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MetaPhysics: II.1-5: “Necessity and Contingency”
To begin, Avicenna wishes to provide a faint definition of what necessary and contingent existence are. He directly states that a necessarily existent thing is a thing which cannot be conceived of as non-existing; in turn, the contingently existent thing is a thing which can be conceived of as either non-existing or existing. Thus the necessary thing must be, whereas the contingent thing has no “must” about it in any way. The necessary thing can also exist through itself or not through itself. What does this mean? If the necessary thing is through itself, then it must owe this existence to itself, not to any other existing thing. But if the necessary thing is not through itself, then it must come about through something other than itself. Avicenna gives an example from mathematics to explain this point. “Four exists necessarily not through itself, but only when positing two plus two” (McGinnis and Reisman 383). Therefore, something can become necessary through the process of a synthesis of elements. The process of “burning” does not exist by itself, but only when what causes burning and what is to be burned meet does the necessity “burning” arise.
However “one thing cannot exist simultaneously as necessary through itself and necessary through another” (383). Why? This is true because if the “other” is removed than either of two things will occur: (1) the necessity of existence will not change since it does not exist through another, or (2) the necessity of existence will disappear thus proving that it is not through itself; in other words, the thing is contingent and therefore possesses possibility.
Potentially, when this contingent thing is considered on its own, there are three ways for this contingent thing to exist: necessarily, possibly, or impossibly. Yet, it cannot exist impossibly since this is an absurdity. Nor does can it exist necessarily, for a necessary thing simply cannot exist through another (384). So what remains is “possibility” for contingency. The “it itself – in itself without condition – exists possibly” (384).
Avicenna establishes the fact that what is contingent is possible, and visa-versa, as well as necessary through another. What this means is that if something is possible and the thing before this something was possible, then nothing new has come to be; whereas if the new state is necessary and made necessary for the first possible thing, then the new thing that has come into being has emerged through necessity. And finally, the existence of the possible thing, as is explained above, is either through itself or through some exterior cause. If this thing comes about through itself, then it is naturally necessary; if it comes about through a cause, then its existence is simultaneous with the existence of the cause itself (385). In brief, whatever is not from the necessary cannot exist.
Moreover, the “necessary existent” cannot come to be from two or more existents in any way. This is the case since the necessary existent has come about through itself and not through another, and since two (or more) cannot exist necessarily through the other. If the latter were true, X would be through Y for necessity, and Y would be through X for necessity, and this is absurd. Rather, X and Y must be considered to be related to one another. Metaphysics II.12-13: “The Necessarily Existent”
To prove the existence of God, or as Avicenna calls Him, the “Necessarily Existent”, Avicenna immediately posits the fact that “undoubtedly there is existence, and all existence is either necessary or possible” as a first premise (388). He then continues to mention that if all is necessary or possible then it only follows that there is a Necessarily Existent Being. This should be the aim of our investigations. He furthermore wishes to show that all possible being terminates with this Necessarily Existent Being (388).
Avicenna then advances the premise that “at any one and the same time there cannot be for anything that is possible in itself a cause that is itself possible ad infinitum” (388). The reason he gives for this premise is that it is either that everything exists together or everything does not. If everything exists together, then it follows that a totality exists necessarily through itself or possibly through itself, but it is a totality nonetheless. Now he considers the two possibilities based from this premise: (1) the totality could exist necessarily through itself, but if each of the members is a possibility, then this potential is an absurdity, for whatever exists necessarily cannot subsist by means of possible things; (2) if the totality exists possibly, then the totality needs something that provides existence, and this can only come from an external or internal source.
And so, if the totality is formed from something internal to the totality, an absurdity erupts since the totality cannot be the cause of its own existence. However, Avicenna does suggest that this is the ideal way that the Necessarily Existent should be sought out – “for anything that is sufficient to necessitate itself is something existing necessarily” (389). Yet Avicenna declares this as false since it was assumed not to exist necessarily. The other option, namely that the totality exists from an external source, cannot be true either since we included every cause existing possibly in this totality (389).
Moreover, the Necessarily Existent must intellect Itself and Things. Now, it would be inconceivable to posit that the Necessarily Existent intellects by the way of things, for that would mean (1) the Necessarily Existent would subsist through things (which is absurd) and (2) intellecting would become an accident of the Necessarily Existent's being (which is absurd). Rather, the First Principle (i.e. the Necessarily Existent) “intellects by way of itself anything of which it is a principle” (391). By this he means that the Necessarily Existent is the principle of things which are complete and things that are subject to corruption and generation. In this way, the Necessarily Existent encompasses all being, both necessary and contingent. And It also intellects everything universally, but yet no individual thing escapes Its notice or attention.
To end, the Necessarily Existent is two major things: (1) It is the Being of which all beings terminate; (2) It exists by intellecting both Itself and beings, both necessary and contingent. Importantly, the Necessarily Existent only intellects on the universal level.
Metaphysics II.19: “Existence and Essence”
The Necessarily Existent intellects not only Itself, but also what is engendered out of the first principles of existent things (267). Existence, therefore, comes about by reason of some cause and particular things come about as a result of this cause. The Necessarily Existent knows the causes and what coincides with them, as well as their recurrences. Yet, the Necessarily Existent does not know the particular, “he cannot know this or that” (268), but understands the particular existent only insofar as it partakes in the universal (i.e. the attributes of the Necessarily Existent).
As a result of these universal attributes, we can provide individual existents with their descriptions and characterizations (since they partake in the universal). In this way, someone can come to describe and classify an individual existent which is alone amongst its species, like the sphere of the Sun or Jupiter. This universality of description is what is called “essence”. The Sun and Jupiter exist as particular existents, but in order to describe them we must use universal attributes, or essences. An essence is a consistent way to apply descriptions to existents. Avicenna uses the example of eclipses. “You know each eclipse and each particular conjunction and opposition, but in a universal way. […] It is universal due to the fact that [applies] to many eclipses” (268-9).
As for the Necessarily Existent, it is inconceivable to apply time and temporal knowledge to him. The Necessarily Existent only comprehends existents through the essences. “The First knows everything from itself on account of the fact that it is a principle of one or more things which have a state and motion that are such and such, and what results from them is such and such, down to the very last division after which one can divide no further. […] These are the keys to what is unseen” (271). This means that although the Necessarily Existent only comprehends through essences, it is necessary for It to understand the smallest of particulars. This is due to the causation that the first principles create, first principles that belong to the Necessarily Existent.
