath you have sworn, and consider only how to oblige Philip, what penalty can be too severe for the authors of his aggrandizement? [135] However, I think I can satisfy you that their punishment will more probably sow the seed of a profitable friendship. Let me tell you, men of Athens, that Philip does not undervalue your city; it was not because he thought you less serviceable that he preferred the Thebans to you. But he was schooled by these men and was informed by them—I once told you this in Assembly, and none of them contradicted me— [136] that a democracy is the most unstable and capricious thing in the world, like a restless wave of the sea ruffled by the breeze as chance will have it. One man comes, another goes; no one attends to, or even remembers, the common weal. Philip, they said, ought to have friends at Athens, who would manage his business for him as it arose, and carry it through—the person speaking, for example; if that provision were made, he would easily accomplish here whatever he desired. [137] Now if he had heard that the persons who talked like that to him had been cudgelled to death immediately after their return home, I fancy he would have done what the King of Persia did. You remember what that was: the King had been inveigled by Timagoras, and had made him a present, as the story goes, of forty talents; but when he heard that the man had been put to death at Athens, and had not been competent to warrant his own life, much less to fulfil his undertaking, he realized that he had not paid the price to the man who could deliver the goods. The first result was that he again placed in subjection to you the city of Amphipolis, which he had put on his own list of friends and allies; and the second, that he nevermore gave money to anybody. [138] Philip would have done the same if he had seen any of these men brought to justice; and he will do the same, if he sees that sight now. But when he sees these men holding up their heads here, making speeches, bringing other people to trial—what is he to do? Is he to make a point of spending a great deal of money, when a little will do? Is he to try to humor all of us, instead of two or three? No; that would be folly. For even his policy of public benevolence to the Thebans was by no means of his own choosing; [139] he was persuaded by their ambassadors, and I will tell you how. Ambassadors came to him from Thebes at the same time that we were there from you. He offered them money—a very large sum, by their own account. The Theban ambassadors declined the overture, and would not take the bribe. Afterwards, at a sacrificial banquet, when Philip was drinking with them, and showing them much civility, he kept offering them presents, beginning with captives and the like, and ending with gold and silver goblets. All these gifts they rejected, and would on no account give themselves away. [140] At last Philo, one of the ambassadors, made a speech that deserved to have been spoken by your representatives, men of Athens, instead of by the spokesman of Thebes. He said that he was delighted and gratified to find Philip so courteously and generously inclined towards them; that they were already his friends and guests, without those gifts; would he be good enough to direct his benevolence to the public business on which he was engaged, and do something creditable both to himself and to the Thebans? If so, they could promise him the friendship of all Thebes as well as their own. [141] Now consider what the Thebans have gained in the end by this policy, and, in the light of actual truth, see what a fine thing it is to refuse to sell your country! The Thebans have gained, in the first place, peace, when they were in trouble, hard pressed by the war, and in danger of defeat; and secondly, the complete overthrow of their enemies, the Phocians, and the utter destruction of their strongholds and cities. Is that all? No, indeed; they have also gained Orchomenus, Coronea, Corsia, Tilphosaeum, and as much of the Phocian territory as they want. [142] Such is the outcome of the peace for the Theban people; and more they could not desire. And what have the ambassadors gained? Nothing at all—except the satisfaction of having achieved these results for their country. Ah, but that is worth having, men of Athens; a glorious reward, if you set any store by that honor and good repute which Aeschines and his friends bartered for a bribe.

Let us now set side by side the results of the peace to the commonwealth of Athens and to the ambassadors of Athens respectively, and you shall see whether there is any equivalence. [143] To the commonwealth the result has been the loss of all those possessions and all those allies, and a sworn promise to Philip that if any man shall at any time attempt to recover them, you will thwart him, and treat the man who would restore to you your own as an enemy and an adversary, and the man who robbed you as an ally and a friend. [144] Such are the terms that Aeschines supported and his accomplice Philocrates proposed. On the first day I had the upper hand and persuaded you to confirm the decision of your allies and to summon Philip's ambassadors, but Aeschines forced an adjournment to the following day, and then persuaded you to adopt Philocrates' resolution, which included all these proposals and others still more objectionable. [145] That is what the peace has brought to the city: you could not easily invent anything more dishonorable. What has it brought to the ambassadors who contrived that dishonor? I say nothing of the wealth that lies before your eyes—houses, timber, grain; but in the country of our ruined allies there are estates and extensive farms bringing in a rental of a talent to Philocrates and half a talent to Aeschines. [146] Surely, men of Athens, it is strange and intolerable that the disasters of your allies have become the emolument of your envoys, and that one and the same peace should have brought, to the city sending ambassadors, the destruction of allies, dispossession of property, ignominy in exchange for honor, and to the ambassadors themselves who intrigued against the city, revenues, property, estates, and opulence in exchange for penury. To prove the truth of my statement, call the witnesses from Olynthus.“ Witnesses ” [147]

I shall not be surprised if he finds courage to tell you that we could not make an honorable peace, such as I required, because the generals mismanaged the war. If so, I beg that you will not forget to ask him whether he represented Athens or some other city. If another city, of which he can say that it had competent generals and has won the war, he has received bribes with some reason; but if he represented this city, how comes it that by terms of treaty the city that sent him has lost property and he has increased his property by his rewards?14 In common justice, the city and its representatives should have fared alike. [148]

Here is another point for your consideration, gentlemen of the jury. Who gained the greater advantage in the operations, the Phocians over the Thebans, or Philip over you? I reply, the Phocians over the Thebans. They held Orchomenus, and Coronea, and Tilphosaeum; they had kept within the walls the Theban garrison at Neon; they had slain two hundred and seventy Thebans at Hedyleum, and a trophy had been set up; they were superior in cavalry, and so an Iliad of woes encompassed the Thebans. [149] No such disaster ever befell, nor, I hope, ever will befall, you. The worst misfortune of your war with Philip was that you could not do him as much harm as you wished; against defeat you were absolutely secure. Then why did the same peace mean, for the Thebans, who were so badly worsted in the war, the recovery of their own possessions and the acquisition of possessions of their adversaries, and, for the Athenians, the loss in time of peace of advantages which were maintained in the war? The reason is that their ambassadors did not sell them, but these men have sold you. That my account is true, you will find further proof as we proceed. [150]

When the peace of Philocrates, which Aeschines supported in a speech, had been concluded, Philip's ambassadors accepted the oaths, and departed. So far no fatal mischief had been done. The peace was, indeed, discreditable and unworthy of Athens—but then we were going to get those wonderful advantages in exchange. I at once called upon you, and told the envoys, to sail for the Hellespont as speedily as possible, and not to abandon, or allow Philip to seize and hold, any of the positions there in the meantime; [151] for well I knew that indolent people lose for ever anything that they let slip in the transition from war to peace. No one, who has been induced by general considerations to sheathe the sword, is ever inclined to begin war over again for the recovery of his losses; and so the appropriator retains possession. Apart from these considerations, I conceived that, if we sailed at once, the city would gain one of two advantages. For when we were on the spot and had accepted his oath according to the decree, either he would restore the places he had taken from Athens and keep his hands off the rest, [152] or, if he refused, we could promptly report his refusal. In that case you, observing his grasping spirit and perfidy in those distant and comparatively unimportant places, would no longer be negligent of the more important concerns that lay nearer home—I mean the Phocians and Thermopylae. If he had not seized the positions, and if there had been no deception of you, all your interests were safe enough, and you would get fair treatment from him without compulsion. [153] This was a reasonable expectation; for so long as the Phocians were safe, as they were at the time, and in possession of Thermopylae, there was no menace which Philip could have brandished in your face to make you disregard any of your just claims. He could not reach Attica either by a march across country or by getting command of the seas. If he refused justice, you could forthwith close his ports, stop his supply of money, and otherwise reduce him to a state of blockade; and so he, and not you, would be wholly dependent on the contingent benefits of the peace. [154] I will now prove to you that I am not making up a story or claiming merit after the event, but that I formed my judgement, kept my eye on your interests, and told the envoys, without any delay. Finding that you had got to the end of the regular Assemblies, and that there was no meeting left, and observing that the envoys were still wasting time at Athens instead of starting at once, I proposed a decree as a member of the Council, to which the Assembly had given authority, directing the envoys to sail immediately, and the general Proxenus to convey them to any place in which he should ascertain that Philip was to be found. I drafted it, as I now read it, in those express terms. Please take and read the decree.“ Decree ” [155]

So I got them away from Athens, but quite against their will, as you will easily learn from their subsequent behavior. When we had arrived at Oreus and joined Proxenus, instead of obeying their instructions and proceeding by sea, they started on a roundabout tour. We had wasted three-and-twenty days before we reached Macedonia; and all the rest of the time, making, with the time consumed by the journey, fifty days in all, until the arrival of Philip, we were dawdling at Pella. [156] Throughout that period Philip was occupying and disposing of Doriscus, Thrace, the Thracian fortresses, the Sacred Mount, and so forth, in spite of the peace and armistice.15 All this time I did not spare words; I talked to them first as one communicating his opinion, then as instructing the ignorant, and finally in uncompromising language, as dealing with corrupt and profligate persons. [157] The man who openly contradicted me, and set himself in opposition to my advice and your formal resolutions, was Aeschines. You will learn presently whether his conduct was agreeable to his colleagues. For the moment, I have nothing to say of them by way of fault-finding. They may all show themselves honest men today, not by compulsion but of their own free will, and as having no share in those iniquities.16 That the deeds done were disgraceful, monstrous, and venal, you have already discovered; let facts disclose who were the participators. [158]

But it may be urged that they spent all this time swearing in the allies, or discharging some other part of their duty. Not at all; though they were on their travels for three whole months, and received from you a thousand drachmas for journey-money, they did not get the oaths from any single city either on their outward journey or on their way home. The oaths were administered at the hostelry in front of the Temple of the Twins,—any of you who have been to Pherae will know the place I mean,—at the time when Philip was already on his march towards Athens with his army, and in a manner, men of Athens, that was thoroughly discreditable to the city. [159] Yet Philip would have paid any sum to have matters managed in this way. For when these men had failed to draw the treaty, as they first tried to do, with a clause excepting the Halians and the Phocians, and Philocrates had been compelled by you to erase those words and write expressly, “the Athenians and the Allies of the Athenians,” to the treaty so drawn Philip did not wish any of his allies to have sworn; for then they would have refused to join in his forcible occupation of those possessions of yours which he now holds, and the oath would have been their excuse. [160] Nor did he desire witnesses of the promises on the strength of which he was obtaining the peace, nor any public disclosure of the fact that after all Athens had not been beaten in the war, and that it was Philip who was really eager for the peace, and was ready to make large promises to the Athenians if he could get it. Therefore he disapproved of these men going anywhere, lest the facts that I am stating should become generally known; and they were ready to gratify him with ostentatious deference and extravagant adulation. [161] Yet, when they are convicted of all these delinquencies, of having squandered their time, thrown away the Thracian outposts, done nothing agreeable either to your instructions or to sound policy, and sent lying dispatches to Athens, how can this man possibly find a way of escape before an intelligent and conscientious jury? However, to prove the truth of my statements, read first the decree giving directions for the administration of the oath, then Philip's letter, and then the decree of Philocrates, and the decree of the Assembly.“ Decree ”“ Letter ”“ Decrees ” [162]

To prove, moreover, that we should have caught Philip at the Hellespont, if my advice had been taken and your directions obeyed in the terms of the decrees, call the witnesses who were there present.“ Witnesses ”

Now read the other deposition testifying to the answer made by Philip to Eucleides17 here, who arrived later.

（The Deposition is read）“ Deposition ” [163]

Let me show you that there is no way of denying that they were acting in the interest of Philip. When we were setting out on the former embassy for peace, you sent forward a herald to arrange our safe-conduct. On that occasion, as soon as they reached Oreus, they wasted no time there waiting for the herald. Although Halus was beleaguered, they crossed the sea thither; then left the town and went to Parmenio, who was conducting the siege; set off through the enemies' positions for Pagasae, and continued their journey till they met the herald at Larissa. Such was the energy and goodwill with which they travelled then; [164] but now, in time of peace, with complete security for travelling, and with your injunctions of haste, it never occurred to them to hasten their journey by land or to travel by sea. Why so? Because then it was to Philip's advantage that peace should be concluded with all speed, but now that as much time as possible should be wasted before the administration of the oaths. [165] To prove that this statement also is true, take and read this deposition.“ Deposition ”

Now could men be more clearly convicted of acting throughout in the interest of Philip? It was the same journey: they loitered when they should have bestirred themselves in your service; they hurried when they ought not to have moved a step until the arrival of the herald. [166]

Take next the period of our loitering at Pella, and compare the employments which we severally chose for ourselves. Mine was to seek out and rescue the captives, spending money of my own, and asking Philip to apply to their ransom the money he was spending on hospitable gifts for us. But what Aeschines constantly tried to effect, you shall hear in a moment. What then was it? It was that Philip should give us a lump sum as a collective present. [167] You must know that Philip was already sounding us all in this way: he sent private messages to each of us in turn, with the offer, men of Athens, of a really large sum in gold. Having failed in some case or other,—in what case let the result disclose; it is not for me to name myself,—he conceived that a collective present might be accepted by all of us without misgiving; and that there would be security for those who had individually sold themselves, if we all shared even to a trifling extent in the general acceptance. Accordingly it was offered,—nominally, as a form of hospitality. [168] I stopped that manoeuvre; and then these men divided that money also among themselves. When I asked Philip to spend it on the captives, he could not with decency either inform against them by replying, “It is in so-and-so's pockets,” or escape the outlay; so he made me the promise, but evaded performance by saying that he would send the men home in time for the Panathenaic Festival. Read the deposition of Apollophanes, and then those of the other persons who were there.“ Deposition ” [169]

Let me now tell you how many of the captives I ransomed myself. For while we were staying at Pella, before Philip's arrival, some of the prisoners,—all in fact who were out on bail,—having, I suppose, no confidence that they would afterwards be able to induce Philip to move, told me that they were willing to provide for their own ransom without putting themselves under obligation to Philip, and offered to borrow their ransom-money, three minas, five minas, or as the case might be. [170] So when Philip agreed to get the release of the rest, I called together these men, to whom I had lent the money as a friendly loan, reminded them of the transaction, and made them a free gift of their ransom-money, lest they should seem to have been put into a worse position by their impetuosity, or to have been ransomed, though poor men, at their own expense, while the rest were expecting deliverance from Philip. To prove the truth of my statement, read these depositions also.“ Depositions ” [171]

Well, these sums of money I gave away as a free gift to my fellow-citizens in distress. If Aeschines in addressing you should say presently: “Demosthenes, if you really inferred from my speech in support of Philocrates that our conduct was thoroughly corrupt, why did you join us on the subsequent embassy to receive the oaths, instead of excusing yourself?” you must remember that I had promised the prisoners whom I delivered that I would bring the ransom-money and do my utmost for their rescue. [172] It would therefore have been too bad to break my word and abandon fellow-creatures and fellow-citizens in misfortune. Had I declined on oath, a private excursion to Macedonia would have been neither decent nor safe. Except for my strong desire to liberate those men, may I die miserably before my time18 if any reward would have induced me to accept an embassy with these men as my colleagues. I proved that by twice excusing myself when you twice appointed me to the third embassy, and also by my constant opposition to them on this journey. [173]

So the business which I controlled by myself on the embassy turned out in this fashion to your advantage, although, where the majority prevailed, everything went to ruin. Indeed, if my advice had been taken, all our transactions might have had an equally fortunate issue; for I was not so foolish and stupid as to lose money, while others were making money, out of sheer public spirit, and then object to a course of action that would have cost no expense, and that offered far greater advantages to the whole commonwealth. Yes, men of Athens, the issue might have been fortunate indeed; only these men had their way. [174]

And now I ask you to look at the acts of Aeschines and those of Philocrates, in comparison with mine; for the contrast will help to expose them. First, in violation both of the decree and of assurances given to you, they excluded the Halians, the Phocians, and Cersobleptes, from the benefits of the treaty. Then they attempted to tamper with and repeal the decree from which our own authority was derived. Next they entered the Cardians as allies of Philip, and refused by a definite vote to send a dispatch written by me, but themselves composed and sent one that did not contain an honest word. [175] Then, because I objected to their acts, not only thinking them dishonorable but fearing that I might share the ruin they were bringing on themselves, our chivalrous friend accused me of promising to Philip that I would overthrow the Athenian democracy, while all the time he was himself constantly holding private communications with Philip. I need only mention that not I but Dercylus, with the help of this servant of mine, watched him by night at Pherae, caught him emerging from Philip's tent, and told the servant to let me know, and not to forget it himself; and that in the end this impudent blackguard stayed with Philip for a day and a night on our departure. [176] To prove the truth of these statements, in the first place I will give evidence myself, having duly written down my deposition and incurred legal responsibility19; and I will then call the other ambassadors in turn, and compel them either to testify, or to take oath that they are unable to testify. If they take the oath, I shall easily convict them of perjury.“ Deposition ” [177]

You have seen how I was harassed by troubles and annoyance throughout the expedition. You can imagine how they behaved there, with their paymaster next door, when their conduct here, under the eyes of the people, who hold the power to reward and to chastise, is what we know it to be.

Now I wish to recapitulate the charges I have brought home, and to show that I have fulfilled the undertaking I gave at the outset of my speech. I have proved, not by words but by the testimony of facts, that there was no word of truth in the report of Aeschines, but that he successfully deceived you. [178] I have proved that he is to blame for your refusal to hear the truth from me, captivated as you then were by his promises and assurances; that his counsels were exactly opposed to right policy; that he spoke against the terms of peace proposed by our allies, and in favor of the proposals of Philocrates; that he purposely wasted your time to debar you from going to the aid of the Phocians if you should so desire; that throughout his journey abroad his sins were many and grievous; that he has betrayed everything, sold everything, taken bribes, and stopped short of no iniquity. That, then, is what I undertook to prove; and that is what I have proved. [179] Now mark what follows; for the argument I now put before you is plain and straightforward. You have sworn to give a verdict according to the laws, and to the decrees of the people and of the Council of Five Hundred; the conduct of the defendant when holding the office of ambassador has manifestly violated those laws, those decrees, and the principles of justice; therefore he must be convicted by an intelligent jury. If he had committed no other crime, two only of his transgressions are sufficient to put him to death, for he has betrayed Thrace as well as the Phocians to Philip. [180] Yet no man could point out two places in the whole world of more importance to the commonwealth than Thermopylae by land and the Hellespont by sea; and both of them these men have infamously sold and delivered into the hands of Philip. What an enormous offence, apart from all the rest, is the surrender of Thrace and the Thracian outposts, I could show by a thousand reasons; and it would be easy to point to many men who for such betrayals have been sentenced to death or mulcted in large sums of money in this court,—Ergophilus, Cephisodotus, Timomachus, and, in old times, Ergocles, Dionysius, and others, of whom I may say that all of them together had inflicted fewer injuries upon the commonwealth than the defendant. [181] But in those days, men of Athens, you were still careful to be on your guard against perils, and not sparing of precaution; now you overlook anything that at any given moment does not disturb you or cause immediate annoyance. And then you come here and pass random resolutions,—that Philip shall swear fidelity to Cersobleptes,—that he shall have no share in Amphictyonic business,—that he shall revise the terms of peace. Yet all your resolutions would have been unnecessary, if only the defendant had chosen to travel by sea and to do his duty. What might have been saved by sailing, he has lost by insisting on travel by land; and what might have been saved by telling the truth, he has lost by telling lies. [182]

He will presently, as I am informed, make it a grievance that he, and he alone of all our debaters, is to be called to account for his speeches. I will spare him the retort that any man who takes money for his speeches might reasonably be brought to justice; but there is one point on which I do insist. If Aeschines talked like an idiot and made blunders as an unofficial person, do not be hypercritical, leave him alone, make allowances. But if he has purposely deceived you for money while holding office as ambassador, do not let him off, do not listen to the suggestion that he is not to be put on his trial for mere words. [183] For what are we to bring any ambassador to justice, if not for his words? Ambassadors have control, not over war-ships, and military positions, and troops, and citadels,—these are never entrusted to them,—but over words and opportunities. If an ambassador has not wasted the opportunities of the state, he is no wrongdoer; if he has wasted them, he has done wrong. If the words of his reports are true and profitable words, let him be acquitted; if they are false, venal, and noxious, let him be convicted. [184] A man can do no greater wrong than by telling lies to a popular assembly; for, where the political system is based upon speeches, how can it be safely administered if the speeches are false? If he actually takes bribes and speaks in the interest of our enemies, will not you be imperilled? Again, to filch your opportunities is not an offence equivalent to filching those of an oligarchy or a monarchy, but far greater. [185] For in those polities, I take it, everything is done promptly at the word of command; but with you, first the Council must be informed, and must adopt a provisional resolution,—and even that not at any time, but only after written notice given to marshals and embassies; then the Council must convene an Assembly, but only on a statutory date. Then the most honest debaters have to make good their advantage and argue down an ignorant or dishonest opposition; [186] and even then, after all these proceedings, when a decision has been formed, and its propriety demonstrated, further time must be granted to the poverty of the populace for the provision of whatever is needed, to enable them to execute the decision. Surely the man who, under a constitution like ours, destroys the opportunities for this procedure, has not destroyed opportunities merely; he has absolutely robbed us of our control over affairs. [187]

Now there is an easy phrase at the disposal of every one who wishes to delude you: “The disturbers of the commonwealth; the thwarters of Philip's public benefactions.” I will not say a word in reply; I will only read to you Philip's letters, and remind you of the several occasions of your deception, to show how “the Benefactor” has forfeited by his beguilements that frigid and nauseating title.“ Letters of Philip ” [188]

Although so many, indeed all, of his acts on embassy were so discreditable and unpatriotic, he goes about asking: “And what are we to say of Demosthenes, who denounces his own colleagues?” Yes, indeed; I do and must denounce them, willingly or unwillingly, having been the victim of your machinations throughout the expedition, and being now reduced to the alternative of appearing as either the accomplice or the accuser of your crimes. [189] I declare I was no colleague of yours; yours was an embassy of flagrant wrong, mine was an embassy of loyal service. Your colleague was Philocrates, and you and Phryno were his; for it was you and your friends who did these things and who approved of them. Hark to his melodramatic whine: “Where is the salt of friendship? where is the genial board? where is the cup of communion?” as if doers of justice, not doers of iniquity, were traitors to those symbols! [190] I know that the Presidents20 unite in a sacrificial service, dine together, and make libation together; but it does not follow that the honest men take their cue from the knaves; as soon as they detect one of themselves in misconduct, they lay information before the Council and the Assembly. In just the same way the Council holds its service of inauguration and its social banquet; the commanders unite in worship and libation; and so of all, or nearly all, the public authorities. Do they give impunity to delinquent colleagues on account of these observances? No, indeed! [191] Leon denounced Timagoras, his fellow-ambassador for four years; Eubulus his messmates, Tharrex and Smicythus; and long ago Conon denounced Adeimantus after serving with him as general. Who were untrue to their salt and to the cup of friendship, Aeschines? The traitors, the false ambassadors, and the bribe-takers, or their accusers? The evil-doers, like you, broke covenant not with their friends alone but with the whole nation. [192]

To show you, then, that these men are the basest and most depraved of all Philip's visitors, private as well as official,—yes, of all of them,—let me tell you a trifling story that has nothing to do with the embassy. After Philip had taken Olynthus, he was holding Olympian games,21 and had invited all sorts of artists to the religious celebration and the festival. [193] At the entertainment at which he crowned the successful competitors, he asked Satyrus, the comedian of our city, why he was the only guest who had not asked any favor; had he observed in him any illiberality or discourtesy towards himself? Satyrus, as the story goes, replied that he did not want any such gift as the others were asking; what he would like to ask was a favor which Philip could grant quite easily, and yet he feared that his request would be unsuccessful. [194] Philip bade him speak out, declaring with the easy generosity of youth that there was nothing he would not do for him. Thereupon Satyrus told him that Apollophanes of Pydna had been a friend of his, and that after his death by assassination his kinsmen in alarm had secretly removed his daughters, who were then children, to Olynthus. These girls had been made captive when the town was taken, and were now in Philip's hands, and of marriageable age. [195] “I earnestly beg you,” he went on, “to bestow them on me. At the same time I wish you to understand what sort of gift you will be giving me, if you do give it. It will bring me no gain, for I shall provide them with dowries and give them in marriage; and I shall not permit them to suffer any treatment unworthy of myself or of their father.” It is said that, when the other guests heard this speech, there was such an outburst of applause and approval that Philip was strongly moved, and granted the boon. And yet Apollophanes was one of the men who had slain Philip's own brother Alexander. [196]

Now let us compare the banquet of Satyrus with another entertainment which these men attended in Macedonia; and you shall see whether there is any sort of resemblance. These men had been invited to the house of Xenophron, a son of Phaedimus, who was one of the Thirty Tyrants, and off they went; but I declined to go. When the drinking began, Xenophron introduced an Olynthian woman,—a handsome, but a freeborn and, as the event proved, a modest girl. [197] At first, I believe, they only tried to make her drink quietly and eat dessert; so Iatrocles told me the following day. But as the carouse went on, and they became heated, they ordered her to sit down and give them a song. The poor girl was bewildered, for she did not wish, and she did not know how, to sing. Then Aeschines and Phryno declared that it was intolerable impertinence for a captive,—and one of those ungodly, pernicious Olynthians too,—to give herself such airs. “Call a servant,” they cried; “bring a whip, somebody.” In came a flunkey with a horsewhip, and—I suppose they were tipsy, and it did not take much to irritate them,when she said something and began to cry, he tore off her dress and gave her a number of lashes on the back. [198] Maddened by these indignities, she jumped to her feet, upset the table, and fell at the knees of Iatrocles. If he had not rescued her, she would have perished, the victim of a drunken orgy, for the drunkenness of this blackguard is something terrible. The story of this girl was told even in Arcadia, at a meeting of the Ten Thousand22; it was related by Diophantus at Athens in a report which I will compel him to repeat in evidence; and it was common talk in Thessaly and everywhere. [199]

With all this on his conscience the unclean scoundrel will dare to look you in the face, and before long he will be declaiming in sonorous accents about his blameless life. It makes me choke with rage. As if the jury did not know all about you: first the acolyte,23 reading the service-books while your mother performed her hocus-pocus, reeling and tumbling, child as you were, with bacchanals and tipsy worshippers; [200] then the junior clerk, doing the dirty work of public offices for a few shillings a month: and at last, not so long ago, the parasite of the greenrooms, eking out by sponging what you earned as a player of trumpery parts! What is the life you will claim, and where have you lived it, when such is too clearly the sort of life you really have lived? And then the assurance of the man! Bringing another man24 before this court on a charge of unnatural crime! However, I will let that go for the present. First read these depositions.“ Depositions ” [201]

Of all these heinous crimes against the commonwealth, gentlemen of the jury, he has been proved guilty. No element of baseness is lacking. Bribe-taker, sycophant, guilty under the curse, a liar, a traitor to his friends,—here are flagrant charges indeed! Yet he will not defend himself against any one of them; he has no honest and straightforward defence to offer. As for the topics on which, as I am informed, he intends to dwell, they border on insanity,—though, perhaps, a man devoid of any honest plea cannot help resorting to all manner of shifts. [202] For I hear that he will tell you that I participated in all the acts I am denouncing, that I approved of them, and co-operated with him, and now have suddenly changed my mind and become his accuser. That is no honest and decent defence against specific charges; it is, however, an accusation against me; for if I acted as he says, I am a worthless person; but that is far from making his actions a whit better. [203] However, it is incumbent on me, I suppose, first, to satisfy you that the allegation, if he makes it, will be false, and secondly, to show you what is an honest defence. Now it is an honest and straightforward defence to prove either that the acts alleged were never committed, or that, if committed, they were for the advantage of the state. But he cannot make good either of these positions. [204] He cannot claim as advantages the destruction of the Phocians, or Philip's occupation of Thermopylae, or the aggrandizement of Thebes, or the invasion of Euboea, or the designs against Megara, or the unratified peace; for he reported himself that exactly the opposite was going to happen and would be to your advantage. Neither can he convince you, against the evidence of your own eyes and your own knowledge, that these disasters are fabulous. [205] My remaining duty is to prove that I had no partnership with these men in any of their doings. Is it your wish that I should put aside the rest of the story,—how I spoke against them in Assembly, how I fell out with them on the journey, how from first to last I persistently opposed them,—and should produce these men themselves as my witnesses to testify that my conduct and theirs has been utterly at variance, that they accepted money to thwart you, and that I refused it? Then observe. [206]

Whom would you call the most detestable person in all Athens, and the most swollen with impudence and superciliousness? No one, I am sure, would name, even by a slip of the tongue, anyone but Philocrates. Who is the most vehement speaker, the man who can express himself most emphatically with the aid of his big voice? Undoubtedly Aeschines. Whom do these men call timid and faint-hearted, or, as I should say, diffident, in addressing a crowd? Me; for I never worried you; I have never tried to dragoon you against your inclinations. [207] Well, at every Assembly, whenever there is any discussion of this business, you hear me denouncing and incriminating these men, and declaring roundly that they have taken bribes and made traffic of all the interests of the commonwealth; and no one of them ever contradicts me, or opens his mouth, or lets himself be seen. [208] How comes it then that the most impudent men in Athens, and the loudest speakers, are overborne by me, the nervous man, who can speak no louder than another? Because truth is strong, and consciousness of corruption weak. Conscience paralyses their audacity; conscience cripples their tongues, closes their lips, stifles them, puts them to silence. [209] You remember the most recent occasion, at Peiraeus only the other day, when you refused to appoint Aeschines to an embassy, how he bellowed at me: “I will impeach you,—I will indict you,—aha! aha!”25 And yet a threat of impeachment involves endless speeches and litigation; but here are just two or three simple words that a slave bought yesterday could deliver: “Men of Athens, here is a strange thing! This man accuses me of offences in which he himself took part. He says that I have taken bribes, when he took them, or shared them, himself.” [210] He never spoke, he never uttered a word of that speech; none of you heard it; he only vented idle menaces. The reason is that he was conscious of guilt; he cowered like a slave before those words; his thoughts did not approach them but recoiled from them, arrested by his evil conscience. Mere vague invective and abuse there was no one to stop. [211]

And now comes the strongest possible point—not a matter of assertion but of fact. I wished to do the honest thing, and to give an account of myself twice, because I had been appointed ambassador twice; but Aeschines approached the Court of Scrutiny, taking with him a crowd of witnesses, and forbade them to summon me, on the ground that I had already submitted to scrutiny, and was no longer liable. What was the real meaning of this ludicrous proceeding? Having himself rendered his account of the earlier embassy, with which nobody found fault, he did not wish to come into court in respect of the embassy for which he is now under examination; and that is the embassy that includes all his misdeeds. [212] But, if I came into court twice, he could not avoid a second appearance, and therefore he would not let me be summoned. Yet that act, men of Athens, proves two propositions: first, that Aeschines has pronounced his own condemnation, and therefore you cannot conscientiously acquit him today; and secondly, that he will not have a truthful word to say about me, otherwise he would have spoken out and denounced me then, instead of trying to block my summons. [213]

To prove the truth of these statements, please call the witnesses.26

If, however, he says scurrilous things about me, not pertinent to the question of the embassy, there are many reasons why you should not listen. I am not on my trial today, and I shall have no second opportunity27 of speaking. It will only mean that he is destitute of honest arguments. No culprit would deliberately choose to prefer accusations, if he had any defence to offer. [214] Or again, look at it in this light, gentlemen of the jury. Suppose that I were on trial, with Aeschines for my accuser, and Philip for my judge, and suppose that, being unable to deny my guilt, I were to vilify Aeschines and throw mud at him; do you not think that that is just what would move Philip's indignation, his own benefactors calumniated before his own tribunal? Do not be less rigorous than Philip, but compel him to address his defence to the real issues of this controversy. Now read the deposition.“ Deposition ” [215]

Thus in my consciousness of innocence I thought it my duty to render my account and accept my full legal liability, while Aeschines did not. Is my conduct then the echo of his? Is it competent for him to lay before this court charges which he has never made before? Assuredly not; and yet he will lay them, for a very good reason. For you know that, ever since mankind and the criminal law first came into being, no culprit has ever been convicted while confessing his guilt. They vapor, they gainsay, they tell lies, they forge excuses,—anything to evade justice. [216] Do not be duped today by any of these stale tricks. You must pass judgement on the facts, according to your knowledge; you must pay no heed either to my assertions or to his, nor even to the witnesses whom he will have in waiting, with Philip as his paymaster, and you will see how glibly they will testify. You must not notice what a fine loud voice he has, and what a poor voice I have. [217] If you are wise, you must not treat this trial as a competition of forensic eloquence; but in regard to a dishonorable and perilous catastrophe, cast back upon the guilty the dishonor that attaches to it, after reviewing transactions that lie within the knowledge of you all. What, then, are the facts that you know and I need not recount? [218] If all the promised results of the peace have come true, if you confess yourselves so effeminate and so cowardly that, with no enemy within your borders, no blockade of your ports, no imperilment of your capital, with corn-prices low and every other condition as favorable as it is today, [219] and with foreknowledge on the assurance of your ambassadors that your allies would be ruined, that the Thebans would gain strength, that Philip would occupy the northern positions, that a basis of attack would be established against you in Euboea, and that everything that has in fact resulted would befall you, you thereupon cheerfully made the peace, by all means acquit Aeschines, and do not crown your other dishonors with the sin of perjury. He has done you no wrong, and I am a madman and a fool to accuse him. [220] But if the truth is otherwise, if they spoke handsomely of Philip and told you that he was the friend of Athens, that he would deliver the Phocians, that he would curb the arrogance of the Thebans, that he would bestow on you many boons of more value than Amphipolis, and would restore Euboea and Oropus, if only he got his peace,—if, I say, by such assertions and such promises they have deceived and deluded you, and wellnigh stripped you of all Attica, find him guilty, and do not reinforce the outrages, for I can find no better word,—that you have endured, by returning to your homes laden with the curse and the guilt of perjury, for the sake of the bribes that they have pocketed. [221]

You should further ask yourselves, gentlemen of the jury, why, if they were not guilty, I should have gone out of my way to accuse them. You will find no reason. Is it agreeable to have many enemies? It is hardly safe. Perhaps I had an old standing feud with Aeschines? That is not so. “Well, but you were frightened on your own account, and were coward enough to seek this as a way of escape;” for that, I hear, is one of his suggestions. But, by your own account, Aeschines, there is no crime, and therefore no jeopardy. If he repeats the insinuation, do you, gentlemen, consider this: in a case where I, who did no wrong whatever, was yet afraid lest these men's conduct should ruin me, what punishment ought they to suffer who were themselves the guilty parties? [222] However, that was not my reason. Then why am I accusing you? Perhaps as a common informer, to get money out of you? Which course was more profitable for me, to take money from Philip, who offered me a great deal,—as much as he gave them,—and so to make friends both with him and with them,—for indeed I might have had their friendship if I had been their accomplice, and even now there is no vendetta between us, only that I had no part in their malpractices, or to levy blackmail on their takings, and so incur Philip's enmity and theirs; to spend all my money on the ransom of captives, and then expect to get a trifle back dishonorably and at the cost of their hostility? [223] The thing is impossible! No; I made honest reports; I kept my hands clean of corruption for the sake of truth and justice and of my future career, believing, as others have believed, that my honesty would be rewarded by your favor, and that my public spirit must never be bartered away for any emolument. I abhor these men because throughout the embassy I found them vicious and ungodly, and because by their corruption I have been robbed of the due reward of my patriotism, through your natural dissatisfaction with the whole business. I now denounce them, and I have attended this scrutiny, because I have a care for the future, and desire a decision recorded in this case and by this court that my conduct has been exactly opposed to theirs. [224] And yet I am afraid,—for all my thoughts shall be laid open to you,—I am afraid that hereafter you may destroy me with them in despite of my innocence, while today you are supine. For indeed, men of Athens, you seem to me to have become altogether slack, idly waiting for the advent of disaster. You see the distresses of others, but take no precaution for yourselves; you have no thought for the steady and alarming deterioration of your commonwealth. [225]

Do you not think this an extremely dangerous symptom? （For though I had decided to say nothing, I am tempted to speak out） Of course you know Pythocles, son of Pythodorus. I was on the most civil terms with him, and there has been no unpleasantness between us to this day. But now, since his visit to Philip, he turns aside whenever he meets me, and if he cannot avoid an encounter, he rushes off as soon as he can for fear he should be seen talking to me, while he will perambulate the whole market-place discussing plans with Aeschines. [226] It is shocking and scandalous, men of Athens, that Philip has such an acute perception of the fidelity or treachery of the men who have made subservience to him their policy, that they all expect that nothing they do even in Athens will escape the master's eye, as though he stood at their very elbow, and that they must needs choose their private friends and enemies in obedience to his wishes; while those whose lives are devoted to your service, and who covet and have never betrayed the honor that you can bestow, encounter in you such dullness of hearing, such darkness of vision, that here am I today contending on equal terms with these pernicious persons, even in a court well acquainted with the whole history. [227] Would you like to know the reason? I will tell you, and I trust that you will not take offence at my candor. Philip, I take it, having one body and one soul loves those who help him and hates those who harm him with his whole heart, whereas no one of you regards the benefactor of the commonwealth as his benefactor, or the enemy of the commonwealth as his enemy. [228] Each man has other motives, of more importance to him, and thereby you are often led astray,—compassion, jealousy, resentment, good nature, and a thousand more. For even though a man escape every other danger, he can never wholly escape those who do not want such a person as he is to exist. But, little by little, by accumulation of these errors the foundation is sapped, and the integrity of public life collapses. [229]

Do not, men of Athens, give way to these motives today. Do not acquit the man who has done you such grievous wrong. Think of the story that will be told, if you do acquit him. Once upon a time certain ambassadors went from Athens to see Philip, and their names were Philocrates, Aeschines, Phryno, and Demosthenes. One of them not only made no gain from his mission, but delivered captives at his own expense; but another went about buying harlots and fish with the money for which he had sold his country. [230] One of them, named Phryno, a bold, bad man, sent his son to Philip before he had put him on the list of citizens; but another did not do anything that was unworthy of his country or himself. Though he was still paying for a chorus and a man-of-war,28 he thought it only right to spend more money of his own free will, to ransom captives, and to allow none of his countrymen to suffer distress through poverty. But another, instead of delivering any of the Athenians who were already in captivity, helped to bring a whole district, and ten thousand of the infantry and about a thousand of the cavalry of the allies into captivity to Philip. [231] The sequel was that the Athenians caught these bad men, for they knew all about it, and—what do you think? They released the men who had taken bribes and had disgraced themselves, the city, and their own children, because they thought that they were very sensible men, and that the city was going on nicely; but they thought that the man who accused them had gone out of his mind, and that he did not understand Athens, and that he did not know even how to fling his money away. [232]

With this example before his eyes, who, men of Athens, will ever wish to prove himself an honest man, or to go on embassy for nothing, if he is neither to make money nor to be held more worthy of your confidence than those who have made money? Today you are not merely adjudging this case: you are legislating for all future time, whether every ambassador is basely to serve your enemies for hire, or without fee or bribe to give his best service to you. [233] On these matters you need no further witness; but to prove that Phryno did send his son to Philip, please call the witnesses.

Now Aeschines never prosecuted Phryno for sending his own son to Philip with a dishonorable intention. But if a man29 in the bloom of his youth was more comely than others, and if, disregarding the suspicion that his personal charm might provoke, he has lived rather recklessly in later years, Aeschines must needs proceed against that man for immorality. [234]

Now let me say a word about my entertainment and my decree. I had nearly forgotten those all-important topics! When I was drafting the provisional resolution of the Council respecting the earlier embassy, and again in addressing the people at the Assemblies that were held to discuss the terms of peace, I followed the usual custom, and included a vote of thanks and an invitation to the public mess-table; for at that time no wrongful word or act of theirs had been disclosed. [235] It is also true that I entertained Philip's ambassadors, and did the thing very handsomely; for, having observed in their own country that they take pride in such hospitality as evidence of wealth and splendor, I thought it my duty to outdo them with a more striking display of munificence. On the strength of these incidents, Aeschines will tell you: “Demosthenes thanked us, and entertained the ambassadors himself”—without marking the distinction of time. [236] All this took place before the country had suffered wrong, and before it was evident that the envoys had sold themselves, immediately after the first return of the envoys, when the people had still to hear their report, and when it was not yet known that Aeschines would support Philocrates, or that Philocrates would move such a resolution. If he mentions the incidents, bear in mind that the dates were earlier than their offences, and that I have never since had any intimacy or any association with them. Read the deposition.“ Deposition ” [237]

Perhaps he will find a brother to speak for him, Philochares or Aphobetus; to both of whom there is much that you can say with justice. （One must converse quite frankly, without any reserve.） We, Aphobetus and Philochares, although you, Philochares, were a painter of alabaster boxes and tambourines, and your brothers ordinary people, junior clerks and the like,—respectable occupations, but hardly suitable for commanding officers,—we, I say, dignified you with embassies, commands as generals, and other high distinctions. [238] Even if none of the family had committed any crime, you would have no claim on our gratitude, but we should have a large claim on yours; for we passed over many much more worthy claimants, and glorified you. But if in the actual enjoyment of those dignities one of you has committed a crime, and such a crime as this, do you not all deserve abhorrence much more than deliverance? That is my view. However, they will storm and bluster,—for they have very loud voices and very little modesty,—and will remind you that “it is no sin to help your kin.” [239] Do not give way to them. It is their business to think of Aeschines; it is your business to think of the laws, of the whole commonwealth, and above all of the oath in virtue of which you sit in that box. If they have besought any of you to deliver him, ask yourselves whether they mean in case he is not, or in case he is, guilty of a crime against the common weal. If they mean in case he is not guilty, I admit the plea; but if they mean, deliver him in any case, they have entreated you to perjure yourselves. For though the vote is secret, it will not escape the eye of Heaven. The legislator wisely discerned herein the essence of secret voting, that no suppliant shall know the name of the juror who has granted his prayer, but the gods and the divine spirit will know him who has cast an unrighteous vote. [240] Far better for each of you to make good his hopes of the blessing of Heaven for himself and his children, by recording a righteous and a dutiful verdict, than to bestow on these men a secret and unacknowledged favor, and acquit a man convicted by his own testimony. For what more powerful evidence, Aeschines, can I adduce for the many crimes of your embassy than the evidence you have given against yourself? You, who thought it necessary to implicate in so grievous a calamity one who purposed to bring a part of your misconduct to light, must surely have expected a terrible retribution if the jury should learn the true history of your deeds. [241]

If you are wise, that performance of his will now be turned to his disadvantage, not only because it was a powerful indication of his misconduct, but because he employed in his prosecution arguments that are now valid against himself. For surely the principles which you, Aeschines, laid down when you prosecuted Timarchus ought to have equal weight for others against you. [242] Now on that occasion he observed to the jury: “Demosthenes will conduct this man's defence, and will denounce my conduct of the embassy; and then, if he leads you astray by his speech, he will go about in his conceited way, and boast: 'How did I do it? What did I say? Why, I led the jury clean away from the question; filched the whole case from them, and came off triumphant.' ” Then do not follow my example: address your defence to the real issue. You had your opportunity of denouncing and saying what you chose when you were the prosecutor. [243]

Moreover, having no witnesses to produce in support of your accusations, you quoted verses to the jury:“ Rumor, that many people spread abroad, Dieth not wholly: Rumor is a god. ”

And now, Aeschines, everybody says that you made money out of your embassy; so, of course, as against you, the rumor that many people spread abroad does not wholly die. [244] That you may understand how far more numerous are your accusers than those of Timarchus, observe this. He was not known even to all his neighbors; but there is not a man in Greece or in foreign parts who does not aver that you ambassadors made gain of your embassy. If rumor is true, the rumor of the multitude is against you; and for the veracity, and even the divinity, of rumor, and for the wisdom of the poet who composed these verses, we have your own assurance. [245]

After these heroics he naturally proceeds to collect and declaim some iambic poetry, for instance:

  “ Whoso delights to walk with wicked men,
  Of him I ask not, for I know him such
  As are the men whose converse pleases him.
  ”
  Unknown

Then follows the passage about “the man who frequented cockpits, and consorted with Pittalacus,” and so forth; “do you not know what his character is?” Well, Aeschines, your iambics shall now serve my turn for an observation about you. I shall be speaking with the propriety of the Tragic Muse, when I say to the jury: Whoso delights to walk （especially on an embassy） with Philocrates, of him I ask not, for I know him well—to have taken bribes, as Philocrates did, who made confession. [246]

Well, when he tries to insult other people by calling them speech-makers and charlatans, he shall be shown to be open to the same reproach. For those iambics come from the Phoenix of Euripides. That play was never acted by Theodorus or Aristodemus, for whom Aeschines commonly took the inferior parts; Molon however produced it, and perhaps some other players of the old school. But Sophocles' Antigone was frequently acted by Theodorus, and also by Aristodemus; and in that play there are some iambic lines, admirably and most instructively composed. That passage Aeschines omitted to quote, though he has often spoken the lines, and knows them by heart; [247] for of course you are aware that, in all tragic dramas, it is the enviable privilege of third-rate actors to come on as tyrants, carrying their royal scepters. Now you shall weigh the merits of the verses which were specially written by the poet for the character of Creon-Aeschines, though he forgot to repeat them to himself in connection with his embassy, and did not quote them to the jury. Read.

  “ Iambics from the Antigone of Sophocles Who shall appraise the spirit of a man,
  His mind, his temper, till he hath been proved
  In ministry of laws and government?
  I hold, and long have held, that man a knave
  Who, standing at the helm of state, deserts
  The wisest counsel, or in craven fear
  Of any, sets a curb upon his lips.
  Who puts his friend above his fatherland
  I scorn as nothing worth; and for myself,
  Witness all-seeing Heaven! I will not hold
  My peace when I descry the curse that comes
  To sap my citizens' security;
  Nor will I count as kin my country's foes;
  For well I wot our country is the ship
  That saves us all, sailing on even keel:
  Embarked in her we fear no dearth of friends.
  ”
  Soph. Ant. 175-190

[248]

Aeschines did not quote any of these lines for his own instruction on his embassy. He put the hospitality and friendship of Philip far above his country,—and found it more profitable. He bade a long farewell to the sage Sophocles; and when he saw the curse that came,—to wit, the army advancing upon the Phocians,—he sounded no warning, sent no timely report; rather he helped both to conceal and to execute the design, and obstructed those who were ready to tell the truth. [249] He forgot the ship that saves; forgot that embarked in her his own mother, performing her rites, scouring her candidates, making her pittance from the substance of her employers, here reared her hopeful brood to greatness. Here, too, his father, who kept an infant-school, lived as best he could,—next door to Heros the physician,30 as I am told by elderly informants,—anyhow, he lived in this city. The offspring of this pair earned a little money as junior clerks and messengers in the public offices, until, by your favor, they became full-fledged clerks, with free maintenance for two years in the Rotunda.31 Finally, from this same city Aeschines received his commission as ambassador. [250] He cared for none of these obligations; he took no thought that the ship of state should sail on even keel; he scuttled her and sank her, and so far as in him lay put her at the mercy of her foes. Are not you then a charlatan? Yes, and a vile one too. Are not you a speech-writer? Yes, and an unprincipled one to boot. You passed over the speech that you so often spoke on the stage, and knew by heart; you hunted up rant that in all your career you had never declaimed in character, and revived it for the undoing of your own fellow-citizen. [251]

Let us now turn to his remarks about Solon. By way of censure and reproach of the impetuous style of Timarchus, he alleged that a statue of Solon, with his robe drawn round him and his hand enfolded, had been set up to exemplify the self-restraint of the popular orators of that generation. People who live at Salamis, however, inform us that this statue was erected less than fifty years ago. Now from the age of Solon to the present day about two hundred and forty years have elapsed, so that the sculptor who designed that disposition of drapery had not lived in Solon's time,—nor even his grand-father. [252] He illustrated his remarks by representing to the jury the attitude of the statue; but his mimicry did not include what, politically, would have been much more profitable than an attitude,—a view of Solon's spirit and purpose, so widely different from his own. When Salamis had revolted, and the Athenian people had forbidden under penalty of death any proposal for its recovery, Solon, accepting the risk of death, composed and recited an elegiac poem, and so retrieved that country for Athens and removed a standing dishonor. [253] Aeschines, on the other hand, gave away and sold Amphipolis, a city which the King of Persia and all Greece recognized as yours, speaking in support of the resolution moved by Philocrates. It was highly becoming in him, was it not to remind us of Solon? Not content with this performance at home, he went to Macedonia, and never mentioned the place with which his mission was concerned. So he stated in his own report, for no doubt you remember how he said “I, too, had something to say about Amphipolis, but I left it out to give Demosthenes a chance of dealing with that subject.” [254] I rose and told you that he had never once left to me anything that he wanted to say to Philip: he would sooner give a man a share of his life-blood than a share of his speech. The truth is that, having accepted money, he could hardly confront Philip, who gave him the money on purpose that he might not restore Amphipolis. Now, please, take and read these elegiac verses of Solon, to show the jury how Solon detested people like the defendant. [255]

What we require, Aeschines, is not oratory with enfolded hands, but diplomacy with enfolded hands. But in Macedonia you held out your hands, turned them palm upwards, and brought shame upon your countrymen, and then here at home you talk magniloquently; you practise and declaim some miserable fustian, and think to escape the due penalty of your heinous crimes, if you only don your little skull-cap,32 take your constitutional, and abuse me. Now read.

  “ Solon's Elegiacs Not by the doom of Zeus, who ruleth all,
  Not by the curse of Heaven shall Athens fall.
  Strong in her Sire, above the favored land
  Pallas Athene lifts her guardian hand.
  No; her own citizens with counsels vain
  Shall work her rain in their quest of gain;
  Dishonest demagogues her folk misguide,
  Foredoomed to suffer for their guilty pride.
  Their reckless greed, insatiate of delight,
  Knows not to taste the frugal feast aright;
  Th' unbridled lust of gold, their only care,
  Nor public wealth nor wealth divine will spare.
  Now here, now there, they raven, rob and seize,
  Heedless of Justice and her stern decrees,
  Who silently the present and the past
  Reviews, whose slow revenge o'ertakes at last.
  On every home the swift contagion falls,
  Till servitude a free-born race enthralls.
  Now faction reigns now wakes the sword of strife,
  And comely youth shall pay its toll of life;
  We waste our strength in conflict with our kin,
  And soon our gates shall let the foeman in.
  Such woes the factious nation shall endure;
  A fate more hard awaits the hapless poor;
  For them, enslaved, bound with insulting chains,
  Captivity in alien lands remains.
  To every hearth the public curse extends;
  The courtyard gate no longer safety lends;
  Death leaps the wall, nor shall he shun the doom
  Who flies for safety to his inmost room.

  Ye men of Athens, listen while I show
  How many ills from lawless licence flow.
  Respect for Law shall check your rising lust,
  Humble the haughty, fetter the unjust,
  Make the rough places plain, bid envy cease,
  Wither infatuation's fell increase,
  Make crooked judgement straight, the works prevent
  Of insolence and sullen discontent,
  And quench the fires of strife. In Law we find
  The wisdom and perfection of Mankind.
  ”
  Solon

[256]

You have heard, men of Athens, what Solon says of men of such character, and of the gods who protect our city. That saying about the protection of our city by the gods is, as I hope and firmly believe, eternally true; and in a manner I think that even the events of this scrutiny furnish the commonwealth with a new example of the divine favor. [257] For consider this: a man who had scandalously misconducted his embassy, and who had given away whole provinces in which the gods should have been worshipped by you and your allies, disfranchised one who had prosecuted him at duty's call.33 And all for what? That he himself may win neither compassion nor indulgence for his own transgressions. Moreover, in accusing him, he went out of his way to speak evil of me, and again at the Assembly he declared he would lay an indictment, with other such threats. And why? In order that you may extend your best indulgence to me when I, who have the most accurate knowledge of his villainies, and have watched him closely throughout, appear as his prosecutor. [258] Again, thanks to his continual evasions, he has at last been brought to trial at the very moment when, for the sake of the future if for no other reason, you cannot possibly, or consistently with your own security, allow a man so steeped in corruption to go scot-free; for, while it is always your duty, men of Athens, to abhor and to chastise traitors and bribe-mongers, a conviction at this crisis will be peculiarly seasonable and profitable to all mankind. [259] A strange and distressing epidemic, men of Athens, has invaded all Greece, calling for extraordinary good fortune, and for the most anxious treatment on your part. The magnates of the several cities, who are entrusted with political authority, are betraying their own independence, unhappy men! They are imposing on themselves a servitude of their own choosing, disguising it by specious names, as the friendship of Philip, fraternity, good-fellowship, and such flummery. The rest of the people, and all the various authorities of the several states, instead of chastising these persons and putting them to death on the spot, as they ought, are filled with admiration and envy, and would all like to be Philip's friends too. [260] Yet this infatuation, this hankering after Philip, men of Athens, until very recently had only destroyed the predominance of the Thessalians and their national prestige, but now it is already sapping their independence, for some of their citadels are actually garrisoned by Macedonians. It has invaded Peloponnesus and caused the massacres at Elis. It infected those unhappy people with such delirious insanity that, to overmaster one another and to gratify Philip, they stained their hands with the blood of their own kindred and fellow-citizens. [261] It has not stopped there. It has entered Arcadia, and turned Arcadian politics upside down; and now many of that nation, who ought to pride themselves as highly as you upon their independence—for you and they are the only indigenous peoples in Greece—admire Philip, set up his effigy in bronze, decorate it with garlands, and, to crown all, have enacted a decree that, if he ever visits Peloponnesus, he shall be made welcome within their walls. The Argives have followed their example. [262] Holy Mother Earth! if I am to speak as a sane man, we stand in need of the utmost vigilance, when this infection, moving in its circuit, has invaded our own city. Therefore take your precautions now, while we are still secure. Let the men who have brought it here be punished with infamy. If not, beware lest you discern the wisdom of my words too late, when you have lost the power of doing what you ought. [263]

Do you not see, men of Athens, what a conspicuous and striking example is offered by those miserable Olynthians, who owe their rain, unhappy men, to nothing so much as to such conduct as I have described? You may easily discover the truth by a review of their experience. At the time when their cavalry was only four hundred strong, and their whole force numbered no more than five thousand, for there was then no coalition of all the Chalcidians, [264] they were invaded by the Lacedaemonians with a large force, both naval and military; and you will remember that in those days the Lacedaemonians may be said to have held command both of land and of sea. Yet in spite of the strength of the attacking force, they never lost a town or even an outpost, they won many engagements, they slew three of the enemy commanders, and finally brought the war to an end on their own terms.34 [265] But when some of them began to accept bribes, when the populace was so stupid, or, let us say, so unlucky, as to give more credence to those persons than to patriotic speakers, when Lasthenes had roofed his house with timber sent as a present from Macedonia, and Euthycrates was keeping a large herd of cattle for which he had paid nothing to anybody, when one man returned home with a flock of sheep and another with a stud of horses, when the masses, whose interests were endangered, instead of being angry and demanding the punishment of the traitors, stared at them, envied them, honored them, and thought them fine fellows,— [266] when, I say, the business had gone so far as that, and corruption had won the day, then, though they numbered more than ten thousand and had a thousand cavalry, though all their neighbors were in alliance with them, though you came to their aid with ten thousand mercenaries, fifty war-galleys, and four thousand of your citizen-force, nothing could save them. Before the war had lasted a year they had lost every town in Chalcidice through treachery, and Philip could no longer pay any attention to the traitors, and hardly knew what to capture first. [267] He took five hundred horsemen with all their equipment by the treason of their officers—a number beyond all precedent. The perpetrators of that infamy were not put to the blush by the sun that shone on their shame or by the soil of their native land on which they stood, by temples or by sepulchres, by the ignominy that waited on their deeds: such madness, men of Athens, such obliquity, does corruption engender! Therefore it behoves you, you the commonalty of Athens, to keep your senses, to refuse toleration to such practices, and to visit them with public retribution. For indeed it would be monstrous if, after passing so stern a decree of censure upon the men who betrayed the Olynthians, you should have no chastisement for those who repeat their iniquity in your own midst. Read the decree concerning the Olynthians.“ Decree ” [268]

Gentlemen of the jury, by the universal judgement of Greeks and barbarians alike, you acted well and righteously in passing this vote of censure upon traitors and reprobates. Therefore, inasmuch as bribe-taking is the forerunner of such treasons, and for the sake of bribes men commit them, whenever, men of Athens, you see any man taking bribes, you may be sure that he is also a traitor. If one man betrays opportunities, another negotiations, another soldiery, each one is making havoc of the business he controls, and all alike deserve your reprobation. [269] In dealing with them you, men of Athens, and you alone among the nations of the world, can find examples to imitate in your own history, and may emulate in act the forefathers whom you justly commend. For if at the present time you are at peace, and cannot emulate the battles, the campaigns, the hazards of war, in which they won renown, you may at least imitate their sound judgement. [270] That is wanted in all circumstances; and an honest judgement costs you no more pains and vexation than a vicious judgement. Each of you will sit in this court for just as long a time, whether, by reaching a right decision and giving a right verdict upon this case, he amends the condition of the commonwealth and does credit to his ancestry, or, by a wrong decision, impairs that condition and dishonors that ancestry. What, then, was their judgement in such a case?—Clerk, take this and read it.—For I would have you know that you are treating with indifference offences such as your forefathers once punished with death.“ Stela Inscription ” [271]

You hear, men of Athens, the record which declares Arthmius, son of Pythonax, of Zelea, to be enemy and foeman of the Athenian people and their allies, him and all his kindred. His offence was conveying gold from barbarians to Greeks. Hence, apparently, we may conclude that your ancestors were anxious to prevent any man, even an alien, taking rewards to do injury to Greece; but you take no thought to discountenance wrongs done by your own citizens to your own city. [272] Does anyone say that this inscription has been set up just anywhere? No; although the whole of our citadel is a holy place, and although its area is so large, the inscription stands at the right hand beside the great brazen Athene which was dedicated by the state as a memorial of victory in the Persian war, at the expense of the Greeks. In those days, therefore, justice was so venerable, and the punishment of these crimes so meritorious, that the retribution of such offenders was honored with the same position as Pallas Athene's own prize of victory. Today we have instead—mockery, impunity, dishonor, unless you restrain the licence of these men. [273]

In my judgement, men of Athens, you will do well, not to emulate your forefathers in some one respect alone, but to follow their conduct step by step. I am sure you have all heard the story of their treatment of Callias, son of Hipponicus, who negotiated the celebrated peace35 under which the King of Persia was not to approach within a day's ride of the coast, nor sail with a ship of war between the Chelidonian islands and the Blue Rocks. At the inquiry into his conduct they came near to putting him to death, and mulcted him in fifty talents, because he was said to have taken bribes on embassy. [274] Yet no one can cite a more honorable peace made by the city before or since; but that is not what they regarded. They attributed the honorable peace to their own valor and to the high repute of their city, the refusal or acceptance of money to the character of the ambassador; and they expected an honest and incorruptible character in any man who entered the service of the state. [275] They held the taking of bribes to be too inimical and unprofitable to the state to be tolerated in any transaction or in any person; but you, men of Athens, having before you a peace which at once has pulled down the walls of your allies and is building up the houses of your ambassadors, which robbed the city of her possessions and earned for them wealth beyond the dreams of avarice, instead of putting them to death of your own accord, wait for the appearance of a prosecutor. You are giving them a trial of words with their evil deeds before your eyes. [276]

Yet we need not restrict ourselves to bygone history, or rely upon those ancient precedents in our appeal to retributive justice. Within your own lifetime, in the time of the generation now living, not a few men have been tried and condemned. Passing by other instances, let me recall to your memory one or two men who have been punished by death after an embassy far less mischievous to the city. Please take and read this decree.“ Decree ” [277]

By the terms of this decree, men of Athens, you condemned to death the ambassadors named. One of them was Epicrates, who, as I am informed by persons older than myself, was an honest, useful, and popular politician, and one of the men who marched from Peiraeus and restored the democracy.36 No such consideration availed him; and that was right, for a man who accepts so important a mission is not to be virtuous by halves. He must not use the public confidence he has earned as an opportunity for knavery; his duty is simply to do you no wilful wrong at all. [278] Well, if the present defendants have omitted any single one of the misdeeds for which those persons were sentenced to death, execute me on the spot. Look at the decree: “Whereas the said ambassadors have disobeyed their instructions.” That is the first charge alleged. And did not these men disobey their instructions? Did not the decree say, “for the Athenians and the Allies of the Athenians,” and did not they declare the Phocians to be excluded? Did it not instruct them to swear in the magistrates in the several cities, and did they not swear in only such persons as Philip sent to them? Did not the decree say that they were not to meet Philip alone in any place whatsoever, and did they not continually have private dealings with Philip? [279] “Whereas,” says the old decree, “certain of them are convicted of making untruthful reports to the Council.” Why, these men are convicted of making untruthful reports even to the Assembly. On what evidence?—you remember that brilliant quibble. On the evidence of facts: the report was exactly contradicted by the event. It goes on: “and of sending untruthful dispatches.” So did they. “And of bearing false witness against allies, and of taking bribes.” For “bearing false witness” read “utterly destroying”—a vastly greater injury. But as to their having taken bribes, we should still, if they denied it, have to make the charge good; but since they admit it, surely there should have been a summary arrest and punishment.37 [280]

What follows, men of Athens? Such being the facts, will you, the descendants of these men, some of whom are still living, be content that Epicrates, the champion of democracy, the hero of the march from Peiraeus, should have been degraded and punished; that more recently Thrasybulus, a son of Thrasybulus the great democrat, who restored free government from Phyle, should have paid a fine of ten talents that even a descendant of Harmodius and of the greatest of all your benefactors, the men to whom, in requital of their glorious deeds, you have allotted by statute a share of your libations and drink-offerings in every temple and at every public service, whom, in hymns and in worship, you treat as the equals of gods and demigods,— [281] will you be content that all these men should have been subjected to the inexorable penalty of law; that they should find no succor in mercy or compassion, in weeping children bearing honored names, or in any other plea? And then, when you have in your power a son of Atrometus the dominie, and of Glaucothea, the fuglewoman of those bacchanalian routs for which another priestess38 suffered death, will you release the son of such parents, a man who has never been of the slightest use to the commonwealth, neither he, nor his father, nor any member of his precious family? [282] Has the state ever had to thank any one of them in the whole course of his life for so much as a horse, or a war-galley, or a military expedition, or a chorus, or any public service, assessed contribution, or free gift, or for any deed of valor or any benefit whatsoever? Yet even if he could claim credit for all those services, but could not add that he has been an honest and disinterested ambassador, he ought assuredly to suffer death. If he has neither the one claim nor the other, will you not punish him? [283] Remember what he told you himself when he prosecuted Timarchus,—that there is no merit in a city that is nerveless in its dealings with malefactors, or in a polity where indulgence and importunity are stronger than the laws. You must not, he said, have any pity for Timarchus's mother, an aged woman, or his children, or anyone else: you must fix your mind on the thought that, if you desert the laws and the constitution, you will find no one to pity you. [284] The unfortunate Timarchus is still disfranchised because he was a witness of Aeschines' misdeeds, and why should you allow Aeschines to go scot-free? If he demanded such severity of retribution from men who had transgressed only against himself and his friends, what retribution are you, a legal jury bound by oath, to exact from men who have grievously transgressed against the commonwealth, and of whom he is proved to be one? [285] He will say that the trial of Timarchus will improve the morals of our young men. Then this trial will improve the integrity of our statesmen, on whom depend the gravest political hazards; and they also have a claim on your consideration. But let me show you that he did not bring Timarchus to ruin because of his anxious care—Heaven help us! for the modesty of your children. Your children, men of Athens, are already modest; and God forbid that Athens should ever be in such evil case as to require an Aphobetus or an Aeschines to teach young people modesty! [286] He did it because Timarchus had moved in the Council a decree making the conveyance of arms or ships' tackle to Philip a capital offence. As evidence of that, let me ask how long Timarchus had been a public speaker? A very long time; and during all that time Aeschines was in Athens; yet he never took offence, he never began to think it a shame that a man of such character should make speeches, until he had visited Macedonia and sold himself. Please take and read the actual decree of Timarchus.“ Decree ” [287]

The man who for your sake proposed the prohibition, under penalty of death, of carrying arms to Philip is vilified and disgraced; the man who surrendered to Philip the armaments of our allies is his accuser. Immorality—save the mark!—was the theme of his speech, while at his side stood his two brothers-in-law, the very sight of whom is enough to set you in an uproar,—the disgusting Nicias, who went to Egypt as the hireling of Chabrias, and the abominable Cyrebio,39 the unmasked harlequin of the pageants. But that was nothing: under his eyes sat his brother Aphobetus. In truth, on that day all that declaiming against immorality was like water flowing upstream.40 [288]

And now, to illustrate the discredit into which our city has been dragged by this man's trickery and mendacity, omitting much that I might mention, I will point to a symptom that you have all observed. In former times, men of Athens, all Greece used to watch anxiously for your decisions. Today we prowl the streets wondering what the other communities have resolved, all agog to hear what is the news from Arcadia, what is the news from the Amphictyons, what will be Philip's next movement, whether he is alive or dead. [289] You know that such is our behavior. What alarms me is the thought, not that Philip is alive, but that in Athens the spirit that loathes and punishes evil-doers is dead. Philip does not terrify me, if only your condition is healthy; but if there is to be impunity in this court for men who hunger after Philip's pay, and if men who have won your confidence, men who have hitherto scorned the imputation of intriguing for Philip, are to appear as their advocates, that does terrify me.— [290] What does this mean, Eubulus? At the trial of your cousin Hegesilaus, and recently at that of Thrasybulus, an uncle of Niceratus, before the first vote of the jury41 you would not even answer when you were called; on the question of damages you did get up to speak, but you had not a word to say in their favor, and merely asked the jury to excuse you. So you do not mount the tribune for your own kinsmen and for men who have a claim on your services, and will you mount it for Aeschines, [291] who, when Aristophon prosecuted Philonicus, and in denouncing him denounced your own policy, joined in the attack upon you, and so ranged himself with your enemies? After terrifying the people, and telling them that they must go down to Peiraeus at once, pay the war-tax and turn the theatric fund into a war-chest, or else vote for the resolution that was supported by Aeschines and moved by that abominable Philocrates, with the result that we got a discreditable instead of an equitable peace, [292] and after all the ruin that has been wrought by their subsequent misdeeds, are you reconciled with them after that? In the Assembly you solemnly cursed Philip; you swore by the head of your children that you desired his utter destruction, and will you now be the defender of Aeschines? How can Philip be utterly destroyed, if you rescue the men who take his bribes? [293] Why did you prosecute Moerocles, because he had extorted twenty drachmas apiece from the lessees of the silver-mines; why did you indict Cephisophon for misappropriating sacred funds, because he was three days late in paying seven minas into the bank, if, instead of prosecuting, you now try to rescue men who have confessed, who have been caught in the act, who are convicted of taking bribes for the destruction of our allies? [294] Yes, these are formidable offences, calling for the utmost vigilance and precaution; while the charges you brought against those two men were comparatively ludicrous, as these considerations will show. Were there any persons in Elis who embezzled public money? In all probability, yes. Did any one of them take part in the recent overthrow of free government there? [295] Not one. When there was still such a city as Olynthus, were there any thieves there? I take it there were. Did Olynthus perish through their sins? No. Do you suppose there were no thieves and pilferers of public funds in Megara? There must have been such. Has any one of them been shown to be responsible for the present political troubles there? Not one. Then who are the people who commit these monstrous crimes? Persons who fancy themselves important enough to be called friends of Philip, men itching for military commands and eager for political distinction, men who claim superiority over the common herd. At Megara the other day was not Perillus tried before the Three Hundred on a charge of visiting Philip? And did not Ptoeodorus, the first man in all Megara for wealth, birth, and reputation, come forward and beg him off, and then send him back to Philip? The sequel was that one of the pair returned with an alien army at his back, while the other was hatching the plot at home. Take that as a specimen. [296] Indeed, there is no danger, no danger whatsoever, that requires more anxious vigilance than allowing any man to become stronger than the people. Let no man be delivered, and let no man be destroyed, merely because this man or that so desires; let hem who is delivered or destroyed by the evidence of facts be entitled to receive from this court the verdict that is his due. That is the democratic principle. [297] Furthermore, at Athens many men have upon occasion risen to power—the great Callistratus, for instance, Aristophon, Diophantus, and others of earlier date. But what was the field of their supremacy? The popular assembly. In courts of justice no man to this day has ever been superior to the people, or to the laws, or to the judicial oath. Then permit no such superiority to Aeschines today. To enforce the warning that it is better to take those precautions than to be credulous, I will read to you an oracle of the gods,—to whom Athens owes her salvation far more than to her most prominent politicians. Read the oracles.“ Oracles ” [298]

Men of Athens, you hear the admonitions of the gods. If they are addressed to you in time of war, they bid you beware of your commanders, for commanders are the leaders of warfare; if after conclusion of peace, of your statesmen, for they are your leaders, they have your obedience, by them you may haply be deceived. The oracle also bids you keep the commonwealth together, that all may be of one mind, and may not gratify the enemy. [299] What do you think, men of Athens? Will Philip be gratified by the deliverance or by the punishment of the man who has done all this mischief? By his deliverance surely; but the oracle bids you strive that the enemy shall not rejoice. Therefore, you are all exhorted by Zeus, by Dione, by all the gods, to punish with one mind those who have made themselves the servants of your enemies. There are foes without; there are traitors within. It is the business of foes to give bribes, of traitors to take bribes, and to rescue those who have taken them. [300]

Moreover, it can be shown by mere human reasoning that it is extremely injurious and dangerous to permit the intimacy of a prominent statesman with men whose purposes are at variance with those of the people. If you will consider by what means Philip acquired his political supremacy and performed his most signal achievements, you will find that it was by buying treachery from willing sellers, and by corrupting leading politicians and stimulating their ambition. [301] Both these practices it is within your power, if you so choose, to frustrate today, if you will first refuse to listen to the defenders of treachery, and prove that they cannot exercise that authority over you of which they boast, and then punish before the eyes of the world the man who has traitorously sold himself. [302] You have good reason, men of Athens, to be indignant with every man who by such conduct has thrown overboard your allies, your friends, and those opportunities on which, for any nation, success or failure depends, but with no man more fiercely or more righteously than with Aeschines. For a man who once ranged himself with those who distrusted Philip, and made unassisted the first discovery of Philip's hostility to all Greece, and then became a deserter and a traitor and suddenly appeared as Philip's champion—does he not deserve a hundred deaths? [303] Yet that such are the facts, he will not be able to deny. For who originally introduced Ischander to you, declaring him to have come as the representative of the Arcadian friends of Athens? Who raised the cry that Philip was forming coalitions in Greece and Peloponnesus while you slept? Who made those long and eloquent speeches, and read the decrees of Miltiades and Themistacles and the oath which our young men take in the temple of Aglaurus42? [304] Was it not Aeschines? Who persuaded you to send embassies almost as far as the Red Sea, declaring that Greece was the object of Philip's designs, and that it was your duty to anticipate the danger and not be disloyal to the Hellenic cause? Was it not Eubulus who proposed the decree, and the defendant Aeschines who went as ambassador to the Peloponnesus? What he said there after his arrival, either in conversation or in public speeches, is best known to himself: what he reported on his return I am sure you have not forgotten. [305] For he made a speech in which he repeatedly called Philip a barbarian and a man of blood. He told you that the Arcadians were delighted to hear that Athens was really waking up and attending to business. He related an incident which, he said, had filled him with deep indignation. On his journey home he had met Atrestidas travelling from Philip's court with some thirty women and children in his train. He was astonished, and inquired of one of the travellers who the man and his throng of followers were; [306] and when he was told that they were Olynthian captives whom Atrestidas was bringing away with him as a present from Philip, he thought it a terrible business, and burst into tears. Greece, he sorrowfully reflected, is in evil plight indeed, if she permits such cruelties to pass unchecked. He counselled you to send envoys to Arcadia to denounce the persons who were intriguing for Philip; for, he said, he had been informed that, if only Athens would give attention to the matter and send ambassadors, the intriguers would promptly be brought to justice. [307] Such was his speech on that occasion; a noble speech, worthy of our Athenian traditions. But after he had visited Macedonia, and beheld his own enemy and the enemy of all Greece, did his language bear the slightest resemblance to those utterances? Not in the least: he bade you not to remember your forefathers, not to talk about trophies, not to carry succor to anybody. As for the people who recommended you to consult the Greeks on the terms of peace with Philip, he was amazed at the suggestion that it was necessary that any foreigner should be convinced when the questions were purely domestic. [308] And as for Philip,—why, good Heavens, he was a Greek of the Greeks, the finest orator and the most thorough—going friend of Athens you could find in the whole world. And yet there were some queer, ill-conditioned fellows in Athens who did not blush to abuse him, and even to call him a barbarian! [309]

Is it, then, conceivable that the man who made the earlier of those speeches should also have made the later unless he had been corrupted? Is it possible that the same man who was then inflamed with abhorrence of Atrestidas on account of those Olynthian women and children, should now be content to cooperate with Philocrates, who brought free-born Olynthian ladies to this city for their dishonor? Philocrates is now so notorious for the infamous life he has lived that I need not apply to him any degrading or offensive epithet. When I merely mention that he did bring the ladies, there is not a man in this court, whether on the jury or among the onlookers, who does not know the sequel, and who does not, I am sure, feel compassion for those miserable and unfortunate beings. Yet Aeschines had no compassion for them. He did not shed tears over Greece on their account, indignant that they should suffer outrage in an allied country at the hands of Athenian ambassadors. [310]

No; our discredited ambassador will keep all his tears for himself. Very likely he will bring his children into court and put them in a conspicuous position. But do you, gentlemen of the jury, as you look at those children of his, reflect how many children of your own friends and allies are wanderers, roaming the world in beggary, suffering hardships which they owe to this man; and that they deserve your compassion infinitely more than the offspring of a malefactor and a traitor, while, by adding to the treaty of peace the words and to their posterity, he and his friends robbed your own children even of hope. When you witness his tears, remember that you hold in your power a man who bade you send accusers to Arcadia to testify against the agents of Philip. [311] And so today you have no need to send a mission to Peloponnesus, to make a long journey, or to pay travelling expenses; you have only to advance one by one to this platform, and there cast a just and a righteous vote for your country's sake against the man who, having at the outset, as I described to you, spoken so eloquently about Marathon and Salamis, about battles and victories, from the moment he set foot on Macedonian soil contradicted his own utterances, forbade you to remember the example of your forefathers, or recall old victories, or carry succor to your friends, or take common counsel with the Greeks, and well-nigh bade you to dismantle the defences of your city. [312] No more disgraceful speeches have ever been made in your hearing during the whole course of your history. Lives there a man, Greek or barbarian, so boorish, so unversed in history, or so ill-disposed to our commonwealth that, if he were asked the question, “Tell me, in all the country that we call Greece and inhabit today, is there an acre that would still bear that name, or remain the home of the Greeks who now possess it, if the heroes of Marathon and Salamis, our forefathers, had not in their defence performed those glorious deeds of valor,” is there one man who would not make reply: “No; the whole country would have become the prey of the barbarian invaders”? [313] Even among your foes there is not a man who would despoil those heroes of their meed of praise and gratitude; and does an Aeschines forbid you, their own descendants, to commemorate their names—all for the sake of his miserable bribes? There are indeed rewards in which the dead have no part or lot; but the praise that waits on glorious achievements is the peculiar guerdon of those who have gloriously died—for then jealousy is no longer their adversary. Let the man who would rob the dead of their reward be stripped of his own honors: that retribution you will levy on him for your forefathers' sake. By those speeches of yours, you reprobate, you made havoc of our policy, traducing and disparaging with your tongue the achievements of our forefathers. [314] And from these performances you emerge a land-owner, a person of high consideration! Take another point. Before he did all that mischief to the commonwealth, he used to admit that he had been a clerk; he was grateful to you for his appointments; his demeanor was quite modest. But since he has perpetrated wrongs without number, he has become mightily supercilious. If a man speaks of “Aeschines, the man who was once a clerk,” he makes a private quarrel of it, and talks of defamation of character. Behold him pacing the market-place with the stately stride of Pythocles, his long robe reaching to his ankles, his cheeks puffed out, as who should say, “One of Philip's most intimate friends, at your service!” He has joined the clique that wants to get rid of democracy,—that regards the established political order as an inconstant wave,—mere midsummer madness. And once he made obeisance to the Rotunda!43 [315]

Now I wish by a brief recapitulation to remind you of the manner in which Philip discomfited your policy with these scoundrels as his confederates. It is well worth while to examine and contemplate the whole imposition. At the outset he was really desirous of peace, for his whole country was overrun by banditti, and his ports were blockaded, so that he got no advantage from all his wealth. Accordingly he sent those envoys who addressed you in his name with so much courtesy—Neoptolemus, Aristodemus, and Ctesiphon. [316] But as soon as he was visited by us ambassadors, he promptly took Aeschines into his pay, that he might support and co-operate with the infamous Philocrates, and overpower those of us whose intentions were honest. He then composed a letter to you, as the best means of obtaining the peace he desired. [317] Even then it was still out of his power to achieve any important result to your disadvantage, unless he should destroy the Phocians. That was no easy task, for, as luck would have it, his affairs had reached a crisis of such a nature that either he could not realize any of his purposes, or else he was obliged to commit falsehood and perjury, with the whole world, both Greek and barbarian, to witness his wickedness. [318] For if he should accept the Phocians as allies, and with your help take the oath of friendship to them, he must at once violate the oaths he had already sworn to the Thessalians and the Thebans, with the latter of whom he had covenanted to help them in the subjugation of Boeotia, and with the former to restore their rights at the Amphictyonic Council. If, on the other hand, he was loth to accept them—and in fact the prospect did not please him—he expected that you would send troops to Thermopylae to stop his passage, as indeed you would have done if you had not been outwitted. In that event, he calculated that he would be unable to get through. [319] He did not need any information from others to reach that conclusion. He was himself a sufficient witness, for, after his first defeat of the Phocians and the overthrow of their leader and commander Onomarchus, although no one in the whole world, Greek or barbarian, sent aid to them save you alone, so far from getting through Thermopylae, or accomplishing any of the purposes of the passage, he had been unable even to approach the pass. [320] I take it he was perfectly well aware that now, with Thessaly at variance with him—the Pheraeans, for example, refusing to join his following—with the Thebans getting the worst of the war, defeated in an engagement, and a trophy erected at their expense, he would be unable to force the passage if you sent troops to Thermopylae, and that he could not even make the attempt without serious loss unless he should also resort to some trickery. “How, then,” he thought, “shall I escape open falsehood, and attain all my objects without incurring the charge of perjury? Only if I can find Athenians to hood-wink the Athenian people, for then I shall have no share in the ensuing dishonor.” [321] Accordingly his envoys warned you that he would not accept the Phocian alliance, but then Aeschines and his friends, taking up the tale, assured the people that, although for the sake of the Thebans and the Thessalians Philip could not with decency accept the alliance, yet if he should become master of the situation, and get his peace, he would thereafter do exactly what we should now ask him to agree to. [322] So on the strength of these expectations and inducements he obtained his peace, with the Phocians excluded; but it was still necessary to stop the reinforcement of Thermopylae, for which fifty war-galleys were lying at anchor to enable you to check Philip's advance. [323] How could it be done? What new artifice could he invent for that purpose? Someone must filch your opportunities of action, and surprise you with an unexpected crisis, so that you might lose the power, if not the will, of sending the expedition. That, then, was clearly what these men undertook. As you have often heard, I was unable to get away in time; I had chartered a ship, but was prevented from sailing. [324] But it was further necessary that the Phocians should acquire confidence in Philip and make a voluntary surrender, so that no delay should intervene, and no unfriendly resolution come to hand from you. “Very well,” thought Philip, “a report shall be made by the Athenian ambassadors that the Phocians are to be protected; and so, though they persist in mistrusting me, they will deliver themselves into my hands through confidence in the Athenians. We will enlist the sympathy of the Athenian people in the hope that, supposing themselves to have got everything they want, they will pass no obstructive resolution. These men shall carry from us such flattering reports and assurances that, whatsoever may befall, they will make no movement.” [325]

In this manner and by the aid of this artifice our ruin was accomplished by men themselves doomed to perdition. For at once, instead of witnessing the restoration of Thespiae and Plataea, you heard of the enslavement of Orchomenus and Coronea. Instead of the humiliation of Thebes and the abasement of her pride and insolence, the walls of your own allies the Phocians were demolished, and demolished by those very Thebans whom Aeschines in his speech had sent to live in scattered villages. [326] Instead of the surrender to you of Euboea in exchange for Amphipolis, Philip is establishing positions in Euboea as a base of attack upon you, and is constantly plotting against Geraestus and Megara. Instead of recovering Oropus, we are making an armed expedition to secure Drymus44 and the district of Panactus,45 an operation in which we never engaged so long as the Phocians were safe. [327] Instead of the re-establishment of ancient rites in the Temple of Apollo, and the restitution of treasure to the god, men who were once Amphictyons are fugitives and exiles, and men who never in all former time were members of it, Macedonians and barbarians, are now forcing their way into the Amphictyonic Council. If anyone says a word about the sacred treasure, he is thrown down the precipice; and Athens is robbed of her precedence in the consultation of the Oracle. [328] To Athens the whole business is an insoluble puzzle. Philip has escaped falsehood, and has accomplished all his purposes, while you, after expecting the complete fulfilment, have witnessed the entire disappointment, of your desires. You are nominally at peace; yet peace has brought you greater calamities than war. Meantime these men have made money by your misfortunes, and until today have never been brought to justice. [329] That they have done it all for bribes, and that they have the price of their perfidy in their pockets, has, I suppose, long ago been manifest to you for many reasons; and I am afraid that, contrary to my desire, I may be wearying you by submitting detailed proofs of facts well known to you. [330] However, I must ask you to listen to one more argument. Gentlemen of the jury, would you set up in the market-place a statue of any of the ambassadors whom Philip sent? Or would you give to them free maintenance in the Town Hall, or any of the other privileges with which you reward your benefactors? Surely not; but why not? For in you there is no lack of gratitude or justice or kindness. It is, you will say—and it is a fair and honest reply—because they did everything for Philip and nothing for us. [331] Then do you suppose that Philip acts on an entirely different principle from yours, and gives all those handsome presents to Aeschines and his friends because they conducted their mission duly and honestly in your interest? That is not so. You have observed the reception he gave to the envoy Hegesippus46 and his colleagues. Not to mention other details, he banished by proclamation the Athenian poet Xenocleides for offering them hospitality as fellow-citizens. Such is his behavior towards your representatives when they honestly speak out what they think; those who have sold themselves he treats as he treated Aeschines and his friends. My argument requires no other witnesses and no stronger proofs; nor can anyone erase these proofs from your minds. [332]

Some one came up to me just now in front of the court, and told me a very odd thing. Aeschines, he said, had prepared himself to denounce the general Chares,47 hoping to cajole you by his eloquent treatment of that topic. I will not lay too much stress on the observation that, whenever Chares has been brought to trial, he has been found to have acted faithfully and loyally, so far as in him lay, in your interests, though he has often failed of success by the fault of the people who do mischief for money. I will go so far as to grant for argument's sake that every word Aeschines will utter against him is true. But even on that assumption it is absolutely ridiculous that a man in Chares' position should be denounced by a man like Aeschines. [333] Observe that I do not blame Aeschines for any of the misadventures of the war, for which the generals are duly called to account. Nor do I blame him because the city made the peace: so far I acquit him. What then is the basis of my speech and of my indictment? That, when the city was making the peace, he supported Philocrates, and did not support speakers whose proposals were patriotic; that he took bribes; that thereafter, on the later embassy, he deliberately squandered his opportunities; that he deceived the city, and confounded its policy, by suggesting the hope that Philip would satisfy all our desires; and that subsequently, when others warned you to beware of the perpetrator of so many iniquities, he addressed you as his advocate. [334] These are my accusations. Do not forget them. For a just and equitable peace I would be grateful; I would have commended and advised you to decorate negotiators who had not first sold themselves and then deceived you with falsehoods. Granted that you were wronged by any commander,—he is not concerned in the present inquiry. Did any commander bring Halus to destruction? or the Phocians? or Doriscus? or Cersobleptes? or the Sacred Mount? or Thermopylae? Was it a commander who gave Philip an open road to Attica through the territory of friends and allies? Who has made Coronea and Orchomenus and Euboea alien ground for us? Who nearly did the same with Megara only yesterday? Who has made the Thebans strong? [335] These are enormous losses, but for none of them is any general to blame. Philip does not hold any of these advantages as a concession made with your consent in the terms of peace. We owe them all to these men and to their venality. If, then, Aeschines shirks the issue, if he tries to lead you astray by talking of anything rather than the charges I bring, I will tell you how to receive his irrelevance. “We are not sitting in judgement on any military commander. You are not being tried on the charges you refute. Do not tell us that this man or that man is to blame for the destruction of the Phocians; prove to us that you are not to blame. If Demosthenes committed any crime, why bring it up now? Why did you not lay your complaint at the statutory investigation of his conduct? For that silence alone you deserve your doom. [336] You need not tell us that peace is a lovely and profitable thing; for nobody blames you because the city concluded peace. Deny, if you can, that the peace we have is a disgraceful and ignominious peace; deny that after its conclusion we were deceived, and that by that deception all was lost. The blame for all these calamities has been brought home to you. Why do you still speak the praises of the man who inflicted them?” Keep guard over his tricks in that fashion, and he will have nothing to say. He will only aggravate the thunders of his voice, and exhaust himself with his own vociferation. [337]

On that famous voice of his, however, I really must offer some observations. For I am informed that he sets great store thereby, and that he hopes to overawe you by an exhibition of histrionic talent. When he tried to represent the woes of the House of Thyestes, or of the men who fought at Troy, you drove him from the stage with hisses and cat-calls, and came near to pelting him with stones, insomuch that in the end he gave up his profession of actor of small parts; and I think you would be behaving very strangely if now, when he has wrought measurable mischief, not on the stage, but in his dealings with the most momentous affairs of state, you should be favorably impressed by his beautiful voice. [338] No, gentlemen; you must not yield to unworthy emotion. If you are holding an examination for the office of herald, you do well to look for a man with a fine loud voice; but if you are choosing an ambassador or a candidate for public office, you seek an honest man, a man who exhibits a proud spirit as your representative, and a spirit of equality as your fellow-citizen. I, for example, showed no respect for Philip; I kept my respect for the captives, I rescued them, I spared no effort. Aeschines, on the other hand, grovelled at Philip's feet, sang his Hymn of Victory, and disregards you altogether. [339] Again, when you observe eloquence, or vocal power, or any such merit, in a right-minded and patriotic speaker, by all means congratulate him and help him to exercise his gift, for you all share in its advantages. But when you find such powers in the possession of a corrupt and evil-minded man, the slave of filthy lucre, discourage him, and listen to him with aversion and animosity; for if knavery enjoys in your eyes the reputation of ability, it becomes a peril to the commonwealth. [340] You have before your eyes the dangers with which the city is encompassed as the result of the reputation he has achieved. Now other forms of ability are almost wholly independent of conditions; but the ability of the speaker is paralyzed by the recalcitrance of his audience. Listen to him, then, as to a knave and a bribe-taker, who will have no truthful word to utter. [341]

Observe in conclusion that, apart from all other reasons, the conviction of this man is eminently desirable in view of your future relations with Philip. For if Philip ever finds himself under the necessity of treating Athens with common justice, he will have to remodel his methods. At present his chosen policy is to cheat the many and court the few; but, when he learns that his favorites have been brought to ruin, he will wish for the future to deal with the many, who are the real masters of our state. [342] Or if he persists in the lawlessness and the insolence that he displays today, you, by putting these men out of the way, will have delivered Athens from men ready to go to all lengths in his service. For if the fear that they would be called to account did not deter them, what conduct can you expect from them if you should give them a licence to do what they please? Will they not outvie Euthycrates, Lasthenes, and all the traitors of history? [343] Every other man will be a worse citizen, when he sees that men who have made traffic of the common interests emerge with wealth and reputation, and with all the advantages of Philip's friendship, while the lot of those who approved themselves honest men and spent their money in your service is vexation and ill-will, and the enmity of those whom I need not name. Let it not be so! For the sake of your honor, of your religion, of your security, of everything you value, you must not acquit this man. Visit him with exemplary punishment, and let his fate be a warning not to our own citizens alone but to every man who lives in the Hellenic world.

1 For the selection of jurors.

2 See Introduction, pp. 241-2.

3 The clause excluding the Phocians from the benefit of the peace had been rescinded by the Assembly （See Dem. 19.159）. Aeschines and his friends were therefore acting ultra vires in restoring the clause, when they administered the oath. Had they been really convinced that Philip intended to spare the Phocians, they would have retained the more general phrase,“the Athenians and their allies.” It is more probable that Philip himself insisted on excluding the Phocians, and the ambassadors were as powerless as the Roman senators before Alaric.

4 The force of the ἤδη γεis not clear. Kennedy translates it “for the first time,” presumably meaning the first time that Athens has ever taken instructions from Macedonia. The previous paragraph suggests that Dem. is insinuating that Philip, whose aim was to keep the Athenians inactive, deferred the invitation till it was too late for them to put a force in the field, whether to support Philip or the Phocians.

5 in the time, etc.: see Dem. 18.139.

6 in the day of our trial: 404 B.C. when, after the naval defeat at Aegispotami, and the surrender of the city to Lysander, Athens lay at the mercy of Thebes, Sparta, and Corinth. Grote, ch. 65.

7 Every meeting of the Assembly and of the Council opened with a form of prayer, which included a curse on the enemies of the state and was recited by the “marshal” （κῆρυξ） at the dictation of an under-clerk. The curse has nowhere been preserved, but a parody will be found in Aristoph. Thes. 331 ff.

8 Demosthenes often alludes scornfully to Aeschines' profession of γραμματεύς. Aeschines seems first to have been private secretary to the statesmen Aristophon and Eubulus. After his career on the stage, he obtained an under-clerkship in the Civil Service, and subsequently became Clerk of the Council and Assembly. This was an official of some dignity; he was appointed by popular election and enjoyed the privilege of free maintenance in the Prytaneum or Town Hall.

9 104 to 109

10 torture: to get evidence from slaves.

11 Demosthenes alludes to Aeschines' former profession of actor and also to some recent trial in which Aeschines had been engaged （possibly the action against Timarchus: see Introd. pp. 234-5）, when, owing to congestion in the law courts, the time allotted to each speaker was cut down to a minimum. But the matter is obscure.

12 A citizen appointed to any office could decline it, if he took an oath before the Assembly that for reasons of health, etc., he was unable to serve.

13 To watch and counteract Demosthenes.

14 An ambassador on the winning side can only be bribed to gain concessions for the losers—a natural and comparatively harmless proceeding: an ambassador on the losing side is bribed by the winners to make their gain, and his country's loss, more complete.

15 See Introd. p. 240.

16 Those members of the embassy who were innocent may come forward voluntarily and disavow Aeschines. Demosthenes will not force them to clear themselves; he accuses none but the chief culprit. The next sentence, however, hints that, if they do not disavow him, they may share his disgrace.

17 Eucleides: sent to protest against Philip's invasion of the dominions of Cersobleptes.

18 The Greek phrase, which occurs also at the end of the De corona, suggests by its jingle the formula of some curse, but cannot be well reproduced in English.

19 It should be remembered that all evidence in the Athenian courts was deposited in writing before the trial. There was no verbal evidence and no cross-examination. By attesting under oath the truth of his deposition, the witness of course made himself answerable to a charge of perjury.

20 The fifty Prytanes, belonging to one tribe, and performing for one tenth of the year the functions of the Council of Five Hundred.

21 Not the great Olympian Games of Elis, but a Macedonian festival held at Dium. The date is probably the spring of 347 B.C.

22 The Assembly of the Arcadian Confederacy, meeting at Megalopolis.

23 the acolyte, etc.: see Dem. 18.259 ff.

24 Timarchus; see Introd. p. 234.

25 In this exclamation Demosthenes perhaps imitates the melodramatic style and intonation of his adversary. Aeschines is like our stage villain, crying, “Aha! A time will come.”

26 Here and elsewhere （e.g. Dem. 19.233） Demosthenes has time to insert a few remarks while the witnesses are being collected and before their depositions are read.

27 no second opportunity: lit. “no one will hereafter pour water for me,” i.e. into the clepsydra [57].

28 i.e. performing the “public services” （λῃτουργίαι） of the choragia and the trierarchia.

29 Timarchus.

30 Heros the Physician: or the Hero Physician; see Dem. 18.129, and note.

31 The Prytaneum or Town Hall.

32 skull-cap: a soft cap commonly worn by invalids; also, according to Plutarch, by Solon, when he recited his verses on Salamis. Demosthenes ironically pretends that the defendant is still suffering from his sham illness [Dem. 19.124].

33 Demosthenes asserts that Timarchus prosecuted Aeschines from purely patriotic motives. The Greek, however, admits of more than one interpretation.

34 Some Chalcidian cities obtained aid against the growing power of Olynthus, and the war lasted from 382 to 379, when the Olynthians sued for peace and became members of the Spartan Confederacy, not exactly “on their own terms.”

35 470 B.C., after the battle of Eurymedon.

36 restored the democracy: under Thrasybulus [Dem. 19.280], 403 B.C. （Grote, ch. 65.）.

37 By the legal process known as ἀπαγωγή.

38 According to Ulpian her name was Nino and her crime was mixing a love-potion.

39 Cyrebrio, a nickname, “Offal” （κυρήβια=bran）; the man's real name was Epicrates.

40 For this metaphor to express topsyturvydom cf. Eur. Med. 410—ἄνω ποταμῶν ἱερῶν χωροῦσι παγαί, καὶ δίκα καὶ πάντα πάλιν στρέφεται.

41 The verdict of “guilty” or “not guilty.” A second vote was in some cases （e.g. at the trial of Socrates） required to decide the punishment.

42 Aglaurus: daughter of Cecrops, legendary king of Attica; canonized for an act of patriotic self-devotion. In her chapel young Athenians, on admission to citizenship, received their arms, and took the oath of loyalty.

43 See Dem. 19.249.

44 Drymus, Panactus: frontier-towns on the edge of Boeotia.

45 Drymus, Panactus: frontier-towns on the edge of Boeotia.

46 Hegesippus [72]: recently sent to protest against Philip's retention of Halonnesus; author of the speech On Halonnesus （Dem. 7） attributed to Demosthenes.

47 Chares: for thirty years an unlucky, or incompetent, commander by land and sea; politically, a friend of Demosthenes; had commanded the unsuccessful expedition sent too late for the relief of Olynthus.

Gentlemen of the jury, it is chiefly because I consider that the State will benefit by the repeal of this law, but partly also out of sympathy with the young son of Chabrias, that I have consented to support the plaintiffs to the best of my ability. It is clear, men of Athens, that Leptines and anyone else who defends the law will have nothing fair to say in its favor, but will urge the unworthiness of certain persons who have used their exemption as a means of shirking the public services, and he will take his stand chiefly on that ground. [2] For my own part, I shall forbear to retort that it is unjust to take away this privilege from all because you find fault with some; for that objection has already been partially stated,1 and you probably realize its force. But I should like to ask Leptines on what grounds, even if not some, but all the recipients had been to the last degree undeserving, he has meted out the same treatment to you as to them; for by the clause “none shall be exempt” he has taken away the privilege from those who now enjoy it, while by the addition “nor shall it be lawful hereafter to grant it” he takes away from you the right to bestow it. For surely he cannot mean that precisely as he thought the holders of this privilege unworthy, so he thought the people unworthy of the right to dispense its own favors to whomsoever it wishes. [3] But perhaps he may object here that he framed his law in this way because the people are so easily gulled. But by parity of reasoning why should you not be deprived of all your rights—of the whole constitution in fact? For there is no single—right which has not been abused in this way. You have often been deceived into passing decrees; you have sometimes been induced to choose weak allies rather than strong; and generally, I suppose, in many of your public proceedings the same thing is bound to happen. [4] Shall we then make a law that hereafter neither Council nor Assembly shall be permitted to deliberate or to vote on any subject? Not so, in my opinion; for we ought not to be deprived of our rights, where we have been misled; we ought to be instructed how to avoid such mistakes, and we ought to make a law, not to strip us of our own authority, but to punish those who mislead us. [5]

Now if, putting these considerations aside, you would examine the real problem, whether it is more advantageous that you should possess the power of bestowing this privilege, even though you are sometimes duped into bestowing it on a scoundrel, or that by being wholly dispossessed of it you should be unable to grant honors even where they are deserved, you would find the former course the more advantageous. And why? Because the result of rewarding too many citizens is to encourage many to do you good service, but the result of rewarding no one, even if deserving, is to discourage emulation in all. [6] There is also this other reason, that those who reward an undeserving individual may be credited with some degree of artlessness,2 but those who never requite their benefactors are charged with baseness. Just so far as it is better to be thought artless than unscrupulous, it is more honorable to repeal this law than to enact it. [7]

Nor again, men of Athens, on reflection does it seem to me reasonable, when finding fault with some on the ground of the rewards they already enjoy, to rob useful citizens of their honors. For if, while these immunities exist, some of the recipients are, as our opponents say, worthless and unprofitable, what result are we to expect when there is no chance whatever of reward for the good citizens? [8]

Then again, you must consider this point, that in accordance with the existing laws of long standing—laws of which Leptines himself cannot deny the soundness—there is an interval of a year between each public service, so that half the time a citizen is immune. And then, when all citizens, even those who have not benefited you in the least, enjoy a half share in that privilege, are we to take away from your real benefactors the addition that we made to it? Surely not; for that would be dishonorable and, in your case, especially unbecoming. [9] When we have a law which forbids cheating in the marketplace, where a falsehood entails no public injury, is it not disgraceful that in public affairs the same state should not abide by the law which it enjoins on private individuals, but should cheat its benefactors, and that although it is itself likely to incur no small penalty? [10] For we must take account not only of loss of money, but of loss of good fame, which you are more anxious to keep than your money—yes, you and your ancestors also. The proof of this is that when they had accumulated vast sums, they spent all for honor, and when reputation was at stake, they never shrank from danger, but even lavished their private fortunes without stint.3 As it stands, then, this law reflects on your city not honor but disgrace, unworthy alike of your ancestors and of yourselves; for Athens is incurring the three worst reproaches—that men should think us envious, faithless, ungrateful. [11]

Next, men of Athens, that it is absolutely contrary to the national character to ratify such a law as this, I will also endeavor to show you briefly by an example of our conduct in the past. The Thirty Tyrants are said to have borrowed money from the Lacedaemonians for use against the patriots in the Piraeus.4 But when unity was restored to the State and those disputes were settled, the Lacedaemonians sent envoys to demand payment. [12] When the question was discussed and some were for ordering the city-party, who were the real borrowers, to repay, while others claimed that the first sign of reconciliation should be the joint settlement of the debt, they say that the people chose to pay their contribution and bear their share of the loss, so that there should be no breach of the agreement. On that occasion, men of Athens, to avoid a breach of faith, you consented to pay money to those who had injured you, but now, when you might without any expense requite your benefactors by repealing this law, will it not be strange if you prefer to break your faith? I for one cannot approve of it. [13]

The instance I have quoted, men of Athens, as well many others, will show what our national character is—truthful, honest, and, where money is concerned, not asking what pays best, but what is the honorable thing to do. But as to the character of the proposer of this law, I have no further knowledge of him, nor do I say or know anything to his prejudice; but if I may judge from his law, I detect a character very far removed from what I have described. [14] I say, then, that it would be more honorable for Leptines to be guided by you in repealing the law than for you to be guided by him in ratifying it, and it would be more profitable for you, as well as for him, that Athens should persuade Leptines to assume a likeness to herself than that she should be persuaded by Leptines to be like him; for even if he is a really good man—and he may be, for aught I know—he cannot excel her in character. [15]

Moreover, gentlemen, I think that you would come to a sounder judgement in this matter if you would observe this further truth, that the present law removes just the one advantage which the rewards of a democracy have over those of other constitutions. For in the material value to the recipients of the rewards bestowed, a tyranny or an oligarchy has an immense advantage in that they can make anyone they choose instantaneously rich; but in honor and in security of possession you will find that the gifts of a democracy are to be preferred. [16] For not the receipt of a flatterer's pay with its taint of shame, but to be honored, where speech is free, as one who is deemed worthy—that is true glory; and to enjoy the willing admiration of equals seems better than to accept the richest gift from a tyrant's hand. For in those communities the fear of tomorrow outweighs the favor of today, but in your city a man could keep what he won without fear of loss, at any rate in time past. [17] So the law which destroys confidence in the rewards takes away the one thing that gives a higher value to rewards which you bestow. And indeed, if from any one of all known forms of government you take away the right of loyal supporters of the constitution to receive favors, you will find that you have deprived those governments of no unimportant safeguard. [18]

Now perhaps Leptines will try to divert your attention from these points and assert that at present the public services fall upon the poor, but that under his law they will be performed by the wealthiest class. At first hearing, the plea seems to have some weight; but examine it strictly and the fallacy will be exposed. For there are, as you know, among us some services that fall upon resident aliens and others that fall upon citizens, and the exemption, which Leptines would remove, has been granted in the case of both. For from special contributions for war or for national defence and also from the equipment of war-galleys, rightly and justly in accordance with earlier laws, no one is exempt, not even the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton, whom Leptines has specially named. [19] Let us then see what additional contributors he provides to perform those public services, and how many will be passed over if we turn a deaf ear to him. Now the richest citizens, when equipping a war-galley, are already exempt from the ordinary services, while those whose wealth is insufficient necessarily enjoy exemption and are out of the reach of this tax; so his law will not provide us with another contributor from either of these classes. [20] He may reply that he recruits many aliens for the services. But if he can point to five such, I will eat my words. I will assume, then, that this is not the case, but that if the law stands, both the number of aliens performing public services will be greater, and of the citizens none will be excused because he is equipping a war-galley. Now let us consider what the State will gain if all these perform the services, for it will prove to be no compensation at all for the disgrace it will entail. [21] Put it thus. Of aliens there are exempt—I will assume ten. And by Heaven, as I said before, I do not believe there are five. Moreover of the citizens there are not half a dozen. Sixteen of both, then. Let us call it twenty, or thirty, if you like. How many, pray, are there that annually perform the regularly recurring services—chorus-masters, presidents of gymnasia, and public hosts? Perhaps sixty in all, or a trifle more. [22] In order, then, that we may have thirty more men for the public services, spread over the whole period,5 is it worth our while to excite the distrust of all? But surely we must know this, that as long as Athens stands, there will be plenty of citizens, without fail, to perform the services, but not a soul will want to do us a good turn, if he sees our previous benefactors wronged. [23] So far, so good. But if there were the most serious shortage of possible contributors, in Heaven's name, which would you prefer—to organize syndicates for those services as for the equipment of war-vessels, or to rob your benefactors of what you have given them? I think I should prefer the syndicates. By the present law, while each of these thirty is performing a public service, Leptines affords a respite for the others, and that is all; after that, each of them will have to spend as much as before; but in the other case, each would pay a small contribution, proportioned to his means, and none would be hardly treated, even if his property were quite small. [24]

Now some of our opponents, men of Athens, are so illogical that they make no attempt to answer these arguments, but take a different line, saying for instance how monstrous it is that on the one hand there is nothing left in the Exchequer, but on the other hand private individuals will grow wealthy because they have secured an immunity. But it is not fair to combine both these statements. For if a man has great wealth without doing you any wrong, there is surely no need to look on him with envy; but if they are prepared to say that he has stolen it or gained it in some other disreputable way, there are laws by which he can be suitably punished. But as long as they do not prosecute him, neither have they any right to make this allegation. [25] Further, with regard to the alleged poverty of the Exchequer, you must reflect that you will not be a whit the better off if you abolish these exemptions, for the expenditure on these services has nothing to do with the revenues or the surplus of the State. And apart from all this, of two possible advantages—wealth and credit with the rest of the world—our State today enjoys the latter. But if anyone imagines that because we have no money we need not also keep our honor bright, his judgement is at fault. For myself indeed, I pray Heaven that, if so it may be, our wealth also may increase, but if not, then at least that our reputation for good faith and constancy may remain sure. [26]

Now take the large fortunes which, according to our opponents, some citizens will amass if relieved of the services, but which I will show to be available for your needs. For of course you are aware that no one is exempt from the equipment of war-galleys or from the special contributions for war. So this person, whoever he may be, who owns much, contributes much to those objects; there is no getting out of it. And again, all would agree that the resources which the State can rely on for these objects should be as great as possible. For money spent by the chorus-masters affords those of us who are in the theater gratification for a fraction of a day; but money lavished on equipment for war gives security to the whole city for all time. [27] Therefore whatever you remit with one hand, you receive with the other; and you grant as an honor exemptions which even those who receive them cannot enjoy, if they have wealth sufficient for the equipment of a war-vessel. But although I suppose you all know that no one is exempt from the latter service, the clerk shall read to you the actual statute. Take the law about the trierarchy and read this clause only.“Law

[And none shall be exempt from the trierarchy except the nine archons.]” [28]

You see, Athenians, how explicitly the law lays down that none shall be exempt from the equipment of a war-galley except the nine archons. So those whose wealth falls short of the qualification for that service will contribute by groups to the special war-tax, but those who reach that qualification will be available both for the war-galleys and for the war-tax. Then what relief does your law, Leptines, afford to the main body of citizens, if from one or two tribes it provides a single contributor, who, having relieved one other citizen on one occasion, will thereafter be exempt?6 I can see no relief. On the other hand it taints the honor and credit of the whole State. Therefore, when the damage it will inflict is greater than the benefit it confers, ought it not to be repealed by this court? Such would be my verdict. [29]

My next point is this, gentlemen of the jury. The law of Leptines explicitly states that “none, whether citizen or enfranchised alien or foreigner, shall be exempt,” and does not specify from what, whether from the public service or from any other charge, but simply that “none shall be exempt except the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton.” The word “none” must be taken to include all classes, and foreigner is not further defined as resident at Athens. [30] It follows that Leptines deprives Leucon,7 the ruler of the Bosporus, and his children of the reward which you bestowed on them. For, of course, Leucon is a foreigner by birth, though by adoption an Athenian citizen, but on neither ground can he claim exemption, if this law stands. And yet, while of our other benefactors each has made himself useful to us on one occasion, Leucon will be found on reflection to be a perpetual benefactor, and that in a matter especially vital to our city. [31] For you are aware that we consume more imported corn than any other nation. Now the corn that comes to our ports from the Black Sea is equal to the whole amount from all other places of export. And this is not surprising; for not only is that district most productive of corn, but also Leucon, who controls the trade, has granted exemption from dues to merchants conveying corn to Athens, and he proclaims that those bound for your port shall have priority of lading. For Leucon, enjoying exemption for himself and his children, has granted exemption to every one of you. [32] See what this amounts to. He exacts a toll of one-thirtieth from exporters of corn from his country. Now from the Bosporus there come to Athens about four hundred thousand bushels; the figures can be checked by the books of the grain commissioners. So for each three hundred thousand bushels he makes us a present of ten thousand bushels, and for the remaining hundred thousand a present of roughly three thousand.8 [33] Now, so little danger is there of his depriving our state of this gift, that he has opened another depot at Theudosia, which our merchants say is not at all inferior to the Bosporus,9 and there, too, he has granted us the same exemption. I omit much that might be said about the other benefits conferred upon you by this prince and also by his ancestors, but the year before last, when there was a universal shortage of grain, he not only sent enough for your needs, but such a quantity in addition that Callisthenes had a surplus of fifteen talents of silver to dispose of.10 [34] What, then, men of Athens, do you expect of this man, who has proved himself such a friend to you, if he learns that you have deprived him by law of his immunity, and have made it illegal to bestow it hereafter, even if you change your minds? Are you not aware that this same law, if ratified, will take away the immunity, not only from Leucon, but from those of you who import corn from his country?11 [35] For surely no one dreams that he will tolerate the cancelling of your gifts to him, and let his own gifts to you stand good. So to the many disadvantages that this law will obviously entail upon you, may be added the immediate loss of part of your resources. In view of this, are you still considering whether you ought to erase it from the statute-book? Have you not made up your minds long ago? Take and read them the decrees touching Leucon. “ Decrees ” [36]

How reasonable and just was the immunity which Leucon has obtained from you, these decrees have informed you, gentlemen of the jury. Copies of all these decrees on stone were set up by you and by Leucon in the Bosporus, in the Piraeus, and at Hierum.12 Just reflect to what depths of meanness you are dragged by this law, which makes the nation less trustworthy than an individual. [37] For you must not imagine that the pillars standing there are anything else than the covenants of all that you have received or granted; and it will be made clear that Leucon observes them and is always eager to benefit you, but that you have repudiated them while they still stand; and that is a far worse offence than to pull them down13; for when men wish to traduce our city, there will stand the pillars to witness to the truth of their words. [38] Now mark! Suppose Leucon sends and asks us on what charge or for what fault we have taken away his immunity; what, in the name of wonder, shall we say, or in what terms will the proposer of your reply draft it? He will say, I suppose, that some of those who obtained immunity did not deserve it! [39] If, then, Leucon replies to this, “Yes; I dare say some of the Athenians are scoundrels, but I have not made that a reason for robbing the good citizens; on the contrary, because I think the Athenians, as a nation, are good men, I allow them all a share”; will there not be more fairness in his words than in ours? To me, at least, it seems so. For it is the custom of all nations, for the sake of their benefactors, rather to include some bad men in their rewards, than to make the worthless men an excuse for withholding their rewards from those who are acknowledged to merit them. [40] Nay more, upon consideration, I cannot even see why anyone should not, if he wishes, challenge Leucon to an exchange of property.14 For there is always property of his at Athens, and by this law, if anyone tries to lay hands on it Leucon will either forfeit it or be compelled to perform public service. And it is not the question of expense that will trouble him most, but the reflection that you have robbed him of his reward. [41]

Again then, Athenians, it is not merely necessary to consider how Leucon may be spared injustice—a man whose anxiety about his privilege would arise from a sense of honor rather than from his needs—but we must also consider whether another man, who did you service when he was prosperous, may not find that the exemption he received from you then is a matter of necessity to him now. To whom, then, do I refer? To Epicerdes of Cyrene, than whom no recipient of this honor ever deserved it better, not because his gifts were great or extraordinary, but because they came at a time when we were hard put to it to find, even among those whom we had benefited, anyone willing to remember our benefactions. [42] For Epicerdes, as this decree then passed in his honor declares, gave a hundred minae to our fellow-countrymen at that time prisoners in Sicily under such distressing circumstances,15 and thus he became the chief instrument in saving them from all perishing of hunger. Afterwards, when you had rewarded him with immunity, seeing that in the war16 just before the rule of the Thirty the people were straitened for want of funds, he gave them a talent as a freewill offering. [43] In the name of Zeus and all the gods, men of Athens, ask yourselves how a man could more clearly show his goodwill towards you, or how he could be less deserving of an ill return than if, being first an eye-witness of that national disaster, he should prefer the beaten side and such favors as they might some day bestow, rather than the victors among whom he found himself in their hour of triumph; or if next, seeing a further need arise, he should be found once more a donor, anxious not to hoard his own private means, but to ensure that no cause of yours should fall short of success, so far as in him lay. [44] Yet this man, who in actual deed on those momentous occasions shared his wealth with the people, but enjoyed only a nominal and honorary immunity, will be robbed by you, not of his immunity, for it is evident that he did not use it when he had it, but of his trust in you; and what could be more discreditable than that? Now you shall hear the very words of the decree then passed in his honor. And observe, men of Athens, how many decrees this law annuls, how many individuals it wrongs, and what occasions they chose for making themselves serviceable to you; for you will find that the law wrongs just the men who least deserve it. Read. “ Decree ” [45]

Gentlemen of the jury, you have heard from the decrees what were the services for which Epicerdes obtained his immunity. Do not stop to ask whether he gave you a hundred minae and a talent as well—for I expect that even those who received it were not struck by the amount of his gift—but think of his zeal, his spontaneous act, and the occasion that he chose. [46] For recompense is due to all alike who are forward to do us service, but in a special degree to those who are friends in time of need; and such an one clearly was Epicerdes. Are we not then ashamed, men of Athens, if it appears that we have retained no memory of these services and have robbed of their reward the sons of such a benefactor, though we can charge them with no fault? [47] For if those who were then saved by him and who bestowed on him this immunity were a different generation from you who now propose to take it away, yet that does not remove the infamy of the act; nay, it is just there that its atrocity lies. For if those who knew and experienced his generosity felt that it merited this return, while we, who have only heard the story told, shall revoke the gift as undeserved, shall we not be guilty of more than ordinary atrocity? [48] Now my plea is the same in this case as for those who overthrew the Four Hundred, and for those who proved helpful to the democrats in exile; for I think they would all be atrociously treated if any portion of the rewards then decreed to them should be revoked. [49]

Now if any of you is persuaded that our city is far from needing such a benefactor today, let him pray Heaven it may be so, and I will join in that prayer; but let him also reflect, first, that he is going to give his vote on a law under which, if unrepealed, he will have to live, and secondly, that bad laws can injure even communities which fancy they are dwelling in security. For there would have been no changes for better or for worse in the fortunes of states, had it not been that a nation in peril is guided to safety by good policy, good laws, and good citizens and by the observance of order in all things, but in the case of a nation that seems established in perfect prosperity, all these things, being neglected, slip away from it little by little. [50] For most men achieve prosperity by planning soundly and by despising nothing; but they do not take the trouble to guard it by the same means. Let not this mistake be yours today, and do not think that you ought to ratify a law which will taint the reputation of our city in the time of her prosperity and, if ever a crisis comes, will leave her destitute of those who would be willing to do her service. [51]

Again, Athenians, it is not only the men who, in a private capacity, chose to benefit you and to offer their services on those important occasions that have been described a little while ago by Phormio and mentioned by me just now—it is not only these men that you must be careful not to wrong, but many others also, who drew whole states, their own native cities, into alliance with us in the war against the Lacedaemonians,17 thus furthering by word and deed the interests of your city; [52] and some of these men through their goodwill to you have no longer a fatherland. The first example that I propose to examine is that of the Corinthian exiles. And here I am obliged to mention facts which I myself have only heard from the lips of the older among you.18 Some occasions, then, on which they made themselves useful to us, I will pass over; but when the great battle against the Lacedaemonians was fought near Corinth, and when the party in that city determined after the battle not to admit our soldiers within their walls, but to send heralds to greet the Lacedaemonians, [53] these men, though they saw that Athens had lost the day and that our enemies were holding the pass,19 refused to betray us or to take steps for their own individual safety, but with the whole armed force of the Peloponnese close upon them, they opened their gates to us in defiance of the majority and chose along with you, who had been engaged in the battle, to suffer whatever might betide, rather than without you to enjoy a safety that involved no danger; and so they admitted the troops and succeeded in saving both you and your allies. [54] And afterwards, when peace, the peace of Antalcidas,20 was concluded with the Lacedaemonians, the latter requited their acts with exile. But you, in giving them shelter, acted like good men and true; for you decreed them all that they needed. Yet now are we actually debating whether those decrees should remain valid? No! The bare statement is a disgrace, if it should be reported that Athenians are debating whether they ought to let their benefactors keep what they have given them; for that question ought to have been debated, yes, and decided, long ago.

Read this decree also to the court.“ Decree ” [55]

Such, gentlemen of the jury, is the decree passed by you in favor of the Corinthians who were exiled on your account. But think! If one who knew those critical times—whether as an eye-witness or hearing the story from one who knew—if he should hear this law which revokes the gifts that were then bestowed, how he would denounce the baseness of us who made the law—and who were so generous and obliging when our need was pressing, but when we have satisfied all our hopes, are so thankless and churlish that we have robbed men of the rewards they enjoy, and have made a law that hereafter no, such rewards should be bestowed! [56] “Oh but,” we shall be told, “some of those who received these rewards did not deserve them”; for that thought will run through all their argument. In that case shall we confess that we do not know that a man's deserts should be examined at the time of the reward, and not an indefinitely long time after? For to give no reward in the first instance is an exercise of judgement; to take it away when given shows a grudging spirit, and you must not seem to have been prompted by that. [57] Furthermore, on the question of merit I shall not shrink from saying this to you: I for one do not think that merit should be examined by the State in the same way as by an individual, because the examination is not concerned with the same questions. For in private life each of us tries to find who is worthy, say, to marry into our family, or something of that sort, and such questions are determined by convention and opinion; but in public affairs the State and the people try to find who is their benefactor and savior, and that question you will find is best decided by reference not to birth or opinion, but to plain fact. So, whenever we want to receive benefits, are we to allow anyone to confer them, but when we have received them, then shall we scrutinize the merits of the benefactor? That will be a topsy-turvy policy. [58]

But, it may be said, the only sufferers will be those I have mentioned, and all my remarks apply to them alone. That is quite untrue. But I could not even attempt to examine all the instances of men who have benefited you, but who by this law, if it is not repealed, will be robbed of their rewards; by calling your attention to one or two further decrees, I absolve myself from discussing these cases. [59] In the first place, then, will you not wrong the Thasian supporters of Ecphantus, if you revoke their immunity—I mean the men who handed over Thasos to you by expelling the armed garrison of the Lacedaemonians and admitting Thrasybulus,21 and thus, by bringing their own country on to your side, were the means of winning for you the alliance of the district bordering on Thrace? [60] In the second place, will you not wrong Archebius and Heraclides, who by putting Byzantium into the hands of Thrasybulus made you masters of the Hellespont, so that you farmed out the toll of ten per cent,22 and thus being well furnished with money forced the Lacedaemonians to conclude a peace favorable to you?23 When subsequently they were banished, you, Athenians, passed what I think was a very proper decree in favor of men exiled through devotion to your interests, conferring on them the title of Friends of the State24 and Benefactors, together with immunity from all taxes. For your sakes they were in exile, from you they received a just recompense; and are we now to let them be robbed of this, though we can charge them with no fault? But that would be scandalous. [61] You will grasp the situation best if you will reason it out for yourselves in this way. Suppose at the present day a party of those in power at Pydna or Potidaea or any of those other places which are subject to Philip and hostile to you— [62] just as Thasos and Byzantium then were friendly to the Lacedaemonians and estranged from you—promised to hand them over to you in return for the same rewards that you gave to Ecphantus of Thasos and Archebius of Byzantium; and suppose some of these gentlemen here objected to their proposal on the ground that it would be monstrous if a select few of the resident aliens were to escape the public services; how would you deal with their arguments? Is it not certain that you would refuse to listen to such malignant pettifoggers? If so, then it is disgraceful that you should consider such an objection malignant when you are going to receive a benefit, but should lend an ear to it when it is proposed to revoke your gifts to former benefactors. Now let us pass to another argument. [63] The men who betrayed Pydna and the other places to Philip—what prompted them to injure us? Is it not obvious to everyone that it was the reward which they calculated on receiving from Philip for their services? Which, then, ought you to have chosen to do, Leptines? To induce our enemies, if you can, to give up honoring those who become their benefactors on the strength of injuries done to us, or to impose a law on us which takes away some part of the rewards which our own benefactors are enjoying? I fancy the former. But that I may not wander from the present point, take and read the decrees passed in honor of the Thasians and the Byzantines.“ Decrees ” [64]

You have heard the decrees, gentlemen of the jury. Perhaps some of the men named are no longer alive. But their deeds survive, since they were done once for all. It is fitting, therefore, to allow these inscriptions to hold good for all time, that as long as any of the men are alive, they may suffer no wrong at your hands, and when they die, those inscriptions may be a memorial of our national character, and may stand as proofs to all who wish to do us service, declaring how many benefactors our city has benefited in return. [65] Nor indeed would I have you forget this, men of Athens, that it is a most disgraceful thing to show and proclaim to all mankind that the misfortunes which these men endured for your sake have been confirmed to them for ever, while the grants which they received from you in recompense have been even now rescinded. [66] For it would have been far more fitting to mitigate their distress by letting them keep your gifts, than, while the distress remains, to rob them of your bounty. In Heaven's name, I ask you, who is there that will choose to do you service with the prospect of instant punishment by your enemies, if he fails, and of a dubious gratitude from you, if he succeeds? [67]

Now I should be greatly vexed, gentlemen of the jury, if I thought that the only real charge I was bringing against the law was its depriving many of our alien benefactors of the immunity, but should seem unable to point to any deserving recipient of the honor among our own fellow-countrymen. For my prayer would ever be that Athens may abound in all blessings, but especially that the best men and the most numerous benefactors of this city may be her own citizens. [68] First of all, then, in the case of Conon, ask yourselves whether dissatisfaction with the man or his performances justifies the cancelling of the gifts conferred on him. For, as some of you who are his contemporaries can attest, it was just after the return of the exiled democrats from the Piraeus,25 when our city was so weak that she had not a single ship, and Conon, who was a general in the Persian service and received no prompting whatever from you, defeated the Lacedaemonians at sea and taught the former dictators of Greece to show you deference; he cleared the islands of their military governors, and coming here he restored our Long Walls26; and he was the first to make the hegemony of Greece once more the subject of dispute between Athens and Sparta. [69] For, indeed, he has the unique distinction of being thus mentioned in his inscription; “Whereas Conon,” it runs, “freed the allies of Athens.” That inscription, gentlemen of the jury, is his glory in your estimation, but it is yours in the estimation of all Greece. For whatever boon any one of us confers on the other states, the credit of it is reaped by the fame of our city. [70] Therefore his contemporaries not only granted him immunity, but also set up his statue in bronze—the first man so honored since Harmodius and Aristogiton. For they felt that he too, in breaking up the empire of the Lacedaemonians, had ended no insignificant tyranny. In order, then, that you may give a closer attention to my words, the clerk shall read the actual decrees which you then passed in favor of Conon. Read them.“ Decrees ” [71]

It was not, then, only by you, Athenians, that Conon was honored for the services that I have described, but by many others, who rightly felt bound to show gratitude for the benefits they had received. And so it is to your dishonor, men of Athens, that in other states his rewards hold good, but of your rewards alone he is to lose this part. [72] Neither is this creditable—to honor him when living, with all the distinctions that have been recited to you, but when he is dead to take back some part of your former gifts. For many of his achievements, men of Athens, deserve praise, and all of them make it improper to revoke the gifts they earned for him, but the noblest deed of all was his restoration of the Long Walls. [73] You will realize this if you compare the way in which Themistocles, the most famous man of his age, accomplished the same result. Now history tells us that Themistocles bade his countrymen get on with the building and detain anyone who came from Sparta, while he went off himself on an embassy to the Lacedaemonians; and while negotiations went on there and the news kept coming that the Athenians were fortifying, he denied it and told them to send envoys to see for themselves, and when these envoys did not return, he urged them to send more. Indeed, I expect you have all heard the story of how he hoodwinked them. [74] Now I assert—and I earnestly appeal to you, Athenians, not to take offence at what is coming, but to consider whether it is true—I assert that in proportion as openness is better than secrecy, and it is more honorable to gain one's end by victory than by trickery, so Conon deserves more credit than Themistocles for building the walls. For the latter achieved it by evading those who would have prevented it, but the former by beating them in battle. Therefore it is not right that so great a man should be wronged by you, or should gain less than those orators who will try to prove that you ought to deduct something from what was bestowed on him. [75]

Very well. But, they will say, we may let the son of Chabrias be robbed of the immunity which his father justly received from you and bequeathed to him. But I am sure there is not a single right-minded man who would approve of that. Now, perhaps you know, even without any words from me, that Chabrias was a man of high character; yet there is no harm if I too recall briefly his achievements. [76] How skilfully, as your commander, he drew up your ranks at Thebes27 to face the whole power of the Peloponnese, how he slew Gorgopas in Aegina, what trophies he set up in Cyprus and afterwards in Egypt, how he visited, I might almost say, every land, yet nowhere disgraced our city's name or his own—of all these exploits it is by no means easy to speak adequately, and it would be a great shame if my words should make them fall below the estimate of him which each one of you has formed in his own mind. But of some, which I think I could never belittle in describing them, I will try to remind you. [77] Now, he beat the Lacedaemonians in a sea-fight28 and took forty-nine warships; he captured most of the islands near and handed them over to you, turning their previous enmity into friendship; he brought to Athens three thousand captives, and paid into the treasury more than a hundred and ten talents taken from the enemy. And in all these facts some of the oldest among you can bear me out. But in addition, he captured more than twenty warships, one or two at a time, and brought them all into your harbors. [78] To sum up; he alone of all our generals never lost a city, a fort, a ship, or a man, as long as he led you; and none of your enemies can boast a single trophy won from you and him, while you possess many won from many enemies while he was your general. But for fear lest my speech should omit any of his exploits, the clerk shall read to you an inventory of all the ships he took and where he took each, the number of cities and the amount of treasure captured, and the place where he set up each trophy. Read.“ Deeds of Chabrias ” [79]

Does it seem to any of you, gentlemen of the jury, that this man, who captured so many cities and ships from your enemies by his victories on sea, and who was the source of so much honor, but never of disgrace, to your city, deserves to be deprived of the immunity which he obtained at your hands and bequeathed to his son? I cannot believe it, for it is out of all reason. Had he lost a single city or as few as ten ships, Leptines and his supporters would have impeached him for high treason, and if he had been convicted, he would have been a ruined man for ever. [80] But since, on the contrary, he took seventeen cities, and captured seventy ships and three thousand prisoners, and paid into the treasury a hundred and ten talents, and set up so many trophies, in that case shall not his rewards for these services stand good? Moreover, Athenians, it will be seen that Chabrias during his lifetime did everything in your behalf, and that he met death itself in no other service; so that for this, as well as for all that he did in his life, you ought to show yourselves generously disposed to his son. [81] Then this too, Athenians, demands your consideration—that we must not prove less generous than the Chians in our treatment of our benefactors. For if they, against whom Chabrias carried arms as an enemy, have not now revoked any of their former gifts, but have made ancient services outweigh recent offences, while you, in whose cause he marched against them to his death, so far from honoring him the more on that account, are even going to rob him of part of the reward of his past services, how will you escape the ignominy that you deserve? [82]

Moreover, should the son be robbed of part of his reward, his treatment would be undeserved in view of the fact that no man's child was ever orphaned through the fault of Chabrias, though he frequently led you in war, but the boy himself has grown up an orphan, just because of his father's devotion to your cause. For to me he seems truly to have been such a staunch patriot, that though reputed to be the most cautious of commanders, as indeed he was, it was for your sake that he displayed that quality whenever he led you, but for his own sake, when he found himself assigned to the post of danger, he forgot all his caution and preferred to lay down his life rather than tarnish the honors that you had bestowed. [83] After that, are we to rob the son of those honors which inspired the father to conquer or to die? And what shall we say, men of Athens, when the trophies that he set up as general in your name stand plain for all men to see, but a part of the reward for those trophies is found to have been filched away? Will you not observe, men of Athens, and reflect that today we are not judging the law, to see whether it is suitable or not? It is you who are under examination, to see whether you are suitable persons to receive benefits in the future or whether you are not. [84]

Turn now to the decree passed in honor of Chabrias. Just look and see; it must be somewhere there.29

There is one thing further that I want to say about Chabrias. You, Athenians, in honoring Iphicrates, honored not only him but also on his account Strabax and Polystratus; and again, when giving your reward to Timotheus, you also for his sake rewarded Clearchus and some others with the citizenship30; [85] but in the case of Chabrias your honors were for him alone. Now, if at the time when he was receiving his reward, he had claimed that as you had rewarded others for the sake of Iphicrates and Timotheus, so for his sake you should reward some of those men who have actually received the immunity, but to whom our opponents object so strongly that they want all alike to be deprived of it, would you not have granted him that boon? I cannot doubt it. [86] For his sake you would have rewarded them then; yet now, on their account, will you take away the immunity from Chabrias himself? Why, that is absurd! For it is inconsistent to seem so generous, when the benefits are recent, that you honor not the benefactors only but their friends as well, but, when a short time has elapsed, to take away even the rewards that you have given to the benefactors.31“ Decrees on the Honors of Chabrias ” [87]

So these whose names you have heard, as well as many others, are the men whom you will injure if you do not repeal the law. Just reflect and ponder in your own minds, if any of these men now passed away could somehow come to know of the present proceedings, what just ground they would have for indignation! For if of the deeds that each wrought for your advantage there is to be a judgement based on words, if actions nobly performed by them, unless nobly avowed by us in speech, have been wrought in vain for all their toil, are they not suffering a terrible wrong? [88]

Now, to satisfy you, Athenians, that every argument that we submit to you is based on perfectly just grounds, and that not a single argument is intended to mislead and deceive you, the clerk shall read the law drafted and proposed by us to take the place of the present one, which we contend is mischievous. For our law will show you that we take some care to ensure that you shall be saved from the appearance of a dishonorable act; that if anyone objects to one of the recipients, he can deprive him of his gift, if the objection is sound, after trial in your courts; and also that those whose claim to the gifts none could dispute shall keep them. [89] And in all this there is nothing new, no innovation of our own; but the old law, transgressed by Leptines, lays down this procedure in legislation, that if a man disapproves of an existing law, he shall bring an indictment against it, but shall himself introduce an alternative, such as he proposes to enact after repeal of the other, and that you, after hearing arguments, shall choose the better law. [90] For Solon, who imposed this method, did not think it right that while the junior archons, who are appointed by lot to administer the laws, undergo two scrutinies32 before entering on office, one in the Council and a second in the law-courts before you, the laws themselves, which regulate their official acts and all other civic duties, should be passed at haphazard to meet some emergency, and should be at once valid without passing a scrutiny. [91] For in those days, indeed, while they legislated in that way, they kept to the existing laws and were not always proposing new ones; but ever since certain statesmen rose to power and, as I am informed, contrived to get into their own hands the right to initiate legislation at any time and in any way they wished, there are so many contradictory statutes that for a long time you have had to appoint a commission to sort out the contradictory ones; [92] yet in spite of this the business never comes to an end. Our laws are no better than so many decrees; nay, you will find that the laws which have to be observed in drafting the decrees are later33 than the decrees themselves. Not to be content, then, with a bare assertion, but to show you the actual law to which I refer, please take and read the law constituting the original legislative commission. “ Law ” [93]

You understand, Athenians, the beauty of Solon's directions for legislating. The first stage is in your courts, before men under oath, where all other ratifications are made; the next is the repeal of the contradictory laws, so that there may be only one law dealing with each subject, and that the plain citizen may not be puzzled by such contradictions and be at a disadvantage compared with those who are acquainted with the whole body of law, but that all may have the same ordinances before them, simple and clear to read and understand. [94] Moreover, before these proceedings, Solon ordered that the laws should be exposed before the statues of the eponymous heroes34 and handed in to the town-clerk to recite them at the meetings of the Assembly, so that each of you may hear them more than once and digest them at leisure, and if they are just and expedient, may add them to the statute-book. Now, numerous as those enactments are, Leptines yonder has observed not one of them, for, if he had, I do not think that you would ever have consented to pass his law. We on the other hand, Athenians, have observed them all, and we are submitting a much better and more equitable law than his. You will realize that when you hear it. [95] Take and read first of all the clauses of his law which we have indicted, and next the clauses we propose to substitute for them. Read.“ Law 35 ”

These are the parts of the law of Leptines which we arraign as unsatisfactory. Next in order read our proposed amendments. Pray attend, gentlemen of the jury, to these as they are recited. Read.“ Law ” [96]

Stop there. The laws now in force contain this provision—a capital one, men of Athens, and unambiguous—that “all rewards granted by the people shall be valid.” Equitable too, by all the powers! So Leptines should not have proposed his own law until he had indicted and repealed this. As it is, neglecting proof of his own violation of the law, he nevertheless proceeded to legislate, in face of the fact that another law proclaims his law indictable for this very offence, namely, for contradicting previous legislation. Here is the very law in question.“ Law ” [97]

Men of Athens, is not the provision that “all rewards granted by the people shall be valid” contradicted by the clause that “no one shall be immune,” no one, that is, of those to whom the people has granted immunity? That is plain enough, at any rate. But it is not so in the alternative law which my friend36 here proposes, and which confirms what you have granted, and provides a fair ground of action against those who have imposed upon you, or have subsequently injured you, or are generally undeserving; so that you will thus prevent anyone you please from retaining his grant. Read the law.“ Law ” [98]

You hear the law, Athenians, and you understand that it enables the deserving to retain their rewards, and those who are judged otherwise to be deprived of any privilege they have unjustly secured; for the future everything is left in your hands, as is right, to grant or to withhold. Now I do not think that Leptines will deny that this law is sound and just, or, if he does, that he will be able to prove it. But perhaps he will try to lead you astray by repeating what he said before the junior archons.37 For he alleged that the publication of this amended law was a mere trick, and that should his own law be repealed, this one would never be passed. [99] Now, to avoid dispute, I will not press the point that the old law of Solon, in accordance with which the junior archons have notified these amendments to you, clearly enjoins that if the law of Leptines is repealed by your vote, the alternative law shall be valid.38 I will pass to another point. Leptines, in saying this, obviously admits that our law is better and fairer than his own, but bases his argument on the way in which it is to be passed. [100] Now, in the first place, there are many ways open to him, if he wishes, of compelling the amender to introduce his own law. In the next place, Phormio and myself and anyone else he likes to name are prepared to guarantee that we will introduce it. You know there is a law making death the penalty for anyone who breaks his promise to the Assembly or one of the Councils or law-courts. You have our guarantee, our promise. Let the archons record it, and let the matter rest in their hands. [101] Neither do anything that is unworthy of this court, nor, if a worthless person is found among those who enjoy the grant, let him keep it; only let each case be judged on its merits. But if Leptines shall say that that is all talk and humbug, this at any rate is not mere talk; let him bring in the amended law himself and cease to say that we will not do so. It is surely a greater honor to propose the law, stamped with your approval,39 than this of his own devising. [102]

It seems to me, Athenians, that Leptines—and pray, be not angry,40 for I am not going to say anything offensive about you—Leptines has either never read Solon's laws or else does not understand them. For if Solon made a law that every man could grant his property to whomsoever he pleased, in default of legitimate offspring, not with the object of depriving the next of kin of their rights of consanguinity, but that by making the prize open to all he might excite a rivalry in doing good one to another; [103] and if you, on the contrary, have proposed a law that the people shall not be permitted to bestow on any man any part of what is their own, how can you be said to have read or understood the laws of Solon? You make the nation barren of would-be patriots by proclaiming unmistakably that those who benefit us shall gain nothing by it. [104] Again, there is another excellent law of Solon, forbidding a man to speak ill of the dead, even if he is himself defamed by the dead man's children. You do not speak ill of our departed benefactors, Leptines; you do ill to them, when you blame one41 and assert that another is unworthy, though these charges have nothing to do with the dead men.42 Are you not very far from the intention of Solon? [105]

Now I have been quite seriously informed that with regard to the absolute prohibition of all rewards,43 whatever a man's services may be, our opponents are prepared to use some such argument as this. The Lacedaemonians, who are a well-organized state, and the Thebans grant no such reward to any of their citizens, and yet possibly there are some good men among them. In my opinion, men of Athens, all such arguments are provocative, and intended to persuade you to abolish the immunities, but just they are certainly not. For I am quite aware that the Thebans and the Lacedaemonians and ourselves do not observe the same laws and customs, nor the same form of government. [106] For in the first place, if this is their argument, they are about to do exactly what a man cannot do at Sparta—praise the laws of Athens or of any other state; nay, so far from that, he is obliged to praise, as well as do, whatever accords with his native constitution. Then again, though the Lacedaemonians do not hold with these customs, yet there are other honors at Sparta, which our citizens to a man would shrink from introducing here. [107] What, then, are those honors? Not to take each singly, I will describe one which comprises all the rest. Whenever a man for his good conduct is elected to the Senate, or Gerusia, as they call it, he is absolute master of the mass of citizens. For at Sparta the prize of merit is to share with one's peers the supremacy in the State; but with us the people is supreme, and any other form of supremacy is forbidden by imprecations44 and laws and other safeguards, but we have crowns of honor and immunities and free maintenance and similar rewards, which anyone may win, if he is a good citizen. [108] And both these customs are right enough, the one at Sparta and the other here. Why? Because in an oligarchy harmony is attained by the equality of those who control the State, but the freedom of a democracy is guarded by the rivalry with which good citizens compete for the rewards offered by the people. [109]

Again, with regard to the absence of honors at Thebes, I think I can express the truth thus. The Thebans, men of Athens, plume themselves more on brutality and iniquity than you on humanity and love of justice. If a prayer may be allowed, may they never cease to withhold honor and admiration from those who do them service, or to deal with kindred states in the same way （For you remember how they treated Orchomenus.45） And never may you cease to do the opposite, honoring your benefactors and winning your rights from your fellow-citizens by debate and in harmony with the laws! [110] And in general, I think that then only ought you to praise the habits and character of other nations and decry your own, when it is possible to prove that they are more prosperous than you. As long as you （thank Heaven!） are more prosperous than they, in public policy, in internal harmony, and in every other way, why should you belittle your national institutions and imitate theirs? Even if theirs could be proved superior in theory, yet the good fortune that you have enjoyed under your own institutions makes it worth your while to retain them. [111] Besides all this, if I must say what I think is right, I would put it in this way. It is not right, Athenians, to cite the laws of the Lacedaemonians or of the Thebans in order to undermine the laws established here; it is not right that you should want to put a man to death for transplanting to Athens any of the institutions that have made those nations great, and yet lend a willing ear to those who propose to destroy the institutions under which our democracy has flourished. [112]

Then they have another argument ready; that even at Athens in former generations men who had rendered great services met with no recognition of this sort, but were content with an inscription in the Hermes-Portico.46 Perhaps indeed the inscription will be read to you. But in my opinion, Athenians, this argument is in many ways prejudicial to the State, besides being unjust. [113] For if anyone says that even these men deserved no honor, let him say who does deserve it, if there is no one either before or after them. If he shall say “no one,” I should be very sorry for our city, if no one in the course of its history has proved worthy of reward. Again, if while admitting their merit he points out that they got nothing by it, assuredly he accuses the city of ingratitude. But that is not the truth or anything like it; but whenever a man maliciously gives a wrong twist to his arguments, I think they must appear hateful. [114] I, however, will explain the case to you, as truth and justice demand. There were, men of Athens, plenty of zealous citizens in former generations, and our city even then honored its good men; only honors then, like everything else, reflected the temper of the times, just as they now reflect the temper of today. And why do I say this? Because for myself I should be inclined to assert that they did get from the State everything that they wished. [115] What is my evidence? Lysimachus,47 only one of the worthies of that day, received a hundred roods of orchard in Euboea and a hundred of arable land, besides a hundred minas of silver and a pension of four drachmas a day. And the decree in which these gifts are recorded stands in the name of Alcibiades. For then our city was rich in lands and money, though now—she will be rich some day48; for I must put it in that way to avoid anything like obloquy. Yet today who, think you, would not prefer a third of that reward to mere immunity? To prove the truth of my words, please take the decree. “ Decree ” [116]

Now this decree, Athenians, proves that your ancestors, like yourselves, were accustomed to honor good men; if they used different methods from ours today, that is another matter. So even if we should admit that neither Lysimachus nor anyone else gained anything from our ancestors, does that make it any fairer in us to rob the men whom we have just rewarded? [117] For there is nothing outrageous in withholding what one never dreamed of giving; but it is an outrage to give and afterwards take back one's gift, with no fault alleged. Prove to me that our ancestors ever took back the gifts they had bestowed, and you too have my leave to do the same, though the disgrace remains none the less; but if no one can cite an instance from the whole course of our history, why is such a precedent to be set in our generation? [118]

Again, men of Athens, you must also consider well and carefully the fact that you have come into court today, sworn to give your verdict according to the laws, not of Sparta or Thebes, nor those of our earliest ancestors, but those under which immunities were granted to the men whom Leptines is now trying to rob by his law; and where there are no statutes to guide you, you are sworn to decide according to the best of your judgement. So far, so good. Then you must apply these principles to the law as a whole. [119] Is it right, Athenians, to honor your benefactors? It is. Well then, is it right to allow a man to keep what has once been given him? It is. Then, to observe your oaths, act on that principle yourselves; resent the imputation that your ancestors acted otherwise; and as for those who cite such instances, alleging that your ancestors rewarded no man for great benefits received, look upon them as both knaves and dullards—knaves, because they falsely charge your ancestors with ingratitude; fools, because they do not see that were the charge proved to the hilt, it would better become them to deny than to repeat it. [120]

Now I expect that another argument of Leptines will be that his law does not deprive the recipients of their inscriptions and their free maintenance, nor the State of the right to confer honor on those who deserve it, but that it will still be in your power to set up statues and grant maintenance and anything else you wish, except this one privilege. But with respect to the powers that he will pretend to leave to the State, I have just this to say. As soon as you take away one of the privileges you have already granted, you will shake the credit of all the rest. For how can the grant of a statue or of free maintenance be more indefeasible than that of an immunity, which you will seem to have first given and then taken away? [121] Further, even if this difficulty were not likely to arise, I cannot think that it is well to bring the State into this dilemma, that it must either put all citizens on an equality with its greatest benefactors, or to avoid this must treat some with ingratitude. Now as for great benefactions, it is not well that you should have many opportunities of receiving them, nor is it perhaps easy for an individual to confer them; [122] but the humbler duties to which one can rise in time of peace and in the civil sphere—loyalty, justice, zeal and the like—it is, in my opinion, both well and necessary that they should be rewarded. Grants ought, therefore, to be so apportioned that each man may receive from the people the exact reward that he deserves. [123] And then again, with regard to what he will say about leaving their honors to those who have received them, some would have a perfectly plain and straightforward answer, when they claim their right to all their rewards, because they were granted for the same service, but the others will reply that the man who says that he leaves them anything is mocking them.49 For if a man has been thought to deserve immunity and has received that from you as his sole reward, be he foreigner or citizen, what reward has he left, Leptines, if that is taken from him? None whatever! Then you have no right to rob some because you arraign the worthlessness of the others, or to rob one class of their sole reward because you say that you are going to leave the other class something. [124] To put it plainly, the danger is not that of doing a greater or less injustice to one member of the whole body, but that of rendering precarious the honors with which we reward men's services, nor is immunity the main topic of my speech, but the evil precedent which this law will establish, so that there will be no security for the nation's gifts. [125]

Again, the most unscrupulous argument that they have framed, as they think, to persuade you to withdraw the immunities, is one which I had better explain for fear you should be their innocent dupes. They are going to claim that all such payments are religious dues, and that of course it is monstrous that anyone should be exempt from the dues of religion. For my part, I see no unfairness in such exemption, if the people have bestowed it; the really monstrous thing is the course which they propose, if that is to be their argument. [126] For if by appealing to the name of the gods they try to justify a robbery which they cannot justify otherwise, will not that be most impious and monstrous conduct? In my opinion, whenever a man appeals solemnly to the gods, his conduct ought to be clearly such as would not appear base even if supported only by human authority. Now that there is a difference between exemption from religious duties and exemption from public services, and that the defendants are trying to deceive you by transferring the name of public services to religious acts, I shall adduce Leptines himself as my witness. For the first clause of the law says [127] “Leptines proposed that, to the end that the wealthiest citizens may perform the public services, none shall be immune save and except the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton.” But if immunity from religious duties were the same as immunity from public services, what was the object of that clause? For immunity from religious duties has never been granted even to the persons here named. To prove that this is so, please take and read the copy of the inscription and then the beginning of the law of Leptines.“ Copy of Stela Inscription ” [128]

You hear the copy of the inscription, men of Athens, ordering them to be immune, save from religious duties. Now read the beginning of the law of Leptines.“ Law ”

Good; stop there. After the words “to the end that the wealthiest citizens may perform the public services,” he added “no one shall be immune save and except, the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton.” Why so, if to pay for a religious rite is to perform a public service? For if that is his meaning, his own drafting will be found to contradict the inscription. [129] Now I should like to put a question to Leptines. When you say that the public services come under the head of religious dues, in what, according to you, did the immunity consist, which our ancestors then granted and you now leave untouched? For by the old laws they are not immune from all the special war-taxes or from the equipment of war-galleys; and they enjoy no immunity from the state services, since they are included in the religious duties. [130] And yet the inscription says that they shall be immune. From what? From the tax on resident aliens, since nothing else is left? Of course not. It is from the regularly recurring services, as the inscription shows, as your law further specifies, and as all history witnesses. During all that length of time no tribe has ever ventured to nominate one of these descendants as chorus-master, and no one nominated has ever ventured to challenge them to an exchange of property. If Leptines dares to deny it, you must pay no heed to him. [131]

Again,50 perhaps they will say in their haphazard51 style that some citizens, by claiming to be Megarians and Messenians,52 at once gain immunity, whole crowds at a time, to say nothing of slaves and jailbirds like Lycidas and Dionysius; such are the examples they select. When they hold such language, deal with them thus. Tell them, if they are speaking the truth, to produce the decrees which contain these men's immunity; for no one in your city enjoys immunity unless granted by some decree or law. [132] Many such men, however, have been proclaimed Friends of the State here at the instance of your politicians Lycidas, for example. But it is one thing to be a Friend of the State and another to enjoy immunity. Be not misled by them. Because slaves, like Lycidas and Dionysius and perhaps one other, were made Friends of the State by men who are readily bribed to propose such decrees, they must not try to take away the gifts that you have justly bestowed on men of a different class—mentorious, freeborn, munificent benefactors. [133] On this principle, what a gross insult it would be to Chabrias, if politicians of that stamp, not content with making his slave, Lycidas, a Friend of your State, should make the slave an excuse for taking back rewards conferred on the master, and that on a false plea! For neither Lycidas nor anyone else enjoys immunity as a Friend of the State, unless such immurity has been expressly conferred by the people. The men in question have not received it; I defy the defendants to prove it. If they have the effrontery to assert it, they will be acting dishonorably. [134]

I now come to speak of a matter about which I feel bound, Athenians, to warn you most seriously. For even if one could admit the truth of all that Leptines will say in praise of his law, it would be impossible under any circumstances to wipe out one disgrace which his law, if ratified, will bring upon our city. To what do I refer? To the reputation of having cheated our benefactors. [135] Now I think you would all agree that this is a distinct disgrace; how much worse in you than in others, hear me explain. You have an ancient law, one held in great respect, that if anyone deceives the people by false promises, he shall be brought to trial, and if convicted shall be punished with death. And are you not then ashamed, Athenians, to find yourselves doing the very thing for which you punish other men with death? Nay, but in everything it is right to take heed against doing whatever seems or is dishonorable, but especially in cases where a man is seen to be indignant with others. For there is no room left even for hesitation in avoiding acts which a man's own judgement has already condemned. [136]

Then there is another precaution that you must take—to do nothing as a community which you would shun as individuals. Not a man among you would take away from another his own personal gifts, nor even dream of doing so. Then do not so in your public capacity, but tell the official defenders53 of this law that [137] if they say that any of the recipients of these rewards is undeserving, or holds them under false pretences, or is open to any other charge, they should indict him under the amended law which we are now proposing, either when we have carried it through, as we guarantee and assert that we will, or when they have themselves carried it, that is, as soon as the legislative commission has been appointed.54 But each defender of this law, it seems, has a personal enemy, whether Diophantus or Eubulus or someone else.55 [138] If they hang back and refuse to take this step, then consider, men of Athens, whether it is to your credit that you should be known to have taken away from your benefactors what not one of these men ventures to take from his personal enemy, and that you should pass a law to rob collectively of their rewards men who have served you well and whom no one dreams of indicting, when the handful of unworthy recipients, if there are any, could be dealt with just as effectively, if these men would impeach them and bring them to trial one by one. For it passes my comprehension how the present arrangement can consort with your honor and your dignity. [139]

Again, we must not deviate from this principle, that it was fair to investigate their merits at the time of conferring the reward, when none of these men opposed the vote, but after that to let the reward stand, unless you have received any subsequent wrong at their hands. If they allege that （for they cannot prove it）, it must be shown that the men were punished at the time of the alleged wrongs. But if you ratify this law, though no such wrong was committed, it will seem that you have taken away their reward because you were envious, not because you found them rascals. [140] Every reproach, I might almost say, should be avoided, but this above all, men of Athens. Why? Because in every way envy is the mark of a vicious nature, and the man who is subject to it has no claim whatever to consideration. Moreover there is no reproach more alien to our city than the appearance of envy, averse as she is from all that is disgraceful. [141] See what strong evidence we have of this. In the first place, you alone of all mankind publicly pronounce over your dead funeral orations, in which you extol the deeds of the brave. Such, however, is the practice of men who admire bravery, not of men who envy the honors that bravery wins. Next, you have from time immemorial given the richest rewards to those who win crowns in the athletic games; nor, because such honors are necessarily confined to a few, have you grudged or stinted the honors of the victors on that account. Beside these notable instances, no one, I think, has ever surpassed our State in generosity; such a superabundance of rewards has she heaped on those who serve her well. [142] All these, men of Athens, are proofs of justice, of virtue, of magnanimity. Then do not now destroy the very qualities on which throughout its history our city's reputation is founded; do not, in order that Leptines may vent his spite on men whom he dislikes, rob both yourselves and your city of the fair fame that has been yours in every age; do not suppose that anything else is at stake in this trial save the honor of Athens, whether it is to stand unimpaired as of old, or to pass into neglect and degradation. [143]

But of all the astonishing features of Leptines' law, what astonishes me most is his ignorance of the fact that just as a man who assigns heavy penalties for offences would be unlikely to have contemplated an offence himself, so one who abolishes the rewards for benefactions will not himself be likely to have contemplated a good deed. Now if, as is just possible, he did not know this, he will at once confess it by allowing you to repeal the law which embodies his own error, but if he shows himself obstinate and eager to ratify the law, I for one cannot praise him, though I refrain from censure. [144] Then be not stubborn, Leptines; do not insist on a course which will not add to your own reputation or that of your supporters, especially as this trial no longer endangers you. For owing to the death of the father of Apsephion here, Bathippus, who indicted Leptines when he was still liable, the legal period has elapsed, and now our whole concern is with the law, and its proposer runs no risk.56 [145]

I am told, however, that you assert that three distinct persons indicted you before Apsephion, but dropped the action. Well, if your complaint against them is that they did not endanger you, you must be fonder of danger than other people, but if you bring it forward as a proof of the justice of your proposals, you are doing a very silly thing. For how is your law improved by the fact that one of those who indicted you died before he could come into court, or was induced by you to drop the charge, or even was simply suborned by you? But I am ashamed even to suggest such things. [146]

There are advocates appointed to defend the law, and very able speakers they are; Leodamas of Acharnae, Aristophon of Hazenia, Cephisodotus of Ceramicus, and Dinias of Herchia.57 Let me tell you, then, how you may reasonably retort upon them, and do you consider whether the retort is fair.58 Take Leodamas first. It was he who impeached the grant to Chabrias,59 which included among other things the gift of immunity, and when his case came before you, he lost it. [147] Now the laws forbid the same man to be tried twice on the same issue, be it a civil action, a scrutiny, a contested claim, or anything else of the sort. But quite apart from all this, it would be a most absurd result if on the first occasion the services of Chabrias outweighed the arguments of Leodamas, but when to his services were added those of all the other benefactors, then the combined effect should be weaker than the arguments. [148] To Aristophon I think I could raise many sound objections. He obtained his grant, which included immunity, by your votes. I find no fault with that, for it is right that you should have it in your power to bestow what is yours on anyone you please. But I do suggest that it is unfair that he should raise no objection when he was going to receive it himself, but when it has been given to others, he should take offence and urge you to withdraw it. [149] Moreover it was Aristophon who proposed to pay Gelarchus five talents for sums advanced to the democrats in the Piraeus60; and he was right. Then, my friend, if you recommended the repayment of unattested sums on the ground of service done to the people, you must not advise the revocation of grants for services which the people themselves attested by inscriptions in the temples, and which are indeed known to all men. You must not exhibit yourself as at the same time proposing that debts ought to be paid, and urging that a man should be deprived of what he has won at the hands of the people. [150] Next, I have this much to say to Cephisodotus. As an orator, men of Athens, he is inferior to none. Then it would be far more honorable to use his talents for the chastisement of evil-doers than for the injury of those who deserve well. If he must make enemies, I suggest that they should be those who injure the people, not those who benefit them. [151] Then as to Dinias. Perhaps he will tell you of the war-galleys he has equipped and of his other public services. For my part, though Dinias has proved himself a valuable servant of the public, as I sincerely believe, I would urge him rather to claim from you some reward for himself than to tell you to take back rewards previously given to others; for a man gives a surer proof of excellence by claiming a reward for his own services than by grudging others the rewards they have received for theirs. [152] But the most effective retort is one which applies to all the commissioners alike. Each one of them has often before served as commissioner for some business or other. Now you have a very sound law—not, of course, directed against these men, but framed to prevent any commissioner from using his opportunity for profit or blackmail—that no one, elected by the people, be permitted to serve as commissioner more than once. [153] Surely those who are going to advocate a law and urge its necessity ought to show themselves ready to obey existing laws; otherwise it is absurd for them to defend one law as commissioners and violate another themselves. Take and read the law which I cite.“ Law ”

That, Athenians, is both an old and a sound law,61 which the commissioners will be careful not to violate, if they are wise. [154]

I have still a few things to say to you before I sit down. For you ought, in my opinion, men of Athens, to be anxious for the utmost possible efficiency of our laws, but especially of those on which depends the strength or weakness of our State. And which are they? They are those which assign rewards to those who do good and punishments to those who do evil. For in truth, if from fear of legal penalties all men shunned wrongdoing, and if from ambition for the rewards of good service all chose the path of duty, what prevents our city from being great and all our citizens honest, with not a rogue among them? [155]

Now the law of Leptines, Athenians, does harm not only by abolishing the rewards of good service and so rendering fruitless the good intentions of those who are ambitious for honor, but also by leaving our city under the serious reproach of imbecility. For you are of course aware that for each grave offence a single penalty is provided by the law, which says explicitly that “at any trial there shall be not more than one assessment of penalty, whichever the court imposes, whether a personal punishment or a fine, but not both.” [156] But Leptines has used a different measure and says that if anyone claims a return from you, “he shall be disfranchised, and his property shall be confiscated.” There you have two penalties. “The process shall be by laying information or by summary arrest; and if he be convicted, he shall be liable under the law which provides for the case of a man holding office while in debt to the treasury.” Death is what he means, for such is the punishment in that case. Why, here are three penalties!62 Is it not monstrously hard, Athenians, if it proves more serious in your courts to ask for a return for good service than to be convicted of some heinous crime? [157]

Men of Athens, this law, so dishonorable, so unsound, so suggestive of envy and spite and—I spare you the rest. Those are the sort of things that the framer of the law seems to favor, but you must not imitate them nor display sentiments unworthy of yourselves. I ask you in Heaven's name, what should we all most earnestly deprecate? What do all our laws most carefully guard against? What but those vengeful murders against which our specially appointed protector is the Council of the Areopagus? [158] Now Draco, in this group of laws, marked the terrible wickedness of homicide by banning the offender from the lustral water, the libations, the loving-cup, the sacrifices and the market-place; he enumerated everything that he thought likely to deter the offender; but he never robbed him of his claim to justice; he defined the circumstances that make homicide justifiable and proclaimed the accused in such case free from taint. If, then, your laws can justify homicide, is this fellow's law to forbid any claim, even a just one, to recompense? Not so, men of Athens! [159] Do not let it appear that you have been more diligent to prevent any of your benefactors from winning a recompense than to suppress murder in your city. Rather, recalling the occasions on which you have repaid the services rendered you, and remembering the inscription of Demophantus, already referred to by Phormio, on which it stands written and confirmed by oath that whoso shall suffer in defence of the democracy shall receive the same reward as Harmodius and Aristogiton, vote for the repeal of this law; for if you do not, it is impossible for you to observe your oaths. [160]

And besides all this, observe a further point. That law cannot be a sound one which deals with the past and the future in the same way. “None,” says this law, “shall be immune save and except the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton.” Good! “Nor shall anyone in future be granted immunity.” What! not even if other such benefactors arise, Leptines? If you found fault with the past, can it be that you also foresaw the future? [161] Because, you will say, we are now past such expectation.63 I pray that we may be, Athenians. But as we are mere mortals, neither our language nor our laws should offend religious sentiment; we may both expect blessings and pray for them, but we must reflect that all things are conditioned by mortality. For the Lacedaemonians never dreamed that they would be brought to their present straits, and perhaps even the Syracusans, once a democracy, who exacted tribute from the Carthaginians and ruled all their neighbors and beat at us at sea, little thought they would fall under the tyranny of a single clerk,64 if report be true. [162] Nor again could the present Dionysius65 ever have exacted that Dion would come against him in a cargo-boat with a handful of soldiers and expel the master of so many warships and mercenaries and cities. But, methinks, the future is hidden from all men, and great events hang on small chances. Therefore we must be modest in the day of prosperity, and must show that we are not blind to the future. [163]

There are still many arguments that one might develop at length, showing that this law is in every respect unsound and opposed to your interests; but to sum up and bring my speech to a conclusion, I will ask you to do this. Calculate and compare in your own minds what will happen to you if you repeal this law, and what if you do not; and then be careful to remember all the consequences of either step, so that you may make the better choice. [164] Now if, on our advice, you reject it, deserving men will receive their due reward from you, and any undeserving man （assuming that there are such） will not only lose his reward, but will pay whatever penalty you approve, in accordance with our alternative law, while all men will acknowledge the honor, justice and veracity of our city. If, on the other hand, you allow it to pass, as I pray you may not, the good will suffer for the sake of the bad, the undeserving will bring calamity on the rest, but come off scot-free themselves, and the reputation of Athens will be the very reverse of what I have described; all men will regard her as faithless, envious and mean. [165] It is unworthy of you, Athenians, to prefer such a foul reproach to advantages so honorable and so appropriate to you. For each of you will share individually in the credit of your joint decision. For it is known to all standing round us,66 as to everyone else, that in this court Leptines is contending with us, but within the conscience of each member of the jury humanity is arrayed against envy, justice against malice, and all that is good against all that is most base. [166] If you yield to the nobler impulse and cast your votes with us, you will win for yourselves the credit, and for the State the benefit, of a righteous verdict, and if ever occasion arises, you will not lack friends willing to encounter risk in your behalf. I ask you, therefore, to take all these considerations seriously to heart and to beware that you are not forced into an error of judgement. For on many occasions, men of Athens, the justice of the case has not been brought home to you, but a verdict has been wrested from you by the clamor, the violence and the shamelessness of the pleaders. Let not that be your case today, for that would be unworthy of you; [167] but hold fast to what you are convinced is just, and bear it in mind until you vote, so that true to your oaths you may cast your votes against the counsels of the wicked. If you punish with death those who debase the coinage, I shall be surprised if you lend an ear to men who render our whole State base and counterfeit. By all the gods, I will not believe it of you.

I think I need say no more, for I believe you understand all my arguments.

1 By the previous speaker, Phormio.

2 εὐήθειαhas many shades of meaning from simplicity to folly. Here the contrast withκακίαshows that the milder sense predominates; not so in Dem. 20.145.

3 He refers to the wealth of the State in the time of Pericles （cf. Dem. 13.26）, and to the exertions of the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War.

4 In 403 Thrasybulus and the exiled democrats had occupied the Piraeus and defeated the Thirty, whose government was then changed to that of the Ten. The Spartans were persuaded by Lysander to lend the Ten 100 talents, but shortly afterwards Pausanias, the Spartan king, who was no friend to Lysander, intervened, withdrew the Spartan son from the Acropolis, and reconciled the parties. The story of the loan is narrated by Xenophon and Plutarch; the decree of the Assembly, accepting responsibility for the repayment, is attested also by Isoc. Areop. 67.

5 As there was a list of 300 citizens qualified for theπροεισφοράand of 1200 for the trierarchy, we may perhaps assume a list of 600 for the regular services. At the rate of 60 a year, it would take 10 years to work through the list, if the contributors were called upon strictly in rotation by the officials of their respective tribes. Therefore the outside estimate of 30 additional contributors, rendered available by abolishing the immunities, would provide only 3 more each year; i.e. 3 citizens out of 60 would be relieved annually. In case of a real shortage of qualified contributors, Demosthenes would prefer the adoption of the system, first instituted for the trierarchy in 357, whereby the 1200 were divided into 20 companies （συμμορίαι） of 60 each, further subdivided into syndicates （συντέλειαι）, each responsible for one ship. This was the system reformed at a later date by Demosthenes himself.

6 According to Demosthemes' lowest estimate, there would be 5 or 6 citizens exempt: total 16. This number he is willing to double, making the full total 30 and the total of citizens presumably 10 or 12. If spread over the l0 tribes, the lower estimate would give, roughly, one contributor for 2 tribes; and the higher, one for each tribe.

7 Leucon, son and succesor of Satyrus, reigned over the Cimmerian Bosporus （Crimea） from 393 to 353. In return for his services here describd, the Athenians had made him a citizen, voted him a golden crown, and allowed him exemption not only from public services but also from the payment of customs at the Piraeus. His sons were Spartacus and Paerisades, who succeeded him as joint rulers, and Apollonius. An inscription in their honor was voted in the years 347-346. It was discovered at Athens and published in 1877. See Hicks, Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions, no. 111.

8 To help his audience in this piece of mental arithmetic, Demosthenes divides his 400,000 into two parts, of 300,000 (of which the thirtieth is easily calculated) and of 100,000, the thirtieth of which is 3333 1/3 or roughly 3000. It should be remembered that the medimnus is more strictly about a bushel and a half.

9 Here not the district, but the capital, Panticapaeum, the modern Kertch. Sixty miles west lies Theudosia （Kaffa）, an ancient colony of Miletus.

10 Callisthenes, asσιτώνηςor Food Controller （an office held by Demosthenes himself,Dem. 18.248）, received so much corn from Leucon that, after supplying the needs of Athens, he was able to make 16 talents for the treasury by selling the surplus elsewhere.

11 Because Leucon will, of course, retaliate by imposing the dues again.

12 On the Asiatic side of the entrance to the Thracian Bosporus from the Euxine.

13 Both nouns being feminine plural, Demosthenes is able to fuse completely the literal and metaphorical meanings.

14 By the legal process known asἀντίδοσις, a citizen called upon to perform a public service, if he thought that a richer man had been unfairly passed over, could challenge him either to perform the service in his stead or to exchange properties. Demosthenes is here putting an extreme case, for it is difficult to believe that an honorary citizen like Leucon, resident elsewhere, could be called upon for a service, even though he had wealth deposited at Athens.

15 For the horrors endured by the 7000 Athenian captives, scorched by day and frozen by night in the deep stone-quarries of Syracuse, see Thuc. 7.87.

16 The third period of the Peloponnesian War, called the “Decelean” War (413-404) from the Spartan fortified post at Decelea in Attica.

17 The so-called Corinthian War, 395-387 B.C.

18 Demosthenes was now thirty, and the battle was fought ten tears before his birth.

19 Between Corinth and its harbor of Lechaeum on the Corinthian Gulf.

20 In 387. Antalcidas was the Spartan diplomatist. The Greeks acknowledged the King of Persia as the arbiter of their disputes, and abandoned to him their cities in Asia. All other Greek states were to be independent, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which were to be retained by Athens. Sparta's main object was to break up the power of Thebes over the other Boeotian cities.

21 408-407 B.C. There is some discrepancy as to the date between our two authorities, Xenophon and Diodorus, neither of whom mentions Ecphantus, presumably a democratic leader in Thasos.

22 Levied by the Byzantines on the value of the cargo of every ship passing through the Bosporus.

23 The Athenians gained Byzantium and Chalcedon in 390 B.C. It is strange to find the notorious peace of Antalcidas mentioned with approval.

24 A proxenus was a foreigner who, in his own state, looked after Athenian interests. These men, being exiles resident at Athens, could not perform this duty. The title was an honorary one, giving them rank and privileges above the ordinary resident aliens.

25 Under Thrasybulus in 403.

26 Conon obtained the support of Persia for Athens against Sparta and was appointed joint commander, with the satrap Pharnabazus, of the Persian fleet. In 394 he destroyed the Spartan fleet off Cnidus, sailed about the Aegean expelling the Spartan harmosts from many of the islands, and finally reached Athens, where he restored the Long Wall, dismantled since the Peloponnesian war.

27 When Athens helped Thebes to repel the invasion of Agesilaus in 378. Chabrias, on his way to Cyprus in 388 to help Evagoras against Persia, landed on Aegina and killed the Spartan harmost there. He was operating in Egypt in 380 and again in 361.

28 Off Naxos in 376.

29 This aside is intended to give an air of reality to the published speech. Editors well compare a similar trick in Cicero Verr. 2.4.3.

30 Iphicrates was honored for the defeat of the Spartan mora in the Corinthian War (390), Timotheus for his successful expedition to Corcyra after the battle of Naxos (376). Strabax was presumably a foreign mercenary; Polystratus is mentioned in Dem. 4.24, as a commander of Athenian mercenaries at Corinth. These last two were rewarded for services under the command of Iphicrates. Clearchus cannot be identified with certainty.

31 The argument seems to be this. Some recipients of immunity obtained similar favors for their friends. Chabrias did not, but he might have done so, and his friends might have been the undeserving persons now enjoying immunity. In this rather hypothetical case, after rewarding the jackals from gratitude to the lion, you now penalize the lion out of contempt for the jackals.

32 To ascertain whether they were duly qualified by birth, by character, and by wealth.

33 νεώτεροι has been misunderstood and variously emended. Laws ought to be general and permanent, decrees particular and occasional; but there has been such a glut of hasty legislation, since the restoration of the democracy in 403, that many decrees still stand unrepealed after the laws on which they were based have been superseded. For the legislative commission see Introduction.

34 The statues of the heroes who gave their names to the ten tribes stood in the Agora near the council-chamber.

35 By this, if correct, must be meant the preamble of the amended law, setting forth the objections to the existing law of Leptines. The second “law” read would be the amendments proposed; and at the end of Dem. 20.97 the whole law as amended is read.

36 Apsephion.

37 At the ἀνάκρισις or preliminary trial.

38 We may conjecture that the old law （that if the original statute was condemned, the amendment baecame law ipso facto） had in practice been superseded.

39 Demosthenes is a trifle premature here.

40 He addresses himself directly to Leptines.

41 i.e. of their descendants, whose demerits are no justification for cancelling a reward once given. But the Greek is not clear.

42 Or possibly, if ὦν is masculine, “though the men thus charged have no connection with the dead.”

43 Demosthenes here misrepresents the law, which only touched the immunities. “Quite seriously” is taken by some with “prepared to use.”

44 At the opening of every meeting of the Assembly and of the Council a herald recited a curse on enemies of the State and on evil counsellors; see Dem. 19.70.

45 Wiped out by the Thebans in 364. The men were massacred, and the women and children sold into slavery.

46 In the Agora. The inscription （quoted by Aeschin. 3.83） was in honor of Cimon's capture of Eion on the Strymon in 476.

47 Son of Aristides the just, pensioned for his father's merits.

48 A euphemism for “she is poor.”

49 “Some” have received other rewards together with immunity; “the others” immunity alone.

50 They assert that many aliens have received immunity; he challenges them to produce the decrees conferring it. He admits that many undeserving aliens have been made proxenoi （in the honorary sense explained in note on Dem. 20.60）, but this distinction does not confer immunity.

51 Literally, trailing the robe; hence slovenly, slipshod.

52 There is no record of any general exemption granted to these two peoples. If Weil's conjecture is right, translate “certain M. and M., by claiming to be Friends of the State.”

53 The advocates named in Dem. 20.146.

54 At the beginning of the next year （July）.

55 The official defenders have their personal enemies, who have received immunity and whom it would be natural for them to indict. This they do not venture to do, but try, by this sweeping law, to deprive all, good and bad alike, of their privileges.

56 See Introduction p. 489.

57 These were the four advocates nominated by the people, with Leptines as a fifth, to defend the law. Aristophon, the best known, was the leading Athenian statesman before the rise of Eubulus. He was now nearly eighty years old, and could boast that he had been 75 times defendant in a γραφὴ παρανόμων and had always acquitted.

58 Demosthenes suggests that the personal record of the advocates should lead the jury to reject their arguments.

59 See Dem. 20.77.

60 See Dem. 20.11. Gelarchus is not otherwise known. There were, apparently, no witnesses to his gift.

61 But it seems to have become obsolete, for sound reasons.

62 All this is pure sophistry.ἀτιμία involving loss of property was not a double penalty, but merely one degree of ἀτιμία. Moreover, the law cited refers to penalties assessed by the courts, not to those prescribed by statute. Lastly, the so-called third penalty was imposed for the additional offence of contempt, where one who had incurred ἀτιμία nevertheless claimed ἀτέλεια.

63 The day of tyrants is past, and the services of tyrannicides are no longer needed.

64 Dionysius I. of Syracuse started life as a clerk in the public service.

65 Dionysius II., expelled by Dion in 357.

66 i.e. the general public; the jury were seated.