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diogenes_of_sinope:dio_chrysostom_oration_10 [2012/06/02 16:45] – created frankdiogenes_of_sinope:dio_chrysostom_oration_10 [2014/01/14 23:19] (current) – external edit 127.0.0.1
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 "And likewise in almost all cases where practical experience in 'using' is lacking, it is difficult to be zealous, and the damage is likely to be greater where the things concerned are greater. Do you, then, think that the 'use' of an ass is like the 'use' of a horse?" "Of course not." "Well, then, is the 'use' of a man like the 'use' of a god?" "But that question does not deserve an answer, **Diogenes**," said he. "Is there anyone, then, who can make use of himself who does not know himself?" "How could he?" replied the other. "Because the one who does not understand man is unable to 'use' man?" "Yes, because he cannot." "So he who does not understand himself would not be able to make use of himself, would he?" "I believe not." "Have you ever heard of the inscription at Delphi: 'Know thyself?" "I have." "Is it not plain that the god gives this command to all, in the belief that they do not know themselves?' "It would seem so." "You, therefore, would be included in the 'all'?" "Certainly." "So then you also do not know yourself?" "I believe not." "And not knowing yourself, you do not know man; and not knowing man, you are unable to 'use' man; and yet, although you are unable to 'use' a man, you are attempting to 'use' a god, an attempt which we agree is altogether the greater and more difficult of the two.  "And likewise in almost all cases where practical experience in 'using' is lacking, it is difficult to be zealous, and the damage is likely to be greater where the things concerned are greater. Do you, then, think that the 'use' of an ass is like the 'use' of a horse?" "Of course not." "Well, then, is the 'use' of a man like the 'use' of a god?" "But that question does not deserve an answer, **Diogenes**," said he. "Is there anyone, then, who can make use of himself who does not know himself?" "How could he?" replied the other. "Because the one who does not understand man is unable to 'use' man?" "Yes, because he cannot." "So he who does not understand himself would not be able to make use of himself, would he?" "I believe not." "Have you ever heard of the inscription at Delphi: 'Know thyself?" "I have." "Is it not plain that the god gives this command to all, in the belief that they do not know themselves?' "It would seem so." "You, therefore, would be included in the 'all'?" "Certainly." "So then you also do not know yourself?" "I believe not." "And not knowing yourself, you do not know man; and not knowing man, you are unable to 'use' man; and yet, although you are unable to 'use' a man, you are attempting to 'use' a god, an attempt which we agree is altogether the greater and more difficult of the two. 
  
-"Tell me, do you think Apollo speaks Attic or Doric? Or that men and gods have the same language? Yet the difference is so great that the Scamander river in Troy is called Xanthus4 by the gods, and that the bird kymindis is called chalkis, and that a certain spot outside the city which the Trojans called Batieia was called the Sema Myrines by the gods. From this it naturally follows that the oracles are obscure and have already deceived many men. Now for Homer perhaps it was safe to go to Apollo at Delphi, as being bilingual and understanding the dialects — if he really did understand them all and not just a few things, like persons who know two or three Persian, Median, or Assyrian words and thus fool the ignorant. +"Tell me, do you think Apollo speaks Attic or Doric? Or that men and gods have the same language? Yet the difference is so great that the Scamander river in Troy is called Xanthus by the gods, and that the bird kymindis is called chalkis, and that a certain spot outside the city which the Trojans called Batieia was called the Sema Myrines by the gods. From this it naturally follows that the oracles are obscure and have already deceived many men. Now for Homer perhaps it was safe to go to Apollo at Delphi, as being bilingual and understanding the dialects — if he really did understand them all and not just a few things, like persons who know two or three Persian, Median, or Assyrian words and thus fool the ignorant. 
  
 "But how about you? Have you no fear, lest, when the god says one thing you may understand another? As, for instance, the story of the famous Laïus, the man who became the lover of Chrysippus; when he had gone to Delphi, he asked the god how he might have issue. The god bade him 'not to beget, or, having begotten, to expose.' And Laïus was so foolish as to misunderstand both commands of the god, for he begot a son and did not rear him. Afterwards both he and all his house were destroyed, all because he had undertaken to 'make use of' Apollo when he lacked the ability. For if he had not received that oracle, he would not have exposed Oedipus, and the latter, having been reared at home, would not have slain Laïus, for he would have known that he was his son. Then you have heard the story about Croesus, the Lydian, who, imagining that he was most faithfully carrying out the behests of the god, crossed the river Halys, lost his empire, was bound in chains himself, and barely escaped being burned alive. Or do you, pray, think that you are wiser than Croesus, a man of such wealth, who ruled over so many people and had met Solon and a great many other wise men? As for Orestes, I presume you see him also in tragic performances inveighing against the god in his fits of madness, and accusing him as though he had counselled him to slay his mother. But do not imagine that Apollo ever ordered those that consult him to commit any dreadful or disgraceful act. It is as I said: although men are incapable of 'using' the god, they go ahead, try, and then blame him and not themselves.  "But how about you? Have you no fear, lest, when the god says one thing you may understand another? As, for instance, the story of the famous Laïus, the man who became the lover of Chrysippus; when he had gone to Delphi, he asked the god how he might have issue. The god bade him 'not to beget, or, having begotten, to expose.' And Laïus was so foolish as to misunderstand both commands of the god, for he begot a son and did not rear him. Afterwards both he and all his house were destroyed, all because he had undertaken to 'make use of' Apollo when he lacked the ability. For if he had not received that oracle, he would not have exposed Oedipus, and the latter, having been reared at home, would not have slain Laïus, for he would have known that he was his son. Then you have heard the story about Croesus, the Lydian, who, imagining that he was most faithfully carrying out the behests of the god, crossed the river Halys, lost his empire, was bound in chains himself, and barely escaped being burned alive. Or do you, pray, think that you are wiser than Croesus, a man of such wealth, who ruled over so many people and had met Solon and a great many other wise men? As for Orestes, I presume you see him also in tragic performances inveighing against the god in his fits of madness, and accusing him as though he had counselled him to slay his mother. But do not imagine that Apollo ever ordered those that consult him to commit any dreadful or disgraceful act. It is as I said: although men are incapable of 'using' the god, they go ahead, try, and then blame him and not themselves. 
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 The other on hearing this replied, "You, **Diogenes**, make Oedipus out to be the greatest dullard in the world; but the Greeks believe that, though he was not a fortunate man, he was the most sagacious of all men. At any rate they say that he alone solved the Sphinx's1riddle." At this **Diogenes** broke into a laugh and said, "He solve the Sphinx's riddle! Have you not heard that the Sphinx prompted him to give the answer 'man'? As to the meaning of 'man,' however, he neither expressed himself nor knew, but when he said the word 'man' he thought he was answering the question. It was just as if one were asked, 'What is Socrates?' and should give no other answer than the word 'Socrates.' I have heard someone say that the Sphinx stands for stupidity; that this, accordingly, proved the ruin of the Boeotians in the past just as it does now, their stupidity preventing their knowing anything, such utter dullards they are; and that while the others had an inkling of their ignorance, Oedipus, who thought that he was very wise and had escaped the Sphinx, and who had made the other Thebans believe all this, perished most miserably. For any man who in spite of his ignorance deludes himself with the belief that he is wise is in a much sorrier plight than anyone else. And such is the tribe of sophists." The other on hearing this replied, "You, **Diogenes**, make Oedipus out to be the greatest dullard in the world; but the Greeks believe that, though he was not a fortunate man, he was the most sagacious of all men. At any rate they say that he alone solved the Sphinx's1riddle." At this **Diogenes** broke into a laugh and said, "He solve the Sphinx's riddle! Have you not heard that the Sphinx prompted him to give the answer 'man'? As to the meaning of 'man,' however, he neither expressed himself nor knew, but when he said the word 'man' he thought he was answering the question. It was just as if one were asked, 'What is Socrates?' and should give no other answer than the word 'Socrates.' I have heard someone say that the Sphinx stands for stupidity; that this, accordingly, proved the ruin of the Boeotians in the past just as it does now, their stupidity preventing their knowing anything, such utter dullards they are; and that while the others had an inkling of their ignorance, Oedipus, who thought that he was very wise and had escaped the Sphinx, and who had made the other Thebans believe all this, perished most miserably. For any man who in spite of his ignorance deludes himself with the belief that he is wise is in a much sorrier plight than anyone else. And such is the tribe of sophists."
 \\ \\
-[[http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Dio_Chrysostom/Discourses/10*.html|Source]]</blockquote>+\\ 
 +SourceDiscourses by Dio Chrysostom published in the Loeb Classical Library, 1932The text is in the public domain. </blockquote>
diogenes_of_sinope/dio_chrysostom_oration_10.1338673502.txt.gz · Last modified: 2014/01/14 22:43 (external edit)

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