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Tracing the Motion Argument for God from Aristotle to Avicenna - Arabic Philosophy

Ptolemiac System

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Authored by Frank Redmond, 2005

The purpose of this paper is to trace the so-called “argument from motion” from its origin in the works of Aristotle through al-Farabi. In doing so, I hope to show how it changes from philosopher to philosopher as the times change and new influences are introduced. After giving a thorough treatment of each philosopher’s physics and metaphysics, I will analyze each God’s significance, but only insofar as it pertains to the argument from motion. I have also included Avicenna at the end of this treatise, not because he adheres to the argument from motion, for he does not, but because he offers its first substantial opposition with his “argument from necessity”. He, in effect, nullifies the argument from motion by identifying its pitfalls and by replacing it with a better and less problematic argument.

I. More than the any of the major Arabic philosophers who succeeded him, Aristotle's conception of God is dependent on arguments from motion. The foundation upon which Aristotle proves his God is found mostly in his work Physics, especially in his discussion in Book VIII. It is this book that I am going to focus on, for it provides the reader with both a decent synopsis of Aristotle's overall views on motion and a proof for the existence of the unmoved mover. Only later, in his Metaphysics, does Aristotle discuss the Unmoved Mover's attributes and Its perfection and why It is perfect. I will later connect the two books together since one must pass through the Physics before one can even perceive or understand the aptly titled Metaphysics. What is essential to note is that Aristotle's Unmoved Mover is heavily connected to Aristotle's view of the physical universe, so much so that Aristotle was the first to conceive of an Unmoved Mover.

Nature, or phusis, is given an array of definitions in Aristotle’s Physics II.1, but there is one common thread found throughout this section of text, which basically states that nature is an inner principle of motion and being at rest. “This means that when an entity moves or is at rest according to its nature, reference to its nature may serve as an explanation of the event. We have to describe how - to what extent, through what other processes, and due to what agency - the preconditions for the process of change or being at rest are present” (Bodnar 2; my emphasis). In order to fully understand nature, we must ask ‘why?’ do things move and investigate what causes this motion, for “the existence of motion is asserted by all who have anything to say about nature, because they all concern themselves with the construction of the world and study the question of becoming and perishing, which processes could not come about without the existence of motion” (Physics VIII.1).

For these reasons, Aristotle, famously, developed the idea of the four causes - material, formal, efficient, final - which, when taken together, explain all change found in nature. This is best adumbrated in Physics II.3 with the famous bronze statue analogy. The material cause of the statue is the bronze; the formal cause, the form or archetype of the statue; the efficient, the primary source for change (i.e. the sculpture); the final, the purpose for which its being done (i.e. for viewing pleasure, etc.) It is only through a thorough understanding of the causes of things that we can even venture to understand the principles of motion, and this is why it is so important that we have identified the four causes found in nature.

Motion provides us with an explanation on why nature unceasingly changes and, to Aristotle, this is precisely why it is imperative for us to fully understand what motion is. On the most basic level, Aristotle states that natural objects composed of matter are always subject to either kinesis or metabole, i.e. change. But, to be more specific, four categories of motion (i.e. change) exist in Aristotelian science: What, or changes in substance; How, or qualitative changes (i.e. when something hot becomes cold); How large, or changes in quantity; and Where, or changes of place (Hoffe 72). These categories provide the physicist with a mental map of sorts, whereby he gains the correct perspective in order to understand the motion of things. It is through this mental map that Aristotle sets up his model of how change occurs through motion in Physics 1.6-7, which states that “there must be (1) something whence the motion occurs, that is, a starting-point, (2) something where it moves to, that is, a final point, and in addition (3) something upon which it occurs, that is, something underlying or a substratum (hypokeimenon) which undergoes the change” (73; my emphasis). It is important to note the key role in which the formal cause plays here; it is the force that puts these steps in motion.

Yet, all motion takes place in time and it is only appropriate that we discuss Aristotle's idea of time, insofar as it is related to motion, before we proceed. Motion takes place in time without it being directly identical to time. Time is neither autonomous nor something that is created, but rather it is “an epiphenomenon of natural process, or more precisely, as an experience made by the mind faced with natural, meaning, changing, things” (82; my emphasis). In other words, time is a secondary phenomenon brought about by motion, meaning that without motion, there can be no time. Given this, time is not only countable, but also directional: there is a before and an after, an earlier and a later. And since time is an epiphenomenon of motion, which is eternal, time is continuous and eternal as well.

It is safe to say, now, that motion is eternal and imperishable, an everlasting process; this is an idea that is proved by Aristotle in Physics Book VIII. Here Aristotle posits the notion that motion and change can have no beginning. The fact that change is currently occurring presupposes a previous process of change. His goal is to establish a theory that there is an eternal chain of motion, in contrast to those who uphold the notion of a static universe, by using the following line of argumentation: Motion, by definition, necessarily involves the presence of the movable, just like how fire requires the presence of wood before flaming. And, these things, the movables, must have a beginning before being or else they are eternal. But it is quite evident that if there is becoming, then it follows that before this becoming another becoming must have taken place. It is absurd to suppose that these things had being throughout all previous time without any motion. Let it suffice that there never was a time when there was not motion, nor will there be a time without motion (Physics VIII.1). One can always trace back the causes of things ad infinitum.

But how do these finite movers move movables? To Aristotle, there are two finite movers: those according to nature and those contrary to nature. In both cases, a mover is necessary, for each particular motion is caused from one agent to another, one particular to the next particular. For instance, fathers beget sons, and then the sons beget their own sons, and so on. If we ask: who or what produced this begetting? You'd have to answer that a man did. However, if the question is restructured to state: Why do men beget sons? You'd be unable to provide a decent answer without understanding what begets motion itself, and this is where our investigation now leads us.

In Aristotelian science, the celestial spheres and their revolutions maintain and regulate the motions of the natural, sublunary realm. “Aristotle postulates that the processes of the universe depend on an eternal motion (or on several eternal motions), the eternal revolution of the heavenly spheres, which in turn is dependent on one or several unmoved movers” (7). This is significant; the eternal revolution prevents the universe from reaching a point of dissolution and it guarantees a continuance of causation between particulars. This is all ultimately due to the excitation that is generated by the revolutions of the spheres. Even though there will always be finite casual chains between celestial revolutions and singular individual processes, none of these natural processes could have continued without the influence and excitation that the spheres produce.

With this established and with our understanding of how the natural world conducts itself, it is prudent for us to investigate what sets the whole of the universe in motion. However, some questions still must be answered. This whole discussion is all contingent on whether the universe is subject solely to the power of the celestial spheres or subject to an external causal authority. In order to posit an Unmoved Mover, it is essential that we show that the celestial spheres do not control the universe as a whole in addition to the particulars of the sublunar realm. Since the celestial spheres are immutable, ungenerated, and eternal, it is impossible for them to be subject to anything resembling the sublunar realm or anything from the sublunar realm; furthermore, Aristotle cannot appeal to a separate being that generated them as responsible for their revolutions since they are immutable, ungenerated, and eternal. Then, how does Aristotle proceed to disprove the spheres' hypothetical universal supremacy? Aristotle cites the fact that since the celestial spheres are themselves in motion, they must not only have actual motion, but also potential motion. They have some component of potentiality. As such, they cannot be the cause of all things since actuality is prior to potentiality and an Unmoved Mover must be, by definition, pure actuality. Thus, “there have always been the same things, either in periodic exchange or in some other way, given that actuality is prior to potentiality. (If they have been always the same in periodic cycles, there must still always have been something that is permanently actual)” (Metaphysics XII.6).

Now since we have, finally, subordinated the celestial spheres to a position under the omnipotence of the Unmoved Mover, it is sensible to ask: What is the Unmoved Mover? And, to be more specific, what is the difference between the Unmoved Mover in the Physics versus the Metaphysics? How do their functions differ between the two texts?

First, it seems proper to investigate the unmoved mover of the Physics as a continuation of our previous investigations into the nature of motion, for it is certain that Aristotle saw the unmoved mover as the logical fulfillment of his theory of motion, as well as the only fully actualized being with infinite power. Therefore, even prior to trying to inundate the unmoved mover with attributes that are “divine”, Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, as found in the Physics, is a related, albeit different idea from that put forth in the Metaphysics.

At any rate, as we saw before, the celestial spheres are eternal, yet have potentiality, and therefore they are unfit to sustain and regulate all the causation of the universe. Yet, beyond the spheres, albeit in communication with them, lies a “supra-physical entity without which the universe could not function or persist” that possesses nothing but pure actuality, actuality that is not directly transmitted in the process of causation (8-9). This, in a word, is the unmoved mover. Just to recap, it is known that all motion is eternal, and that motion cannot begin without a mover. Also, remember that motion on the celestial and sublunar levels is never self-caused; it is always moved via impartation of energy from another mover. Thus, something must be imparting motion while not being moved itself; this something must be completely actualized in order for it to set things in motion without being subject to outside movers. If no unmoved mover existed, then motion would cease, for movers require a cause in order to move. Furthermore, the unmoved mover must be eternal and necessary since motion is eternal and necessary – “There is something that comprehends them all, and that as something apart from each one of them, and this is that is the cause of the fact that some things are and others are not and of the continuous process of change” (Physics VIII.6). But, is Aristotle speaking of multiple unmoved movers or only one when he says, “something comprehends them all”? Aristotle, logically, comes to the conclusion that there can only be one unmoved mover. More than one unmoved mover would be superfluous; it not only would be unnecessary, but also would produce conflict between movers since each one would be producing its own continuous movements. In other words, the system of cause and effect found below the unmoved mover would be interrupted. Initial motion of the unmoved mover, by necessity (and grace), is of one, single, fluid movement - “The unmoved mover, as has been said, since it remains permanently simple and unvarying and in the same state, will cause motion that is one and simple” (Physics VIII.6). Lastly, it should be noted, the unmoved mover possesses no magnitude whatsoever, for an infinite force cannot exist in a finite magnitude. Thus it lies in a place where it imparts motion easiest to the celestial spheres.

However, in the Metaphysics, a different picture of the Unmoved Mover develops: a theologically influenced picture manifests itself. Aristotle in the Metaphysics not only extends what he has already said in the Physics, but he also begins to think of the Unmoved Mover, I am tempted to say “God”, as less of a mover, and more of a self-reflexive cosmological idea who happens to move the universe. In the Metaphysics, the Unmoved Mover is immune from physical processes, It produces Itself, and is the mover which moves without moving. This is nothing new; it is seen in the Physics' account. However, in order to explain how the Unmoved Mover exerts influence outside of Itself, that is how It produces movement, Aristotle says that “the object of desire and the object of thought produce movement […] The object of appetite is what seems good and the primary of wish is what really is good” (Lambda 7). In other words, the Unmoved Mover causes processes by being an object of desire or an intentional object (Lawson- Tancred 372). As such, the Unmoved Mover becomes the object of desire for the celestial spheres. This is only possible if the Unmoved Mover is envied or desired. But, why would It be desired? Out of all beings the Unmoved Mover enjoys the highest and greatest of “lives”, a characteristic which makes it divine in nature. “As the highest goal of all desire, the [Unmoved Mover] effects [Its] powers of attraction like a model that determines all of nature, albeit in intensity. The fixed stars imitate the mover by adopting his perfection for their movement in space and perform a circular motion. The substances of sublunar nature, that is, living beings, strive toward [the Unmoved Mover] by reproducing themselves” (107). The Unmoved Mover is the object of love and affection, and thereby It causes motion by being the object of love.

In Lambda 9, we first hear Aristotle call the Unmoved Mover “God”. This is perhaps because God thinks, whereas an Unmoved Mover does not. Here, Aristotle tries to clarify his idea of the “thought of thought”, though he falls a little short of being totally clear. Here, Aristotle confirms his idea that the “divine” mind contains no knowledge of anything outside of Itself; it is merely concerned with Itself. Nevertheless, this act of thinking makes God living, God is alive - “God also has life; for the activation of thought is a life, and He is that activation. His intrinsic activation is supreme, eternal life. Accordingly, we assert that God is a supreme and eternal living being, so that to God belong life and continuous and eternal duration. For that is what God is” (Lambda 7). But God is not alive like you and me, but God is alive so that other substances can be alive through movement. Yet, what does God think of? God is a constant, consistent thinker who cannot think of anything but perfect and actual, rather than potential, thoughts. God must think of Himself as an object, necessarily, since if God thought of an external object, it would make Him an imperfect thinker, and this is impossible. In the end, however, Aristotle never explains how thought can be the object of itself, but ends Lambda with the Homeric quote, spoken by Odysseus, “Too many kings are bad – let there be one!”.

As is apparent, Aristotle’s whole proof for the existence of the Unmoved Mover is wholly dependent on arguments from motion. This is seen in the name itself, most obviously: it is called the “unmoved mover” afterall. But the dependency on motion runs deeper than just a name. Aristotle, since in his science the whole universe is in motion and it is the physicist’s objective to determine ‘why?’ this is so, he figured the easiest way to solve this issue is by positing an unmoved mover. This might seem to be he most logical of solutions, perhaps the only logical solution, given the premises he begins with. However, what if Aristotle is working with the wrong first premises? What if he gave motion too great an emphasis, and thereby overlooked other potential proofs for the existence of God? These are questions the Arabic Philosophers who came after him asked and grappled with.

II. As we now turn towards the world of Arabic Philosophy, it is important to keep in mind the influence Aristotle had on these philosophers. They wholeheartedly accepted Aristotle and his teachings, even going so far as to consider him the cornerstone of their whole enterprise. They constructed their philosophical apparatus from the corpus of Aristotle, supplementing it here and there with the works of authors like Galen, Ptolemy, Plato, and the Neo-Platonists. But Aristotle was still king. Furthermore, it was in the Arabic speaking world that the cumulative nature of philosophy was given prominence. As such, philosophy became an enterprise, not where one tries to bury ones opponents, but rather where one tries to contribute his own knowledge for a community of scholars (that is until al-Ghazali). Aristotle was viewed as a person whose philosophy could be built upon, or at least learned from, like al-Kindi writes: “We ought to be grateful to the progenitors of those who have imparted to us a measure of truth, just as we are to the latter, insofar as they have been the cause of their being, and consequently of our discovery of the truth” (Fakhry 71).

III. The first of the Arabic Philosophers to begin to develop what would become known as Arabic Philosophy and really critically look at the doctrines of Aristotle was al-Kindi (d. 866). A renaissance man of sorts, he contributed to many and diverse areas of scholarship; however, we shall only be looking at his arguments for the existence of God, his views on the physical universe, and how they are related to his main precursor and teacher Aristotle. To avoid being redundant, I will only focus on the parts of al-Kindi's doctrine that are at odds with Aristotle, since it is upon Aristotle's shoulders that al-Kindi built his theories.

Before continuing to explain al-Kindi's view of God, it is necessary for us to investigate his view of the physical world, or his natural philosophy. It is fair to say that al-Kindi accepted Aristotle's four causes with no qualms, and expressed the necessity of keeping matter separate from form. Where the two differ, in a major way, however, is in respect to the idea of motion, namely what it is. Al-Kindi, to begin, states that the universe is a finite thing. He proves this like so: Say there is an infinite body and then one separates a finite body from it, then what remains must be either infinite or finite. It is absurd that it is finite since, if what remains is finite and then a finite thing is added to it, the body which will result will be finite since it is measurable. On the other hand, if the remnant is infinite, then when the piece of the body is added back to it, either it will become greater or will return to its prior magnitude. Since the piece that was abstracted from the infinite whole was finite, it can be used to measure the infinite piece by means of a ratio. Anything that is measurable is finite; hence the universe cannot be infinite in actuality. Time, motion, and even matter are therefore necessarily finite things. As such, motion is measured in time with neither one preceding the other, for they are necessary concomitants. Al-Kindi makes his stance clear: “Time cannot be infinite actually. Time is the time of the body of the universe. […] So if time is finite, then the existence unique to the body of the universe is finite, since time is not itself something that exists. Nor is there a body without a time, because time is nothing but the measure of motion. […] Thus, if there is motion, there is time, and if there is a body, there is motion, and if there is no body, there is no motion” (37-8; my emphasis). In al-Kindi's view of the natural universe, things that are unquestionably considered eternal in Aristotelian physics (i.e. time, matter, motion) pass away, cease, and desist. As we shall see, this doctrine influences al- Kindi's notion of God.

As could have been intuited (given al-Kindi's doctrine of finitude), the one major point of divergence between Aristotle and al-Kindi is concerning the question of whether the world is created or not. Al-Kindi is obviously a proponent of creationism given the tenets of his natural philosophy, but what does this mean for al-Kindi's notion of God?

As a starting point, Aristotle explicitly states that the world is eternal, but al-Kindi has a differing opinion stating the world came into being ex nihilo. For him, God existed before everything else, instead of existing concurrently with everything else like in Aristotle, making Him the Creator of all things. Al-Kindi argues for this argument like so: Since bodies in a finite universe are finite by definition, it is impossible for the finite body to have always existed, and since bodies are created in time, a creator must have created this created thing in finite time. Thus the universe has a Creator. And this Creator, or as al-Kindi calls Him - the First Agent, must be the only eternal thing, for there is multiplicity in His creation, but no multiplicity in Him whatsoever. As al-Kindi writes, “He is unlike His creation, because there is multiplicity in all creation, but none whatsoever in Him, and because He is the Creator and they are creations, and because He is eternal and they are not, since the states of whatever is in motion change and whatever changes is not eternal” (40). (Notably, al-Kindi emphasizes the fact that God is the One, is the Unity, is the First Agent, rather than some conglomeration of powerful beings; also, God is a fairly simple entity in comparison to some other metaphysical projections).

Though al-Kindi is at odds with Aristotle on this major point, let us not be deluded into thinking that al-Kindi is completely depleted of Aristotelian elements however, since he is clearly working within an Aristotelian framework.

For example, the idea that the universe is not actually infinite is taken directly from Aristotelian physics. For Aristotle, if the actual infinite exists, then many problems occur. For one, an infinite universe would not have a center and would not have any determinate motions to and fro from this center. This presents a major problem since it suspends motion, which is impossible. For two, since every body in the universe is positioned somewhere, it cannot be actually infinite due to the fact that no body can be infinite. The existent cosmos is not infinite; however, the potential infinite does exist and is a useful tool to explain potential operations in the universe. Furthermore, one can count or add to potential infinity, or one can subdivide infinitely anything that is continuous (195). For, “it is true that Aristotle advocates a world that is limited in space and the mass of its matter” (81).

Al-Kindi is also awfully insistent that the First Being must be self-caused since it is the cause of all things - “the First Being must be superior to everything else and have no analogy with anything created. […] It must also be simple, having no matter or form, and be independent of any of the four Aristotelian forms of motion” (Fakhry 78-9). Note well that al-Kindi is careful not to give the First Being any attributes; he instead makes the First Being into the simplest and most efficient of all beings by having no form or motion of its own. Now Aristotle said the same about the Unmoved Mover, so it is certainly possible that al-Kindi was influenced by Aristotle in this regard.

Nevertheless, al-Kindi was a diehard Neo-Platonist when it came to explaining how the First Being interacts with the world. The First Being created, generated, the world ex nihilo, not by design or will, for that would imply a lack, but through an overflow of his infinite Being and divine creativity. “The world emanates from God as light emanates from the sun or the properties of a triangle from a triangle” (Sheikh 46). This makes the First Being the only Real Agent or cause in the world. This is clearly at odds with Aristotle's Unmoved Mover which relates to the world, at least in the Physics, on a purely rational causal basis. And even in the Metaphysics, God does not emanate being or instructions or agency downwards, but instead, due to affection for God, the lower beings create motion by their love for God, while God stagnantly thinks.

To sum up, is al-Kindi’s First Being dependent on arguments from motion? Yes. The fact that al-Kindi so firmly grounds his proof for the First Being on the doctrine of the impossibility of the actual infinite makes his proof a proof from motion. If the universe were actually infinite, motion would cease; however, since al-Kindi is insistent that the First Being’s creative abilities are contingent upon the fact that the universe is actually finite where motion does exist, the proof as a whole is therefore contingent on motion. Also, in the al-Kindian universe, matter is finite and things pass away. This implies motion, and since the First Being is the one who generated this finite matter ex nihilo, rather than being fully detached from the matter, It is connecting Itself to the finitude of the matter which It has generated.

IV. With the arrival of al-Farabi, we see a major shift in focus towards Neo-Platonism; however, al-Farabi went to great strides to try to reconcile the two main currents of thought in his time, Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism, and his whole philosophy can be seen as a result of this syncretic attempt. For this reason alone, it is safe to say that al-Farabi’s philosophy betrays both Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic influences equally, but the trick is to identify these separate currents as separate and try to make sense of their function.

In order to explain the way the universe functions, al-Farabi puts to use what he calls the “Theory of Ten Intelligences”. This theory is important since it offers an explanation for both the physical and the metaphysical workings of the universe; more particularly, it offers an explanation of how the two realms, heaven and earth, interact and influence one another, as well as offering us an interpretation of the phenomenon of change (457).

Al-Farabi has to develop a solution for the ever-present problem of the One versus the many, especially considering his theory is titled “Theory of Ten Intelligences”. To begin, al- Farabi makes it clear that the One is absolutely necessary by itself. It has no need for another for Its existence - “In the First [i.e. the One] there is no deficiency in any way whatsoever. There can be no existence more perfect and superior than Its existence. There can be no existence prior to It nor at any rank equivalent to It that is not Its own existence exclusively” (161). Furthermore, “the aim of the existence of the First is not the existence of the other things […] since then there would be a cause apart from Itself for Its existence” (167); but this is absurd. The First in no way derives more perfection or another perfection apart from Itself by providing existence. If this were true, the First would no longer have supremacy and this would preclude it from being the First. Rather, “it is on account of It and as a consequence and result of Its substance that anything other than It derives existence from It” (167). The First does not need anything other than Itself to bestow existence from Itself, unlike us humans and other beings of our sort. It is also in Its own class of substance with nothing else resembling or being like It, and It, presumably following the doctrine of al-Kindi, is fully unified Being, not made of multiple beings. Thus in light of these things, the First's existence is distinct from everything else because it is “one” in Its being. What does this mean? Al-Farabi seems to be saying that the “oneness” of the First is due to Its uniqueness in that It does not possess matter, but is an “intellect” in Its substance (163-4). Mirroring Aristotle's doctrine of “thinking of thought”, the First intellects Its own essence, and by intellecting Itself in this way, It becomes an intelligible. This Intelligible, the First, is unique in that, by virtue of intellecting Itself, It is an intellect and something that intellects.

Next, al-Farabi explores the First’s causal ability, or, in other words, the First’s influence on the universe and the relationship between It and the many particulars below It (458). He states, “Since the existence that belongs to the First is due to Itself, it necessarily follows that natural beings […] derive whatever existence they have from It” (166). This means that the First bestows being onto things. We can see that al-Farabi here is espousing our omnipresent theme of Aristotelian causality. However, being the Neo-Platonist he is, al-Farabi elucidates this theme by using a theory of emanation, whereby the First, i.e. the Necessary One, emanates by virtue of its own self-goodness and self-knowledge. This knowledge, thus, becomes creation, and by thinking a thought, the “first intelligence” can bring something into existence. It is through these acts of thought that the second intelligence is granted intelligence and this continues all the way down to the last, the tenth, intelligence which governs the sublunary world. From this tenth intellect flows the four elements and human souls (458).

However, why are there ten intelligences, rather than, say, five or three? Al-Farabi accepted the Ptolemic universe as his model, a universe which is constituted of nine circularly, eternally orbiting spheres around the Earth. These spheres each have their own intelligences and souls, yet are governed by the “first intelligence”. In this picture, the soul is the proximate mover of the sphere, and the sphere gains its power from its intelligence. Each sphere, also, intellects itself, like the First does, but it must intellect the First in order to find joy in itself, for joy is only found in the act of intellecting the First. The First is always the First Beloved and First Desired for the secondary causes. As such, the sphere moves due to its desire for the First; it pursues the perfection found in the First. This desire can never be quenched and as a result the sphere must necessarily be always in a state of motion.

But it must be remembered that al-Farabi constructed his universe in an architectonic manner where everything is given a designated place in the hierarchical order. So, the first intelligence obviously is of the highest order, for it is the most transcendent, and then souls of the spheres follow, and finally the spheres themselves. And lowly earth lies in the last order with equally lowly matter. From this perspective, everything that is celestial and eternal is pure and everything else, namely the things of the Earthly realm and of prime matter, are base and impure. Once we reach the earth every movement is wholly dependent on the motions of the celestial spheres resulting in the generation and corruption of matter. Now we can see how the “Theory of Ten Intelligences” allows everything to be tied together marvelously into one great system where nothing escapes the vision and emanance of the First. It even provides us with an answer to the One versus many problem as well as the problem of causation and motion.

Even so, al-Farabi’s universe is still maintained by motion and “theories” of causation. I say “theories” because his idea of emanation from the first intellect is directly analogous to the idea of motion coming from the unmoved mover. It is the unmoved mover with a Neo-Platonic twist. Furthermore, we have seen that the movements of the spheres, nay, the movements of everything below the first intellect, are dependent upon the bestowal power of the First. This means that all causality can be traced directly back to the First, just like in Aristotelian metaphysics, and this is one way in which we can prove that the First exists. Also, the whole architecture of the al-Farabian universe depends on the constant motion of things, for without motion it would collapse. This is because the secondary spheres, numbers two through ten, desire the First, and this makes the First necessary, since without It the universe would stop moving due to a lack of an object of desire. The same is true of the Aristotelian universe as well. So, for all of al-Farabi’s tendencies towards Neo-Platonism, in the end he still uses the architecture of the Aristotelian universe to explain the universe's processes, and this entails proving the First’s existence through arguments from motion.

V. By the time we arrive at Avicenna, Neo-Platonism had already been fully ingrained into Aristotelian thought by thinkers like al-Farabi, so much so that when Avicenna arrived on the scene there undoubtedly was a huge blur between the two schools of thought. This blurring, coupled with Avicenna’s erudition, made for a very creative philosophical endeavour, one which easily surpasses the last two thinkers in depth and insight. For Avicenna not only opened up new paths for thought, he conceived of the divine in a wholly new manner. Hopefully by exploring this man’s metaphysical doctrine, we can come to better understand why he is so pivotal of a philosopher.

To begin, Avicenna separates himself from the outset from his predecessors insofar as he rejects the argument for God from motion. Instead, Avicenna argues, in a nutshell, for a Necessary God which can be proved from existence, ontologically, rather than motion. This is a novel way of doing things, and, as such, Avicenna has to be particularly careful in his setting up argumentation and premises.

So, how does one go about proving that God is a necessary being? Avicenna begins his argumentation by setting up a dichotomy between the necessary and the contingent. Avicenna directly states, in his Metaphysics II.1-5, that a necessarily existent thing is a thing which cannot be conceived of as non-existing; in turn, the contingently existent thing is a thing which can be conceived of as either non-existing or existing. Thus the necessary thing must be, whereas the contingent thing has no “must” about it in any way. As becomes clear, the necessarily existent thing must owe its existence unto itself, for “what exists necessarily requires no cause” (Goodman 64). On the other hand, “what is contingent might or might not exist without any internal contradiction, so if it requires a cause that makes it necessary, not in itself, but relative to that cause; but something exists: this exists” (64). However, this “this” must either be necessary or contingent - if it is necessary, then there exists a necessary, uncaused being, QED; if it is contingent, then it must have some cause that makes it exist, for nothing in nature has to exist and never existing is not a contradiction (64). Now, we must look to the cause of this contingent being, and then we trace back, through all the causes, to a necessary being. But we must not think that an infinite series reaches an actual end, but a hypothetical one. This is where the crux of Avicenna’s argument lies: “[No] complex system of causes [can] sustain itself and overcome the contingency inherent in all complexity, since that would make effects ultimately their own causes, transforming what is contingent in itself into something necessary in itself. So there is a necessary being, QED” (64).

With this being the proof, QED, for the existence of the Necessary Being, Avicenna is suggesting that the Necessarily Existent exists necessarily since all existence must stem from and end with some Necessarily Existent. Existence cannot sustain itself in a vicious whirlpool of causes and effects, since that would “make effects there own causes”, and this is impossible. Avicenna gladly provides us with a metaphor, writing, “If the father’s existence were to depend on the son’s existence, and the son’s existence were to depend on the father’s existence, and moreover the two were not simultaneous, but one of them essentially after, then neither of them would exist” (390) It is a vicious circle.

With this established, now, how does the Necessarily Existent function? Avicenna takes a very sharp Neo-Platonic stance when it comes to the Necessarily Existent’s function by stating that It is self-emanated and emanates necessarily through the rest of existence via pure intellection. Now, it would be inconceivable to posit that the Necessarily Existent intellects by the way of things, for that would mean (1) the Necessarily Existent would subsist through things (which is absurd) and (2) intellecting would become an accident of the Necessarily Existent's being (which is absurd). Rather, the First Principle (i.e. the Necessarily Existent) “intellects by way of itself anything of which it is a principle” (391). By this he means that the Necessarily Existent is the principle of things which are complete and things that are subject to corruption and generation. In this way, the Necessarily Existent encompasses all being, both necessary and contingent. And It also intellects everything universally, but yet no individual thing escapes Its notice or attention. Note how Avicenna finds a way around the arguments from motion here again by saying that the act of intellection pervades all being, encompassing all of its functions.

For, the Necessarily Existent intellects not only Itself, but also what is engendered out of the first principles of existent things (267). Existence, therefore, comes about by reason of some principle cause and particular things come about as a result of this cause. The Necessarily Existent knows the principle causes and what coincides with them, as well as their recurrences. Yet, the Necessarily Existent does not know the particular, “he cannot know this or that” (268), but understands the particular existent only insofar as it partakes in the universal (i.e. the attributes of the Necessarily Existent).

As a result of these universal attributes, we can provide individual existents with their descriptions and characterizations (since they partake in the universal). In this way, someone can come to describe and classify an individual existent which is alone amongst its species, like the sphere of the Sun or Jupiter. This universality of description is what is called “essence”. The Sun and Jupiter exist as particular existents, but in order to describe them we must use universal attributes, or essences. An essence is a consistent way to apply descriptions to existents. Avicenna uses the example of eclipses. “You know each eclipse and each particular conjunction and opposition, but in a universal way. […] It is universal due to the fact that it [applies] to many eclipses” (268-9).

As for the Necessarily Existent, it is inconceivable to apply time and temporal knowledge to him. As such, the Necessarily Existent only comprehends existents through the essences. “The First knows everything from itself on account of the fact that it is a principle of one or more things which have a state and motion that are such and such, and what results from them is such and such, down to the very last division after which one can divide no further. […] These are the keys to what is unseen” (271). This means that although the Necessarily Existent only comprehends through essences, it is necessary for It to understand the smallest of particulars. This is due to the causation that the first principles create, the first principles which emanate from the Necessarily Existent.

Yet, what does this mean for the physical realm and what does this proof for God do to the argument from motion? Avicenna blatantly states that we cannot prove God’s existence by appealing to the natural, physical realm. This is where Aristotle and his closest followers, namely al-Kindi and al-Farabi, made their greatest error. It is said: “Among the ten practical guidelines that [Avicenna] offered in logic for avoiding pitfalls that fallacies present, he included advice against the Prime Mover argument, which was the mainstay of Aristotelian theology: ‘Avoid ambiguous or problematic premises like the proposition, *All that moves must have a mover, since nothing can be self-moving.*’” (75).

Also, Avicenna is reported to have said that, in short, it pains him that God should be only proved by way of motion as described in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, since the interpretations have gotten it all wrong. God’s proof has nothing to do with theological explorations like those found in Aristotle’s Metaphysics; only in the Physics does Aristotle make sound observations about the nature and necessity of God (75). This is because only in the Physics does the unmoved mover possess the complete ontological absoluteness that one expects of God; in the Metaphysics, this possession disappears, or at least is reduced in value, in favor of a more teleological-influenced conception of God.

For, what Avicenna seeks, ultimately, is for God to have an ontological basis, based on being itself, rather than God having a basis in the movement of the spheres, i.e. the physical world. Avicenna repudiates any arguments from motion for this very reason, and, as such, he also makes a clear-cut distinction between metaphysics and physics, a distinction his predecessors failed to make. This distinction renders the physical realm impotent in regards to investigating the nature of God; it can no longer be used as a means of argument. Furthermore, the argument nullifies the proofs for God which came before Avicenna since he adequately demonstrates the pitfalls of the argument from motion by defending and explicating his Necessarily Existent.

WORKS CITED

“Al-Farabi”. A Reader of Classical Arabic Philosophy. Trans. McGinnis and Reisman. 18 November 2006.
“Al-Kindi”. A Reader of Classical Arabic Philosophy. Trans. McGinnis and Reisman. 18 November 2006.
Aristotle. Metaphysics, The. Trans. Lawson-Tancred. London: Penguin, 2004. Aristotle. Physics. Trans. Hardie and Gaye. 18 November 2006. <http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/a8ph/>.
“Avicenna”. A Reader of Classical Arabic Philosophy. Trans. McGinnis and Reisman. 18 November 2006.
Bodnar, Istvan. “Aristotle’s Natural Philosophy”. 18 November 2006.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-natphil/>. 31 July 2006.
De Boer, T. J. History of Philosophy in Islam, The. New York: Dover Pub., 1967.
Fakhry, Majid. History of Islamic Philosophy, A. Third Edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.
Goodman, Lenn E. Avicenna. Second Edition. United States: Cornell Paperbacks, 2006.
Hoffe, Otfried. Aristotle. Trans. Salazar. Albany: SUNY Press, 2003.
Randall, John Herman. Aristotle. New York: Columbia Press, 1960.
Unknown. “Al-Farabi”. History of Muslim Philosophy, The.
WORKS CONSULTED Arberry, Arthur J. Avicenna on Theology. Westport: Hyperion Press, 1979.

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