Aristotle: Politics Book 5

[1301a] [19]

1Almost all the other subjects which we intended to treat [20] have now been discussed. There must follow the consideration of the questions, what are the number and the nature of the causes that give rise to revolutions in constitutions, and what are the causes that destroy each form of constitution, and out of what forms into what forms do they usually change, and again what are the safeguards of constitutions in general and of each form in particular, and what are the means by which the safeguarding of each may best be put into effect.2

And we must first assume the starting-point, that many forms of constitution have come into existence with everybody agreeing as to what is just, that is proportionate equality, but failing to attain it （as has also been said before）. Thus democracy arose from men's thinking that if they are equal in any respect they are equal absolutely （for they suppose that because they are all alike free they are equal absolutely）, oligarchy arose from their assuming that if they are unequal as regards some one thing they are unequal wholly （for being unequal in property they assume that they are unequal absolutely）; and then the democrats claim as being equal to participate in all things in equal shares, while the oligarchs as being unequal seek to have a larger share, for a larger share is unequal. All these forms of constitution then have some element of justice, but from an absolute point of view they are erroneous; and owing to this cause, when each of the two parties has not got the share in the constitution which accords with the fundamental assumption that they happen to entertain, faction ensues. And of all men those who excel in virtue would most justifiably stir up faction, though they are least given to doing so; [1301b] [1] for they alone can with the fullest reason be deemed absolutely unequal. And there are some men who being superior in birth claim unequal rights because of this inequality; for persons who have ancestral virtue and wealth behind them are thought to be noble.

These then roughly speaking are the starting-points and sources of factions, which give rise to party strife （and revolutions due to this take place in two ways: sometimes they are in regard to the constitution, and aim at changing from the one established to another, for instance from democracy to oligarchy, or to democracy from oligarchy, or from these to constitutional government and aristocracy, or from those to these; but sometimes the revolution is not in regard to the established constitution, but its promoters desire the same form of government, for instance oligarchy or monarchy, but wish it to be in their own control. Again it may be a question of degree; for instance, when there is an oligarchy the object may be to change to a more oligarchical government or to a less, or when there is a democracy to a more or to a less democratic government, and similarly in the case of the remaining constitutions, the aim may be either to tighten them up or to relax them. Or again the aim may be to change a certain part of the constitution, for example to establish or abolish a certain magistracy, as according to some accounts Lysander [20] attempted to abolish the kingship at Sparta and the king Pausanias the ephorate3; and also at Epidamnus the constitution was altered in part, for they set up a council instead of the tribal rulers, and it is still compulsory for the magistrates alone of the class that has political power to come to the popular assembly when an appointment to a magistracy is put to the vote; and the single supreme magistrate was also an oligarchical feature in this constitution）. For party strife is everywhere due to inequality, where classes that are unequal do not receive a share of power in proportion （for a lifelong monarchy is an unequal feature when it exists among equals）; for generally the motive for factious strife is the desire for equality. But equality is of two kinds, numerical equality and equality according to worth—by numerically equal I mean that which is the same and equal in number or dimension, by equal according to worth that which is equal by proportion4; for instance numerically 3 exceeds 2 and 2 exceeds 1 by an equal amount, but by proportion 4 exceeds 2 and 2 exceeds 1 equally, since 2 and 1 are equal parts of 4 and 2, both being halves. But although men agree that the absolutely just is what is according to worth, they disagree （as was said before5） in that some think that if they are equal in something they are wholly equal, and others claim that if they are unequal in something they deserve an unequal share of all things. Owing to this two principal varieties of constitution come into existence, democracy and oligarchy; for noble birth and virtue are found in few men, but the qualifications specified6 in more: [1302a] [1] nowhere are there a hundred men nobly born and good, but there are rich men7 in many places. But for the constitution to be framed absolutely and entirely according to either kind of equality is bad. And this is proved by experience, for not one of the constitutions formed on such lines is permanent. And the cause of this is that it is impossible for some evil not to occur ultimately from the first and initial error that has been made. Hence the proper course is to employ numerical equality in some things and equality according to worth in others. But nevertheless democracy is safer and more free from civil strife than oligarchy; for in oligarchies two kinds of strife spring up, faction between different members of the oligarchy and also faction between the oligarchs and the people, whereas in democracies only strife between the people and the oligarchical party occurs, but party strife between different sections of the people itself does not occur to any degree worth mentioning. And again the government formed of the middle classes is nearer to the people than to the few, and it is the safest of the kinds of constitution mentioned.

And since we are considering what circumstances give rise to party factions and revolutions in constitutions, we must first ascertain their origins and causes generally. They are, speaking roughly, three in number,8 which we must first define in outline separately. [20] For we must ascertain what state of affairs gives rise to party strife, and for what objects it is waged, and thirdly what are the origins of political disorders and internal party struggles.

Now the principal cause, speaking generally, of the citizens being themselves disposed in a certain manner towards revolution is the one about which we happen to have spoken already. Those that desire equality enter on party strife if they think that they have too little although they are the equals of those who have more, while those that desire inequality or superiority do so if they suppose that although they are unequal they have not got more but an equal amount or less （and these desires may be felt justly, and they may also be felt unjustly）; for when inferior, people enter on strife in order that they may be equal, and when equal, in order that they may be greater. We have therefore said what are the states of feeling in which men engage in party strife.

The objects about which it is waged are gain and honor, and their opposites, for men carry on party faction in states in order to avoid dishonor and loss, either on their own behalf or on behalf of their friends.

And the causes and origins of the disturbances which occasion the actual states of feeling described and their direction to the objects mentioned, according to one account happen to be seven in number, though according to another they are more. Two of them are the same as those spoken of before although not operating in the same way: the motives of gain and honor also stir men up against each other not in order that they may get them for themselves, as has been said before, [1302b] [1] but because they see other men in some cases justly and in other cases unjustly getting a larger share of them. Other causes are insolence, fear, excessive predominance, contempt, disproportionate growth of power; and also other modes of cause9 are election intrigue, carelessness, pettiness, dissimilarity. Among these motives the power possessed by insolence and gain, and their mode of operation, is almost obvious; for when the men in office show insolence and greed, people rise in revolt against one another and against the constitutions that afford the opportunity for such conduct; and greed sometimes preys on private property and sometimes on common funds. It is clear also what is the power of honor and how it can cause party faction; for men form factions both when they are themselves dishonored and when they see others honored; and the distribution of honors is unjust when persons are either honored or dishonored against their deserts, just when it is according to desert. Excessive predominance causes faction, when some individual or body of men is greater and more powerful than is suitable to the state and the power of the government; for such are the conditions that usually result in the rise of a monarchy or dynasty. Owing to this in some places they have the custom of temporary banishment,10 as at Argos and Athens; yet it would be better to provide from the outset that there may be no persons in the state [20] so greatly predominant, than first to allow them to come into existence and afterwards to apply a remedy. Fear is the motive of faction with those who have inflicted wrong and are afraid of being punished, and also with those who are in danger of suffering a wrong and wish to act in time before the wrong is inflicted, as the notables at Rhodes banded together11 against the people because of the law-suits that were being brought against them. Contempt is a cause of faction and of actual attacks, upon the government, for instance in oligarchies when those who have no share in the government are more numerous （for they think themselves the stronger party）, and in democracies when the rich have begun to feel contempt for the disorder and anarchy that prevails, as for example at Thebes the democracy was destroyed owing to bad government after the battle of Oenophyta,12 and that of the Megarians was destroyed when they had been defeated owing to disorder and anarchy,13 and at Syracuse before the tyranny14 of Gelo, and at Rhodes15 the common people had fallen into contempt before the rising against them. Revolutions in the constitutions also take place on account of disproportionate growth; for just as the body16 is composed of parts, and needs to grow proportionately in order that its symmetry may remain, and if it does not it is spoiled, when the foot is four cubits long and the rest of the body two spans, and sometimes it might even change into the shape of another animal if it increased disproportionately not only in size but also in quality,17 so also a state is composed of parts, [1303a] [1] one of which often grows without its being noticed, as for example the number of the poor in democracies and constitutional states. And sometimes this is also brought about by accidental occurrences, as for instance at Tarentum when a great many notables were defeated and killed by the Iapygians a short time after the Persian wars a constitutional government was changed to a democracy, and at Argos when those in the seventh tribe18 had been destroyed by the Spartan Cleomenes the citizens were compelled to admit some of the surrounding people, and at Athens when they suffered disasters by land the notables became fewer because at the time of the war against Sparta the army was drawn from a muster-roll.19 And this happens also in democracies, though to a smaller extent; for when the wealthy become more numerous or their properties increase, the governments change to oligarchies and dynasties.20 And revolutions in constitutions take place even without factious strife, owing to election intrigue, as at Heraea21 （for they made their magistrates elected by lot instead of by vote for this reason, because the people used to elect those who canvassed）; and also owing to carelessness, when people allow men that are not friends of the constitution to enter into the sovereign offices, as at Oreus22 oligarchy was broken up when Heracleodorus became one of the magistrates, who in place of an oligarchy [20] formed a constitutional government, or rather a democracy. Another cause is alteration by small stages; by this I mean that often a great change of institutions takes place unnoticed when people overlook a small alteration, as in Ambracia the property-qualification was small, and finally men hold office with none at all, as a little is near to nothing, or practically the same. Also difference of race is a cause of faction, until harmony of spirit is reached; for just as any chance multitude of people does not form a state, so a state is not formed in any chance period of time. Hence most of the states that have hitherto admitted joint settlers or additional settlers23 have split into factions; for example Achaeans settled at Sybaris24 jointly with Troezenians, and afterwards the Achaeans having become more numerous expelled the Troezenians, which was the Cause of the curse that fell on the Sybarites; and at Thurii Sybarites quarrelled with those who had settled there with them, for they claimed to have the larger share in the country as being their own, and were ejected; and at Byzantium the additional settlers were discovered plotting against the colonists and were expelled by force of arms; and the people of Antissa25 after admitting the Chian exiles expelled them by arms; and the people of Zancle26 after admitting settlers from Samos were themselves expelled; and the people of Apollonia on the Euxine Sea after bringing in additional settlers fell into faction; and the Syracusans after the period of the tyrants27 [1303b] [1] conferred citizenship on their foreign troops and mercenaries and then faction set in and they came to battle; and the Amphipolitans having received settlers from Chalcis were most of them driven out by them.28

（And in oligarchies civil strife is raised by the many, on the ground that they are treated unjustly because they are not admitted to an equal share although they are equal, as has been said before, but in democracies it begins with the notables, because they have an equal share although they are not equal.）29

Also states sometimes enter on faction for geographical reasons, when the nature of the country is not suited for there being a single city, as for example at Clazomenae30 the people near Chytrum are in feud with the inhabitants of the island, and the Colophonians and the Notians31; and at Athens the population is not uniformly democratic in spirit, but the inhabitants of Piraeus are more so than those of the city. For just as in wars the fording of watercourses, even quite small ones, causes the formations to lose contact, so every difference seems to cause division. Thus perhaps the greatest division is that between virtue and vice, next that between wealth and poverty, and so with other differences in varying degree, one of which is the one mentioned.32

Factions arise therefore not about but out of small matters; but they are carried on about great matters. And even the small ones grow extremely violent when they spring up among men of the ruling class, [20] as happened for example at Syracuse in ancient times. For the constitution underwent a revolution as a result of a quarrel that arose33 between two young men, who belonged to the ruling class, about a love affair. While one of them was abroad the other who was his comrade won over the youth with whom he was in love, and the former in his anger against him retaliated by persuading his wife to come to him; owing to which they stirred up a party struggle among all the people in the state, enlisting them on their sides. On account of this it is necessary to guard against such affairs at their beginning, and to break up the factions of the leaders and powerful men; for the error occurs at the beginning, and the beginning as the proverb says is half of the whole, so that even a small mistake at the beginning stands in the same ratio34 to mistakes at the other stages. And in general the faction quarrels of the notables involve the whole state in the consequences, as happened at Hestiaea35 after the Persian wars, when two brothers quarrelled about the division of their patrimony; for the poorer of the two, on the ground that the other would not make a return of the estate and of the treasure that their father had found, got the common people on his side, and the other possessing much property was supported by the rich. And at Delphi the beginning of all the factions that occurred afterwards was when a quarrel arose out of a marriage; [1304a] [1] the bridegroom interpreted some chance occurrence when he came to fetch the bride as a bad omen and went away without taking her, and her relatives thinking themselves insulted threw some articles of sacred property into the fire when he was performing a sacrifice and then put him to death as guilty of sacrilege. And also at Mitylene36 a faction that arose out of some heiresses was the beginning of many misfortunes, and of the war with the Athenians in which Paches captured the city of Mitylene: a wealthy citizen named Timophanes left two daughters, and a man who was rejected in his suit to obtain them for his own sons, Doxander, started the faction and kept on stirring up the Athenians, whose consul he was at Mitylene. And among the Phocians when a faction arising out of an heiress sprang up in connection with Mnaseas the father of Mnason and Euthykrates the father of Onomarchus,37 this faction proved to be the beginning for the Phocians of the Holy War. At Epidamnus also circumstances relating to a marriage gave rise to a revolution in the constitution38; somebody had betrothed his daughter, and the father of the man to whom he had betrothed her became a magistrate, and had to sentence him to a fine; the other thinking that he had been treated with insolence formed a party of the unenfranchised classes to assist him. And also revolutions to oligarchy and democracy and constitutional government arise from the growth in reputation or in power of some magistracy or some section of the state; [20] as for example the Council on the Areopagus having risen in reputation during the Persian wars was believed to have made the constitution more rigid, and then again the naval multitude, having been the cause of the victory off Salamis and thereby of the leadership of Athens due to her power at sea, made the democracy stronger; and at Argos the notables having risen in repute in connection with the battle against the Spartans at Mantinea took in hand to put down the people; and at Syracuse the people having been the cause of the victory in the war against Athens made a revolution from constitutional government to democracy; and at Chalcis the people with the aid of the notables overthrew the tyrant Phoxus39 and then immediately seized the government; and again at Ambracia similarly the people joined with the adversaries of the tyrant Periander in expelling him and then brought the government round to themselves.40 And indeed in general it must not escape notice that the persons who have caused a state to win power, whether private citizens or magistrates or tribes, or in general a section or group of any kind, stir up faction; for either those who envy these men for being honored begin the faction, or these men owing to their superiority are not willing to remain in a position of equality. And constitutions also undergo revolution when what are thought of as opposing sections of the state become equal to one another, [1304b] [1] for instance the rich and the people, and there is no middle class or only an extremely small one; for if either of the two sections becomes much the superior, the remainder is not willing to risk an encounter with its manifestly stronger opponent. Owing to this men who are exceptional in virtue generally speaking do not cause faction, because they find themselves few against many. Universally then in connection with all the forms of constitution the origins and causes of factions and revolutions are of this nature.

The means used to cause revolutions of constitutions are sometimes force and sometimes fraud. Force is employed either when the revolutionary leaders exert compulsion immediately from the start or later on—as indeed the mode of using fraud is also twofold: sometimes the revolutionaries after completely deceiving the people at the first stage alter the constitution with their consent, but then at a later stage retain their hold on it by force against the people's will: for instance, at the time of the Four Hundred,41 they deceived the people by saying that the Persian King would supply money for the war against the Spartans, and after telling them this falsehood endeavored to keep a hold upon the government; but in other cases they both persuade the people at the start and afterwards repeat the persuasion and govern them with their consent.

Speaking generally therefore in regard to all the forms of constitution, the causes that have been stated are those from which revolutions have occurred.

But in the light of these general rules we must consider the usual course of events [20] as classified according to each different kind of constitution. In democracies the principal cause of revolutions is the insolence of the demagogues; for they cause the owners of property to band together, partly by malicious prosecutions of individuals among them （for common fear brings together even the greatest enemies）, and partly by setting on the common people against them as a class. And one may see this taking place in this manner in many instances. In Cos the democracy was overthrown42 when evil demagogues had arisen there, for the notables banded themselves together; and also in Rhodes,43 for the demagogues used to provide pay for public services, and also to hinder the payment of money owed44 to the naval captains, and these because of the lawsuits that were brought against them were forced to make common cause and overthrow the people. And also at Heraclea45 the people were put down immediately after the foundation of the colony because of the people's leaders; for the notables being unjustly treated by them used to be driven out, but later on those who were driven out collecting together effected their return and put down the people. And also the democracy at Megara was put down in a similar manner46; the people's leaders in order to have money to distribute to the people went on expelling many of the notables, until they made the exiles a large body, and these came back and defeated the people in a battle and set up the oligarchy. And the same thing happened also at Cyme [1305a] [1] in the time of the democracy which Thrasymachus put down47, and in the case of other states also examination would show that revolutions take place very much in this manner. Sometimes they make the notables combine by wronging them in order to curry favor, causing either their estates to be divided up or their revenues by imposing public services, and sometimes by so slandering them that they may have the property of the wealthy to confiscate. And in old times whenever the same man became both leader of the people and general, they used to change the constitution to a tyranny; for almost the largest number of the tyrants of early days have risen from being leaders of the people. And the reason why this used to happen then but does not do so now is because then the leaders of the people were drawn from those who held the office of general （for they were not yet skilled in oratory）, but now when rhetoric has developed the able speakers are leaders of the people, but owing to their inexperience in military matters they are not put in control of these, except in so far as something of the kind has taken place to a small extent in some places. And tyrannies also used to occur in former times more than they do now because important offices were entrusted to certain men, as at Miletus a tyranny48 arose out of the presidency （for the president had control of many important matters）. And moreover, because the cities in those times were not large but the common people lived on their farms [20] busily engaged in agriculture, the people's champions when they became warlike used to aim at tyranny. And they all used to do this when they had acquired the confidence of the people, and their pledge of confidence was their enmity towards the rich, as at Athens Pisistratus made himself tyrant by raising up a party against the men of the plain, and Theagenes at Megara by slaughtering the cattle of the well-to-do which he captured grazing by the river, and Dionysius49 established a claim to become tyrant when he accused Daphnaeus and the rich, since his hostility to them caused him to be trusted as a true man of the people. And revolutions also take place from the ancestral form of democracy to one of the most modern kind; for where the magistracies are elective, but not on property-assessments, and the people elect, men ambitious of office by acting as popular leaders bring things to the point of the people's being sovereign even over the laws. A remedy to prevent this or to reduce its extent is for the tribes to elect the magistrates, and not the people collectively.

These then are the causes through which almost all the revolutions in democracies take place.

Oligarchies undergo revolution principally through two ways that are the most obvious. One is if they treat the multitude unjustly; for anybody makes an adequate people's champion, and especially so when their leader happens to come from the oligarchy itself, like Lygdamis at Naxos, who afterwards actually became tyrant of the Naxians. [1305b] [1] Faction originating with other people also has various ways of arising. Sometimes when the honors of office are shared by very few, dissolution originates from the wealthy themselves,50 but not those that are in office, as for example has occurred at Marseilles,51 at Istrus,52 at Heraclea,53 and in other states; for those who did not share in the magistracies raised disturbances until as a first stage the older brothers were admitted, and later the younger ones again （for in some places a father and a son may not hold office together, and in others an elder and a younger brother may not）. At Marseilles the oligarchy became more constitutional, while at Istrus it ended in becoming democracy, and in Heraclea the government passed from a smaller number to six hundred. At Cnidus also there was a revolution54 of the oligarchy caused by a faction formed by the notables against one another, because few shared in the government, and the rule stated held, that if a father was a member a son could not be, nor if there were several brothers could any except the eldest; for the common people seized the opportunity of their quarrel and, taking a champion from among the notables, fell upon them and conquered them, for a party divided against itself is weak. Another case was at Erythrae,55 where at the time of the oligarchy of the Basilidae in ancient days, although [20] the persons in the government directed affairs well, nevertheless the common people were resentful because they were governed by a few, and brought about a revolution of the constitution.

On the other hand, oligarchies are overthrown from within themselves both56 when from motives of rivalry they play the demagogue （and this demagogy is of two sorts, one among the oligarchs themselves, for a demagogue can arise among them even when they are a very small body,—as for instance in the time of the Thirty at Athens, the party of Charicles rose to power by currying popularity with the Thirty, and in the time of the Four Hundred57 the party of Phrynichus rose in the same way,—the other when the members of the oligarchy curry popularity with the mob, as the Civic Guards at Larisa58 courted popularity with the mob because it elected them, and in all the oligarchies in which the magistracies are not elected by the class from which the magistrates come but are filled from high property-grades or from political clubs while the electors are the heavy-armed soldiers or the common people, as used to be the case at Abydos, and in places where the jury-courts are not made up from the government59—for there members of the oligarchy by courting popular favor with a view to their trials cause a revolution of the constitution, as took place at Heraclea on the Euxine60; and a further instance is when some men try to narrow down the oligarchy to a smaller number, for those who seek equality are forced to bring in the people as a helper.） And revolutions in oligarchy also take place when they squander their private means by riotous living; for also men of this sort seek to bring about a new state of affairs, and either aim at tyranny themselves or suborn somebody else [1306a] [1] （as Hipparinus put forward Dionysius61 at Syracuse, and at Amphipolis62 a man named Cleotimus led the additional settlers that came from Chalcis and on their arrival stirred them up to sedition against the wealthy, and in Aegina the man who carried out the transactions with Chares attempted to cause a revolution in the constitution for a reason of this sort63）; so sometimes they attempt at once to introduce some reform, at other times they rob the public funds and in consequence either they or those who fight against them in their peculations stir up faction against the government, as happened at Apollonia on the Black Sea. On the other hand, harmonious oligarchy does not easily cause its own destruction; and an indication of this is the constitutional government at Pharsalus, for there the ruling class though few are masters of many men64 because on good terms with one another. Also oligarchical governments break up when they create a second oligarchy within the oligarchy. This is when, although the whole citizen class is small, its few members are not all admitted to the greatest offices; this is what once occurred in Elis, for the government being in the hands of a few, very few men used to become members of the Elders,65 because these numbering ninety held office for life, and the mode of election was of a dynastic type66 and resembled that of the Elders at Sparta.

Revolutions [20] of oligarchies occur both during war and in time of peace— during war since the oligarchs are forced by their distrust of the people to employ mercenary troops （for the man in whose hands they place them often becomes tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth,67 and if they put several men in command, these win for themselves dynastic power）, and when through fear of this they give a share in the constitution to the multitude, the oligarchy falls because they are compelled to make use of the common people; during peace, on the other hand, because of their distrust of one another they place their protection in the hands of mercenary troops and a magistrate between the two parties, who sometimes becomes master of both, which happened at Larisa in the time of the government of the Aleuadae led by Simus,68 and at Abydos in the time of the political clubs of which that of Iphiades was one. And factions arise also in consequence of one set of the members of the oligarchy themselves being pushed aside by another set and being driven into party strife in regard to marriages or law-suits; examples of such disorders arising out of a cause related to marriage are the instances spoken of before, and also the oligarchy of the knights at Eretria was put down69 by Diagoras when he had been wronged in respect of a marriage, while the faction at Heraclea and that at Thebes arose out of a judgement of a law-court, when the people at Heraclea justly but factiously enforced the punishment against Eurytion on a charge of adultery [1306b] [1] and those at Thebes did so against Archias; for their personal enemies stirred up party feeling against them so as to get them bound in the pillory in the market-place. Also many governments have been put down by some of their members who had become resentful because the oligarchies were too despotic; this is how the oligarchies fell at Cnidus70 and at Chios. And revolutions also occur from an accident, both in what is called a constitutional government and in those oligarchies in which membership of the council and the law-courts and tenure of the other offices are based on a property-qualification. For often the qualification first having been fixed to suit the circumstances of the time, so that in an oligarchy a few may be members and in a constitutional government the middle classes, when peace or some other good fortune leads to a good harvest it comes about that the same properties become worth many times as large an assessment, so that all the citizens share in all the rights, the change sometimes taking place gradually and little by little and not being noticed, but at other times more quickly.

Such then are the causes that lead to revolutions and factions in oligarchies （and generally, both democracies and oligarchies are sometimes altered not into the opposite forms of constitution but into ones of the same class, for instance [20] from legitimate democracies and oligarchies into autocratic ones and from the latter into the former）.

In aristocracies factions arise in some cases because few men share in the honors （which has also been said71 to be the cause of disturbances in oligarchies, because an aristocracy too is a sort of oligarchy, for in both those who govern are few—although the reason for this is not the same in both—since this does cause it to be thought that aristocracy is a form of oligarchy）. And this is most bound to come about when there is a considerable number of people who are proud-spirited on the ground of being equals in virtue （for example the clan called the Maidens' Sons72 at Sparta—for they were descended from the Equals—whom the Spartans detected in a conspiracy and sent away to colonize Tarentum）; or when individuals although great men and inferior to nobody in virtue are treated dishonorably by certain men in higher honor （for example Lysander by the kings73）; or when a person of manly nature has no share in the honors （for example Cinadon,74 who got together the attack upon the Spartans in the reign of Agesilaus）. Faction in aristocracies also arises when some of the well-born are too poor and others too rich （which happens especially during wars, and this also occurred at Sparta at the time of the Messenian War—as appears from the poem of Tyrtaeus entitledLaw and Order; [1307a] [1] for some men being in distress because of the war put forward a claim to carry out a re-division of the land of the country）. Also if a man is great and capable of being yet greater, he stirs up faction in order that he may be sole ruler （as Pausanias who commanded the army through the Persian war seems to have done at Sparta, and Hanno75 at Carthage）.

But the actual overthrow of both constitutional governments and aristocracies is mostly due to a departure from justice in the actual framework of the constitution. For what starts it in the case of a constitutional government is that it does not contain a good blend of democracy and oligarchy; and in the case of an aristocracy it is the lack of a good blend of those two elements and of virtue, but chiefly of the two elements （I mean popular government and oligarchy）, for both constitutional governments and most of the constitutions that are called aristocracies aim at blending these. For this76 is the point of distinction between aristocracies and what are called constitutional governments, and it is owing to this that some of them77 are less and others more stable; for the constitutions inclining more towards oligarchy men call aristocracies and those inclining more to the side of the multitude constitutional governments, owing to which those of the latter sort are more secure than the others, for the greater number is the stronger, and also men are more content when they have an equal amount, whereas the owners of wealthy properties, if the constitution gives them the superior position, [20] seek to behave insolently and to gain money. And speaking broadly, to whichever side the constitution leans, that is the side to which it shifts as either of the two parties increases its own side—a constitutional government shifts to democracy and an aristocracy to oligarchy, or to the opposite extremes, that is, aristocracy to democracy （for the poorer people feeling they are unjustly treated pull it round to the opposite） and constitutional governments to oligarchy （for the only lasting thing is equality in accordance with desert and the possession of what is their own）. And the change mentioned78 came about at Thurii, for because the property-qualification for honors was too high, the constitution was altered to a lower property-qualification and to a larger number of official posts, but because the notables illegally bought up the whole of the land （for the constitution was too oligarchical, so that they were able to grasp at wealth） . . .79 And the people having been trained in the war overpowered the guards, until those who were in the position of having too much land relinquished it.

Besides, as all aristocratic constitutions are inclined towards oligarchy, the notables grasp at wealth （for example at Sparta the estates are coming into a few hands）; and the notables have more power to do what they like, and to form marriage connections with whom they like （which was the cause of the fall of the state of Locri, as a result of the marriage with Dionysius,80 which would not have taken place in a democracy; nor in a well-blended aristocracy）. [1307b] [1] And aristocracies are most liable to undergo revolution unobserved, through gradual relaxation, just as it has been said in what has gone before about all forms of constitution in general, that even a small change may cause a revolution. For when they give up one of the details of the constitution, afterwards they also make another slightly bigger change more readily, until they alter the whole system. This occurred for instance with the constitution of Thurii. There was a law that the office of general could be held at intervals of four years, but some of the younger men, becoming warlike and winning high repute with the mass of the guards, came to despise the men engaged in affairs, and thought that they would easily get control; so first they tried to repeal the law referred to, so as to enable the same persons to serve as generals continuously, as they saw that the people would vote for themselves with enthusiasm. And though the magistrates in charge of this matter, called the Councillors, at first made a movement to oppose them, they were won over, believing that after repealing this law they would allow the rest of the constitution to stand; but later, though they wished to prevent them when other laws were being repealed, they could no longer do anything more, but the whole system of the constitution was converted into a dynasty of the men who had initiated the innovations.

And constitutions of all forms [20] are broken up some times from movements initiating from within themselves, but sometimes from outside, when there is an opposite form of constitution either near by or a long way off yet possessed of power. This used to happen in the days of the Athenians and the Spartans; the Athenians used to put down oligarchies everywhere and the Spartans democracies.

We have then approximately stated the causes that give rise to revolutions in the constitutions of states and to party factions.

The next thing to speak about is security both in general and for each form of constitution separately. First then it is clear that if we know the causes by which constitutions are destroyed we also know the causes by which they are preserved; for opposites create opposites, and destruction is the opposite of security. In well-blended constitutions therefore, if care must be taken to prevent men from committing any other breach of the law, most of all must a small breach be guarded against, for transgression of the law creeps in unnoticed, just as a small expenditure occurring often ruins men's estates; for the expense is not noticed because it does not come all at once, for the mind is led astray by the repeated small outlays, just like the sophistic puzzle, ‘if each is little, then all are a little.’81 This is true in one way but in another it is not; for the whole or total is not little, but made up of little parts. One thing therefore that we must guard against is this beginning; and the next point is that we must not put faith in the arguments strung together for the sake of tricking the multitude, [1308a] [1] for they are refuted by the facts （and what sort of constitutional sophistries we refer to has been said before）. And again we must observe that not only some aristocracies but also some oligarchies endure not because the constitutions are secure but because those who get in the offices treat both those outside the constitution and those in the government well, on the one hand by not treating those who are not members of it unjustly and by bringing their leading men into the constitution and not wronging the ambitious ones in the matter of dishonor or the multitude in the matter of gain, and on the other hand, in relation to themselves and those who are members, by treating one another in a democratic spirit. For that equality which men of democratic spirit seek for in the case of the multitude is not only just but also expedient in the case of their compeers. Hence if there are a greater number in the governing class, many of the legislative enactments of a democratic nature are advantageous, for example for the offices to be tenable for six months, to enable all the compeers to participate in them; for the compeers in this case are as it were the people （owing to which demagogues often arise even among them, as has been said already）, and also oligarchies and aristocracies fall into dynasties less （for it is not so easy to do wrongs [20] when in office for a short time as when in for a long time, since it is long tenure of office that causes tyrannies to spring up in oligarchies and democracies; for either those who are the greatest men in either sort of state aim at tyranny, in the one sort the demagogues and in the other the dynasts, or those who hold the greatest offices, when they are in office for along time）. And constitutions are kept secure not only through being at a distance from destroyers but sometimes also through being near them,82 for when they are afraid the citizens keep a closer hold on the government; hence those who take thought for the constitution must contrive causes of fear, in order that the citizens may keep guard and not relax their vigilance for the constitution like a watch in the night, and they must make the distant near. Again, they must also endeavor to guard against the quarrels and party struggles of the notables by means of legislation, and to keep out those who are outside the quarrel before they too have taken it over; since to discern a growing evil at the commencement is not any ordinary person's work but needs a statesman. And to deal with the revolution from oligarchy and constitutional government that arises because of the property-qualifications, when this occurs while the rates of qualification remain the same but money is becoming plentiful, it is advantageous to examine the total amount of the rated value of the community as compared with the past amount, in states where the assessment is made yearly, over that period, [1308b] [1] and three years or five years ago in the larger states, and if the new total is many times larger or many times smaller than the former one at the time when the rates qualifying for citizenship were fixed, it is advantageous that there should be a law for the magistrates correspondingly to tighten up or to relax the rates, tightening them up in proportion to the ratio of increase if the new total rated value exceeds the old, and relaxing them and making the qualification lower if the new total falls below the old. For in oligarchies and constitutional states, when they do not do this, in the one case83 the result is that in the latter an oligarchy comes into existence and in the former a dynasty, and in the other case84 a constitutional government turns into a democracy and an oligarchy into a constitutional government or a government of the people. But it is a policy common to democracy and oligarchy [and to monarchy],85 and every form of constitution not to raise up any man too much beyond due proportion, but rather to try to assign small honors and of long tenure or great ones quickly86 （for officials grow corrupt, and not every man can bear good fortune）, or if not, at all events not to bestow honors in clusters and take them away again in clusters, but by a gradual process; and best of all to try so to regulate people by the law that there may be nobody among them specially pre-eminent in power due to friends or wealth, or, failing this, to cause their periods out of office to be spent abroad. [20] And since men also cause revolutions through their private lives, some magistracy must be set up to inspect those whose mode of living is unsuited to the constitution—unsuited to democracy in a democracy, to oligarchy in an oligarchy, and similarly for each of the other forms of constitution. And also sectional prosperity in the state must be guarded against for the same reasons; and the way to avert this is always to entrust business and office to the opposite sections （I mean that the respectable are opposite to the multitude and the poor to the wealthy）, and to endeavor either to mingle together the multitude of the poor and that of the wealthy or to increase the middle class （for this dissolves party factions due to inequality）. And in every form of constitution it is a very great thing for it to be so framed both by its laws and by its other institutions that it is impossible for the magistracies to make a profit. And this has most to be guarded against in oligarchies; for the many are not so much annoyed at being excluded from holding office （but in fact they are glad if somebody lets them have leisure to spend on their own affairs） as they are if they think that the magistrates are stealing the common funds, but then both things annoy them, exclusion from the honors of office and exclusion from its profits. And indeed the sole way in which a combination of democracy and aristocracy is possible is if someone could contrive this arrangement87; [1309a] [1] for it would then be possible for the notables and also the multitude both to have what they want; for it is the democratic principle for all to have the right to hold office and the aristocratic one for the offices to be filled by the notables, and this will be the case when it is impossible to make money from office; for the poor will not want to hold office because of making nothing out of it, but rather to attend to their own affairs, while the wealthy will be able to hold office because they have no need to add to their resources from the public funds; so that the result will be that the poor will become well-off through spending their time upon their work, and the notables will not be governed by any casual persons. Therefore to prevent peculation of the public property, let the transfer of the funds take place in the presence of all the citizens, and let copies of the lists be deposited for each brotherhood,88 company89 and tribe; and to get men to hold office without profit there must be honors assigned by law to officials of good repute. And in democracies it is necessary to be sparing of the wealthy not only by not causing properties to be divided up, but not incomes either （which under some constitutions takes place unnoticed）, and it is better to prevent men from undertaking costly but useless public services like equipping choruses and torch-races90 and all other similar services, even if they wish to; [20] in an oligarchy on the other hand it is necessary to take much care of the poor, and to allot to them the offices of profit, and the penalty if one of the rich commits an outrage against them must be greater than if it is done by one of themselves,91 and inheritance must not go by bequest but by family, and the same man must not inherit more than one estate, for so estates would be more on a level, and more of the poor would establish themselves as prosperous. And it is expedient both in a democracy and in an oligarchy to assign to those who have a smaller share in the government—in a democracy to the wealthy and in an oligarchy to the poor—either equality or precedence in all other things excepting the supreme offices of state; but these should be entrusted to those prescribed by the constitution exclusively, or to them for the most part.

There are some three qualities which those who are to hold the supreme magistracies ought to possess, first, loyalty to the established constitution, next, very great capacity to do the duties of the office, and third, virtue and justice—in each constitution the sort of justice suited to the constitution （for if the rules of justice are not the same under all constitutions, it follows that there must be differences in the nature of justice also）. It is a difficult question how the choice ought to be made when it happens that all these qualities are not found in the same person; [1309b] [1] for instance, if one man is a good military commander but a bad man and no friend of the constitution, and the other is just and loyal, how should the choice be made? It seems that two things ought to be considered, what is the quality of which all men have a larger share, and what the one of which all have a smaller share? Therefore in the case of military command one must consider experience more than virtue, for men have a smaller share of military experience and a larger share of moral goodness; but in the case of a trusteeship or a stewardship the opposite, for these require more virtue than most men possess, but the knowledge required is common to all men. And somebody might raise the question, why is virtue needed if both capacity and loyalty to the constitution are forthcoming, as even these two qualities will do what is suitable? May not the answer be, because those who possess these two qualities may possibly lack self-control, so that just as they do not serve themselves well although they know how to and although they love themselves, so possibly in some cases they may behave in this way in regard to the community also? And broadly, whatever provisions in the laws we describe as advantageous to constitutions, these are all preservative of the constitutions, and so is the supreme elementary principle that has been often stated, that of taking precautions that the section desirous of the constitution shall be stronger in numbers than the section not desirous off it. And beside all these matters one thing must not be overlooked which at present is overlooked by the, deviation-forms92 of constitution—the middle party; [20] for many of the institutions thought to be popular destroy democracies, and many of those thought oligarchical destroy oligarchies. But the adherents of the deviation-form, thinking that this form is the only right thing, drag it to excess, not knowing that just as there can be a nose that although deviating from the most handsome straightness towards being hooked or snub nevertheless is still beautiful and agreeable to look at, yet all the same, if a sculptor carries it still further in the direction of excess, he will first lose the symmetry of the feature and finally will make it not even look like a nose at all, because of its excess and deficiency in the two opposite qualities （and the same is the ease also in regard to the other parts of the body）, so this is what happens about constitutions likewise; for it is possible for an oligarchy and a democracy to be satisfactory although they have diverged from the best structure, but if one strains either of them further, first he will make the constitution worse, and finally he will make it not a constitution at all. Therefore the legislator and the statesman must not fail to know what sort of democratic institutions save and what destroy a democracy, and what sort of oligarchical institutions an oligarchy; for neither constitution can exist and endure without the well-to-do and the multitude, but when an even level of property comes about, the constitution resulting must of necessity be another one, [1310a] [1] so that when men destroy these classes by laws carried to excess they destroy the constitutions. And a mistake is made both in democracies and in oligarchies—in democracies by the demagogues, where the multitude is supreme over the laws; for they always divide the state into two by fighting with the well-to-do, but they ought on the contrary always to pretend to be speaking on behalf of men that are well-to-do, while in democracies the oligarchical statesmen ought to pretend to be speaking on behalf of the people, and the oligarchics ought to take oath in terms exactly opposite to those which they use now, for at present in some oligarchies they swear, “And I will be hostile to the people and will plan whatever evil I can against them,”93 but they ought to hold, and to act the part of holding, the opposite notion, declaring in their oaths, “I will not wrong the people.” But the greatest of all the means spoken of to secure the stability of constitutions is one that at present all people despise: it is a system of education suited to the constitutions. For there is no use in the most valuable laws, ratified by the unanimous judgement of the whole body of citizens, if these are not trained and educated in the constitution, popularly if the laws are popular, oligarchically if they are oligarchical; for there is such a thing as want of self-discipline in a state, as well as in an individual.But to have been educated [20] to suit the constitution does not mean to do the things that give pleasure to the adherents of oligarchy or to the supporters of democracy, but the things that will enable the former to govern oligarchically and the latter to govern themselves democratically. But at present in the oligarchies the sons of the rulers are luxurious, and the sons of the badly-off become trained by exercise and labor, so that they are both more desirous of reform and more able to bring it about; while in the democracies thought to be the most democratic the opposite of what is expedient has come about. And the cause of this is that they define liberty wrongly （for there are two things that are thought to be defining features of democracy, the sovereignty of the majority and liberty）; for justice is supposed to be equality, and equality the sovereignty of what ever may have been decided by the multitude, and liberty doing just what one likes. Hence in democracies of this sort everybody lives as he likes, and ‘unto what end he listeth,’ as Euripides94 says. But this is bad; for to live in conformity with the constitution ought not to be considered slavery but safety.

This therefore, speaking broadly, is a list of the things that cause the alteration and the destruction of constitutions, and of those that cause their “security and continuance.”

It remains to speak of monarchy, the causes that destroy it and the natural means of its preservation. [1310b] [1] And the things that happen about royal governments and tyrannies are almost similar to those that have been narrated about constitutional governments. For royal government corresponds with aristocracy, while tyranny is a combination of the last form of oligarchy95 and of democracy; and for that very reason it is most harmful to its subjects, inasmuch as it is a combination of two bad things, and is liable to the deviations and errors that spring from both forms of constitution. And these two different sorts of monarchy have their origins from directly opposite sources; royalty has come into existence for the assistance of the distinguished against the people, and a king is appointed from those distinguished by superiority in virtue or the actions that spring from virtue, or by superiority in coming from a family of that character, while a tyrant is set up from among the people and the multitude to oppose the notables, in order that the people may suffer no injustice from them. And this is manifest from the facts of history. For almost the greatest number of tyrants have risen, it may be said, from being demagogues, having won the people's confidence by slandering the notables. For some tyrannies were set up in this manner when the states had already grown great, but others that came before them arose from kings departing from the ancestral customs and aiming at a more despotic rule, [20] and others from the men elected to fill the supreme magistracies （for in old times the peoples used to appoint the popular officials96 and the sacred embassies97 for long terms of office）, and others from oligarchies electing some one supreme official for the greatest magistracies. For in all these methods they had it in their power to effect their purpose easily, if only they wished, because they already possessed the power of royal rule in the one set of cases and of their honorable office in the other, for example Phidon in Argos98 and others became tyrants when they possessed royal power already, while the Ionian tyrants99 and Phalaris100 arose from offices of honor, and Panaetius at Leontini and Cypselus at Corinth and Pisistratus101 at Athens and Dionysius102 at Syracuse and others in the same manner from the position of demagogue. Therefore, as we said, royalty is ranged in correspondence with aristocracy, for it goes by merit, either by private virtue or by family or by services or by a combination of these things and ability. For in every instance this honor fell to men after they had conferred benefit or because they had the ability to confer benefit on their cities or their nations, some having prevented their enslavement in war, for instance Codrus,103 others having set them free, for instance Cyrus,104 or having settled or acquired territory, for instance the kings of Sparta and Macedon and the Molossians.105 And a king wishes to be a guardian, [1311a] [1] to protect the owners of estates from suffering injustice and the people from suffering insult, but tyranny, as has repeatedly been said, pays regard to no common interest unless for the sake of its private benefit; and the aim of tyranny is what is pleasant, that of royalty what is noble. Hence even in their requisitions money is the aim of tyrants but rather marks of honor that of kings; and a king's body-guard consists of citizens, a tyrant's of foreign mercenaries. And it is manifest that tyranny has the evils of both democracy and oligarchy; it copies oligarchy in making wealth its object （for inevitably that is the only way in which the tyrant's body-guard and his luxury can be kept up） and in putting no trust in the multitude （which is why they resort to the measure of stripping the people of arms, and why ill-treatment of the mob and its expulsion from the city and settlement in scattered places is common to both forms of government, both oligarchy and tyranny）, while it copies democracy in making war on the notables and destroying them secretly and openly and banishing them as plotting against it and obstructive to its rule. For it is from them that counter-movements actually spring, some of them wishing themselves to rule, and others not [20] to be slaves. Hence comes the advice of Periander to Thrasybulus,106 his docking of the prominent cornstalks, meaning that the prominent citizens must always be made away with.

Therefore, as was virtually stated,107 the causes of revolutions in constitutional and in royal governments must be deemed to be the same; for subjects in many cases attack monarchies because of unjust treatment and fear and contempt, and among the forms of unjust treatment most of all because of insolence, and sometimes the cause is the seizure of private property. Also the objects aimed at by the revolutionaries in the case both of tyrannies and of royal governments are the same as in revolts against constitutional government; for monarchs possess great wealth and great honor, which are desired by all men. And in some cases the attack is aimed at the person of the rulers, in others at their office. Risings provoked by insolence are aimed against the person; and though insolence has many varieties, each of them gives rise to anger, and when men are angry they mostly attack for the sake of revenge, not of ambition. For example the attack on the Pisistratidae took place because they outraged Harmodius's sister and treated Harmodius with contumely （for Harmodius attacked them because of his sister and Aristogiton because of Harmodius, and also the plot was laid against Periander the tyrant in Ambracia108 because when drinking [1311b] [1] with his favorite he asked him if he was yet with child by him）,and the attack on Philip by Pausanias109 was because he allowed him to be insulted by Attalus and his friends, and that on Amyntas the Little110 by Derdas because he mocked at his youth, and the attack of the eunuch on Evagoras of Cyprus was for revenge, for he murdered him as being insulted, because Evagoras's son had taken away his wife. And many risings have also occurred because of shameful personal indignities committed by certain monarchs. One instance is the attack of Crataeas on Archelaus111; for he was always resentful of the association, so that even a smaller excuse became sufficient, or perhaps it was because he did not give him the hand of one of his daughters after agreeing to do so, but gave the elder to the king of Elimea when hard pressed in a war against Sirras and Arrabaeus, and the younger to his son Amyntas, thinking that thus Amyntas would be least likely to quarrel with his son by Cleopatra; but at all events Crataeas's estrangement was primarily caused by resentment because of the love affair. And Hellanocrates of Larisa also joined in the attack for the same reason; for because while enjoying his favors Archelaus would not restore him to his home although he had promised to do so, he thought that the motive of the familiarity that had taken place [20] had been insolence and not passionate desire. And Pytho and Heraclides of Aenus made away with Cotys112 to avenge their father, and Adamas revolted from Cotys because he had been mutilated by him when a boy, on the ground of the insult. And also many men when enraged by the indignity of corporal chastisement have avenged the insult by destroying or attempting to destroy its author, even when a magistrate or member of a royal dynasty. For example when the Penthilidae113 at Mitylene went about striking people with their staves Megacles with his friends set on them and made away with them, and afterwards Smerdis when he had been beaten and dragged out from his wife's presence killed Penthilus. Also Decamnichus took a leading part in the attack upon Archelaus, being the first to stir on the attackers; and the cause of his anger was that he had handed him over to Euripides the poet to flog, Euripides being angry because he had made a remark about his breath smelling. And many others also for similar reasons have been made away with or plotted against. And similarly also from the motive of fear; for this was one of the causes we mentioned in the case of monarchies, as also in that of constitutional governments; for instance Artapanes114 killed Xerxes fearing the charge about Darius, because he had hanged him when Xerxes had ordered him not to but he had thought that he would forgive him because he would forget, as he had been at dinner. And other attacks on monarchs have been on account of contempt, [1312a] [1] as somebody killed Sardanapallus115 when he saw him combing his hair with his women （if this story told by the narrators of legends is true—and if it did not happen with Sardanapallus, it might quite well be true of somebody else）, and Dion attacked the younger Dionysius116 because he despised him, when he saw the citizens despising him and the king himself always drunk. And contempt has led some even of the friends of monarchs to attack them, for they despise them for trusting them and think they will not be found out. And contempt is in a manner the motive of those who attack monarchs thinking that they are able to seize the government; for they make the attempt with a light heart, feeling that they have the power and because of their power despising the danger, as generals commanding the armies attack their monarchs; for instance Cyrus attacked Astyages117 when he despised both his mode of life and his power, because his power had waned and he himself was living luxuriously, and the Thracian Seuthes attacked Amadocus118 when his general. Others again attack monarchs for more than one of these motives, for instance both because they despise them and for the sake of gain, as Mithridates119 attacked Ariobarzanes.120 And it is men of bold nature and who hold a military office with monarchs who most often make the attempt for this reason; for courage possessing power is boldness, [20] and they make their attacks thinking that with courage and power they will easily prevail. But with those whose attack is prompted by ambition the motive operates in a different way from those spoken of before; some men attack tyrants because they see great profits and great honors belonging to them, but that is not the reason that in each case leads the persons who attack from motives of ambition to resolve on the venture; those others are led by the motive stated, but these attack monarchs from a wish to gain not monarchy but glory, just as they would wish to take part in doing any other uncommon deed that makes men famous and known to their fellows. Not but what those who make the venture from this motive are very few indeed in number, for underlying it there must be an utter disregard of safety, if regard for safety is not to check the enterprise; they must always have present in their minds the opinion of Dion, although it is not easy for many men to have it; Dion marched with a small force against Dionysius, saying that his feeling was that, whatever point he might be able to get to, it would be enough for him to have had that much share in the enterprise—for instance, if it should befall him to die as soon as he had just set foot in the country, that death would satisfy him.

And one way in which tyranny is destroyed, as is each of the other forms of constitution also, is from without, [1312b] [1] if some state with an opposite constitution is stronger （for the wish to destroy it will clearly be present in such a neighbor because of the opposition of principle, and all men do what they wish if they have the power）—and the constitutions opposed to tyranny are, on the one hand democracy, which is opposed to it as （in Hesiod's phrase121） ‘potter to potter,’ because the final form of democracy is tyranny, and on the other hand royalty and aristocracy are opposed to tyranny because of the opposite nature of their constitutional structure （owing to which the Spartans put down a very great many tyrannies, and so did the Syracusans at the period when they were governed well.） But one way is from within itself, when the partners in it fall into discord, as the tyranny of the family of Gelo122 was destroyed, and in modern times123 that of the family of Dionysius124—Gelo's, when Thrasybulus the brother of Hiero paid court to the son of Gelo and urged him into indulgences in order that he himself might rule, and the son's connections banded together a body of confederates in order that the tyranny might not be put down entirely but only Thrasybulus, but their confederates seizing the opportunity expelled them all; Dionysius was put down by Dion, his relative, who got the people on to his side and expelled him, but was afterwards killed. There are two causes that chiefly lead men to attack tyranny, hatred and contempt; the former, hatred, [20] attaches to tyrants always, but it is their being despised that causes their downfall in many cases. A proof of this is that most of those that have won tyrannies have also kept their offices to the end, but those that have inherited them almost all lose them at once; for they live a life of indulgence, and so become despicable and also give many opportunities to their attackers. And also anger must be counted as an element in the hatred felt for them, for in a way it occasions the same actions. And often it is even more active than hatred, since angry men attack more vigorously because passion does not employ calculation （and insolence most frequently causes men to be led by their angry tempers, which was the cause of the fall of the tyranny of the Pisistratidae and many others）, but hatred calculates more; for anger brings with it an element of pain, making calculation difficult, but enmity is not accompanied by pain. And to speak summarily, all the things that we have mentioned as causing the down fall of unmixed and extreme oligarchy and of the last form of democracy must be counted as destructive of tyranny as well, since extreme oligarchy and democracy are in reality divided125 tyrannies. Royal government on the other hand is very seldom destroyed by external causes, so that it is long-lasting; but in most cases its destruction arises out of itself. And it is destroyed in two ways, [1313a] [1] one when those who participate in it quarrel, and another when the kings try to administer the government too tyrannically, claiming to exercise sovereignty in more things and contrary to the law. Royal governments do not occur any more now, but if ever monarchies do occur they are rather tyrannies, because royalty is government over willing subjects but with sovereignty over greater matters, but men of equal quality are numerous and no one is so outstanding as to fit the magnitude and dignity of the office; so that for this reason the subjects do not submit willingly, and if a man has made himself ruler by deception or force, then this is thought to be a tyranny. In cases of hereditary royalty we must also set down a cause of their destruction, in addition to those mentioned, the fact that hereditary kings often become despicable, and that although possessing not the power of a tyrant but the dignity of a king they commit insolent outrages; for the deposition of kings used to be easy, since a king will at once cease to be king if his subjects do not wish him to be, whereas a tyrant will still be tyrant even though his subjects do not wish it.

These causes then and others of the same nature are those that bring about the destruction of monarchies.

On the other hand it is clear that monarchies, speaking generally, are preserved in safety as a result of the opposite causes to those by which they are destroyed. But taking the different sorts of monarchy separately—royalties are preserved by bringing them [20] into a more moderate form; for the fewer powers the kings have, the longer time the office in its entirety must last, for they themselves become less despotic and more equal to their subjects in temper, and their subjects envy them less. For this was the cause of the long persistence of the Molossian royalty, and that of Sparta has continued because the office was from the beginning divided into two halves, and because it was again limited in various ways by Theopompus,126 in particular by his instituting the office of the ephors to keep a check upon it; for by taking away some of the kings' power he increased the permanence of the royal office, so that in a manner he did not make it less but greater. This indeed as the story goes is what he said in reply to his wife, when she asked if he felt no shame in bequeathing the royal power to his sons smaller than he had inherited it from his father: “Indeed I do not,” he is said to have answered, “for I hand it on more lasting.”

Tyrannies on the other hand are preserved in two extremely opposite ways. One of these is the traditional way and the one in which most tyrants administer their office. Most of these ordinary safeguards of tyranny are said to have been instituted by Periander127 of Corinth, and also many such devices may be borrowed from the Persian empire. These are both the measures mentioned some time back to secure the safety of a tyranny as far as possible—the lopping off of outstanding men and the destruction of the proud,—and also the prohibition of common meals and club-fellowship and education and all other things of this nature, [1313b] [1] in fact the close watch upon all things that usually engender the two emotions of pride and confidence, and the prevention of the formation of study-circles and other conferences for debate,128 and the employment of every means that will make people as much as possible unknown to one another （for familiarity increases mutual confidence）; and for the people in the city to be always visible and to hang about the palace-gates （for thus there would be least concealment about what they are doing, and they would get into a habit of being humble from always acting in a servile way）; and all the other similar devices of Persian and barbarian tyranny （for all have the same effect）; and to try not to be uninformed about any chance utterances or actions of any of the subjects, but to have spies like the women called ‘provocatrices’ at Syracuse and the ‘sharp-ears’ that used to be sent out by Hiero wherever there was any gathering or conference （for when men are afraid of spies of this sort they keep a check on their tongues, and if they do speak freely are less likely not to be found out）; and to set men at variance with one another and cause quarrels between friend and friend and between the people and the notables and among the rich. And it is a device of tyranny to make the subjects poor, so that a guard129 [20] may not be kept, and also that the people being busy with their daily affairs may not have leisure to plot against their ruler. Instances of this are the pyramids in Egypt and the votive offerings of the Cypselids,130 and the building of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the Pisistratidae131 and of the temples at Samos, works of Polycrates132 （for all these undertakings produce the same effect, constant occupation and poverty among the subject people）; and the levying of taxes, as at Syracuse （for in the reign of Dionysius133 the result of taxation used to be that in five years men had contributed the whole of their substance）. Also the tyrant is a stirrer-up of war, with the deliberate purpose of keeping the people busy and also of making them constantly in need of a leader. Also whereas friends are a means of security to royalty, it is a mark of a tyrant to be extremely distrustful of his friends, on the ground that, while all have the wish, these chiefly have the power. Also the things that occur in connection with the final form of democracy134 are all favorable to tyranny—dominance of women in the homes, in order that they may carry abroad reports against the men, and lack of discipline among the slaves, for the same reason; for slaves and women do not plot against tyrants, and also, if they prosper under tyrannies, must feel well-disposed to them, and to democracies as well （for the common people also wishes to be sole ruler）. Hence also the flatterer is in honor with both—with democracies the demagogue （for the demagogue is a flatterer of the people）, and with the tyrants those who associate with them humbly, which is the task of flattery. [1314a] [1] In fact owing to this tyranny is a friend of the base; for tyrants enjoy being flattered, but nobody would ever flatter them if he possessed a free spirit—men of character love their ruler, or at all events do not flatter him. And the base are useful for base business, for nail is driven out by nail, as the proverb goes.135 And it is a mark of a tyrant to dislike anyone that is proud or free-spirited; for the tyrant claims for himself alone the right to bear that character, and the man who meets his pride with pride and shows a free spirit robs tyranny of its superiority and position of mastery; tyrants therefore hate the proud as undermining their authority. And it is a mark of a tyrant to have men of foreign extraction rather than citizens as guests at table and companions, feeling that citizens are hostile but strangers make no claim against him.136 These and similar habits are characteristic of tyrants and preservative of their office, but they lack no element of baseness. And broadly speaking, they are all included under three heads; for tyranny aims at three things, one to keep its subjects humble （for a humble-spirited man would not plot against anybody）, second to have them continually distrust one another （for a tyranny is not destroyed until some men come to trust each other, owing to which tyrants also make war on the respectable, as detrimental [20] to their rule not only because of their refusal to submit to despotic rule, but also because they are faithful to one another and to the other citizens, and do not inform against one another nor against the others）; and the third is lack of power for political action （since nobody attempts impossibilities, so that nobody tries to put down a tyranny if he has not power behind him）. These then in fact are the three aims to which the wishes of tyrants are directed; for all the measures taken by tyrants one might class under these principles—some are designed to prevent mutual confidence among the subjects, others to curtail their power, and others to make them humble-spirited.

Such then is the nature of one method by which security is obtained for tyrannies. The other tries to operate in a manner almost the opposite of the devices mentioned. And it can be ascertained from considering the downfall of royal governments. For just as one mode of destroying royalty is to make its government more tyrannical, so a mode of securing tyranny is to make it more regal, protecting one thing only, its power, in order that the ruler may govern not only with the consent of the subjects but even without it; for if he gives up this, he also gives up his position as tyrant. But while this must stand as a fundamental principle, all the other measures he may either adopt or pretend to adopt by cleverly acting the royal part. The first step is to be careful of the public funds, [1314b] [1] not squandering presents such as the multitudes resent, when tyrants take money from the people themselves while they toil and labor in penury and lavish it on mistresses and foreigners and craftsmen, and also rendering account of receipts and expenditure, as some tyrants have done already （for this careful management would make a ruler seem a steward of the state and not a tyrant, and he need not be afraid of ever being at a loss for funds while he is master of the state; on the contrary, for those tyrants who go abroad on foreign campaigns this is actually more expedient than to leave their money there collected into one sum, for there is less fear of those guarding it making an attempt on power; since for tyrants campaigning abroad the keepers of the treasury are more to be feared than the citizens, for the citizens go abroad with him but the others stay at home）. Secondly he must be seen to collect his taxes and benevolences for purposes of administration and to meet his occasional requirements for military emergencies, and generally must pose as guardian and steward as it were of a public fund and not a private estate. And his bearing must not be harsh but dignified, and also such as to inspire not fear but rather respect [20] in those who encounter him, though this is not easy to achieve if he is a contemptible personality; so that even if he neglects the other virtues he is bound to cultivate military valor, and to make himself a reputation as a soldier. And further more not only must he himself be known not to outrage any of his subjects, either boy or girl, but so also must everybody about him, and also their wives must similarly show respect towards the other women, since even the insolences of women have caused the fall of many tyrannies. And in regard to bodily enjoyments he must do the opposite of what some tyrants do now （for they not only begin their debaucheries at daybreak and carry them on for many days at a time, but also wish to be seen doing so by the public, in order that people may admire them as fortunate and happy）, but best of all he must be moderate in such matters, or if not, he must at all events avoid displaying his indulgences to his fellows （for not the sober man but the drunkard is easy to attack and to despise, not the wakeful man but the sleeper）. And he must do the opposite of almost all the things mentioned some time back, for he must lay out and adorn the city as if he were a trustee and not a tyrant. And further he must be seen always to be exceptionally zealous as regards religious observances （for people are less afraid of suffering any illegal treatment from men of this sort, [1315a] [1] if they think that their ruler has religious scruples and pays regard to the gods, and also they plot against him less, thinking that he has even the gods as allies）, though he should not display a foolish religiosity. And he must pay such honor to those who display merit in any matter that they may think that they could never be more honored by the citizens if they were in dependent; and honors of this kind he should bestow in person, but inflict his punishments by the agency of other magistrates and law-courts. And it is a protection common to every sort of monarchy to make no one man great, but if necessary to exalt several （for they will keep watch on one another）, and if after all the ruler has to elevate an individual, at all events not take a man of bold spirit （for such a character is most enterprising in all undertakings）; and if he thinks fit to remove somebody from his power, to do this by gradual stages and not take away the whole of his authority at once. And again he should carefully avoid all forms of outrage, and two beyond all, violent bodily punishments and outrage of the young. And this caution must especially be exercised in relation to the ambitious, for while to be slighted in regard to property annoys the lovers of wealth, slights that involve dishonor are what men of honorable ambition and high character resent. [20] Hence the tyrant should either not consort with men of this kind, or appear to inflict his punishments paternally and not because of contempt, and to indulge in the society of the young for reasons of passion, not because he has the power, and in general he should buy off what are thought to be dishonors by greater honors. And among those who make attempts upon the life of a ruler the most formidable and those against whom the greatest precaution is needed are those that are ready to sacrifice their lives if they can destroy him. Hence the greatest care must be taken to guard against those who think that insolent outrage is being done either to themselves or to those who happen to be under their care; for men attacking under the influence of anger are reckless of themselves, as Heraclitus137 also observed when he said that anger was hard to combat because it would buy revenge with a life. And since states consist of two parts, the poor people and the rich, the most important thing is for both to think that they owe their safety to the government and for it to prevent either from being wronged by the other, but whichever class is the stronger, this must be made to be entirely on the side of the government, as, if this support for the tyrant's interests is secured, there is no need for him to institute a liberation of slaves or a disarming of the citizens, for one of the two parts of the state added to his power will be enough to make him and them stronger than their attackers. But to discuss each of such matters separately is superfluous; for the thing to aim at is clear, [1315b] [1] that it is necessary to appear to the subjects to be not a tyrannical ruler but a steward and a royal governor, and not an appropriator of wealth but a trustee, and to pursue the moderate things of life and not its extravagances, and also to make the notables one's comrades and the many one's followers. For the result of these methods must be that not only the tyrant's rule will be more honorable and more enviable because he will rule nobler subjects and not men that have been humiliated, and will not be continually hated and feared, but also that his rule will endure longer, and moreover that he himself in his personal character will be nobly disposed towards virtue, or at all events half-virtuous, and not base but only half-base.

Nevertheless oligarchy and tyranny138 are less lasting than any of the constitutional governments. For the longest-lived was the tyranny at Sicyon, that of the sons139 of Orthagoras and of Orthagoras himself, and this lasted a hundred years.140 The cause of this was that they treated their subjects moderately and in many matters were subservient to the laws, and Cleisthenes because he was a warlike man was not easily despised, and in most things they kept the lead of the people by looking after their interests. At all events it is said that Cleisthenes placed a wreath on the judge who awarded the victory away from him, and some say that the statue [20] of a seated figure in the market-place is a statue of the man who gave this judgement. And they say that Pisistratus141 also once submitted to a summons for trial before the Areopagus. And the second longest is the tyranny at Corinth, that of the Cypselids,142 for even this lasted seventy-three and a half years, as Cypselus was tyrant for thirty years, Periander for forty-four,143 and Psammetichus son of Gordias for three years. And the reasons for the permanence of this tyranny also are the same: Cypselus was a leader of the people and continuously throughout his period of office dispensed with a bodyguard; and although Periander became tyrannical, yet he was warlike. The third longest tyranny is that of the Pisistratidae at Athens, but it was not continuous; for while Pisistratus144 was tyrant he twice fled into exile, so that in a period of thirty-three years he was tyrant for seventeen years out of the total, and his sons for eighteen years, so that the whole duration of their rule was thirty-five years. Among the remaining tyrannies is the one connected with Hiero and Gelo145 at Syracuse, but even this did not last many years, but only eighteen in all, for Gelo after being tyrant for seven years ended his life in the eighth, and Hiero ruled ten years, but Thrasybulus was expelled after ten months. And the usual tyrannies have all of them been of quite short duration.

The causes therefore of the destruction of constitutional governments and of monarchies and those again of their preservation have almost all of them been discussed. [1316a] [1]

The subject of revolutions is discussed by Socrates in the Republic,146 but is not discussed well. For his account of revolution in the constitution that is the best one and the first does not apply to it particularly. He says that the cause is that nothing is permanent but everything changes in a certain cycle, and that change has its origin in those numbers ‘whose basic ratio 4 : 3 linked with the number 5 gives two harmonies,’—meaning whenever the number of this figure becomes cubed,—in the belief that nature sometimes engenders men that are evil, and too strong for education to influence—speaking perhaps not ill as far as this particular dictum goes （for it is possible that there are some persons incapable of being educated and becoming men of noble character）, but why should this process of revolution belong to the constitution which Socrates speaks of as the best, more than to all the other forms of constitution, and to all men that come into existence? and why merely by the operation of time, which he says is the cause of change in all things, do even things that did not begin to exist simultaneously change simultaneously? for instance, if a thing came into existence the day before the completion of the cycle, why does it yet change simultaneously with everything else? And in addition to these points, what is the reason why the republic changes from the constitution mentioned into the Spartan form147? For all constitutions more often change into the opposite form than into the [20] one near them. And the same remark applies to the other revolutions as well. For from the Spartan constitution the state changes, he says, to oligarchy, and from this to democracy, and from democracy to tyranny. Yet revolutions also occur the other way about, for example from democracy to oligarchy, and more often so than from democracy to monarchy. Again as to tyranny he does not say whether it will undergo revolution or not, nor, if it will, what will be the cause of it, and into what sort of constitution it will change; and the reason for this is that he would not have found it easy to say, for it is irregular; since according to him tyranny ought to change into the first and best constitution, for so the process would be continuous and a circle, but as a matter of fact tyranny also changes into tyranny, as the constitution of Sicyon148 passed from the tyranny of Myron to that of Cleisthenes, and into oligarchy, as did that of Antileon149 at Chalcis, and into democracy, as that of the family of Gelo150 at Syracuse, and into aristocracy, as that of Charilaus151 at Sparta [and as at Carthage].152 And constitutions change from oligarchy to tyranny, as did almost the greatest number of the ancient oligarchies in Sicily, at Leontini to the tyranny of Panaetius,153 at Gelo to that of Cleander, at Rhegium to that of Anaxilaus,154 and in many other cities similarly. And it is also a strange idea that revolutions into oligarchy take place because the occupants of the offices are lovers of money and engaged in money-making, [1316b] [1] but not because owners of much more than the average amount of property think it unjust for those who do not own any property to have an equal share in the state with those who do; and in many oligarchies those in office are not allowed to engage in business, but there are laws preventing it, whereas in Carthage, which has a democratic government,155 the magistrates go in for business, and they have not yet had a revolution. And it is also a strange remark156 that the oligarchical state is two states, one of rich men and one of poor men. For what has happened to this state rather than to the Spartan or any other sort of state where all do not own an equal amount of wealth or where all are not equally good men? and when nobody has become poorer than he was before, none the less revolution takes place from oligarchy to democracy if the men of no property become more numerous, and from democracy to oligarchy if the wealthy class is stronger than the multitude and the latter neglect politics but the former give their mind to them. And although there are many causes through which revolutions in oligarchies occur, he mentions only one—that of men becoming poor through riotous living, by paying away their money in interest on loans—as if at the start all men or most men were rich. But this is not true, but although when some of the leaders have lost their properties they stir up innovations, when men of the other classes are ruined nothing strange happens; [20] and even when such a revolution does occur it is no more likely to end in a democracy than in another form of constitution. And furthermore men also form factions and cause revolutions in the constitution if they are not allowed a share of honors, and if they are unjustly or insolently treated, even if they have not run through all their property . . .157 because of being allowed to do whatever they like; the cause of which he states to be excessive liberty. And although there are several forms of oligarchy and of democracy, Socrates speaks of the revolutions that occur in them as though there were only one form of each.

1 Book 5 is placed as Book 7 by some editors, as Book 8 by others, see Book 3 fin., note.

2 For this distinction between broad methods of guarding against revolution and the practical means by which those methods can be put into effect Newman compares 9.2 f., 10 f.; 4.2.5 fin., 6.1.1.

3 See 1307a 34 n.

4 This ethical arithmetic is helped out in Greek by the fact that, even without the qualification κατ᾽ ἀξίαν, ἴσος often means ‘equal to desert,’ fair, just.

5 See 1301a 27 ff. and note.

6 That is, numbers and wealth.

7 Perhaps the text should be emended to give ‘there are many rich men and poor men in many places.’

8 Viz. the material, final and efficient causes of revolutions （Jowett）.

9 The four causes now mentioned are those alluded to just above （1302a 38） as an addition to the seven enumerated above, 1302a 38-b 5.

10 Cf. 1284a 18.

11 Perhaps in 390 B.C., cf. 1302b 32 f. and 1304b 27 ff.

12 Against Athens, 456 B.C.

13 See 1300a 18 n.

14 485 B.C.

15 See 1302b 23 n.

16 It is not clear whether what follows refers to a work of art （cf. 1284b 8） or is an exaggerated account of a disease; Galen describes one called σατυρίασις, in which the bones of the temple swell out like satyrs' horns.

17 i.e. if, for example, the foot became as hard as a hoof.

18 The word to be understood here may be φυλῇ, or possibly ἡμέρᾳ: the seventh day of the month was sacred to Apollo, especially at Sparta, and one account assigns Cleomenes' victory to that day, in which case the casualties may well have been known afterwards as ‘those who fell on the seventh.’

19 i.e. was made up of citizens and not of mercenaries.

20 See 1292b 10 n.

21 On the Alpheus, in Arcadia.

22 In Euboea; its secession from Sparta to Athens, 377 B.C., was perhaps the occasion of this revolution.

23 i.e. colonists not from the mother-city, admitted either at the foundation of the colony or later.

24 Sybaris, founded 720 B.C., became very wealthy. The Troezenian population when expelled were received at Croton, which made war on Sybaris and destroyed it 510 B.C. To what exactly τὸ ἄγος refers is unknown.

25 In Lesbos.

26 Later Messana, Messina.

27 Thrasybulus succeeded his brother Hiero as tyrant in 467 B.C. and fell within a year.

28 Cf. 1306a 2. The exact circumstances are unknown; Amphipolis was colonized from Athens 437 B.C.

29 This sentence is out of place here, and would fit in better if placed （as it is by Newman） above at 1301a 39, after στασιάζουσι, or （with other editors） 1301b 26.

30 Topography uncertain: Clazomenae near Smyrna was partly on a small island, which Alexander joined to the mainland with a causeway.

31 Notium was the port of Colophon.

32 i.e. difference of locality.

33 Perhaps under the oligarch of the Gamori, overthrown by the people and followed by Gelo's tyranny, 485 B.C.

34 i.e. the ratio of being a half to the whole: a bad start does as much to harm as all the later mistakes put together.

35 Also called Oreus, see 1303a 18.

36 The revolt of Mitylene 428 B.C. is ascribed to purely political causes by Thuc. 3.1-30.

37 i.e. the fathers of the two suitors for the heiress's hand turned the quarrel into a faction fight.

38 Perhaps the same event as that referred to 1301b 21.

39 Unknown.

40 580 B.C; cf. 1311a 39 ff.

41 The oligarchy at Athens 411 B.C., cf. 1305a 27.

42 Date unknown.

43 See 1302b 23 n.

44 i.e. owed for repairs to the ships, and perhaps also for advances of pay to the crews.

45 Probably the Pontic Heraclea （cf. 1305b 5, 36, 1306a 37）, founded middle of the 6th century B.C., not the Trachinian.

46 See 1300a 18 ff. n.

47 An event otherwise unknown.

48 Perhaps that of Thrasybulus （Hdt. 1.20）, 612 B.C.

49 Dionysius the elder, see 1259a 29 n.

50 The contrasted case, of dissolution of oligarchy arising from the people, should follow, but is omitted.

51 Cf. 1321a 29 ff.

52 Near the mouth of the Danube.

53 See 1304b 31 n.

54 Perhaps not the same as the one mentioned at 1306b 3.

55 Just west of Smyrna. The family name implies a claim to royal ancestry.

56 This sentence is interrupted by a parenthesis and is resumed in 5.6, ‘And revolution is oligarchy also—’.

57 See 1304b 12 n.

58 See 1275b 29 n.

59 i.e. （apparently） where membership is not confined to the class eligible for the magistracies.

60 See 1304b 31 n.

61 See 1259a 29 n.

62 See 1303b 2 n.

63 i.e. he had squandered his fortune in riotous living; this deal with the Athenian general may have been in 367 B.C.

64 i.e. both of the lower classes and of the subject cities.

65 i.e. the small governing body.

66 i.e. like a dynasteia, favorable to the interest of a few very wealthy families; see 1292b 10 n.

67 Corinth was at war with Argos circa 350 B.C. Timophanes was killed by his brother the famous Timoleon, in order to restore constitutional government.

68 A probable emendation of the Greek gives ‘happened at Larisa to Simus and his party at the time of the government of the Aleuadae.’ This family were hereditary rulers of Larisa （see also 1275b 29 ff. n., and 1305b 29 ff.）

69 Possibly before the Persian wars. See 1289b 36 ff. The two following cases are unrecorded elsewhere.

70 See 1305b 13 n.

71 See 1306a 13 ff.

72 Said to be descended from irregular unions authorized in order to keep up population during the First Messenian War. They founded Taranto 708 B.C.

73 King Pausanias II. checked Lysander after his conquest of Athens in 403 B.C. and King Agesilaus thwarted him on the expedition into Asia Minor in 396.

74 His conspiracy against the Ὅμοιοι in 398 B.C. was discovered and he was executed.

75 Perhaps Hanno who fought in Sicily against the elder Dionysius circa 4OO B.C.

76 i.e. their mode of blending oligarchy and democracy.

77 The writer loosely speaks of aristocracies and polities as a single class, differing only in degree of concentration of power in the hands of the upper classes.

78 i.e. from aristocracy to democracy. Possibly these events occurred after the defeat of Athens at Syracuse in 413 B.C., when the Athenian party at Thurii was banished （Lysias 835 D）. The events in 8 were perhaps in the fourth century.

79 Probably a clause meaning ‘civil strife ensued’ has been lost.

80 See 1259a 28 n. He married in 397 B.C. the daughter of a Locrian citizen, who bore him the younger Dionysius.

81 This is the soritesfallacy; add to one stone another, and another, and another—when do they make a heap （ σωρός）? and take away stone after stone—when do they cease to be a heap? Horace's ‘ratio ruentis acerui’ （Hor. Ep. 2.47.

82 This modifies 1207a 31.

83 i.e. if the total valuation has decreased.

84 i.e. if the total has increased.

85 Some MSS. and many editors omit these words.

86 The text should probably be emended ‘with a short tenure.’

87 i.e. render it impossible to make money out of office

88 Groups of citizens normally three to a tribe, supposed to be based on relationship.

89 Originally a military, later a civil classification.

90 Equipping the chorus and actors for tragedies and comedies and providing for the ceremonial torch-races were public services borne by individuals at Athens.

91 Or possibly ‘than if he does it against one of his own class.’

92 See 1279a 20.

93 The ‘scoffing anapaestic cadence’ of this oath has been noted. In 411 B.C. the democratic reaction at Athens swore ‘to be enemies of the Four Hundred and to hold no parley with them.’

94 Fragment 883, from an unknown play.

95 Cf. 1296a 3, 1312b 35.

96 Here δημιουργία means ‘magistracy’ generally; δημιουργός was the title of a special officer in some Peloponnesian states.

97 Official missions to religious games and to oracles.

98 Perhaps circa 750 B.C.

99 e.g. Thrasybulus, tyrant of Miletus, 612 B.C.

100 Tyrant of Agrigentum 572 B.C.

101 See 1305a 23 n.

102 See 1259a 28 n.

103 The usual tradition was that Codrus was already king when he saved Athens by sacrificing his life.

104 Cyrus liberated Persia from the Median empire 559 B.C.

105 Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, conquered the Molossi and became their king.

106 See 1284a 26 n.

107 This has not been stated, but can be inferred from what precedes.

108 See 1304a 31 n.

109 A Macedonian youth of family, who murdered Philip 336 B.C. Attalus was the uncle of Philip's wife Cleopatra.

110 Perhaps the adjective should be transferred to Derdas and expunged as an interpolated note. The persons referred to are uncertain.

111 King of Macedon 413-399 B.C. Euripides went to reside at his court 408 B.C. and died there 406 B.C. at the age of 75.

112 King of Thrace 382-358 B.C.

113 The ruling family in the early oligarchy there, claiming descent from Penthilus, an illegitimate son of Orestes.

114 Captain of Xerxes' body-guard.

115 Last king of the Assyrian empire at Nineveh.

116 Tyrant of Syracuse 367-356 and 346-343 B.C., cf. 1312a 34 ff.

117 The last king of Media, reigned 594-559 B.C.

118 Both these Thracian kings became allies of Athens 390 B.C., but the event referred to may be later.

119 Perhaps Mithridates II., who succeeded his father Ariobarzanes as satrap of Pontus 336 B.C.

120 The following sentence may have been shifted by mistake from the end of 8.14 above.

121 Hes. WD 25καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, ‘two of a trade never agree.’

122 Tyrant of Syracuse 485-478 B.C., succeeded by his brother Hiero who died 467. Gelo's son is unknown. Cf. 1315b 35 ff.

123 356 B.C., a good many years before this book was written.

124 See 1312a 4 n.

125 i.e. divided among several persons, ‘put into commission.’

126 King of Sparta circa 770-720 B.C.

127 See 1284a 26 n.

128 The phrases cover Plato's gatherings in the Academy, Aristotle's in the Peripatos of the Lyceum, and other meetings for the intellectual use of leisure in gymnasia, palaestrae and leschae.

129 Apparently this means a citizen force side by side with the tyrant's mercenaries; a variant gives ‘in order that the （tyrant's） guard may be kept.’

130 Cypselus and his son Periander （1310b 29 n., 1284a 26 n.） dedicated a colossal statue of Zeus at Olympia and other monuments there and at Delphi.

131 Pisistratus is said to have begun the temple of Olympian Zeus at Athens, not finished till the time of Hadrian.

132 Tyrant of Samos, d. 522 B.C.

133 See 1259a 28 n.

134 Cf. 1309b 27 ff.

135 The proverb ἡλῷ ἧλος ἐκκρούεται usually meant driving out something by a thing of the same kind （‘set a thief to catch a thief’）, not as here the execution of evil designs by appropriate agents.

136 i.e. do not claim honors as against their patron, claim to be his equals.

137 The natural philosopher of Ephesus, fl. circa 513 B.C., known as ὁ σκοτεινός for his epigrammatic obscurity.

138 Oligarchy is not mentioned in what follows, and the context deals with the forms of monarchy. Tyranny is included among the constitutions at 1312a 40, but not elsewhere in this Book. Some editors bracket ll. 19-29 as spurious or out of place.

139 i.e. descendants; Cleisthenes was his grandson.

140 From 670 B.C.

141 See 1305a 23 n.

142 From 655 B.C.

143 The Greek may be corrected to ‘forty and a half’ to give the stated total.

144 See 1305a 23 n.

145 See 1312b 12 n.

146 Plato, Republic, Bks. 8, 9 init.; the mathematical formula for the change from Aristocracy to Timocracy quoted here occurs at Plat. Rep. 546c—see Adam's note there.

147 Timocracy, Plat. Rep. 545a.

148 See 1315b 13 n.

149 Unknown, cf. 1304a 29 n.

150 See 1302b 33 n.

151 See 1271b 26 n.

152 This clause seems an interpolation; cf. b 6.

153 See 1310b 29 n.

154 Unknown. Reggio is related to Sicily as Dover is to France.

155 Apparently this clause also is an interpolation, or ‘democratic’ is a copyist's mistake for ‘oligarchic’ or ‘timocratic,’ see 1272b 24 ff.

156 Plat. Rep. 551d

157 Some words appear to be lost here; what follows refers to democracy, cf. Plat. Rep. 587b.