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Functions of the Soul and Knowledge of the Self - Avicenna
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Authored by Frank Redmond, 2005
Before it is possible to investigate the questions “how do we think?” and “what makes us know ourselves?”, it is prudent for us to first identify what the soul is. Without identifying what the soul basically is, everything that follows in our investigation will lack a fundamental basis. Avicenna, likewise, begins his investigations into the nature of the soul by establishing the existence of the soul and then defining it as soul.
According to Avicenna, it is a matter of common observation that we detect in nature certain bodies which display attributes like locomotion, volition, nutrition, growth, and reproduction. It is also evident that these attributes do not belong to or issue from the bodies' corporeality, but from something else - the “soul”. In short, the “soul” is “the thing out of which these actions [i.e. locomotion, volition, etc.] issue” (McGinnis & Reisman 319). It is the mover out of which actions are set in motion, in the most basic sense.
Animals (this includes humans) and plants, therefore, are composed of both corporeality and soul, and only in this way are they complete and able to subsist. To Avicenna, there are two different ways to subsist however: potentially and actually. The body only exists potentially and the soul logically exists actually. It is through the soul that an animal or plant exists actually and perfectly. But the soul itself is not the body or a part of the body, but is a form “placed upon” the material body to generate an animal or plant subject.
The soul does not have a single function or purpose, but many. Avicenna lists four: (1) The soul is a “faculty” since actions issue from it; (2) It's a “potentiality” since it receives forms from both sensible and intelligible objects; (3) It's a “form” in relation to the matter it inhabits; (4) It's a “perfection” since it perfects the species from the genus (321). To repeat, we must keep in mind that the soul performs its functions perfectly. As Avicenna says, “when we define the soul as a perfection, this most properly denotes its meaning and likewise includes all species of the soul in all respects, not excluding the soul that is separate from matter” (322).
Now that we understand that the soul is perfect and performs flawlessly and that it is the source of life in an animal or plant, we are in a better position to understand how the human soul functions and thinks. Therefore, how do we think? To begin, it is helpful to think of the human soul as composed from three main faculties, each of which individually contribute to how we think: the Vegetative, the Animal, and the Rational, respectively. The Vegetative soul, the most basic, provides us with the ability to grow, reproduce, and eat & drink. The Animal, which is much more sophisticated, controls our motor skills, our appetites, our five senses, and our cognitive ability to retain, estimate, represent, and produce. The Rational soul is the most sophisticated of the three and is the soul that separates us from the animals and plants. As we will see below, this is mainly due to our ability to theorize and make use of practical reason (Fakhry 144).
To Avicenna, the principle property specific to the human soul is conceptualization. We, as humans, have the power to intellect and think through universal accounts which are 2 abstracted from all matter. In this way, we assent to knowledge and deduct from knowledge, rather than having knowledge passively descend to us (338). However, this is not the only way in which we think; we also think freely on particular things. It is useful to think of particular knowledge as knowledge of practical sense. For instance, “A universal conviction about how one should build a house does not on its own result in the building of the house. For actions deal with particular things and result from particular opinions because the universal, as a universal, does not apply uniquely to one particular” (338). As we can see, the human soul has two faculties: one related to universal opinions, and another related to particulars, especially in relationship to questions on good versus evil, and beneficial versus harmful, and right versus wrong. It is this practical intellect that arrives at decisions and then resolves to move towards ends or goals based on these decisions. This action is not dissimilar to the movements and intellectual achievements seen in animals, and in this way humans are mentally related to them. However, we must keep in mind the fact that the ability to resolve problems derives from our ability to deduct from universal opinions, and is therefore distinctly human.
The human intellect is thus divided into two main faculties of thought: the faculty related to scientific investigations and conceptualization, the so-called theoretical intellect; and the faculty related to ordinary action, the so-called practical intellect.
The theoretical intellect is the investigative faculty and therefore determines what is true versus false; what is necessary, possible, or impossible; and what the primary premises of deductive reasoning are. This intellect is the one which supports opinions, or conclusive convictions based on evidence free from bias. It uses pure reason to make conclusions, and steers clear from using sensory knowledge to make judgments. The theoretical intellect, therefore, dwells in the uppermost echelons of the human soul and has no need for the functions that are below it (341).
The practical intellect, one the other hand, is the faculty related to practical action and is used to determine what is good versus evil; what is right, wrong, and permissible; and what the commonly held premises of the general population are, ones based on assumption and tenuous results of methodic experience (340). This is intellect is the one which is subject to assumptions, that is having a biased conviction contrary to other possibilities.“
Another important facet of human thought is the ability to think empirically, or through sense data. It is no mistake that this way of perception is related to the practical intellect, for it does not use pure reason to think, but thinks through images and through the body, for “the soul seeks the aid of the body to obtain basic principles for the purpose of conception and assent” (349). The animal soul uses the particulars, or sense data, perceived from the external world in order to obtain four things. (1) The animal soul can obtain simple universals from particular sense data by noting what is essential and what is not, what is common and what is unique. In this way, the imaginative faculty is produced. (2) The animal soul creates relationships between these simple universals. (3) The a ânimal soul acquires basic premises by using methodic experience. This is the case since the animal soul, by identifying things using sensory perception, connects the subject of a thing with its predicate, thus leading the soul to be confident that there exists a relationship between the subject and predicate of the particular thing. In other words, the animal soul understands and becomes habituated with the thing in question, thereby becoming confident in its tangible existence. (4) The animal soul acquires knowledge from widespread reports (348-9). Once the animal soul obtains knowledge from these particular sources, it turns back on itself, and ruminates over the data which it has received. This act of reflexivity can be disrupted if it happens to be distracted by a lower faculty. But if it not distracted, the animal soul either uses the information at hand, or “stores” the information that it has taken in for use at another time. The latter occurs so the animal soul can function without having to constantly seek the aid of the imagery faculty. Over time, as experience and knowledge accrues, the consultation of the imagery faculty tapers off. Once the animal soul reaches a certain height, it is considered strong and no longer needs the senses, the body, or other imagery to perform its functions. In this way, through habit and acquisition, the animal soul can approach the sanctity and perfection of the rational intellect.
So, how do we apprehend ourselves? Avicenna answers our question in a very peculiar, albeit ingenious, way; he constructs a proof, taking as its basis the fact that the soul is separate from the body and its constituent parts and is not corruptible, and takes these rational premises to their logical extremes. To repeat, Avicenna makes it clear from the outset that the soul and the body are two separate entities. The soul can thrive on its own, and it does å, without the body's assistance, and the soul is not subject to the same corruption that a body is, for “human souls do not suffer corruption; the soul does not die with the death of the body” (355).
Avicenna wishes to demonstrate that even if we lose parts of our bodies, or even the whole, we still are ourselves, we survive the body. If my whole body suddenly lost a part of itself, I would still know and apprehend the fact that I am still myself, even if I were missing an appendage. My appendages are nothing but tools in order to fulfill certain needs of my body, and if those needs were to disappear, there would be no further need of my appendages. But what if a man were to appear suddenly out of thin air without limbs, organs, or any corporeality at all? He would certainly lack the ability to touch external objects, or hear sounds, or know that his organs exist; in essence, he could not depend on the five senses for data since he does not have any sense organs. Yet, A Ôvicenna states that he would still be able to know that he exists as a singular thing despite not knowing anything else. Thus he concludes that our bodily members have nothing to do with our apprehension of ourselves. We only think that our bodies are essential since we have always had bodily members, and we therefore have come to think of these members as parts of our real selves (376).
Similarly, if we were composed of one specific bodily organ, then that organ would be believed to be ourselves. “What that organ is, namely, its being a heart, a brain, or some other organ or organs with this description, is identical to it or its totality is identical to the thing I perceive myself to be myself, then my perception that I am must be my perception of that thing” (377). Just like the bodily parts example, I cannot perceive anything different from the organ that I am. This is true, not because I am the organ itself, but through experiential knowledge I have come to know that I am this or that organ. To repeat, I do not know that I am I because of the bodily attributes I am composed of physically. It is only an accident that I perceive myself to be this or that organ. Instead, I am I when I say things like “I sensed”, “I intellected”, “I thought”. Cogito ergo sum.
But is the I the soul? Avicenna unequivocally states that I always knows itself as the thing intended by what Avicenna calls “soul” (377). Once one comes to an understanding that the soul is I, it becomes evident who (or what) controls the body's tools such as the motive and perceptive faculties. All motions and perceptions of the body can be traced back to this “soul” or I. In fact, the I is merely using the body, but is definitively not part of the body.
WORKS CITED
“Avicenna”. A Reader of Classical Arabic Philosophy. Trans. McGinnis and Reisman. 25 Oct. 2006.
Fakhry, Majid. History of Islamic Philosophy, A. New York