User Tools

Site Tools


2012:avicennas-psychology

<html>

<a href=“http://lucianofsamosata.info/wiki/doku.php?id=submission_page”><img src=“http://lucianofsamosata.info/images/contact.png” /></a>

</html>

Avicenna's Psychology

<html><p xmlns:dct=“http://purl.org/dc/terms/”><a rel=“license” href=“http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/”><img src=“http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png” style=“border-style: none;” alt=“Public Domain Mark” /></a><br />This work (by <a href=“https://lucianofsamosata.info/wiki” rel=“dct:creator”>https://lucianofsamosata.info/wiki</a>), identified by <a href=“http://meninpublishing.org” rel=“dct:publisher”><span property=“dct:title”>Frank Redmond</span></a>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</p></html>

Authored by Frank Redmond, 2006

Before it is possible to investigate the questions “how do we think?” and “what makes us know ourselves?”, it is prudent for us to first identify what the “soul” is, for without identifying what the soul basically is, everything that follows in our investigation will lack a fundamental basis. Avicenna, likewise, begins his investigations into the nature of the intellect by establishing the existence of the soul and then defining it as soul.

According to Avicenna, it is a matter of common observation that we detect in nature certain bodies which display attributes like locomotion, volition, nutrition, growth, and reproduction. It is also evident that these attributes do not belong to or issue from the bodies' corporeality, but from something else - the “soul”. In short, the “soul” is “the thing out of which these actions [ i.e. locomotion, volition, etc.] issue” (McGinnis & Reisman 319). It is the mover out of which actions are set in motion.

Animals and plants, therefore, are composed of both corporeality and soul, and only in this way are they complete and able to subsist. To Avicenna, there are two different ways to subsist however: potentially and actually. The body only exists potentially and the soul logically exists actually. It is through the soul that an animal or plant exists actually and perfectly. But the soul itself is not the body or a part of the body, but is a form “placed upon” the material body to generate an animal or plant subject.

The soul does not have a single function or purpose, but many. Avicenna lists four: (1) The soul is a “faculty” since actions issue from it; (2) It's a “potentiality” since it receives forms from both sensible and intelligible objects; (3) It's a “form” in relation to the matter it inhabits; (4) It's a “perfection” since it perfects the species from the genus (321). The many functions the soul plays only hints at its layered complexity.

To repeat, we must keep in mind that the soul performs these functions perfectly. As Avicenna says, “when we define the soul as a perfection, this most properly denotes its meaning and likewise includes all species of the soul in all respects, not excluding the soul that is separate from matter” (322). This perfection has two modes: the first and the second, respectively. The first is a simple perfection where the species becomes like a species, like the shape that forms a gun. The second, which is more complex, constitutes what comes after this first perfection, namely the actions and passions emanating from the first perfection, like firing the gun. It is within this second perfection that things distinctly human, like deliberation and discernment, and things animal, like sensation and locomotion, reside.

Now that we understand that the soul is perfect and performs flawlessly and that it is the source of life in an animal or plant, it is imperative to understand how the human soul functions, or “how do we think?”. To Avicenna, the principle property specific to the human is conceptualization. We, as humans, have the power to intellect and think through universal accounts which are abstracted from all matter. In this way, we “assent” to knowledge, rather than having knowledge descend to us (338). However, this is not the only way in which we think; we also think freely on particular things. It is useful to think of particular knowledge as knowledge of practical sense. For instance, “A universal conviction about how one should build a house does not on its own result in the building of the house. For actions deal with particular things and result from particular opinions because the universal, as a universal, does not apply uniquely to one particular” (338). As we can see, the human soul has two faculties: one related to universal opinions, and another related to particulars, especially in relationship to good versus evil, and beneficial versus harmful, and right versus wrong. It is this practical intellect that arrives at decisions and then resolves to move towards their ends or goals based on the judgment derived from these decisions. This action is not dissimilar to the movements and intellectual achievements of animals, and in this way humans are mentally related to them. Yet, importantly, we must keep in mind the fact that this faculty, the faculty to resolve problems, derives from our ability to deduct from universal opinions.

The human intellect is thus divided into two main faculties of possible thought: the faculty related to scientific investigations, the so-called theoretical intellect; and the faculty related to ordinary action, the so-called practical intellect.

The theoretical intellect is the investigative faculty and therefore determines what is true versus false; what is necessary, possible, or impossible; and what the primary premises of deductive reasoning are. This intellect is the one which supports opinions, or conclusive convictions based on evidence free from bias. It uses pure reason to make conclusions, and steers clear of use of sensory knowledge. The theoretical intellect, therefore, dwells in the uppermost echelons of the human soul and has no need for what functions are below it (341). It also has a predisposition not to associate with the functions that lie below.

The practical intellect, one the other hand, is the faculty related to practical action and is used to determine what is good versus evil; what is right, wrong, and permissible; and it holds the commonly held premises of the general population, ones based on assumption and tenuous results of methodic experience (340). This is intellect is the one which is subject to assumptions, or the having of a biased conviction contrary to possibility otherwise. Furthermore, this intellect depends on the body for its actions, and is rather inconsistent as result of this. It is here, in the practical intellect, that animalistic drives, such as desire and anger, form and manifest themselves; these drives are incited in one's faculty based on imagery found externally to the subject. (reword).

Another important facet of human thought is the ability to think empirically, or through sense data. It is no mistake that this way of perception is related to the practical intellect, for it does not use pure reason to think, but images and though the body. This way of perception is entangled with the animal intellect, for “the soul seeks the aid of the body to obtain basic principles for the purpose of conception and assent” (349). The animal soul uses the particulars, or sense data, perceived from the external world in order to make four things. (1) The animal soul can obtain simple universals from particular sense data by noting what is essential and what is not, what is common and what is unique. In this way, the imaginative faculty is produced. (2) The animal soul [….] (3) The animal soul acquires basic premises by using methodic experience. This is the case since the animal soul, by identifying things using sensory perception, connects the subject of a thing with its predicate, thus leading the soul to be confident that there exists a relationship between the subject and predicate of the particular thing. In other words, the soul understands and becomes habituated with the thing in question, thereby becoming confident in its tangible existence. (4) The animal soul acquires knowledge from widespread reports (348-9). Once the animal soul obtains knowledge from these particular sources, it turns back on itself, and ruminates over the data which it has received. This act of thought reflexivity can be disrupted if it happens to be distracted by a lower faculty. But if it not distracted, the soul either uses the information at hand, or “stores” the information that it has taken in for use at another time. The latter occurs so the soul can function without having to constantly seek the aid of the imagery faculty since the consultation of the imagery faculty is something that occurs frequently in the beginning and then tapers off over time as experience and knowledge accrues. Once the animal soul reaches a certain height, it is considered strong and no longer needs the senses, the body, or other imagery to perform its functions.

Now that we have addressed the issue on “how do we think?”, it is imperative for us to investigate the question “what makes us know ourselves?”. To begin, Avicenna makes it clear that the soul and the body are two separate entities. The soul can thrive on its own without the body's assistance, and the soul is not subject to the same corruption that a body is - “human souls do not suffer corruption; the soul does not die with the death of the body” (355).

With that established, Avicenna wishes to demonstrate that even if we lose parts of our bodies, or even the whole, we still are ourselves. For example, if my whole body suddenly lost part of itself, I would still know and apprehend the fact that I am still myself, even if I were missing an appendage or two. My appendages are nothing but tools in order to fulfill certain needs of my body, and if those needs were to disappear, there would be no further need of my appendages. But what if a man were to appear suddenly out of thin air without limbs, organs, or any corporeality at all? He would certainly lack the ability to touch external objects, or hear sounds, or know that his organs exist; in essence, he could not depend on the five senses for data since he does not have any sense organs. Yet, Avicenna states that he would still be able to know that he exists as a singular thing despite not knowing anything else. Thus he concludes that our bodily members have nothing to do with our apprehension of ourselves. We only think that our bodies are essential since we have always had bodily members, and we therefore have come to think of these members as parts of our real selves (376).

Similarly, if we were composed of one specific bodily organ, then that organ would be believed to be ourselves. “What that organ is, namely, its being a heart, a brain, or some other organ or organs with this description, is identical to it or its totality is identical to the thing I perceive myself to be myself, then my perception that I am must be my perception of that thing” (377). Just like the bodily parts example, “I” cannot perceive anything different from the organ that I am. This is true, not because “I” am the organ itself, but because through experiential knowledge I have come to know that I am this organ. To repeat, I do not know that I am I because of the bodily attributes I am composed of physically. It is only an accident that I perceive myself to be this or that organ. Instead, I am I when I say things like “I sensed”, “I intellected”, “I thought”, or in the words of Descartes - Cogito ergo sum.

But is “I” not a soul either, just like how “I” is not a body? Avicenna unequivocally states that “'I' always knows IT as the thing intended by what I call 'soul'” (377). Once one comes to an understanding that the soul is “I”, it becomes evident what controls the body's tools such as the motive and perceptive faculties. All motions and perceptions of the body can be traced back to the “soul” or “I”. In fact, the “I” is merely using the body, but is not part of the body. In its imagined form, the “I” is totally without corporeality.

2012/avicennas-psychology.txt · Last modified: 2015/12/16 11:03 by 127.0.0.1

Except where otherwise noted, content on this wiki is licensed under the following license: Public Domain
Public Domain Donate Powered by PHP Valid HTML5 Valid CSS Driven by DokuWiki