<html>
<a href=“http://lucianofsamosata.info/wiki/doku.php?id=submission_page”><img src=“http://lucianofsamosata.info/images/contact.png” /></a>
</html>
<html><p xmlns:dct=“http://purl.org/dc/terms/”><a rel=“license” href=“http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/”><img src=“http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png” style=“border-style: none;” alt=“Public Domain Mark” /></a><br />This work (by <a href=“https://lucianofsamosata.info/wiki” rel=“dct:creator”>https://lucianofsamosata.info/wiki</a>), identified by <a href=“http://meninpublishing.org” rel=“dct:publisher”><span property=“dct:title”>Frank Redmond</span></a>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</p></html>
Aristotle's Book Zeta introduces us to two primary kinds of generation: spontaneous and artistic. Aristotle's inquiry is: “Why [are] some things produced spontaneously as well as by art, e.g. health, while others are not, e.g. a house?” (…). Aristotle's goal, in other words, is to determine how things generate and why they do. For instance, why is health produced by two kinds of generation, while a house only one? To answer this, Aristotle looks to matter itself. Only matter that is capable of self-motion can be spontaneously generated, and in situations where this is impossible, an external mover is required to generate the matter. In Aristotle's words, “some matter is such as to be set in motion by itself and some is not of this nature, and of the former kind some can move itself in the particular way required, while other matter is incapable of this” (…). Averroes, in his commentary and analysis, takes this to imply, simply, things which are self-moved generate in a similar fashion to those which are generated by their like. Moreover, things generated from themselves, unlike those which are not generated as a result of their like, are generated in a similar manner to those things which in their matter there exists a power from which things come to be. To Averroes, what Aristotle means by this comment is that the generation of accidents is similar to the way the generation of substances that come to be from different kinds (441). Generation, therefore, only concerns things that have the same form but are numerically different.
Furthermore, Aristotle suggests that every product of art is produced from a thing which shares its name, as with natural products, or from a part of itself which shares a name, just like how a house is produced from another house, qua by the mind (…). What this means is that the producer has the same form as the produced. To Aristotle, this also applies to things that are purely rational and not natural; a house cannot be built without the form, or idea, of the house in the mind of the builder, so, in effect, the builder inculcates the form he has in his mind into the house he is building. Pertaining to this, Averroes comments that what is produced is like the producer merely “in a sense” because the produced is not always the same as the producer; it can be a little different. For instance, the house which is built from the other house qua by the mind does not have to be an exact replica of the first house; rather, it can be a little deviant as long as the general form, or blueprint, exists in the mind of the builder.
Aristotle then jumps to say that substance is the starting-point of everything. It is by first identifying “what a thing is?” that syllogisms start and from substance we also find processes of production to start (…). Averroes likewise, says that all generalizations begin with substance as the starting point of everything; it is from the “what?” that generalizations derive. In this way, Averroes and Aristotle have consonant views.
We now proceed to discuss a third kind of generation: natural. Things which are formed by nature are formed like the aforementioned products of art. Take the seed for instance. The seed is productive in exactly the same way as things that work by art. It has a potential form, and like artistic productions, the producer and the produced are the same in form and in name; a seed begets a seed. Averroes agrees. He says, for example, the seed has a form in it potentially, and the form from which the seed comes and the seed itself share a name together. This is analogous to relationship between the builder and the built building above. This is a fact for, according to Averroes, Aristotle states that substance is the beginning of things that are made; therefore, all things generated by nature result from prior essences, i.e. the seed had a prior seed for a producer (440). So, in all, things are produced either by art or nature, and that the things which are produced by works of nature are like those produced by works of art. In this way, Averroes and Aristotle easily agree. Aristotle's claim, “the seed produces just like that which comes from work”, means that the seed makes a generable thing by something in that is analogous to “work”; in short, it is the essence of what is made, i.e. the generable thing (440). And when Aristotle says that the form is in the seed “potentially”, he means that the seed rests in the seed potentially just like a work of art rests in the artist potentially.
In conclusion, therefore, it is not the form that comes to be, nor is it primary classes like quantity or quality. A “brazen sphere” comes to be, not its form, i.e. the sphere, nor its matter, i.e. the brass. “It is a concrete unity that comes to be (for the matter and the form must always exist before” (…). In other words, it is not the quality or quantity that comes to be, but the wood or the animal or whatever of that quality and quantity. Whenever a form comes to be, the form (at least a portion of it) must pre-exist. But substance is peculiar in that when substance comes to be, another substance, which must exist beforehand in complete reality, produces it. In conclusion, “it is not necessary that a quantity or a quality should pre-exist otherwise than potentially” (…). Averroes upholds this truth as well.
But what does this “truth” mean exactly? Averroes begins to answer this riddle by denouncing some of the rival claims about generation. These are: Avicenna believed that all forms come from the Active Intellect. Themistius might also have conceded to this conclusion, since he says that “the soul is not only that in which all forms are […] but also that it is implants all forms in matter and creates them” (444). As such, the forms of the elements flow from the Giver of Forms. Actual fire comes about from a motion from potential to actual. But motion does not produce the substantial form of the fire. The form of fire can only come from the Agent, the Giver of Forms. In both cases, an external agent is needed to forge the bond. These theories, to Averroes, are false. There is no need for the celestial world and the sublunary world to have a causal link.
Plato too says that while what is in its potency can only come to be through contact with something that is actual in its genus or species, we also find that there are plants and animals which go from potentiality to actuality without a seed, without substance, but are produced instead by something similar to it in form. From this information, it might be falsely believed that there are separate substances and forms for these particular plants and animals. Moreover, it might be supposed that these forms must be self-produced, whereby generation occurs from the ungenerated, or they come from an external source which can be of the subject's species or genus, or of another form altogether.
But this might also be true of what is produced by seeds given that a “soul” is not actually in the seed but merely potentially in the seed. Now, understand that whatever is in a state of potency must have something that is in actuality, since the soul is not actualized in the seed, nor is it a mixture, except to those who uphold that the soul is a mixture. Averroes mentions that many philosophers of his period called this mixture the “Active Intellect” against the view of Aristotle. It is thought that the Active Intellect provides the forms of souls to simple particulars as well as the substantial forms to the elements, and this is the solution to the enigma.
Aristotle says that the forms are not generated themselves, because then they would lack necessary matter. They would be missing one half of the equation. As a consequence, the thing that is generated is an informed thing, but if this is true, then that which generates this thing must be the thing which moves matter until it is given form. The form, hence, moves from potency to actuality (445). Now, it is a fact that what moves matter must be a body with active quality, or a substance which is activated by a touching body with active qualities. This substratum has form included with it; it cannot be any other way. This means that the agent's activity is due to the substratum's relationship with form. And what generates the substratum also generates the form. It is a simultaneous act. One should rely on this demonstration if they are to proceed in the correct Aristotelian manner.
Due to this demonstration, Aristotle was led to posit an Active Intellect that is separate from matter, since, to his mind, the intellectual powers are not mixed in with matter, so what is not mixed produces other things that are not mixed, and things that are mixed produce things that are mixed. Averroes is suggesting that, if Aristotle did not so firmly believe that the intellectual powers cannot be mixed with matter, he would not have to posit an Active Intellect to solve his enigma.
Averroes' commentary could be considered a reinforcement and defense of Aristotle's position concerning generation. While much of what Averroes says is repetitious, directly reiterating Aristotle, he succeeds in defending Aristotle against his harshest critics, namely Plato, Avicenna, and Themistius by denouncing their doctrines.
