Demosthenes: Speeches 21-30

The brutality and insolence with which Meidias treats everyone alike are, I suppose, as well known to you, gentlemen of the jury, as to all other citizens. For myself, I have simply taken the course which anyone of you would have adopted, had he been the victim of a similar outrage. I lodged a plaint in the Assembly against him as an offender in connection with the festival, not only for his assault on my person at the Dionysia, but for many other acts of violence during the whole period when I served as chorus-master. [2] But when the whole people, acting honorably and rightly, evinced such anger, such exasperation, such deep concern at the wrongs which they knew I had suffered, that, in spite of the frantic efforts of the defendant and a few supporters, they were deaf to their arguments, shut their eyes to their wealth and their promises, and condemned him by an unanimous show of hands, thereupon, gentlemen of the jury, many citizens, including some of you who are here in court, came to me and demanded and even implored that I should take the further step of bringing Meidias under your jurisdiction; and they did so, I think, for two reasons, men of Athens, because, so help me heaven! they thought that my own wrongs were serious, and they also wished to punish Meidias for conduct which they had witnessed on other occasions, as a scoundrel and a ruffian who could no longer be tolerated. [3] This being so, I have in your interests taken all due precautions, and now that the case is before the court, I am here, as you see, to accuse him, having refused large sums of money, men of Athens, which I might have accepted on condition of dropping the prosecution, and having had to steel myself against many appeals and favorable offers-yes, and even menaces. [4] What yet remains to do is in your hands; but my hope is that the more the defendant has pestered you with his solicitations—I observed just now what he was up to in front of the courthouse-more likely I am to obtain justice. For I would not insult any of you by imagining that you will be indifferent to the cause in which you so heartily supported me before, or that, in order to grant Meidias immunity for future outrages, any juryman remembering his oath will give other than what he considers a righteous verdict. [5] Now if, men of Athens, I were going to accuse Meidias of unconstitutional proposals or of misconduct on an embassy or of any offence of that sort, I should not feel justified in appealing for your sympathy, for I consider that in such cases the plaintiff ought to confine himself to proving his case, though the defendant may have recourse to prayers. But since Meidias bribed the umpires and so robbed my tribe unfairly of the prize, [6] since I in person was struck by him and insulted as perhaps no chorus-master was ever insulted before, and since I am here to follow up the verdict which the Assembly pronounced in indignation and anger at such conduct, for these reasons I shall not shrink even from an appeal to you. For, if I may say so, it is now I who am in the position of a defendant, if indeed to obtain no redress for an insult is the real calamity. [7] Therefore, gentlemen of the jury, I appeal to you all, and implore you first to grant me a favorable hearing, and secondly, if I prove that the insults of Meidias touch, not me only, but you and the laws and the whole body of citizens, to come at once to any rescue and to your own. For the case stands thus, Athenians. I was the victim and it was my person that was then outraged; but now the question to be fought out and decided is whether Meidias is to be allowed to repeat his performances and insult anyone and everyone of you with impunity. [8] Therefore if perhaps anyone of you hitherto assumed that this action was brought from private motives, when he now reflects that this is a matter of general concern, and that public interest demands that no one shall be allowed to act in this way, let him grant me an attentive hearing, and then let him give what seems to him the fairest verdict.

But first the clerk shall read you the law which provides for the lodging of plaints in the Assembly; after that I will try to enlighten you on other points. Recite the law.“Law

[The Prytanes shall call a meeting of the Assembly in the temple of Dionysus on the day next after the Pandia. At this meeting they shall first deal with religious matters; next they shall lay before it the plaints lodged concerning the procession or the contests at the Dionysia, namely such as have not been satisfied.]” [9]

This is the law, Athenians, which provides for the lodging of a plaint. It directs, as you have heard, that a meeting of the Assembly shall be held in the temple of Dionysus after the Pandia, and that at this meeting, when the chairmen for the day have dealt with the official acts of the chief Archon, they shall also deal with any offences or illegal acts in connection with the festival—a sound and expedient law, Athenians, as the facts of the present case attest. For when it appears that certain persons, with this threat overhanging them, can be as insolent as ever, how should we expect that such men would behave, if there were no risk and no trial to be faced? [10]

Now I want to read to you the next law as well, because it will illustrate to all of you the self-restraint of the citizens in general and the hardihood of the defendant. Read the law.“Law

[Evegorus proposed that, on the occasion of the procession in honor of Dionysus in Peiraeus with the comedies and tragedies, the procession at the Lenaeum with the comedies and tragedies, the procession at the City Dionysia with the boys' contests and the revel and the comedies and tragedies. and also at the procession and contest of the Thargelia, it shall not be lawful on those days to distrain or to seize any debtors' property, even if they are defaulters. If anyone transgresses any of these regulations, he shall be liable to prosecution by the aggrieved party, and public plaints against him as an offender may be lodged at the meeting of the Assembly in the temple of Dionysus, as is provided by statute in the case of other offenders.]” [11]

You will observe, gentlemen of the jury, that whereas in the first law the public plaint may be lodged against those who violate the laws of the festival, in the latter law you have sanctioned plaints against those who exact money from defaulting debtors or seize any property or use violence to that end. So far from thinking it right that any man's person should be outraged on those days, or that any equipment should be damaged which a citizen provides out of his private means for a public service, you have even conceded that what by law and by verdict belongs to the winner of a suit should remain the property of the loser and original owner, at any rate during the festival. [12] You therefore, Athenians, have all risen to such a height of benevolence and piety that during those days you have even suspended the exaction of penalties due for past offences; but Meidias, as I shall prove, chose those very same days to commit offences that call for the severest punishment. I intend to describe in order each outrage of which I have been the victim, before I speak of the blows in which his attacks culminated, for there is not a single one of those attacks for which he will not be shown to have deserved death. [13]

Two years ago the tribe of Pandionis had failed to appoint a chorus-master, and when the Assembly met at which the law directs the Archons to assign the flute-players by lot to the choruses, there was a heated discussion and mutual recrimination between the Archon and the overseers of the tribe.1 Thereupon I came forward and volunteered to act as chorus-master, and at the drawing of the lots I was fortunate enough to get first choice of a flute-player. [14] You, Athenians, all of you, welcomed with the utmost cordiality both these incidents—my voluntary offer and my stroke of luck; and your cheers and applause expressed your approval of my conduct and your sympathy with my good fortune. But there seems to have been one solitary exception, Meidias, who in his chagrin kept up a constant fire of insults, trifling or serious, during the whole period of my service. [15] Now the trouble that he caused by opposing the exemption of our chorus from military service, or by putting himself forward as overseer at the Dionysia and demanding election, these and other similar annoyances I will pass over in silence; for I am not unaware that although to myself, the victim of his persecution and insolence, each of these acts caused as much irritation as any really serious offence, yet to the rest of you, who were not directly concerned, these things in themselves would hardly seem to call for litigation. I shall therefore confine myself to what will excite indignation in all of you alike. [16] His subsequent conduct, which I am now going to describe, passes all limits; and indeed I should never have ventured to arraign him today, had I not previously secured his immediate conviction in the Assembly. The sacred apparel—for all apparel provided for use at a festival I regard as being sacred until after it has been used—and the golden crowns,which I ordered for the decoration of the chorus, he plotted to destroy,men of Athens, by a nocturnal raid on the premises of my goldsmith. And he did destroy them, though not completely, for that was beyond his power. And no one can say that he ever yet heard of anyone daring or perpetrating such an outrage in this city. [17] But not content with this, men of Athens, he actually corrupted the trainer of my chorus; and if Telephanes, the flute-player, had not proved the staunchest friend to me, if he had not seen through the fellow's game and sent him about his business, if he had not felt it his duty to train the chorus and weld them into shape himself, we could not have taken part in the competition, Athenians; the chorus would have come in untrained and we should have been covered with ignominy. Nor did his insolence stop even there. It was so unrestrained that he bribed the crowned Archon himself; he banded the choristers against me; he bawled and threatened, standing beside the umpires as they took the oath he blocked the gangways from the wings,2 nailing up those public thoroughfares without public authority; he never ceased to cause me untold damage and annoyance. [18] Of those outrages which were committed in public or before the umpires in the theater, you are yourselves my witnesses, all of you, gentlemen of the jury. And surely the statements on which most reliance should be placed are those of which the jury can themselves attest the truth. So after he had already corrupted the umpires in the men's contest, he put the cap, as it were, on all his previous acts of wantonness by two outrages: he assaulted my person, and he was chiefly responsible for preventing my tribe, which was winning, from gaining the prize. [19]

These were the crimes and brutalities which Meidias committed in connection with the festival against my fellow-tribesmen and myself. It was for these, men of Athens, that I lodged my public plaint; and there are many besides, of which I will describe to you immediately as many as I can. But I have to tell of many other acts of unmitigated rascality and insolence, directed against many of yourselves, and many daring crimes of this blackguard. [20] Some of his victims, gentlemen of the jury, suffered in silence, because they were cowed by him and his self-confidence, or by his gang of bullies, his wealth and all his other resources; others tried to obtain redress and failed; others again made terms with him, perhaps because they thought that the best policy. Those, then, who were induced to do so have obtained the satisfaction due to themselves; but of the satisfaction due to the laws, by breaking which Meidias wronged them and is wronging me now and every other citizen—of that satisfaction you are the dispensers. [21] Therefore include all the offences in one sweeping penalty, whatever you consider just.

I will first, then, adduce proofs of the outrages against myself, next of those against you. After that, Athenians, I will examine all the rest of his life and will show that he deserves not one death, but a thousand. First please take and read the deposition of the goldsmith. [22] “Deposition

[I, Pammenes, son of Pammenes, of Erchia, have a goldsmith's shop in the Agora, where I reside and carry on my business. When Demosthenes, for whom I am a witness, commissioned me to fashion a golden crown,3 and to make a gold-embroidered robe, that he might wear them at the procession in honor of Dionysus; and when I had completed them and had them ready by me, Meidias, who is being prosecuted by Demosthenes, broke into my premises by night, having also others with him, and tried to destroy the crown and the robe, and a part of them he injured, but was not able to destroy them completely, because I appeared and prevented him.]” [23]

Now I have much to say also, men of Athens, about the wrongs which he inflicted on others, as I told you at the beginning of my speech, and I have made a collection of his outrageous and insulting acts, which you shall hear in a moment. The collection was indeed an easy matter, for the victims themselves applied to me.4 [24]

But before I come to that, I want to speak about the tricks by which I am told he will try to deceive you; for I think it very necessary for me to put my remarks on that subject before you, and very important for you to hear them. Why so? Because the same argument that prevents your deception will help you to cast your votes in accordance with justice and your oath. You must pay attention to this argument above all others and bear it in mind, so as to meet each separate point in his speech. [25]

And first, it is pretty evident from his private conversation as reported to me that he will say that, if I had really suffered from him as I assert, I ought to have brought various personal suits against him, one for willful damage, arising out of the destruction of the robes and golden crowns, and another for assault, arising out of his alleged attack on my person; but that I ought most emphatically not to have brought him to a public trial and proposed a penalty or a fine which he must pay. [26] But of one thing I am perfectly certain, and you should be equally so-that if I had not lodged the public plaint but had brought a civil action, the opposite argument would have been used against me, that if there was any truth in my statements, I ought to have lodged a public plaint and claimed redress at the time when the offences were committed; for the chorus was a state-chorus, the apparel was being prepared entirely for a public festival, and I, the aggrieved party, was official chorus-master. Who then would dream of any other form of redress than that which the law provides against those who profane a festival? [27] I am sure that he would have said all that in those circumstances. For it is, I believe, the cue for the defendant, the man who has done a wrong, to try and shuffle out of the method actually adopted to bring him to punishment and to say that a different method should have been employed; but it is the duty of sensible jurymen to ignore such evasions and to chastise anyone whom they convict of an outrage. [28] Do not allow him to say that the law affords me a choice of personal suits or an indictment for assault. That is true; but he has to prove that he has not done what I have charged him with, or that in doing it he has not profaned the festival, for that is the ground on which I based my public plaint against him, and that is the question on which you must presently cast your votes. But if I, waiving the profit which a private suit would bring, entrust his punishment to the State, and if I have chosen this particular form of action from which I can receive no benefit myself, then surely it ought to win me your favour and not prejudice my case. [29]

Now I know that he will also make great use of this argument: “Do not deliver me into Demosthenes' hands; do not ruin me to oblige Demosthenes. Because I am at war with him, will you ruin me?” That is the sort of language that he will, I am sure, use again and again, with the object of exciting prejudice against me. [30] But the truth is quite otherwise. You never “deliver” a malefactor to his accuser; for when someone has been wronged, you do not exact the penalty in such a form as the injured party urges upon you in each case. On the contrary, laws were laid down by you before the particular offences were committed, when the future wrongdoer and his victim were equally unknown. What is the effect of these laws? They ensure for every citizen the opportunity of obtaining redress if he is wronged. Therefore when you punish a man who breaks the laws, you are not delivering him over to his accusers; you are strengthening the arm of the law in your own interests. [31] But surely when he says, “Demosthenes was insulted,” he is met by an argument that is just and impartial and in the interests of all. It was not against the individual named Demosthenes that his brutality was directed on that occasion, but also against your chorus-master; and what that implies you may realize from the following considerations. [32] You know of course that of the judges who sit in this court none has the name of Judge, but each has some name of his own. Therefore if a man is guilty of assault or slander against anyone of them in his private capacity, he will stand his trial on an indictment for assault or in a suit for slander; but if he assails him as judge, he will incur total disfranchisement. Why so? Because at once by the mere act he is outraging your laws, your public crown of office, and the name that belongs to the State, for Judge is not a private name but a state-title. [33] In the same way again, if you strike or abuse the Archon when wearing his crown, you are disfranchised; but if you assault him as a private citizen, you are liable to a private suit. Moreover, this is true not only of these officials, but of everyone to whom the State grants the inviolability of a crowned office or of any other honor. Therefore in my case also, if on any other day in the year Meidias had wronged me as a private citizen, he would have had to give me private satisfaction; [34] but if all his outrages are shown to have been aimed at your chorus-master during the holy days of the festival, it is right that he should face public resentment and pay a public penalty. For the chorus master was insulted as well as Demosthenes, and that is a concern of the State, as well as the fact that this occurred on the very days on which the laws expressly forbid it. When you are framing your laws, you must scrutinize their purport; but when you have passed them, you must uphold them and put them in force, for that is required by your oath and by justice as well. [35] You had the law—an ancient one—of damage; you had the law of battery and the law of assault. Now if it had been sufficient that those guilty at the Dionysia of any of these offences should be punished according to these laws, there would have been no need for this further law. But it was not sufficient, and the proof of this is that you made a law to protect the sanctity of the god during the Holy Month. If, then, anyone is liable both under those pre-existing laws and under this subsequent one as well as all the rest of the laws, is he for that reason to escape punishment, or should he in fairness suffer a heavier one? I think that it should be the heavier punishment. [36]

I have been told that Meidias goes about inquiring and collecting examples of people who have at any time been assaulted, and that these people are going to give evidence and describe their experiences to you; for instance, men of Athens, the Chairman for the day who is said to have been struck by Polyzelus in your court, the judge who was lately struck when trying to rescue the flute-girl, and similar cases. He imagines that if he can point to many other victims of serious assault, you will be less indignant at the assault committed upon me! [37] But it seems to me, Athenians, that it would be reasonable for you to do just the reverse, since your duty is to be solicitous for the common good of all. For who of you is unaware that the reason for the frequency of these assaults is the failure to punish the offenders, and that the only way to prevent such assaults in the future is adequately to punish every offender who is caught? Therefore, if it is to your interest to deter others, those cases are an additional reason for punishing Meidias, and punishing him the more severely in proportion to their number and their seriousness; but if you want to encourage him and everybody, you must let him off. [38] [Then again we shall find that he has not the same claim to consideration as these others. For in the first case the man who struck the judge had three excuses: he was drunk, he was in love, and he did not know what he was doing in the darkness and the night. Polyzelus again explained that owing to his ungovernable temper he had lost his head when he committed the offence; there was no hostility behind the act and no intention to insult. But Meidias cannot plead any of these excuses, for he was my enemy, and he assaulted me willfully by daylight, and not only on that, but on every occasion he has shown a deliberate intention to insult me. [39] And indeed I can see no comparison between my own conduct and that of those others. In the first case it will be proved that the judge took no thought or concern for you or for the laws, but was privately induced by a sum of money—I cannot say how much—to drop his action. In the same way the man who was struck by Polyzelus was privately squared, laughed in his sleeve at you and your laws, and never even prosecuted his assailant. [40] Such statements, then, are quite in point if one wishes to accuse those men today, but as a defence of Meidias against my indictments they are the very last pleas that should be urged. For my conduct was clean contrary to theirs. It will be proved that I never got, or tried to get, any advantage for myself, but religiously observed, and have now restored to your keeping, the task of avenging the laws, the god, and your interests.] Do not then allow him to make these statements, or if he persists, do not give him credence as if his plea were just. If he finds that this is your fixed determination, he will have nothing to say, not a word. [41] For what sort of pretext, what decent and moderate excuse, can he show for his conduct? Anger? Possibly that will be his plea. But whereas in cases where a sudden loss of self-control has impelled a man even to inflict a wanton insult, it is open to him to say that he has acted in anger; if, on the other hand, he is detected in a continuous course of law-breaking, spread over many days, surely this is far from a mere fit of anger and he stands convicted of a deliberate policy of insult. [42]

Very well; since he has clearly done what I accuse him of, and has done it by way of insult, we must now consider the laws, gentlemen of the jury, for it is in accordance with the laws that you have sworn to give your verdict. Observe, moreover, that the laws treat the willful and insolent transgressors as deserving more resentment and a heavier punishment than other classes of offenders. [43] First then, all the laws of damage—to take these first—order the offender to pay the amount twice over if the damage is willful, but only once if it is involuntary. This is reasonable, because, while the injured party is in any case entitled to relief, the law does not ordain that the resentment against the aggressor should be the same, whether his act is voluntary or involuntary. Again, the laws of homicide punish willful murder with death, perpetual exile, and confiscation of goods, but accidental homicide they treat with much consideration and charity. [44] It is not only in these, but in all cases, that the laws may be seen to be severe against premeditated outrages. For how is it that if a man who has lost his case fails to pay, the law thereupon is not content with a private suit for ejectment, but directs the imposition of a further fine to the treasury? Or again, how is it that if a man takes from another by mutual consent a sum of one, two, or ten talents, and then fraudulently withholds it, the State has no concern with him; but if a man, taking something that would merit only a trifling fine, keeps it back by force, then the laws direct the jury to impose an additional fine for the treasury equal to that paid to the private owner? [45] The answer is that the legislator regarded every deed of violence as a public offence, committed against those also who are not directly concerned. For force belongs to the few, but the laws to all alike; and the man who agreed to the transaction can right himself privately, but the victim of violence needs relief at the hands of the State. On this principle, for the actual assault the law grants everyone the right to prosecute, but makes over the whole of the fine to the State. The legislator considered that the State, as well as the injured party, was wronged by the author of the outrage, and that his punishment was sufficient compensation for the victim, who ought not to make money for himself out of such wrongs. [46] Indeed he went to such extreme lengths that even if a slave was assaulted, he granted him the same right of bringing a public action. He thought that he ought to look, not at the rank of the sufferer, but at the nature of the act, and when he found the act unjustifiable, he would not give it his sanction either in regard to a slave or in any other case. For nothing, men of Athens, nothing in the world is more intolerable than a personal outrage, nor is there anything that more deserves your resentment. Read me the actual law with regard to it. There is nothing like hearing the law's own words. [47] “Law

If anyone assaults any child or woman or man, whether free or slave, or commits any unlawful act against anyone of these, any Athenian citizen who desires so to do, being qualified, may indict him before the Judges; and the Judges shall bring the case before the Heliastic Court within thirty days from the date of the indictment, unless some public business prevents, in which case it shall be brought on the earliest possible date. Whomsoever the Court shall condemn, it shall at once assess the punishment or the fine which he is considered to deserve. In all cases where an indictment is entered, as the law directs, if anyone fails to prosecute, or after prosecution fails to obtain one fifth of the votes of the jury, he shall pay a thousand drachmas to the Treasury. If he is fined for the assault, he shall be imprisoned until the fine is paid, provided that the offence was committed against a freeman.” [48]

Athenians, you hear the humanity of the law, which does not permit even slaves to be assaulted. In heaven's name, think what this means. Suppose someone carried this law to the barbarous nations from whom we import our slaves; suppose he praised you and described your city to them in these words: [49] “There are in Greece men so mild and humane in disposition that though they have often been wronged by you, and though they have inherited a natural hostility towards you, yet they permit no insult to be offered even to the men whom they have bought for a price and keep as their slaves. Nay, they have publicly established this law forbidding such insult, and they have already punished many of the transgressors with death.” [50] If the barbarians heard these words and understood their import, do you not think that they would unanimously appoint you their protectors?5 As regards this law then, which is so well esteemed among the Greeks and would be well esteemed among the barbarians also, consider what penalty he who transgresses it will have to pay before he has paid his deserts. [51]

Now if I had not been chorus-master, men of Athens, when I was thus maltreated by Meidias, it is only the personal insult that one would have condemned; but under the circumstances I think one would be justified in condemning also the impiety of the act. You surely realize that all your choruses and hymns to the god are sanctioned, not only by the regulations of the Dionysia, but also by the oracles, in all of which, whether given at Delphi or at Dodona, you will find a solemn injunction to the State to set up dances after the ancestral custom, to fill the streets with the savour of sacrifice, and to wear garlands. [52] Please take and read the actual oracles.

  “ Oracles You I address, Pandion's townsmen and sons of Erechtheus,
  who appoint your feasts by the ancient rites of your fathers.
  See you forget not Bacchus, and joining all in the dances
  Down your broad-spaced streets, in thanks6 for the gifts of the season,
  Crown each head with a wreath, while incense reeks on the altars.
  For health sacrifice and pray to Zeus Most High, to Heracles, and to Apollo the Protector; for good fortune to Apollo, god of the streets, to Leto, and to Artemis; and along the streets set wine-bowls and dances, and wear garlands after the manner of your fathers in honor of all gods and all goddesses of Olympus, raising right hands and left in supplication,7 and remember your gifts.
  ”
  unknown

[53] “Oracles from Dodona

To the people of the Athenians the prophet of Zeus announces. Whereas ye have let pass the seasons of the sacrifice and of the sacred embassy, he bids you send nine chosen envoys, and that right soon. To Zeus of the Ship8 sacrifice three oxen and with each ox three sheep; to Dione one ox and a brazen table for the offering which the people of the Athenians have offered.

The prophet of Zeus in Dodona announces. To Dionysus pay public sacrifices and mix a bowl of wine and set up dances; to Apollo the Averter sacrifice an ox and wear garlands, both free men and slaves, and observe one day of rest; to Zeus, the giver of wealth, a white bull.” unknown [54]

Besides these oracles, men of Athens, there are many others addressed to our city, and excellent oracles they are. Now what conclusion ought you to draw from them? That while they prescribe the sacrifices to the gods indicated in each oracle, to every oracle that is published they add the injunction to set up dances and to wear garlands after the manner of our ancestors. [55] Therefore in the case of all the choruses that are constituted, together with their chorus-masters, during the days on which we meet in competition, these oracles make it clear that we wear our crowns as your representatives, the winner as well as the one destined to be last of all; it is not until the day of the prize-giving that the victor receives his own special crown. If, then, a man commits a malicious assault on any member or master of these choruses, especially during the actual contest in the sacred precinct of the god, can we deny that he is guilty of impiety? [56]

Moreover, you are aware that, although anxious to exclude aliens from the contest, you do not grant unlimited right to any chorus-master to summon for scrutiny any member of a chorus9; if he summons him, he is fined fifty drachmas, and a thousand drachmas if he orders him to sit among the spectators. What is the object? To protect the crowned official, who is doing public service to the god, from being maliciously summoned or annoyed or insulted on that day. [57] So even the man who in due course of law summons a member of a chorus will not escape a fine. And shall not he be punished who in contempt of all the laws thus publicly strikes the master of a chorus? Surely it is useless for your laws to be thus well and humanely framed for the protection of the humbler citizen, if those who disobey and flout them are not to incur the resentment of you who are, for the time being, entrusted with their administration. [58]

And now I solemnly call your attention to another point. I shall beg you not to be offended if I mention by name some persons who have fallen into misfortune; for I swear to you that in doing so I have no intention of casting reproach upon any man; I only want to show you how carefully all the rest of you avoid anything like violent or insulting behavior. There is, for instance, Sannio, the trainer of the tragic choruses, who was convicted of shirking military service and so found himself in trouble. [59] After that misfortune he was hired by a chorus-master—Theozotides, if I am not mistaken—who was keen to win a victory in the tragedies. Well, at first the rival masters were indignant and threatened to debar him, but when they saw that the theater was full and the crowd assembled for the contest, they hesitated, they gave way, and no one laid a finger on him. One can see that the forbearance which piety inspires in every one of you is such that Sannio has been training choruses ever since, not hindered even by his private enemies, much less by any of the chorus-masters. [60] Then again there is Aristeides of the tribe of Oeneis, who has had a similar misfortune. He is now an old man and perhaps less useful in a chorus, but he was once chorus-leader for his tribe. You know, of course, that if the leader is withdrawn, the rest of the chorus is done for. But in spite of the keen rivalry of many of the chorus-masters, not one of them looked at the possible advantage or ventured to remove him or prevent him from performing. Since this involved laying hands on him, and since he could not be cited before the Archon as if he were an alien whom it was desired to eject, every man shrank from being seen as the personal author of such an outrage. [61] Then is not this, gentlemen of the jury, a shocking and intolerable position? On the one hand, chorus-masters, who think that such a course might bring them victory and who have in many cases spent all their substance on their public services, have never dared to lay hands even on one whom the law permits them to touch, but show such caution, such piety, such moderation that, in spite of their expenditure and their eager competition, they restrain themselves and respect your wishes and your zeal for the festival. Meidias, on the other hand, a private individual who has been put to no expense, just because he has fallen foul of a man whom he hates—a man, remember, who is spending his money as chorus-master and who has full rights of citizenship—insults him and strikes him and cares nothing for the festival, for the laws, for your opinion, or for the god's honor. [62]

Now although men have quarrelled often enough, whether on private or on public grounds, no one has ever been so lost to shame as to venture on such conduct as this. Yet it is said that the famous Iphicrates once had a serious quarrel with Diocles of the Pitthean deme, and, to make matters worse, Iphicrates' brother Teisias happened to be a chorus-master in competition with Diocles. Iphicrates was a wealthy man with many friends and had a high opinion of himself, as a man would naturally have who had earned so many honors and distinctions at your hands; [63] but Iphicrates never went under cover of night to the goldsmiths' shops, he never ripped up the costumes intended for the festival, he never bribed the instructor and hindered the training of the chorus, he never played any of the tricks that Meidias repeatedly practised. No, he submitted to the laws and to the wishes of his fellow-citizens, and patiently witnessed the victory and the crowning of his enemy. And he was right; for he felt that such submission was due to the constitution under which he himself had enjoyed such prosperity. [64]

Take another instance. We all know that Philostratus of Colonus was one of the accusers when Chabrias10 was tried for his life on charges relating to Oropus, and that he showed himself the bitterest of them all, and that afterwards he won the prize at the Dionysia with a chorus of boys. Yet Chabrias neither struck him nor snatched the crown off his head nor in any way intruded where he had no right. [65] I could mention many others who on various grounds have quarrelled with their neighbors, but I have never seen or heard of anyone who carried his insolence so far as to behave like this. And I am quite sure that no one here can recall any case where a man, involved in a public or private dispute, has taken his stand beside the umpires while they were being named, or dictated the oath when they were being sworn, or paraded his hostility on any such occasion. [66] These and all similar acts, Athenians, are partly excusable in a chorus-master who is carried away by emulation; but to harass a man with one's hostility, deliberately and on every occasion, and to boast one's own power as superior to the laws, that, by Heaven! is cruel and unjust and contrary to your interests. For if each man when he becomes chorus-master could foresee this result: “If So-and-so is my enemy—Meidias for example or anyone else equally rich and unscrupulous—first I shall be robbed of my victory, even if I make a better show than any of my competitors next I shall be worsted at every point and exposed to repeated insults:” who is so irrational or such a poor creature that he would voluntarily consent to spend a single drachma? [67] I suppose what tends to make everyone public-spirited and liberal with his money is the reflection that under a democracy each man has his share of just and equal rights. Now I, men of Athens, was deprived of those rights through this man's acts, and, quite apart from the insults I endured, I was robbed of my victory. Yet I shall prove to all of you beyond a doubt that Meidias, without committing any outrageous offence, without insulting or striking me, had it in his power both to cause me trouble and to display his public spirit to you in a legitimate way, so that I should not be able to open my lips against him. [68] This is what he ought to have done, Athenians. When I offered myself to the Assembly as chorus-master for the tribe of Pandionis, he should have got up and offered himself as a rival master for his own tribe of Erechtheis he should have put himself on equal terms with me and spent his money as I was spending mine and tried in that way to wrest the victory from me; but not even as my rival should he have thus insulted and struck me. [69] As it was, he did not adopt this course, by which he might have done honor to the people, nor did he work off his high spirits in this way. No; I was his target, I who in my madness, men of Athens,—for it may be madness to engage in something beyond one's power perhaps in my ambition, volunteered for chorus-master. He harassed me with a persecution so undisguised and so brutal that neither the sacred costumes nor the chorus nor at last even my own person was safe from his hands. [70]

Now if there is anyone of you, Athenians, whose anger against Meidias falls short of a demand for his death, he is wrong. For it is neither just nor proper that the forbearance of the victim should contribute to the acquittal of a man who has put no check on his insolence. The latter you should punish as if the results of his conduct had been utterly irremediable; to the former you should show your goodwill by favouring his cause.11 [71]

You cannot retort that such acts have never had any serious consequences, but that I am now exaggerating the incident and representing it as formidable. That is wide of the mark. But all, or at least many, know what Euthynus, the once famous wrestler, a youngster, did to Sophilus the prize-fighter. He was a dark, brawny fellow. I am sure some of you know the man I mean. He met him in Samos at a gathering—just a private pleasure-party-and because he imagined he was insulting him, took such summary vengeance that he actually killed him.12

It is a matter of common knowledge that Euaeon, the brother of Leodamas, killed Boeotus at a public banquet and entertainment in revenge for a single blow. [72] For it was not the blow but the indignity that roused the anger. To be struck is not the serious thing for a free man, serious though it is, but to be struck in wanton insolence. Many things, Athenians, some of which the victim would find it difficult to put into words, may be done by the striker—by gesture, by look, by tone; when he strikes in wantonness or out of enmity; with the fist or on the cheek. These are the things that provoke men and make them beside themselves, if they are unused to insult. No description, men of Athens, can bring the outrage as vividly before the hearers as it appears in truth and reality to the victim and to the spectators. [73] In the name of all the gods, Athenians, I ask you to reflect and calculate in your own minds how much more reason I had to be angry when I suffered so at the hands of Meidias, than Euaeon when he killed Boeotus. Euaeon was struck by an acquaintance, who was drunk at the time, in the presence of six or seven witnesses, who were also acquaintances and might be depended upon to denounce the one for his offence and commend the other if he had patiently restrained his feelings after such an affront, especially as Euaeon had gone to sup at a house which he need never have entered at all. [74] But I was assaulted by a personal enemy early in the day, when he was sober, prompted by insolence, not by wine, in the presence of many foreigners as well as citizens, and above all in a temple which I was strictly obliged to enter by virtue of my office. And, Athenians, I consider that I was prudent, or rather happily inspired, when I submitted at the time and was not impelled to any irremediable action; though I fully sympathize with Euaeon and anyone else who, when provoked, takes the law into his own hands. [75] My views were, I think, shared at that trial by many of the jury; for I am told that he was only condemned by a single vote, and yet he had no recourse to tears or supplications and made no effort, small or great, to win the favour of his judges. Let us assume, then, that the judges who condemned him did so, not because he retaliated, but because he did it in such a way as to kill the aggressor, while the judges who acquitted him allowed even this licence of revenge to a man who had suffered an outrage on his person. [76] What follows? I who was so careful not to cause any irremediable mischief that I never retaliated—from whom am I to seek redress for my sufferings? I think it should be from you and from the laws. I think that you should set up a precedent for all to follow, that no one who wantonly assaults and outrages another should be punished by the victim himself in hot blood, but must be brought into your court, because it is you who confirm and uphold the protection granted by the laws to those who are injured. [77]

Now I expect, gentlemen of the jury, that some of you are anxious to hear about the quarrel between Meidias and myself; for you must suppose that no human being could treat a fellow-countryman with such violence and brutality, unless he had a long account to settle with him. Well, I am quite willing to give you a detailed account of this quarrel from its inception, so that you may understand that on this score too, as I shall prove, he owes me reparation. The narrative shall be brief, though I may seem to go a long way back for the start. [78]

When I brought my action against my guardians for the recovery of my patrimony, being a mere lad, neither acquainted with Meidias nor even aware of his existence—would that I were not acquainted with him now!—when my suit was due to come on in three or four days, Meidias and his brother suddenly burst into my house and challenged me to take over their trierarchy.13 It was the brother, Thrasylochus, who submitted his name and made the challenge; but the real author of all these proceedings was Meidias. [79] And first they forced the doors of the apartments, assuming that these became their property by the terms of the challenge; next in the presence of my sister, who was a young girl still living at home, they used foul language such as only men of their stamp would use—nothing would induce me to repeat to you some of their expressions—and they uttered unrestrained abuse of my mother and myself and all my family. But, what was more shocking still, from words they proceeded to deeds, and they were going to drop the lawsuits, claiming them as their own, to oblige my guardians. [80] All this is ancient history, though I expect some of you remember it, for all Athens heard of the challenge and of the plot they then hatched and of their brutal behavior. As for me, being quite alone in the world and a mere lad, I did not want to lose the property that was still in the hands of my guardians, and I expected to obtain, not the trifle that I was actually able to recover, but all that I knew I had been robbed of; so I gave them twenty minas, the sum which they had paid for the performance of their trierarchy by deputy. Such was the scandalous treatment that I received at their hands. [81] Next I brought an action against Meidias for slander and gained the verdict by default, for he did not appear. He had put himself into my power by failing to pay the fine, but I did not lay hands on his property. Instead I obtained leave to bring an action for ejectment, but to this day I have never been able to commence it, such shifts and quibbles does he find to thwart me. While I think it my duty to proceed thus with caution, legally and constitutionally, Meidias, as you learn, thought fit to treat with brutal insolence not only me and mine, but also my fellow-tribesmen through me. [82] To prove the truth of this, please call my witnesses, so that you may know that, before obtaining legal redress for my former injuries, I have again been insulted in the way that you have heard.“Deposition

[We, Callisthenes of Sphettus, Diognetus of Thoricus, Mnesitheus of Alopece, know that Demosthenes, for whom we appear, has brought an action for ejectment against Meidias, who is now also being publicly prosecuted by him, and that eight years have now passed since that action, and that Meidias has been the cause of all the delay by repeated excuses and procrastinations.]” [83]

Hear now what he has done, men of Athens, in the matter of the legal action and observe his insolent and overbearing conduct on each occasion. In that action—I mean the one in which I obtained a verdict against him—the arbitrator assigned to me was Strato of Phalerum, a man of small means and no experience, but in other respects quite a good fellow; but his appointment proved the unhappy man's ruin—a ruin undeserved, unjust, and in every way scandalous. [84] This Strato, acting as arbitrator, when the appointed day arrived and all the legal delays had been exhausted—counter-pleas, demurrers, and the rest of them—and there was not a trick left, at first begged me to abandon the arbitration, and then to postpone it till the next day, and at the last, as I continued to refuse and Meidias did not appear in court, and it was getting late, he gave his decision against him. [85] It was now evening and growing dark. Up comes this fellow Meidias to the office of the Archons, and finds them just leaving and Strato already making his way home after having handed to them his judgement of guilty by default. This I learned from one of the bystanders. Well, at first he had the impudence to try and persuade Strato to report a judgement for the defendant instead of one for the plaintiff, and he wanted the Archons to alter the record and offered them fifty drachmas. [86] But finding that they resented the offer and that he could persuade neither Archons nor arbitrator, he threatened them and blackguarded them and went off and—what do you think he did? Just observe his malignity. [He appealed against the arbitration but omitted the oath, thus allowing the verdict against him to be made absolute, and he was recorded as unsworn. Then, wishing to conceal his real object,] he waited for the last day14 for appeal against the arbitrators, which falls in Thargelion or Scirophorion, a day on which some of the arbitrators turned up but others did not; [87] he induced the presiding arbitrator to put it to the vote contrary to all the laws, because Meidias had not appended the name of a single witness to the summons; he denounces Strato in his absence and in the absence of witnesses, and gets him struck off the roll of arbitrators and disfranchised. And so a citizen of Athens, because Meidias lost his suit by default, has been deprived of all his civic rights, and has been irrevocably disfranchised; and it is unsafe for him to bring an action against Meidias when wronged, or to act as arbitrator for him, or even, it seems, to walk the same street with him. [88] [Now you must consider the transaction from this point of view. Estimate what loss Meidias must have suffered before he could plan such a dire revenge against a fellow-citizen; and if it was something really terrible and overwhelming, he may be forgiven, but if it was nothing of the sort, mark the insolent brutality with which he treats all whom he comes across. Well, what loss has he suffered? He was cast, you reply, in a big lawsuit, so big that he has lost all his property. [89] But the lawsuit only involved a thousand drachmas. True, you will say; but the galling thing is to be made to pay unfairly, and it was the unfairness of it that caused him to let the day of payment pass unnoticed.15 But he noticed his mistake the same day, which is the strongest possible proof that Strato had done him no wrong; and he has not yet paid a single drachma. But of that later. [90] But of course he could have moved for a fresh trial on the ground of nullity, and so made me the object of his litigation as at the first. But no; that was not his game. To save him from defending a suit in which the penalty was fixed by law at ten minas—the suit in which he neglected to apppear—to save him from paying the penalty if guilty or if innocent, a citizen of Athens must needs be disfranchised, and must obtain neither pardon nor right of defence nor any sort of equitable treatment, privileges extended even to those whose guilt is established. [91] But now that he has disfranchised the man he wanted to, and you have indulged him in this; now that he has sated that shameless temper that prompted him to this course, has he finished the business? Has he paid the fine, to escape which he ruined the poor fellow? Not a brass farthing of it to this day! He submits rather to be the defendant in an action for ejectment. So the one man is disfranchised and ruined on a side issue; the other is unscathed and is playing havoc with the laws, the arbitrators, and everything else that he pleases. [92] Moreover, he has secured the validity of the award against the arbitrator, which he maneuvered to get without serving a summons, while the suit which he lost to me, wittingly and after due summons, this he renders invalid.] Yet if such is the vengeance that he claims from arbitrators who have given judgement against him by default, what vengeance ought you to wreak on a man who openly and wantonly transgresses your laws? [For if disfranchisement and loss of all legal and civil rights is a fitting punishment for that other offence, death seems an inadequate one for this reckless outrage.] [93] However, to prove the truth of my statements, please call the witnesses, and also read the law concerning arbitrators.“Witnesses

[We, Nicostratus of Myrrhinus and Phanias of Aphidna, know that Demosthenes, for whom we appear, and Meidias, who is being prosecuted by Demosthenes, when Demosthenes brought his action against him for slander, chose Strato as arbitrator; and when the statutory day arrived, Meidias did not appear in court but abandoned the case. Judgement having gone by default against Meidias, we know that Meidias tried to induce Strato, the arbitrator, and us, who were at that time Archons, to reverse the judgement against him, and he offered us fifty drachmas, and, when we resented his offer, he threatened us and so departed. Also we know that on this account Strato was victimized by Meidias and was disfranchised contrary to all justice.]” [94]

Read also the law concerning arbitrators.“Law

[If any parties are in dispute concerning private contracts and wish to choose any arbitrator, it shall be lawful for them to choose whomsoever they wish. But when they have chosen by mutual agreement, they shall abide by his decisions and shall not transfer the same charges from him to another court, but the judgements of the arbitrator shall be final.]” [95]

Call also Strato, the victim of this persecution, for no doubt he will be allowed to stand up in court.

This man, Athenians, is a poor man perhaps, but certainly not a bad man. He was once a citizen and served at the proper age in all the campaigns; he has done nothing reprehensible, yet now there he stands silent, stripped not only of all our common privileges, but also of the right to speak or complain; he is not even allowed to tell you whether he has suffered justly or unjustly. [96] All this he has endured at the hands of Meidias, and from the wealth and pride of Meidias, because he himself is poor and friendless and just one of the multitude. If in violation of the laws he had accepted the fifty drachmas and changed his verdict from a condemnation to an acquittal, he would now be a full citizen, untouched by harm and sharing with the rest of us in our common rights; but because he disregarded Meidias in comparison with justice and feared the laws more than his threats, therefore he has met with this great and terrible misfortune through the act of this man. [97] And then this same man, so cruel, so heartless, who has taken such dire vengeance for his wrongs—you have only his word for them, for he really suffered none—will you acquit him when you have detected him in a wanton outrage on one of the citizens? [If he regards neither festivals nor temples nor law nor anything else, will you not condemn him? Will you not make an example of him?] [98] If not, what have you to say, gentlemen of the jury? What fair and honorable excuse, in heaven's name, can you find for him? Is it because he is a ruffian and a blackguard? That is true enough, but surely, men of Athens, your duty is to hate such creatures, not to screen them. Is it because he is wealthy? But you will find that his wealth was the main cause of his insolence, so that your duty is to cut off the resources from which his insolence springs, rather than spare him for the sake of those resources; for to allow such a reckless and abominable creature to have such wealth at his command is to supply him with resources to use against yourselves. [99] What plea, then, is left? Pity, forsooth! He will group his children round him and weep and beg you to pardon him for their sakes. That is his last move. [But I need not remind you that pity is the due of those who unjustly suffer more than they can endure, not of those who are paying the penalty for the misdeeds they have committed.] And who could justly pity his children, when he sees that Meidias had no pity for Strato's children, whose distress is enhanced by the reflection that for their father's calamity no relief is possible? For it is not a question of paying a fixed fine and regaining his civil rights; he has been disfranchised absolutely, at one stroke, by the wanton resentment of Meidias. [100] [Whose insolence then will be checked, and who will be deprived of the wealth that makes such outrages possible, if you are prepared to pity Meidias as though he were an innocent victim, while, if a poor man, who has done no wrong, has through him become unjustly involved in utmost ruin, you fail even to share in his indignation? It must not be. No one deserves pity who shows no pity; no one deserves pardon who grants no pardon. [101] For I think that all men, in all that they do, feel bound to make a contribution out of their own pockets for the benefit of their own life. Here am I, let us suppose; moderate and merciful towards all, and a benefactor of many. To such a man all men ought to make an equivalent return, if occasion offers or need demands. Here again is a very different man; violent, showing no pity to his neighbor, nor even treating him as a fellow-man. Such a man deserves to be paid in his own coin. And such, Meidias, was the contribution that you paid for your own benefit; such is the return that you deserve.16] [102]

Therefore, men of Athens, I think that even if I had no other charge to bring against Meidias, and even if what I shall allege hereafter were not more serious than what I have already said, you would be justified, in view of my statements, in condemning him and imposing the utmost penalty of the law. Yet the tale is not complete, and I think I shall not be at a loss what to say next, so lavishly has he furnished me with matter for indictment. [103] How he trumped up a charge of desertion against me and bribed another to bring the action—a scoundrel ready for any dirty job, the filthy Euctemon—that I shall pass over; for that blackmailer never moved for a trial, nor had Meidias hired him for any other purpose than to have this notice posted up before the Tribal Heroes for all men to read, “Euctemon of the Lusian deme has indicted Demosthenes of the Paeanian deme for desertion of his post.” Indeed I think he would have been delighted, if it had been in order, to add that Meidias had hired him to indict me. But I pass that over, because Euctemon, having disfranchised himself by failing to follow up the charge, has given me all the satisfaction that I require. [104] But I will now relate a serious act of cruelty committed by him, men of Athens, which I at least regard as not merely a personal wrong but a public sacrilege. For when a grave criminal charge was hanging over that unlucky wretch, Aristarchus, the son of Moschus, at first, Athenians, Meidias went round the Market-place and ventured to spread impious and atrocious statements about me to the effect that I was the author of the deed; next, when this device failed, he went to the relations of the dead man, who were bringing the charge of murder against Aristarchus, and offered them money if they would accuse me of the crime. He let neither religion nor piety nor any other consideration stand in the way of this wild proposal: he shrank from nothing. [105] Nay, he was not ashamed to look even that audience in the face and bring such a terrible calamity upon an innocent man; but having set one goal before him, to ruin me by every means in his power, he thought himself bound to leave no stone unturned, as if it were only right that when any man, having been insulted by him, claimed redress and refused to keep silence, he should be removed by banishment without a chance of escape, should even find himself convicted of desertion, should defend himself on a capital charge, and should be in imminent danger of crucifixion. Yet when Meidias is proved guilty of all this, as well as of his insults when I was chorus-master, what leniency, what compassion shall he deserve at your hands? [106] My own opinion, men of Athens, is that these acts constitute him my murderer; that while at the Dionysia his outrages were confined to my equipment, my person, and my expenditure, his subsequent course of action shows that they were aimed at everything else that is mine, my citizenship, my family, my privileges, my hopes. Had a single one of his machinations succeeded, I should have been robbed of all that I had, even of the right to be buried in the homeland. What does this mean, gentlemen of the jury? It means that if treatment such as I have suffered is to be the fate of any man who tries to right himself when outraged by Meidias in defiance of all the laws, then it will be best for us, as is the way among barbarians, to grovel at the oppressor's feet and make no attempt at self-defence. [107] However, to prove that my statements are true and that these things have actually been perpetrated by this shameless ruffian, please call the witnesses.“Witnesses

[We, Dionysius of Aphidna and Antiphilus of Paeania, when our kinsman Nicodemus had met with a violent death at the hands of Aristarchus, the son of Moschus, prosecuted Aristarchus for murder. Learning this, Meidias, who is now being brought to trial by Demosthenes, for whom we appear, offered us small sums of money to let Aristarchus go unharmed, and to substitute the name of Demosthenes in the indictment for murder.]”

Now let me have the law concerning bribery. [108]

While the clerk is finding the statute, men of Athens, I wish to address a few words to you. I appeal to all of you jurymen, in the name of Zeus and all the gods, that whatever you hear in court, you may listen to it with this in your minds: What would one of you do, if he were the victim of this treatment, and what anger would he feel on his own account against the author of it? Seriously distressed as I was at the insults that I endured in the discharge of my public service, I am far more seriously distressed and indignant at what ensued. [109] For in truth, what bounds can be set to wickedness, and how can shamelessness, brutality and insolence go farther, if a man who has committed grave-yes, grave and repeated wrongs against another, instead of making amends and repenting of the evil, should afterwards add more serious outrages and should employ his riches, not to further his own interests without prejudice to others, but for the opposite purpose of driving his victim into exile unjustly and covering him with ignominy, while he gloats over his own superabundance of wealth? [110] All that, men of Athens, is just what has been done by Meidias. He brought against me a false charge of murder, in which, as the facts proved, I was in no way concerned; he indicted me for desertion, having himself on three occasions deserted his post; and as for the troubles in Euboea—why, I nearly forgot to mention them!-troubles for which his bosom-friend Plutarchus was responsible, he contrived to have the blame laid at my door, before it became plain to everyone that Plutarchus was at the bottom of the whole business. [111] Lastly, when I was made senator by lot, he denounced me at the scrutiny, and the business proved a very real danger for me; for instead of getting compensation for the injuries I had suffered, I was in danger of being punished for acts with which I had no concern. Having such grievances and being persecuted in the way that I have just described to you, but at the same time being neither quite friendless nor exactly a poor man, I am uncertain, men of Athens, what I ought to do. [112] For, if I may add a word on this subject also, where the rich are concerned, Athenians, the rest of us have no share in our just and equal rights. Indeed we have not. The rich can choose their own time for facing a jury, and their crimes are stale and cold when they are dished up before you, but if any of the rest of us is in trouble, he is brought into court while all is fresh. The rich have witnesses and counsel in readiness, all primed against us; but, as you see, my witnesses are some of them unwilling even to bear testimony to the truth. [113] One might harp on these grievances till one was weary, I suppose; but now recite in full the law which I began to quote. Read.“Law

If any Athenian accepts a bribe from another, or himself offers it to another, or corrupts anyone by promises, to the detriment of the people in general, or of any individual citizen, by any means or device whatsoever, he shall be disfranchised together with his children, and his property shall be confiscated.” [114]

This man, then, is so impious, so abandoned, so ready to say or do anything, without stopping for a moment to ask whether it is true or false, whether it touches an enemy or a friend, or any such question, that after accusing me of murder and bringing that grave charge against me, he suffered me to conduct initiatory rites and sacrifices for the Council, and to inaugurate the victims on behalf of you and all the State; [115] he suffered me as head of the Sacred Embassy to lead it in the name of the city to the Nemean shrine of Zeus; he raised no objection when I was chosen with two colleagues to inaugurate the sacrifice to the Dread Goddesses.17 Would he have allowed all this, if he had had one jot or tittle of proof for the charges that he was trumping up against me? I cannot believe it. So then this is conclusive proof that he was seeking in mere wanton spite to drive me from my native land. [116]

Then, when for all his desperate shifts he could bring none of these charges home to me, he turned informer against Aristarchus, aiming evidently at me. To pass over other incidents, when the Council was in session and was investigating the murder, Meidias came in and cried, “Don't you know the facts of the case, Councillors? Are you wasting time and groping blindly for the murderer, when you have him already in your hands?”-meaning Aristarchus. “Won't you put him to death? Won't you go to his house and arrest him?” [117] Such was the language of this shameless and abandoned reptile, though only the day before he had stepped out of Aristarchus's house, though up till then he had been as intimate with him as anyone could be, and though Aristarchus in the day of his prosperity had often importuned me to settle my suit with Meidias out of court. Now if he said this to the Council, believing that Aristarchus had actually committed the crime which has since proved his ruin, and trusting to the tale told by his accusers, yet even so the speech was unpardonable. [118] Upon friends, if they seem to have done something serious, one should impose the moderate penalty of withdrawing from their friendship; vengeance and prosecution should be left to their victims or their enemies. Yet in a man like Meidias this may be condoned. But if it shall appear that he chatted familiarly under the same roof with Aristarchus, as if he were perfectly innocent, and then uttered those damning charges against him in order to involve me in a false accusation, does he not deserve to be put to death ten times—no! ten thousand times over? [119] I am going to call the witnesses now present in court to prove that my version of the facts is correct; that on the day before he told that tale to the Council, he had entered Aristarchus's house and had a conversation with him; that on the next day-and this, men of Athens, this for vileness is impossible to beat—he went into his house and sat as close to him as this, and put his hand in his, in the presence of many witnesses, after that speech in the Council in which he had called Aristarchus a murderer and said the most terrible things of him; that he invoked utter destruction on himself if he had said a word in his disparagement; that he never thought twice about his perjury, though there were people present who knew the truth, and he actually begged him to use his influence to bring about a reconciliation with me. [120] And yet, Athenians, must we not call it a crime, or rather an impiety, to say that a man is a murderer and then swear that one has never said this to reproach a man with murder and then sit in the same room with him? And if I let him off now and so stultify your vote of condemnation, I am an innocent man apparently; but if I proceed with my case, I am a deserter, I am accessory to a murder, I deserve extermination. I am quite of the contrary opinion, men of Athens. If I had let Meidias off, then I should have been a deserter from the cause of justice, and I might reasonably have charged myself with murder, for life would have been impossible for me, had I acted thus. [121] And now please call the witnesses to attest the truth of these statements also.“Witnesses

[We, Lysimachus of Alopece, Demeas of Sunium, Chares of Thoricus, Philemon of Sphetta, Moschus of Paeania, know that at the date when the indictment was presented to the Council charging Aristarchus, the son of Moschus, with the murder of Nicodemus, Meidias, who is now being tried at the suit of Demosthenes, for whom we appear, came before the Council and stated that Aristarchus, and no one else, was the murderer of Nicodemus, and he advised the Council to go to the house of Aristarchus and arrest him. This he said to the Council, having dined on the previous day with Aristarchus in our company. We also know that Meidias, when he came from the Council after making this statement, again entered the house of Aristarchus and shook hands with him and, invoking destruction on his own head, swore that he had said nothing in his disparagement before the Council, and he asked Aristarchus to reconcile Demosthenes to him.]” [122]

Can anything go beyond that? Has there ever been, or could there ever be, baseness to compare with this of Meidias? He felt justified in informing against that unfortunate man, who had done him no wrong—I waive the fact that he was his friend—and at the same time he was begging him to bring about a reconciliation between himself and me; and not content with this, he spent money on an iniquitous attempt to procure my banishment as well as that of Aristarchus. [123]

Yet this habit of his, Athenians, this scheme of involving in yet greater calamities all who stand up against him in just defence, is not something that might well rouse indignation and resentment in me, but that the rest of you should overlook. Far from it. All citizens alike should be stirred to anger, when they reflect and observe that it is exactly the poorest and weakest of you that run the greatest risk of being thus wantonly wronged, while it is the rich blackguards that find it easiest to oppress others and escape punishment, and even to hire agents to put obstacles in the path of justice. [124] Such conduct must not be overlooked. It must not be supposed that the man who by intimidation tries to debar any citizen from obtaining reparation for his wrongs is doing less than robbing us of our liberties and of our right of free speech. Perhaps I and one or two others may have managed to repel a false and calamitous charge and so have escaped destruction; but what will the vast majority of you do, if you do not by a public example make it a dangerous game for anyone to abuse his wealth for such a purpose? [125] When the accused man has rendered an account of his actions and has stood his trial on the charges brought against him, then he may retaliate upon unjust assailants; but even then he must not try to spirit away some witness of his ill deeds, nor to escape a trial by bringing false charges; he must not count it a grievance to submit to justice, but must avoid all outrageous conduct from the first. [126]

Men of Athens, you have now heard how many outrages I endured, both in my own person and in the performance of my public service, and how many escapes I have had from plots and ill-treatment of every kind. Yet I have omitted much, for it was not easy perhaps to mention everything. But the case is this. By none of his acts was I alone wronged, but in the wrongs inflicted on the chorus my whole tribe, the tenth part of the citizens, shared; by his plots and attacks against me he wronged the laws, to which each of you looks for protection;lastly by all these acts he wronged the god to whose service I had been dedicated and that divine and awful power beyond our ken—the power of Holiness. [127] Those who would exact from him an adequate punishment for his misdeeds must not let their indignation be checked by the reflection that I alone am concerned, but must base the penalty on the ground that all alike are victims of the same wrong—the laws, the gods, the city of Athens; and they must look upon those who support him and are marshalled in his defence as something more than mere advocates, as men who set the seal of their approval to his acts. [128]

Now if, men of Athens, Meidias had in other respects behaved with decency and moderation, if he had never injured any other citizen, but had confined his brutality and violence to me, I might, in the first place, consider this a piece of my own bad luck, and, in the second place, I should be afraid lest, by pointing to the moderation and humanity of the rest of his life, he might so evade punishment for his outrage on me. [129] But as it is, the wrongs that he has done to many of you are so many and so great that I am relieved of this apprehension; my fear is now, on the contrary, that when you hear of the terrible wrongs that others have suffered at his hands, some such argument as this may occur to you. “What have you to complain of? Have you suffered more than each of his other victims?” Now all that he has done, I could not relate to you, nor would you have the patience to listen, even if I were allowed for the rest of my speech all the time assigned to both of us: all my time and all his in addition would not suffice. I will confine myself to the most important and clearest examples. [130] Or rather, this is what I propose to do. I will read you all my memoranda, just as I wrote them out for my own use. I will take first whatever incident you would like to hear first; next your second choice, and so on, as long as you care to listen. There is no lack of variety; plenty of examples of assault, of kinsmen swindled, and of sacrilege. There is not a single passage where you will not find that he has committed many crimes worthy of death.“ Memoranda of the Crimes of Meidias ” [131]

That, gentlemen of the jury, is how he has treated everyone that comes across his path. I have omitted other instances, for no one could compress into a single narrative the violent acts that he has spent a lifetime in committing. But it is worth while noticing to what a height of audacity he has advanced in consequence of his never having been punished for any of these acts. He seems to have thought that no act that one man can commit against an individual was brilliant or dashing enough or worth risking his life for, and unless he could affront a whole tribe or the Council or some class of citizens and harass vast multitudes of you at once, he felt that life was really not worth living.18 [132] And as to other instances, innumerable as they are, I say nothing, but as regards the cavalry which was dispatched to Argura, and of which he was one, you all know of course how he harangued you on his return from Chalcis, blaming the troop and saying that its dispatch was a scandal to the city. In connection with that, you remember too the abuse that he heaped on Cratinus, who is, I understand, going to support him in the present case. Now if he provoked such serious but groundless quarrels with so many citizens at once, what degree of wickedness and recklessness may we expect from him now? [133] [But I should like to ask you, Meidias, which was the greater scandal to the city—the men who crossed to Chalcis in due order, and with the equipment proper to those who were to take the field against the enemy and to join forces with our allies, or you, who, when lots were drawn for the expedition, prayed that you might draw a blank, who never donned your cuirass, who rode on a saddle with silver trappings, imported from Euboea, taking with you your shawls and goblets and wine-jars, which were confiscated by the customs? We of the infantry learned this by report, for we had not crossed at the same point as the cavalry. [134] And then, because Archetion or someone chaffed you on the subject, must you annoy them all?] If you did what your fellow-troopers say you did, Meidias, and what you complain of them for saying, then you deserved their reproaches, because you were bringing harm and disgrace both on them and on these jurymen here and on all the city. But if you did not do it and it was all a fabrication, and if the rest of the soldiers, instead of reproving the slanderers, chuckled over you, it only shows that from your general manner of life they thought that such a story exactly fitted you. It was yourself, then, that you ought to have kept more under control, instead of accusing the others. [135] But you threaten all, you bully all. You insist that everyone else shall consult your wishes; you do not your self consult how to avoid annoying others. Yes, and what seems to me the most damning proof of your audacity is this: you come forward, you shameless ruffian, and include all these men in one sweeping accusation. Anyone else would have shuddered at the thought of doing such a thing. [136]

I observe, gentlemen, that in all other trials the defendants are charged with one or two offences only, but they can rely on any number of appeals, such as these: “Does anyone in court know me to be capable of this? Who among you has ever seen me commit these offences? No one. The plaintiffs are libelling me out of spite. I am the victim of false testimony,” and so on. But with Meidias the case is just the reverse; [137] for I suppose you all know his way of life, his arrogance and his superciliousness, and I even suspect that some have long marvelled at things which they know themselves, but have not heard from my lips today. But I note that many of his victims are reluctant to disclose in evidence all that they have suffered, because they realize his violence and his persistence and the extent of those resources which make him so powerful and so dreaded, despicable though he is. [138] For a man whose wickedness and violence are supported by power and wealth is fortified against any sudden attack. So this fellow, if he were deprived of his property, would perhaps discontinue his outrages, or if not, he will be of less account in your courts than the most insignificant criminal; for then he will rail and bluster to deaf ears, and for any act of gross violence he will pay the penalty like the rest of us. [139] But now, I believe, his champions are Polyeuctus and Timocrates and the ragamuffin Euctemon. Such are the mercenaries that he keeps about him; and there are others besides, an organized gang of witnesses, who do not openly force themselves upon you, but readily give a silent nod of assent to his lies. [I do not of course imagine that they make anything out of him, but there are some people, men of Athens, who are strangely prone to abase themselves towards the wealthy, to attend upon them, and to give witness in their favour.] [140] All this, I expect, is alarming for the rest of you as individuals, depending each upon his own resources; and that is why you band yourselves together, so that when you find yourselves individually inferior to others, whether in wealth or in friends or in any other respect, you may together prove stronger than any one of your enemies and so check his insolence. [141]

Now, some such ready plea as this will be submitted to you: “Why did not So-and-so, who suffered this or that at my hands, try to obtain redress from me? Or why did not So-and-so?”—naming perhaps another of his victims. But I expect you all know the stock excuses for shirking the duty of self-defence—want of leisure, a distaste for affairs, inability to speak, lack of means, and a thousand such reasons. [142] I do not, however, think that Meidias has any right to use such language now; his duty is to prove that he has not done what I have accused him of doing, and if he cannot, then he deserves death all the more. For if he is so powerful that he can act like this and yet prevent you individually from obtaining satisfaction from him, you ought all of you, in common and on behalf of all, now that he is in your grasp, to punish him as the common enemy of the State. [143]

History tells us that Alcibiades lived at Athens in the good old days of her prosperity, and I want you to consider what great public services stand to his credit and how your ancestors dealt with him when he thought fit to behave like a ruffian and a bully. And assuredly it is not from any desire to compare Meidias with Alcibiades that I mention this story. I am not so foolish or infatuated. My object, men of Athens, is that you may know and feel that there is not, and never will be, anything—not birth, not wealth, not power—that you, the great mass of citizens, ought to tolerate, if it is coupled with insolence. [144] For Alcibiades, Athenians, was on his father's side one of the Alcmaeonidae, who are said to have been banished by the tyrants because they belonged to the democratic faction, and who, with money borrowed from Delphi, liberated our city, expelling the sons of Peisistratus, and on his mother's side he claimed descent from Hipponicus and that famous house to which the people are indebted for many eminent services. [145] But these were not his only claims, for he had also taken arms in the cause of democracy, twice in Samos and a third time in Athens itself, displaying his patriotism, not by gifts of money or by speeches, but by personal service. He had also to his credit for the Olympian chariot-race and victories there, and we are told that he was regarded as the best general and the ablest speaker of the day. [146] But yet your ancestors, for all these services, would not allow him to insult them. They made him a fugitive and an outlaw, and in the day of Lacedaemonian power they endured the fortification of Decelea, the capture of their fleet, and every kind of loss, because they deemed any involuntary suffering more honorable than a voluntary submission to the tyranny of insolence. [147] Yet what was his insolence compared with what has been proved of Meidias today? He boxed the ears of Taureas, when the latter was chorus-master. Granted; but it was as chorus-master to chorus-master that he did it, and he did not transgress the present law, for it had not yet been made. Another story is that he imprisoned the painter Agatharchus. Yes, but he had caught him in an act of trespass, or so we are told; so that it is unfair to blame him for that. He was one of the mutilators of the Hermae. All acts of sacrilege, I suppose, ought to excite the same indignation, but is not complete destruction of sacred things just as sacrilegious as their mutilation? Well, that is what Meidias has been convicted of. [148] To contrast the two men, let us ask who Meidias is and to whom he displayed his qualities. Do not then imagine that for you, gentlemen, being the descendants of such ancestors, it would be in accordance with justice or piety, to say nothing of honor, if, when you have caught a rascally, violent bully, a mere nobody and son of nobody, you should pronounce him deserving of pardon or pity or favour of any kind. For why should you? Because of his services as general? But not even as a private soldier, much less as a leader of others, is he worth anything at all. For his speeches then? In his public speeches he never yet said a good word of anyone, and he speaks ill of everyone in private. [149] For the sake of his family perhaps? And who of you does not know the mysterious story of his birth—quite like a melodrama? He was the sport of two opposing circumstances. The real mother who bore him was the most sensible of mortals; his reputed mother who adopted him was the silliest woman in the world. Do you ask why? The one sold him as soon as he was born; the other purchased him, when she might have got a better bargain at the same figure. [150] And yet, though he has thus become the possessor of privileges to which he has no claim, and has found a fatherland which is reputed to be of all states the most firmly based upon its laws, he seems utterly unable to submit to those laws or abide by them. His true, native barbarism and hatred of religion drive him on by force and betray the fact that he treats his present rights as if they were not his own—as indeed they are not. [151]

Such, then, being the events that make up the life of this shameless blackguard, some of his associates came to me, gentlemen of the jury, urging me to retire and drop this action; but finding me unmoved, they did not venture to assert that he was innocent of all these crimes and would not deserve the severest penalty for his deeds. They took this line of argument. “He has already been convicted and condemned; what fine do you expect the court to impose on him? Do you not see that he is a rich man and will talk about the equipment of war-galleys and other public services? Then take care that he does not beg himself off by such pleas, and make you his laughingstock, when he pays the State a far less sum than he now offers you.” [152] For myself, in the first place, I do not charge you with anything dishonorable, nor do I suppose that you will lay on him a lighter punishment than will effectually check his insolence; and that means, for choice, death, or failing that, at least the confiscation of all his property. In the next place, my own opinion about his trierarchies and public services and pleas of that sort is this. [153] If, men of Athens, public service consists in saying to you at all the meetings of the Assembly and on every possible occasion, “We are the men who perform the public services; we are those who advance your tax-money; we are the capitalists”—if that is all it means, then I confess that Meidias has shown himself the most distinguished citizen of Athens; for he bores us at every Assembly by these tasteless and tactless boasts. [154] But if you want to find out how he really performs his services, I will tell you; and please mark with what fairness I shall test him, for I will compare him with myself. This man, Athenians, who is about fifty years old or only a trifle less, has not performed more public services than I, who am only two and thirty. Moreover I, as soon as I had reached man's estate, undertook the trierarchy in the days when only two shared the duty, and when we paid all the expenses from our own purses and provided the crews ourselves. [155] Meidias, when he was of my present age, had not yet begun to perform services; he has only put his hand to the task since you made twelve hundred citizens joint contributors, from whom such men as Meidias exact a talent and then contract for the equipment of the war-galley at the same price. After this the State provides the crews and furnishes the tackle; so that some of them succeed in really spending nothing at all and by pretending to have performed one public service enjoy exemption from the rest. [156] Well, is there anything else? He has once equipped a tragic chorus; I have furnished a band of male flute-players; and everyone knows that the latter involves much greater expense than the former. Moreover my service is voluntary; his was only undertaken after a challenge to exchange property. Therefore no one could justly allow him any credit for it. What else? I have feasted my tribe and equipped a chorus for the Panathenaea; he has done neither. [157] I was chairman of one of the tax-syndicates19 for ten years, contributing the same share as Phormio, Lysitheides, Callaeschrus, and the richest citizens, not from my actual property, of which my guardians had robbed me, but from the estimated wealth which my father had left and which I was entitled to inherit when I had passed the scrutiny for citizenship. That is how I have borne myself towards you; but how has Meidias? To this day he has never been chairman of a syndicate, though no one has ever robbed him of any part of his inheritance and he has received from his father a large property. [158] In what, then, consist his splendor, his public services and his lordly expenditure? I cannot for the life of me see, unless one fixes one's attention on these facts. He has built at Eleusis a mansion huge enough to overshadow his neighbors; he drives his wife to the Mysteries, or anywhere else that he wishes, with a pair of greys from Sicyon; he swaggers about the market-place with three or four henchmen in attendance, describing beakers and drinking-horns and cups loud enough for the passers-by to hear. [159] I do not see how the mass of Athenians are benefited by all the wealth that Meidias retains for private luxury and superfluous display; I do see that his insolence, fostered by his wealth, affects many of us ordinary folk. You ought not to show respect and admiration for such things on every occasion, nor judge a man's public spirit by such tests as these—whether he builds himself a splendid house or keeps many maid-servants or handsome furniture, but whether his splendor and public spirit are displayed in those things in which the majority of you can share. There you will find Meidias absolutely wanting. [160]

But, mark you, he gave us a war-galley! I am sure he will brag about that vessel. “I,” he will say, “presented you with a trireme.” Now this is how you must deal with him. If, men of Athens, he gave it from patriotic motives, be duly grateful and pay him the thanks that such a gift deserves. But do not give him a chance to air his insolence; that must not be conceded as the price of any act or deed. If, on the other hand, it is proved that his motive was cowardice and malingering, do not be led astray. How then will you know? This too I will explain. I will tell you the story from the start: it is not a long one. [161] Voluntary gifts were first introduced at Athens for the expedition to Euboea. Meidias was not one of those volunteers, but I was, and my colleague was Philinus, the son of Nicostratus. There was a second call subsequently for Olynthus. Meidias was not one of those volunteers either. Yet surely the public-spirited man ought to be found at his post on every occasion. We have now these voluntary gifts for the third time, and this time he did make an offer. But how? Though present in the Council when the gifts were being received, he made no offer then. [162] But when it was announced that the troops at Tamynae were blockaded, and when the Council carried a preliminary decree to dispatch the rest of the cavalry, to which he belonged, then, alarmed at the prospect of this campaign, he came forward with a voluntary gift at the next meeting of the Assembly, even before the Committee could take their seats. What makes it clear, beyond all possibility of doubt, that his motive was not public spirit but the desire to shirk the campaign? His subsequent proceedings. [163] For in the first place, when it appeared, as the meeting proceeded and speeches were made, that the services of the cavalry were not now required, but that the proposed expedition had fallen through, he never set foot on the ship he had presented, but dispatched a resident alien, the Egyptian Pamphilus, while he himself stayed at home and behaved at the Dionysia in the way that is the matter of the present trial. [164] Next, when the general, Phocion, summoned the cavalry from Argura to take their turn of service, and the trickery of Meidias was exposed, then this damnable coward quitted that post and hurried to his ship and never went out with the cavalry whom he claimed to command here at home. But if there had been any risk at sea, he would certainly have hastened to land. [165] Not so behaved Niceratus, the beloved son of Nicias, though he was himself physically an utter weakling. Not so behaved Euctemon, the son of Aesion, nor Euthydemus, the son of Stratocles. Each of these men had made the gift of a war-galley, yet did not run away from the campaign in this way. Each, as an act of grace and a free gift, supplied the State with a ship ready for sea, and where the law of the State assigned them their posts, there each insisted on giving his personal service. [166] But not so our cavalry-officer Meidias. He deserted the post assigned him by the laws, and this, which is a punishable offence against the State, he is prepared to count as a meritorious service. Yet, good heavens! what name best befits such a trierarchy as his? Shall we call it patriotism, or tax-jobbing, two-per-cent-collecting, desertion, malingering, and everything of that sort? Unable in any other way to get himself exempt from service with the cavalry, Meidias has invented this new-fangled cavalry-collectorship.20 Another point. [167] All the other donors of war-galleys convoyed you when you sailed back from Styra; Meidias alone took no part in the convoy, but, without a thought for you, he was bringing fences and cattle and door-posts for his own house and pit-props for his silver-mines, and so his command has proved, not a public service, but a lucrative job for this detestable creature. However, to prove to you the truth of my statements, though most of the facts are known to you, I will nevertheless call witnesses. [168] “Witnesses[We, Cleon of Sunium, Aristocles of Paeania, Pamphilus, Niceratus of Acherdus, and Euctemon of Sphetta, on the occasion when we sailed home from Styra with the entire force, were commanders of triremes along with Meidias, who is now being prosecuted by Demosthenes, for whom we appear as witnesses. When the whole fleet was sailing in formation and the commanders had instructions not to separate until we landed at Athens, Meidias lagged behind the fleet and loaded his ship with timber and fencing and cattle and other things, and sailed alone into Peiraeus two days later, and did not join with the other commanders in bringing the force to land.]” [169]

Now if, men of Athens, his public services and his conduct were really what he will presently in court allege and boast them to have been and not what I thus prove them to have been, even so surely he has no right, under cover of his services, to escape the punishment due to his insolent acts. For I know that there are many men who have done you great and useful service—though not after the style of Meidias! Some have won naval victories, others have captured cities, others have set up many glorious trophies to the credit of the State. [170] But yet to not one of these men have you ever yet granted, nor are you likely to grant, this reward—licence for each one of them to oppress his private enemies whenever he likes and in whatever way he can. For not even Harmodius and Aristogeiton were so privileged, though indeed they received from you the highest rewards for the noblest services. You would never have tolerated it if any one had added this to the inscription on their monument, “And they shall be licensed to oppress whomsoever they will.” No, they received their other rewards for this very service, that they had restrained those who acted insolently. [171]

I now propose to show you, Athenians, that he has received from you a recompense adequate not only to the public services he has actually performed—for in that case it would be small indeed!—but even to the most distinguished services; so that you may not imagine that you are still in debt to this contemptible fellow. For it was you, men of Athens, who elected him—he being what he is—steward of the Paralus, and also commander of the cavalry, though he could not sit a horse in the processions through the market-place, and superintendent of the Mysteries, and sacrificer on one occasion, and buyer of the victims and all the rest of it. [172] And then, that a man's innate baseness and cowardice and wickedness should be redeemed by offices and honors and appointments from you—do you, in heaven's name, regard that as a trivial gift and favour? Take away, indeed, his right to say, “I have been commander of the cavalry; I have been made steward of the Paralus,” and what else is he good for? [173] But at any rate you know this, that when he had been made steward of the Paralus, he plundered the people of Cyzicus of more than five talents, and to avoid punishment he worried and harassed the wretches in every possible way, and by making chaos of the treaties he has alienated their state from ours, while he keeps the money himself. Since he was appointed its commander, he has ruined your cavalry force, getting laws passed which he afterwards disowned. [174] When he was steward of the Paralus at the time of your expedition to Euboea against the Thebans, though he was authorized to expend twelve talents of public money and was instructed by you to sail and convoy the troops, he rendered them no assistance and did not arrive until Diocles had already concluded his truce with the Thebans; moreover he was outstripped by one of the privately owned galleys. That shows you how well he had equipped your sacred galley. Then as cavalry-commander-I do not know what you think of his other performances, but this wealthy fine gentleman did not venture to buy a horse—not even a horse! He led the processions on one borrowed from Philomelus of Paeania, and every cavalryman knows it. Please call the witnesses to prove the truth of these statements also.“ Witnesses ” [175]

Now I propose, men of Athens, to name those who have been condemned by you, after an adverse vote of the Assembly, for violating the festival, and to explain what some of them had done to incur your anger, so that you may compare their guilt with that of Meidias. First of all then, to begin with the most recent condemnation, the Assembly gave its verdict against Euandrus of Thespiae for profanation of the Mysteries on the charge of Menippus, a fellow from Caria. The law concerning the Mysteries is identical with that concerning the Dionysia, and it was enacted later. [176] Well, Athenians, what had Euandrus done to deserve your condemnation? He had won a commercial suit against Menippus, but being, as he alleged, unable to catch him sooner, he had arrested him while he was staying here for the Mysteries. You condemned him for that alone, and there were no aggravating circumstances. When he came before the court, you were inclined to punish him with death, and when his accuser was induced to relent, you compelled Euandrus to refund the damages, amounting to two talents, which he had won in the former action, and you also made him compensate the fellow for the loss that he had sustained, on his own calculation, by staying here in deference to your preliminary verdict. [177] There you have one case of a man, in a merely private matter, with no added circumstances of insolence, paying so heavy a penalty for a breach of the law. With good reason; because that is what you are here to guard—the laws and your oath. That is what you who serve on any jury hold as a trust from the rest of the citizens, a trust which must be maintained inviolate in the interests of all who appeal to you with justice on their side. [178]

There was another man who in your opinion had profaned the Dionysia, and although he was actually sitting as assessor to his son, who was Archon, you condemned him, because in ejecting from the theater a man who was taking a wrong seat, he laid a hand on him. That man was the father of the highly respected Charicleides, at that time archon. [179] Yes, and you thought that his accuser had a strong case when he said, “If I was taking a wrong seat, fellow, if as you assert I was disregarding the notices, what authority do the laws confer on you or even on the archon himself? The authority to bid the attendants remove me, but not to strike me yourself. If I still refuse to go, you may impose a fine; anything rather than touch me with your own hand; for the laws have taken every precaution to save a citizen from being insulted in his own person.” That was his argument. You gave your votes, but the accuser died before he could bring the case before a jury. [180] Then another man, Ctesicles, was unanimously condemned by the Assembly for profaning the festival, and when he came before you, you sentenced him to death, because he carried a leathern lash in the procession and, being drunk, struck with it a personal enemy of his. It was thought that insolence, not drink, prompted the stroke, and that he seized the excuse of the procession and his own drunkenness to commit the offence of treating freemen like slaves. [181] Now I am certain, men of Athens, that everyone would admit that the offences of Meidias were much more serious than those of any of these men, of whom one, as I have shown, forfeited the damages he had already received, while the other was actually punished with death. For Meidias, not being in a procession, not having won a suit, not acting as assessor, having in fact no other motive than insolence, behaved worse than any of them. About them I will say no more; [182] but Pyrrhus, men of Athens, one of the Eteobutadae, who was indicted for serving on a jury when he was in debt to the Treasury, was thought by some of you to deserve capital punishment, and he was convicted in your court and put to death. And yet it was from poverty, not from insolence, that he tried to get the juryman's fee. And I could mention many others who were put to death or disfranchised for far slighter offences than those of Meidias. You yourselves, Athenians, fined Smicrus ten talents and Sciton a similar sum, because he was adjudged to be proposing unconstitutional measures; you had no pity for their children or friends and relations, or for any of those who supported them in court. [183] Do not, then, display such anger when people make unconstitutional proposals, and such indulgence when not their proposals, but their acts are unconstitutional. For no mere words and terms can be so galling to the great mass of you as the conduct of a man who persistently insults any citizen who crosses his path. Beware, Athenians, of bearing this testimony against yourselves, that if you detect a man of the middle class or a friend of the people committing an offence, you will neither pity nor reprieve him, but will punish him with death or disfranchisement, while you are ready to pardon the insolence of a rich man. Spare us that injustice, and show your indignation impartially against all offenders. [184]

There are some other points that I consider no less necessary to mention than those which I have already put before you. I will mention them and discuss them briefly before I sit down. The leniency of your disposition, men of Athens, is a great asset and advantage to all wrongdoers. Give me, then, your attention while I show that you have no right to admit Meidias to the least share in that advantage. My view is that all men during their lives pay contributions to their own fortunes,21 not only those which are actually collected and paid in, but others also. [185] For instance, one of us is moderate, kindly disposed and merciful: he deserves to receive an equivalent return from all, if he ever falls into want or distress. Yonder is another, who is shameless and insulting, treating others as if they were beggars, the scum of the earth, mere nobodies: he deserves to be paid with the same measure that he has meted to others. If you will consent to look at it in a true light, you will find that this, and not the former, is the kind of contribution that Meidias has made. [186]

Now I know that he will set up a wail, with his children grouped about him, and will make a long and humble appeal, weeping and making himself as pitiable a figure as he can. But the more he humiliates himself, Athenians, the more he deserves your hatred. Why so? If in his past life he was so brutal and violent because it was impossible for him to be humble, it would be right to abate some of your anger as a concession to his natural temper and to the destiny that made him the man he is; but if he knows how to behave discreetly when he likes, but has deliberately chosen the opposite line of conduct, it is surely obvious that, if he slips through your fingers now, he will once more prove himself the man you know so well. [187] Pay no attention to him; do not let the present crisis in his affairs, expressly invented by him, carry more weight and influence with you than the whole course of his life, of which you have direct knowledge. I have no children to pose before you, while I weep and wail over them for the insults I have received. For that reason shall I, the victim, be of less account in your court than the perpetrator of the wrong? It must not be. [188] When Meidias, with his children round him, calls you to cast your votes for them, then you must imagine that I am standing here with the laws by my side and the oath that you have sworn, demanding and imploring each of you to vote for them. It is in every way more just that you should side with the laws than with this man. The laws, Athenians, you have sworn to obey; through the laws you enjoy your equal rights; to the laws you owe every blessing that is yours—not to Meidias nor to the children of Meidias. [189]

Perhaps he will say of me, “This man is an orator.” If an orator is one who offers you such counsel as he thinks expedient for you, yet stops short of pestering or bullying you, then for my part I would neither shun nor disclaim that title. But if by orator he means one of those speakers such as you and I so often see, men who have shamelessly enriched themselves at your expense, I cannot be one, for I have never received a penny from you and I have spent upon you all but a trifle of my fortune. Yet even if I were the most unscrupulous of that gang, I ought rather to be punished according to the laws than insulted in the performance of a public service. [190] Then again, none of these orators supports me in this trial; nor do I blame them, for I have never said a word in public in support of one of them. I make it a fixed rule to take my own line, speaking and acting in whatever way I believe to be for your advantage. But you will see very soon that Meidias has all the orators in turn ranged on his side. Yet is it fair in him to brand me with the reproach of that title and then to depend on these very men to rescue him? [191]

Perhaps too he will say something of this sort; that my present speech is all carefully thought out and prepared. I admit, Athenians, that I have thought it out, and I should not dream of denying it; yes, and I have spent all possible care on it. I should be a poor creature if all my wrongs, past and present, left me careless of what I was going to say to you about them. Yet the real composer of my speech is Meidias. [192] The man who has furnished the facts with which the speeches deal ought in strict justice to bear that responsibility, and not the man who has devoted thought and care to lay an honest case before you today. That is what I am doing, men of Athens; to that I plead guilty. As for Meidias, he has probably never in his life troubled himself about honesty, for if it had entered his head even for a moment to consider such a thing, he would not have missed it so completely in practice. [193]

Again, I expect that he will not shrink from vilifying the people and the Assembly, but will repeat what he had the effrontery to say when the plaint was first brought in: that the meeting was composed of men who had stayed at home when they ought to have gone to the front and who had left their posts unguarded, and that he was condemned by the votes of chorus-men and aliens and the like. [194] As those of you who were present know, gentlemen, he had risen on that occasion to such a height of bravado and impudence that, by abusing and threatening and turning his glance to any quarter of the Assembly that was inclined to be obstreperous, he thought he could browbeat the whole body of citizens. That, I think, must surely make his tears today seem ridiculous. Execrable wretch, what have you to say? [195] Will you claim pity for your children and yourself or a kindly interest in your fortunes from these men whom you have already insulted publicly? Are you alone of living men privileged to be in your daily life so notoriously possessed of the demon of arrogance that even those who have no dealings with you are exasperated by your assurance, your tones and gestures, your parasites, your wealth and your insolence; and then, the instant you are put on your trial are you to be pitied? [196] It would be indeed a great method that you have devised, or, rather, a great trick, if you could in so short a time make yourself the object of two contradictory sentiments, rousing resentment by your way of life and compassion by your mummeries. You have no conceivable claim to compassion; no, not for an instant. On the contrary, hatred, resentment and wrath—those are what your conduct calls for. But let me come back to my point, that he intends to arraign the people and the Assembly. [197] Now when he does so, just reflect, gentlemen of the jury, that this same man brought accusations against the cavalry who had served with him, coming into the Assembly after they had sailed for Olynthus; and now once more, having stayed at home, he will address his denunciation of the people to the men who were then away on service. Are you, then, prepared to admit that you, whether at home or on service, are what Meidias proclaims you to be, or on the contrary that he is, and always has been, an unhallowed ruffian? That is my own opinion of him; [for how else are we to describe a creature whom his own troopers, his brother-officers and his friends cannot stomach? [198] I swear solemnly by Zeus, by Apollo, and by Athena—for I will speak out, whatever the result may be—for when this man was going about, trumping up the story that I had abandoned the prosecution, I observed signs of disgust even among his ardent supporters. And by heaven! they had some excuse, for there is no putting up with the fellow; he claims to be the only rich man and the only man who knows how to speak; all others are in his opinion outcasts, beggars, below the rank of men. [199] Since he stands on such an eminence of pride, what do you think he will do, if he escapes now? I will tell you how you may know it; you have only to observe the signs that followed the adverse vote.] For who is there that, if an adverse vote had been recorded, and that on a charge of profaning the feast, even if there had been no further suit pending and no danger ahead,—who is there, I say, that would not have made that a reason for effacing himself and behaving decently, at any rate until the time of the trial, if not for ever after? Anyone else would have acted so. But not Meidias. [200] From that day onwards he has been talking, railing, and bellowing. Is there an election on? Meidias of Anagyrus is a candidate. He is the accredited agent of Plutarchus; he knows all the secrets; the city cannot hold him. His object in all this is obvious;he wants to proclaim that “I am not a pin the worse for the vote of the people: I have no fears or misgivings about the pending action.” [201] Now a man who thinks it degrading to show any fear of you, Athenians, and a dashing thing to snap his fingers at you, does not such a man deserve death ten times over? [He really believes that you will have no hold over him. Rich, arrogant, haughty, loud-voiced, violent, shameless, where will you catch him if he gives you the slip now?] [202]

But in my opinion, if for nothing else, yet for those harangues that he delivers at every opportunity and for the occasions that he chooses for them, he would deserve the severest penalty. For of course you know that if any welcome news is brought to the city, such as we all rejoice to hear, Meidias has never on any of those occasions been found in the ranks of those who share in the public satisfaction or the public rejoicings; [203] but if it is something untoward, something that no one else would wish to hear, he is the first to jump up at once and harangue the people, making the utmost of his opportunity and enjoying the silence by which you show your distress at what has happened. “Why, that is the sort of men you Athenians are. You do not serve abroad; you see no need to pay your property-tax. And then do you wonder that your affairs go wrong? Do you think I am going to pay my property-tax and you spend the money? Do you think I am going to fit out war-galleys and you decline to embark in them?” [204] That is how he insults you, seizing the chance to void the rancor and venom that he secretes in his heart against the masses, as he moves about among you. Now is the chance for you, men of Athens, now when he comes with his humbug and chicanery, with his lamentations, tears and prayers, to throw this answer in his teeth. “Yes, and that is the sort of man you are, Meidias. You are a bully; you cannot keep your hands to yourself. Then can you wonder if your evil deeds bring you to an evil end? Do you think that we shall submit to you and you shall go on beating us? That we shall acquit you and you shall never desist?” [205]

As for the speakers who will support him, their object, I swear, is not so much to oblige him as to insult me, owing to the personal quarrel which that man there22 says that I have with himself. He insists that it is so, whether I admit it or not; but he is wrong. Too much success is apt sometimes to make people overbearing. For when I, after all that I have suffered, do not admit that he is my enemy, while he will not accept my disclaimer, but even confronts me in another's quarrel, and is prepared now to mount the platform and demand that I shall even forfeit my claim to that protection which the laws afford to all, is it not clear that he has grown overbearing and is too powerful to suit the interests of each one of us? [206] Furthermore, Athenians, Eubulus was in his seat in the theater when the people gave their vote against Meidias, and yet, as you know, he never stood up when called upon by name, though Meidias begged and implored him to do so. Yet if he thought that the plaint had been brought against an innocent man, that was the moment to help him by his testimony, if he was really his friend;but if he withheld his support then, because he had pronounced him guilty, but is now going to ask for his acquittal, because he has fallen foul of me, it is not well that you should humor him. [207] In a democracy there must never be a citizen so powerful that his support can ensure that the one party submits to outrages and the other escapes punishment. But if you are anxious to do me an ill turn, Eubulus,though I protest that I know not why you should—you are a man of influence and a statesman; take any legal vengeance you like on me, but do not deprive me of my compensation for illegal outrages. If you find it impossible to harm me in that way, it may be taken as a proof of my innocence that you can readily censure others, but find no ground of censure in me. [208]

Now I have learned that Philippides and Mnesarchides and Diotimus of Euonymia and some other rich trierarchs will plead with you for his acquittal, claiming it as a favour due to themselves. I would not utter a word in disparagement of these men; I should indeed be mad to do so: but I will tell you how you ought to reflect and consider, when they make their request. [209] Suppose, gentlemen of the jury, that these men—never may it so befall, as indeed it never will—made themselves masters of the State, along with Meidias and others like him; and suppose that one of you, who are men of the people and friends to popular government, having offended one of these men,—not so seriously as Meidias offended me, but in some slighter degree—came before a jury packed with men of that class; what pardon, what consideration do you think he would receive? They would be prompt with their favour, would they not? Would they heed the petition of one of the common folk? Would not their first words be, “The knave! The sorry rascal! To think that he should insult us and still draw breath! He ought to be only too happy if he is permitted to exist”? [210] Do not therefore, men of Athens, treat them otherwise than as they would treat you. Keep your respect, not for their wealth or their reputation, but for yourselves. They have many advantages, which no one hinders them from enjoying; then they in their turn must not hinder us from enjoying the security which the laws provide as our common birthright. [211] Meidias will suffer no distressing hardship if he shall come to possess just as much as the majority of you, whom he now insults and calls beggars, and if he is stripped of the superfluous wealth that incites him to such insolence. Surely such men have no right to ask of you, “Do not try the case by the laws, gentlemen of the jury; do not help the man who has suffered serious wrongs; do not observe your oaths; grant us your verdict as a favour.” If they plead for Meidias, that is what their plea will come to, though these may not be their actual words. [212] But if they are his friends and think it hard that he should not be rich, well, they are extremely rich themselves; that is their good fortune. Let them spare him some of their own wealth, that you may give your votes honestly, as you swore to do when you came into court, and that they may be generous to him at their own expense, and not at the expense of your honor. But if these men with all their money are not prepared to sacrifice it, how can it be honorable for you to sacrifice your oath? [213]

An imposing muster of wealthy men, whose prosperity has raised them to apparent importance, will come into court to plead with you. Men of Athens, do not sacrifice me to any one of them; but just as each of them will be zealous for his private interests and for the defendant, so be zealous for your own selves and for the laws, as well as for me who have fled to you for refuge, and cleave to the opinion that you already hold. [214] If, men of Athens, at the time of the plaint the people, after hearing the facts, had acquitted Meidias, it would not be so hard to bear: one might console oneself with the fancy that the assault had never been made, or that it was not a profanation of the festival, and so on. [215] But now this would be the hardest blow for me to bear, if, when the offences were fresh in your memory, you displayed such anger and indignation and bitterness that, when Neoptolemus and Mnesarchides and Philippides and another of these very wealthy men were interceding with you and me, you shouted to me not to let him off, and when Blepaeus the banker came up to me, you raised such an uproar, as if I was going to take a bribe—the old, old story!— [216] that I was startled by your clamor, Athenians, and let my cloak drop so that I was half-naked in my tunic, trying to get away from his grasp, and when you met me afterwards, “Mind you prosecute the blackguard,” you cried; “don't let him go; the Athenians will watch to see what you are going to do”; and yet when the act has been condemned by vote as an outrage, and those who gave that verdict were sitting in a sacred building, and when I have stuck to my task and not betrayed either you or myself, if after all this you are going to acquit him.23 [217] Never! [Such a result entails all that is most disgraceful. I do not deserve this at your hands, Athenians. How should I, when I am bringing to justice a fellow who is as violent a bully as he is reputed to be, who has offended against decency at a public festival, and who has made not only you, but all the Greeks who were visiting the city, witnesses of his brutality? The people heard what he had done. What was the result? They voted him guilty and passed him on to your court. [218] So it is impossible that your decision should be concealed or hushed up, or that the question should not be asked, How did you judge the case when it was brought before you? No; if you punish him, you will be thought men of discretion and honor and haters of iniquity; but if you acquit him, you will seem to have capitulated to some other motive.] For this is not a political issue, nor does it resemble the case of Aristophon, who stopped the plaint against him by restoring the crowns. This case arises from the insolence of Meidias and from the impossibility of his undoing any of his acts. [Is it then better, in view of the past, to punish him now or the next time he offends? Now is the time, I think, because the trial is a public one, even as the offences for which he is being tried were public.] [219]

Furthermore, it was not I alone, men of Athens, that he then, in his intention, struck and insulted, when he acted as he did, but all who may be supposed less able than I am to obtain satisfaction for themselves. If you were not all beaten, if you were not all insulted while acting as choir-masters, you realize of course that you cannot all be choir-masters at the same time, and that no one could possibly assault all of you at once with a single fist. [220] But whenever a solitary victim fails to obtain redress, then each one of you must expect to be the next victim himself, and must not be indifferent to such incidents nor wait for them to come his way, but must rather guard against them as long beforehand as possible. I perhaps am hated by Meidias, and each of you by someone else. Would you, then, allow that enemy, whoever he is, to gain the power of doing to each of you what this man has done to me? I should think not indeed. Then neither must you leave me, Athenians, in this man's power. [221] Just think. The instant this court rises, each of you will walk home, one quicker, another more leisurely, not anxious, not glancing behind him, not fearing whether he is going to run up against a friend or an enemy, a big man or a little one, a strong man or a weak one, or anything of that sort. And why? Because in his heart he knows, and is confident, and has learned to trust the State, that no one shall seize or insult or strike him. [222] That sense of security, then, with which you walk the streets—will you not guarantee it to me before you set off home? How can I reasonably expect to survive after what I have suffered, if you leave me in the lurch? Perhaps someone will say, “Take heart! You will not be insulted again.” But if I am, will you be angry with him then, after acquitting him now? Do not, gentlemen of the jury, do not betray me or yourselves or the laws. [223] For if you would only examine and consider the question, what it is that gives you who serve on juries such power and authority in all state-affairs, whether the State empanels two hundred of you or a thousand or any other number, you would find that it is not that you alone of the citizens are drawn up under arms, not that your physical powers are at their best and strongest, not that you are in the earliest prime of manhood; it is due to no cause of that sort but simply to the strength of the laws. [224] And what is the strength of the laws? If one of you is wronged and cries aloud, will the laws run up and be at his side to assist him? No; they are only written texts and incapable of such action. Wherein then resides their power? In yourselves, if only you support them and make them all-powerful to help him who needs them. So the laws are strong through you and you through the laws. [225] Therefore you must help them as readily as any man would help himself if wronged; you must consider that you share in the wrongs done to the laws, by whomsoever they are found to be committed; and no excuse—neither public services, nor pity, nor personal influence, nor forensic skill, nor anything else—must be devised whereby anyone who has transgressed the laws shall escape punishment. [226]

Those of you who were spectators at the Dionysia hissed and hooted Meidias when he entered the theater; you gave every indication of your abhorrence, though you had not yet heard what I had to say about him. Were you so indignant before the case was investigated, that you urged me to demand vengeance for my wrongs and applauded me when I brought my plaint before the Assembly? [227] And yet now, when his guilt has been established, when the people, sitting in a sacred building, have anticipated his condemnation, when all the other crimes of this miscreant have been sifted, when it has fallen to your lot to be his judges and it lies in your power to conclude the whole affair by a single vote—now, I say, will you hesitate to succor me, to gratify the people, to give all a lesson in sobriety, and to enjoy perfect safety for the rest of your lives, by making an example of the defendant for the instruction of others?

Therefore for all the reasons that I have urged, and above all for the honor of the god whose festival he has been convicted of profaning, punish this man by casting the vote which piety and justice alike demand.

1 Elected, one from each tribe, to help the Archon in directing the procession at the Dionysia.

2 Rooms projecting R. and L. from the back-scene, and giving access to the orchestra for the dithyrambic chorus. Meidias apparently compelled them to enter by the πάροδοι, like a tragic chorus. See Haigh's Attic Theatre, p. 117.

3 If this document were worth emending, we should have to read στεφάνους χρυσοῦς here and τοὺς στεφάνους below, to tally with Dem. 21.16.

4 There is obviously some dislocation here. The evidence of the goldsmith, which concerns the outrages specified in the προβολή, should have come, with the other depositions, after Dem. 21.18. Dem. 21.23, in its present place, with its reference to the beginning of the speech, is nonsense. It is a repetition of Dem. 21.19 and Dem. 21.20, being an introduction to a description of outrages committed against others. This part of his argument Demosthenes commences at Dem. 21.128. Goodwin, who thinks that Demosthenes intended to revise his arrangement of topics, but did not carry it out when the case was dropped, brackets Dem. 21.23 here and inserts it before Dem. 21.128.

5 πρόξενος, here loosely used, is technically a man chosen by a foreign state as its representative in his own native city （nearly a “consul” in the modern sense）.

6 ἱστάναι χάριν, if the Greek is sound, seems to be a “portmanteau” phrase to set up a dance in gratitude. The oracle quoted may perfectly well be genuine.

7 Translating λιτάς, Weil's suggestion.

8 There was a temple at Dodona dedicated to Zeus under this title to commemorate a rescue from shipwreck.

9 If a chorus-master suspected that a member of a rival chorus was an alien, he must not forcibly eject him nor summon him before the Archon to prove his nationality.

10 Chabrias, with Callistratus, was tried for treachery in connection with the surrender of Oropus in 366. The defence of Callistratus is said to have roused the admiration of Demosthenes, then a youth.

11 The argument is here condensed. Demosthenes imagines a juryman as saying to himself, “Demosthenes did not retaliate; therefore the insult was not really intolerable.” He replies, “That only shows my forebearance. You ought to punish Meidias as severely as you would if I had shown that the insult was intolerable by hitting him back.”

12 The language is strangely colloquial, not to say slip-shod. Many editors think that we have here a passage which Demosthenes has not finally worked up. Yet the sudden drop in style might be effective, if only the meaning were more clear. Did the wrestler kill the prize-fighter or vice versa? The reader must take his choice. If ὁ τύπτων is retained, it will mean because the striker [E. or S.?] intended to insult him [S. or E.?]. The καί only makes confusion worse confounded.

13 Before the system of “symmories” was introduced, the liturgies fell on individuals. A citizen to whom one was assigned could challenge another citizen, whom he thought better able to bear the expense, to undertake the liturgy or exchange properties. Such exchange was called ἀντίδοσις.

14 It seems safest to follow the scholiast in this difficult passage. He explains that the arbitrators underwent their audit in the eleventh month of the year, i.e. Thargelion, though he makes the odd mistake of calling it Scirophorion. The last day of the month, called ἔνη καὶ νέα, belonged partly to the passing month and partly to the new. Strato, being off his guard, imagined that the month was over and that it was too late for complaints to be brought against him.

15 This, as the scholiast remarks, seems to be obscure. The rankling injustice would be more likely to keep his memory active.

16 This metaphor of the ἔρανος, which means （1） a picnic, （2） a benefit club, to which each member paid a subscription, and from which he could claim help in time of need, is repeated more fully and clearly in Dem. 21.184. Revision of the speech would probably have cancelled this passage; Dem. 21.100, Dem. 21.101 are obelized in S and two other Mss.

17 The Eumenides （Furies）, whose sanctuary was a cave under the Areopagus.

18 “He that kills me some six or seven dozen of Scots at a breakfast, washes his hands, and says to his wife 'Fie upon this quiet life! I want work.'” （Shakespeare,Hen. 4. Pt. 1. 2. 4. 115）.

19 See note on Dem. 2.29.

20 Using nominal service with the cavalry to secure the profits of a collector.

21 See note on Dem. 21.101.

22 Demosthenes points at Eubulus. The sentence is clumsy, and even doubtful Greek, and may be corrupt. This and the two following sections are obelized in S and other good Mss.

23 Editors find this sentence so intolerably clumsy that they see in it a proof that Demosthenes did not revise this part of the speech. It may be urged that the sentence, though involved, is lucid enough and would be very effective as an apparently unpremeditated outburst.

Gentlemen of the jury, Euctemon finding himself wronged by Androtion, thinks it his duty to obtain satisfaction for himself and at the same time to up hold the constitution; and that is what I also shall essay to do, if I am equal to the task. As a matter of fact the outrages that Euctemon has endured, many and serious and utterly illegal as they were, are slighter than the trouble that Androtion has caused me. Euctemon was the object of a plot to get money out of him and to eject him unfairly from an office of your appointment; but if the charges that Androtion trumped up against me had been accepted in your courts, not a single living man would have opened his door to me, [2] for he accused me of things that anyone would have shrunk from mentioning, unless he were a man of the same stamp as himself, saying that I had killed my own father. He also concocted a public indictment for impiety, not against me directly, but against my uncle, whom he brought to trial, charging him with impiety for associating with me, as though I had committed the alleged acts, and if it had ended in my uncle's conviction, who would have suffered more grievously at the defendant's hands than I? For who, whether friend or stranger, would have consented to have any dealings with me? What state would have admitted within its borders a man deemed guilty of such impiety? Not a single one. [3] Of these charges, then, I cleared myself in your court, not by a narrow margin but so completely that my accuser failed to obtain a fifth of the votes; and upon Androtion I shall endeavor, with your help, to avenge myself today and on every other occasion.

I shall pass over a great deal that I might say about private matters; but there are other matters on which you are now going to give your votes, including not a few injuries which the defendant has done you in dealing as a citizen with public affairs, and these, which Euctemon chose to pass over, but which it is better for you to understand, I shall now try to explain briefly. [4] If I could see any straightforward defence that he could offer to these charges, I would not make any reference to them; but I am quite certain that he cannot have any simple and honest plea to put forward, but will try to hoodwink you, inventing malicious answers to each charge and so leading you astray. For he is a skillful rhetorician, men of Athens, and has devoted all his life to that one study. Therefore, that you may not be deceived and persuaded to vote contrary to the spirit of your oath and to acquit a man whom you have every reason to punish, pray attend to what I shall say, so that when you have heard me, you may have the right reply to every argument that he will advance. [5]

There is one plea which he thinks a clever defence of the omission of the preliminary decree. There is a law, he says, that if the Council by its performance of its duties seems to deserve a reward, that reward shall be presented by the people. That question, he says, the chairman of the Assembly put, the people voted, and it was carried. In this case, he says, there is no need of a preliminary decree, because what was done was in accordance with law. But I take the exactly contrary view-and I think you will agree with me—that the preliminary decrees should only be proposed concerning matters prescribed by the laws, because, where no laws are laid down, surely no proposal whatever is admissible. [6] Now he will say that all the Councils that have ever received a reward from you, have received it in this way, and that in no case has a preliminary decree ever been passed. But I think—or rather, I am certain—that this statement is untrue. Even if it were absolutely true, yet surely where the law says the opposite, we ought not to transgress the law now because it has often been transgressed before; on the contrary we ought to enforce the observance of the law, beginning with you, Androtion, first. [7] You must not tell us that this has often been done before; you must show us that it is right to do it. If the practice has at any time been contrary to the laws and you have only followed precedent, you cannot in fairness escape, but ought all the more to be convicted; for if any of the former delinquents had been condemned, you would never have proposed the resolution, and in the same way, if you are punished now, no one else will propose it in the future. [8]

Coming now to the law which explicitly denies to the Council the right to ask a reward, if they have not built the warships, it is worth while to hear the defence that he will set up, and to get a clear view of the shamelessness of his behavior from the arguments that he attempts to use. The law, he says, forbids the Council to ask for the reward, if they have not built the ships. But, he adds, the law nowhere prohibits the Assembly from giving it. “If I gave it at their request, my motion was illegal, but if I have never mentioned the ships in the whole of my decree, but give other grounds for granting a crown to the Council, where is the illegality of my motion?” [9] It is surely not difficult for the jury to find the right answer to this: that in the first place the Committee of the Council and the chairman, who puts these proposals to the vote, duly put the question and called for a show of hands—“those who are of opinion that the Council have deserved a reward, to vote aye; on the contrary, no.” Yet surely men who neither ask nor expect a reward should never have put the question at all. [10] Besides this, when Meidias and others brought certain accusations against the Council, the Councillors fairly leaped up on to the platform and begged not to be robbed of their reward. There is no need for me to tell the jury this, for you were present in the Assembly and know what happened there. So when he says that the Council did not ask for it, have that answer ready for him. But I will also prove to you that the people are forbidden by the law to give the reward, if the Council have not built the ships. [11] For the law, that the Council should not ask for the reward if they have not built the war ships, was framed in that way, men of Athens, to prevent the possibility of the people being influenced or misled. The legislator held that the question should not depend on the abilities of the speakers, but that whatever he could devise that was at once just and expedient for the people, should be fixed by law. “You have not built the ships? Then don't ask for the reward.” Where the law does not permit the asking, does it not absolutely forbid the giving? [12]

Now there is another question, men of Athens, which is worth going into. Why is it that when the Council have performed all their other duties satisfactorily, and no one has any complaint to make, yet, if they have not built the ships, they are not allowed to ask for the reward? You will find that this stringent enactment is in the interests of the people. For I suppose no one would deny that all that has happened to our city, in the past or in the present, whether good or otherwise—I avoid an unpleasant term—has resulted in the one case from the possession, and in the other from the want, of warships. [13] Many instances might be given, ancient and modern, but of those that are most familiar to your ears, take if you please this. The men who built the Propylaea and the Parthenon, and decked our other temples with the spoils of Asia, trophies in which we take a natural pride,—you know of course from tradition that after they abandoned the city and shut themselves up in Salamis, it was because they had the war galleys that they won the sea-fight and saved the city and all their belongings, and made themselves the authors for the rest of the Greeks of many great benefits, of which not even time can ever obliterate the memory. [14] Well, you say, but that is ancient history. But take something that you have all seen. You know that lately you sent help to the Euboeans within three days and got rid of the Thebans by an armistice.1 Could you have done all this so promptly, if you had not had new vessels to convey your force? You would have found it impossible. Many other successes might be mentioned that have resulted from our being provided with these ships in sound condition. [15] Yes, and how many disasters from unsound ships? I will pass over most of them; but in the Decelean war2—I am reminding you of a bit of old history which you all know better than I do—though many serious disasters befell our city, she did not succumb till her fleet was destroyed. But why need me cite ancient instances? You know how it stood with our city in the last war with the Lacedaemonians3 when it seemed unlikely that you could dispatch a fleet. You know that vetches were sold for food. But when you did dispatch it, you obtained peace on your own terms. [16] Therefore, men of Athens, seeing that warships have such weight in either scale, you nave done rightly to set this strict limit to the Council's claim to the reward. For if they should discharge all their other duties satisfactorily, but fail to build these ships, by which we gained our power at the first and by which we retain it today, all their other services are of no avail, for it is the safety of the whole State that must be ensured for the people before every thing. Now the defendant is so obsessed with the idea that he can make any speech or proposal he wishes, that though the Council has discharged its other duties in the way that you have heard, but has not built the warships, he moved to grant them their reward. [17]

That this is not a violation of the law, he could not possibly assert nor could you be brought to believe it. But I understand that he will put before you some such plea as this—that the Council was not to blame for the shortage of ships, but the treasurer of the shipbuilders, who absconded with two and a half talents, and so the business ended in a fiasco. But I must first express my surprise that he should have demanded a crown for the Council to reward a fiasco. I thought such honors were reserved for successes. Next, I have another consideration to put before you. [18] I submit that it is not fair to combine the two pleas, that the gift was not illegal and that the Council are not responsible for the lack of ships. For if it is right to give them the reward even when they have not built the ships, what need is there to say who is responsible for the omission? But if it is not right, why were the Council any the more entitled to it, because he can point to this or that man as responsible for the shortage? [19] Apart from that, it seems to me that such arguments offer you a choice, whether you think you ought to hear excuses and pleas from men who have done you harm, or whether you ought to have some ships. For if you accept the defendant's plea, it will be clear to every future Council that their business is to find you plausible excuses, not to build you ships, with the result that your money will be spent, but there will be no ships for you. [20] But if, as the law says and as your oath enjoins, you sternly and absolutely reject their excuses, and make it clear that you have withheld the reward because they have not built the ships, then every Council, men of Athens, will deliver to you the ships duly built, because they will see that in your eyes everything else is of less consequence than the law. Now I shall show you clearly that no other human being is responsible for the shortage of ships; for the Council, having made the law null and void, elected this treasurer themselves.4 [21]

Again, with regard to the law5 of prostitution, he tries to make out that we are insulting him and attacking him with baseless calumnies. He says too that if we believed the charges true, we ought to have faced him in the Court of the Thesmothetae, and asked a fine of a thousand drachmas if our charges had been proved false; as it is, we are trying to hoodwink you by accusations and idle abuse, and are confusing you by matters outside your jurisdiction. [22] But I think you ought first of all to reflect in your own minds that abuse and accusation are very far removed from proof. It is an accusation when one makes a bare statement without supplying grounds for believing it; it is proof when one at the same time demonstrates the truth of one's statements. Those, therefore, who are proving a case must supply evidence sufficient to establish its credibility with you, or must advance reasonable arguments, or must produce witnesses. Of some facts it is impossible to put eye-witnesses in the box, but if one can establish any of these tests, you rightly consider in every case that you have a sufficient proof of the truth. [23] We then base our proof, not on probabilities nor on circumstantial evidence, but on a witness from whom the defendant may easily obtain satisfaction—a man who has prepared a document containing an account of the defendant's life, and who makes himself responsible for this evidence. So that when Androtion says that this is mere abuse and accusation, reply that this is proof, but that abuse and accusation describe his own performance; and when he says that we ought to have denounced him to the Thesmothetae, reply that we intend to do so, and that we are now quite properly citing this statute. [24] For if we were bringing these charges against him in any other kind of trial, he could have just cause of complaint; but if the present trial is one that concerns illegal proposals, and if men who have led a life like his are forbidden by the laws to make even a legal proposal, and if we prove that he has not only made an illegal proposal but has also led an illegal life, then is it not proper to cite this law which determines his illegal status? [25]

Moreover you should grasp this fact, that Solon, who framed these and most of our other laws, was a very different kind of legislator from the defendant, and provided not one, but many modes of procedure for those who wish to obtain redress for various wrongs. For he knew, I think, that for all the citizens to be equally clever, or bold, or moderate folk, was impossible. If, then, he was going to frame the laws to satisfy the moderate man's claim to redress, many rascals, he reflected, would get off scot-free, but if he framed them in the interests of the bold and the clever speakers, the plain citizen would not be able to obtain redress in the same way as they would. [26] But he thought that no one should be debarred from obtaining redress in whatever way he can best do so. How then will this be ensured? By granting many modes of legal procedure to the injured parties. Take a case of theft. Are you a strong man, confident in yourself? Arrest the thief; only you are risking a thousand drachmas. Are you rather weak? Guide the Archons to him, and they will do the rest. Are you afraid even to do this? Bring a written indictment. [27] Do you distrust yourself, and are you a poor man, unable to find the thousand drachmas? Sue him for theft before a public arbitrator, and you will risk nothing. In the same way for impiety you can arrest, or indict, or sue before the Eumolpidae, or give information to the King-Archon. And in the same way, or nearly so, for every other offence. [28] Now just suppose that a man, instead of rebutting the charge of crime or impiety or whatever else he may be tried for, should claim his acquittal on these grounds-in the case of an arrest, that you might have brought an action before an arbitrator and that you ought to have indicted him, or, if he is defendant in an arbitrator's court, that you ought to have arrested him, so that you might risk a fine of a thousand drachmas. Surely that would be a farce. A defendant, if innocent, need not dispute the method by which he is brought.to justice: he ought to prove hat he is innocent. [29] In just the same way, if you, Androtion, propose a decree after having been guilty of prostitution, do not imagine that you ought to escape punishment because we might also have denounced you to the Thesmothetae, but either prove that you are innocent or submit to punishment for any decrees that you have proposed, being what you are; or you have no right to propose them. If we do not punish you by every process that the laws allow, be grateful to us for those that we omit: do not on that ground claim to pay no penalty at all. [30]

Now it is worth your while, men of Athens, to study too the character of Solon, who framed this law, and to observe what care he took of the constitution in all the laws, how much more zealous indeed he was for the constitution than for the matter on which he was legislating. This may be seen in many ways, but especially from this law, which forbids persons guilty of prostitution to make speeches or to propose measures. For he saw that the majority of you do not avail yourselves of your right to speak, so that the prohibition seemed no great hardship, and he could have laid down many harsher penalties, if his object had been the chastisement of these offenders. [31] But that was not his aim; he imposed this disability in the interests of you and of the State, for he knew—I say, he knew that of all states the most antagonistic men of infamous habits is that in which every man is at liberty to publish their shame. And what state is that? A democracy. He thought it would be dangerous if there ever happened to coexist a considerable number of men who were bold and clever speakers, but tainted with such disgraceful wickedness. [32] For the people may be led astray by them to make many mistakes, and such men may attempt either to overthrow the democracy completely,—for in an oligarchy, even if there are viler livers than Androtion, no one may speak evil of dignities—or to debauch the people, so that they may be as nearly as possible like themselves. He therefore absolutely forbade such men to take any share in the counsels of the State, lest the people should be deluded into some error. Disregarding all this, our honorable gentleman here thought fit not only to make speeches and proposals, though not entitled to do so, but even ventured to make illegal ones. [33]

Again, with regard to the law which forbids him to speak or move resolutions, because his father owed money to the exchequer and has never paid it, you have a fair and reasonable answer to him, if he says that we ought to have laid an information against him. We will do that later, certainly not now, Androtion, when you have to render an account of your other crimes, but when it is proper to do so according to the law. For the present, we are content to prove that the law does not permit you to move resolutions, not even such as every other citizen may move. [34] Prove, therefore, that your father was not a defaulter, or that he left the prison, not by running away, but by paying his debts. If you cannot prove that, then you had no right to move your resolution; for the law makes you a partner in the disqualification of your father, and being disqualified you had no right either to speak or move. Also with regard to the laws which we have cited in court, I think that if he tries to cheat and mislead you, gentlemen, you must give him the reply that I have indicated. [35]

On other points also he has arguments admirably calculated to deceive you, and it is better that you should be told of them beforehand. One of them runs like this: “Do not steal the reward from five hundred of yourselves, nor involve them in disgrace; they are on their trial, not I.” But, had you been going to deprive them of something without otherwise benefiting the State, I should not have asked you to show any great keenness in the matter; but if by this action you are going to convert more than ten thousand others into better citizens, what a far finer thing it is to make so many men honest than to confer an unjust favour on five hundred. [36] But I am in a position to assert that the question does not concern the whole Council, but only Androtion and some others, who are the cause of the mischief. For should the Council receive no crown, who suffers disgrace, if he makes no speech and moves no resolution himself, and perhaps even does not attend most of the meetings? No one surely. The disgrace attaches to him who moves resolutions and meddles with politics and tries to impose his wishes on the Council; because it is through such men that the deliberations of the Council have proved undeserving of the crown. [37] And yet, even if we grant freely that the whole Council is on its trial, reflect how much more advantage you will gain if you condemn Androtion, than if you do not. If you acquit him, the talkers will rule in the Council chamber, but if you convict him, the ordinary members. For when the majority see that they have lost the crown through the misconduct of the orators, they will not leave the transaction of business in their hands, but will depend on themselves for the best advice. If this comes to pass, and if you are once rid of the old gang of orators, then, men of Athens, you will see everything done as it ought to be. For this, if for no other, reason you ought to convict. [38]

Now attend to another point that must not escape you. Perhaps Philippus will get up and defend the Council; perhaps too Antigenes and the checking-clerk6 and some others, who along with the defendant kept the Council-chamber as their private preserve, and who are the cause of the present discontents. Now you must all observe that their pretence is that they are supporting the cause of the Council, but really they will be fighting for their own interests, to support the audit which they have to render of their official acts. [39] For the case stands thus. If you dismiss this impeachment, they are all acquitted and not a single one of them will pay the penalty, for who henceforth would give his verdict against them when you have crowned the Council of which they were the leading spirits? But if you convict, in the first place you will have kept your judicial oath; and further, when you have each of these men before you at their audit, anyone whom you think guilty you will punish; and anyone who is not, then will be the time to acquit him. Do not, therefore, accept their words as spoken on behalf of the Council and of the general public, but be incensed against them as impostors defending their own interests. [40]

Again, I expect that Archias, of the deme of Cholargas,—for he too was a Councillor last year-will plead on their behalf in his character of respectable citizen. But I suggest that you should meet his plea in some such way as this. Ask him whether the conduct with which the Council are charged seems to him honorable or the reverse, and if he says “honorable,” pay him no longer the attention due to a respectable man; if he says “dishonorable,” ask him a second question: why did he let it pass, if he claims to be a respectable man? [41] If he says that he spoke against it but could persuade no one, surely it is ridiculous for him now to defend this Council that rejected all his excellent advice; but if he says that he held his tongue, is he not guilty of an injustice if he neglected his chance of dissuading them from the offence they were contemplating, and yet ventures now to say that having actually done so much evil they deserve to be crowned? [42]

I expect too that Androtion will not refrain from pleading that all this has come upon him because of his success in collecting on your behalf large arrears of taxes, which a few citizens （so he will tell you） shamelessly neglected to pay; and he will denounce these men—undertaking an easy task, I think—[for not paying their property-tax], and will prophesy complete impunity for all who do not pay, if you give your verdict against him. [43] But I must first ask you, men of Athens, to reflect that the question you are sworn to decide is not this, but whether his proposal was in accordance with the laws. Next reflect that it is outrageous in one who charges others with violating the constitution to claim exemption from punishment for his own more serious violations; because it is obviously more serious to propose an unconstitutional decree than to fail to pay the property-tax. [44] Then even if it were certain that after this man's conviction no one would pay the tax or be willing to collect it, even so you must not acquit him, as you will see from this consideration. Upon the property-taxes from the archonship of Nausinicus—say three hundred talents or a trifle more7—you have a deficit of fourteen talents, of which he levied seven; but I am assuming that he levied the whole amount. Now you do not need Androtion to deal with the willing payers, but with the defaulters. [45] So you have now to consider whether that is the value that you put on the constitution, the existing laws, and your regard for your oath;for if you acquit him, though his proposal was manifestly illegal, everyone will conclude that you have preferred this sum of money to the laws and to your good faith. Why, even if a man gave you this sum out of his own pocket, it would not be worth taking, much less if it has to be exacted from others. [46] Therefore, when he uses this argument, remember your oath, and reflect that this indictment concerns not the collection of taxes, but the sovereignty of the laws. And as to all this—how he will try to hoodwink you by distracting you from the subject of this law, and what points you must bear in mind so as not to give way to him—though I might say more on these subjects, I will refrain, as I think that this will suffice. [47]

I desire also to subject the politics of this honorable gentleman to a scrutiny, from which it will be clear that he has not stopped short of the utmost limits of depravity; for I shall prove him to be shameless and reckless, a thief and a bully, fit for anything rather than to play a public part in a democracy. And first of all let us examine this levying of taxes, on which he chiefly prides himself. Without paying any attention to his boasts, let us look at the facts in their true light. [48] He said that Euctemon was retaining your taxes, and he undertook to prove the charge or pay the sum out of his own pocket. On that pretext he got you to vote for the dismissal of an official appointed by lot, and so wormed his way into a collectorship. He delivered sundry harangues on the subject, telling you that you had a choice of three courses, either to break up the sacred plate, or to impose a fresh tax, or to squeeze the money out of the defaulters; and you naturally chose the last. [49] Having you under his thumb, thanks to his promises, and having liberty of action owing to the state of affairs at the time, he did not think it necessary to employ the existing laws for his purpose, nor to make new laws, if he considered the old ones inadequate; but he proposed in your Assembly monstrous and unconstitutional decrees, by means of which he created a job for himself and has stolen a great deal that belongs to you, putting in a clause that the Eleven should attend on him. [50] Then, with the Eleven, he led the way to the homes of his fellow-citizens. Against Euctemon he could prove nothing, though he had said that he would get the taxes out of him or pay them himself; but it was from you that he levied them, as if his motive was hostility, not to Euctemon, but to you. [51] Let no one understand me to say that the money ought not to have been wrung from the defaulters. It ought; but how? Even as the law enjoins, for the benefit of the other citizens. That is the spirit of democracy. For what you, men of Athens, have gained by the exaction of such paltry sums of money in this way, is nothing to what you have lost by the introduction of such habits into political life. If you care to inquire why a man would sooner live under a democracy than under an oligarchy, you will find that most obvious reason is that in a democracy everything is more easy-going. [52] I shall not, then, trouble to show that the defendant has proved himself more brutal than any oligarchy anywhere in the world. But here, in our own city, at what period were the most outrageous things done? You will all say, “Under the Thirty Tyrants.” Now under the Thirty, as we are informed, no man forfeited the power to save his life who could hide himself at home; what we denounce the Thirty for is that they arrested men illegally in the market-place. This man displayed a brutality so far in excess of theirs that he, a public man under a democracy, turned every man's private house into a jail by conducting the Eleven into your homes. [53] But what do you think of this, Athenians? What if a poor man, or a rich man for that matter who has spent much money and is naturally perhaps rather short of cash, should have to climb over the roof to a neighbor's house or creep under bed, to avoid being caught and dragged off to jail, or should degrade himself in some other fashion, fit for slaves and not for freemen, and should be seen thus acting by his own wife, whom he espoused as a freeman and a citizen of our state? And what if the cause of all this was Androtion, a man who is debarred by his own conduct and mode of life from seeking redress for himself, much more for the State? [54] Yet if he were asked whether the taxes are due from our property or from our persons, he would admit, if he cared to speak the truth, that they are due from our property; it is from property that our contributions come. Then why did you drop the sequestration and scheduling of lands and houses, and proceed to imprison and insult Athenian citizens and the unfortunate resident aliens, whom you have treated with more insolence than your own slaves? [55] Indeed, if you wanted to contrast the slave and the freeman, you would find the most important distinction in the fact that slaves are responsible in person for all offences, while freemen, even in the most unfortunate circumstances, can protect their persons. For it is in the shape of money that in the majority of cases the law must obtain satisfaction from them; but Androtion on the contrary exacted vengeance from their persons, as if they had been bond-slaves. [56] So corrupt and selfish was his attitude towards you that he thought that his own father, imprisoned by the State for moneys due, had a right to escape, without payment and without trial, but that any other citizen, not having the means to pay, might be dragged from his own home to prison. And then, on the top of all this, as though he could do whatever he liked, he distrained upon Sinope and Phanostrate, who were prostitutes certainly, but owed no property-tax. [57] Should anyone possibly think that those women were fitting people to suffer, yet assuredly it was not a fitting procedure—that men should be so puffed up by a chance opportunity as to march into houses and carry off the furniture of people who are not in debt. For one could point to many who are and have been “fitting persons” for such treatment. But surely such is not the language of the statutes or of the principles of the constitution, which it is your duty to uphold. In them we find pity, pardon, everything that becomes free citizens. [58] To all such feelings the defendant is of course a stranger by birth and breeding. Many are the outrages and insults that he has had to submit to when consorting with men who had no love for him but could pay his price. For such insults, Androtion, it would have been right to vent your spite, not on the next citizen you meet, not on the women who follow your own profession, but on the father who gave you such a bringing up. [59]

Now that these are serious offences, contrary to every statute, he will not be able to deny; but he is so impudent that in the Assembly, contriving always an anticipation of his defence against this indictment, he dared to say that it was in your interests and for your sake that he had drawn down enmity on himself and was now in desperate peril. But I want to prove to you, men of Athens, that he has never suffered, nor is likely to suffer, any inconvenience at all through his services to you, but that for his abominable and monstrous wickedness he has hitherto not paid the penalty, but will pay it now, if you on your part do what is right. [60] Consider this point. What did he undertake to do for you, and what did you appoint him to do? To collect moneys. Anything else besides? Not a single thing! Very well; I will remind you of the items of his accounts. He collected from Leptines of Coele thirty-four drachmas, from Theoxenus of Alopece seventy drachmas or a trifle more, and from Callicrates, the son of Eupherus, and from the young son of Telestes, whose name I cannot give you—but without going into details, of all those from whom he collected money, I doubt if anyone owed more than a mina. [61] Then do you suppose that all these men are his inveterate enemies merely because he collected this money from them? Is it not rather because he said of one of them, in the hearing of all of you in the Assembly, that he was a slave and born of slaves and ought by rights to pay the contribution of one-sixth with the resident aliens8; and of another that he had children by a harlot; of this man that his father had prostituted himself; of that man that his mother had been on the streets; that he was making an inventory of one man's peculations from the start of his career, that another had done this or that, and that a third had committed every conceivable crime—slandering them all in turn? [62] I feel sure that of all whom he has abused in his cups, each one looked upon the tax as a necessary item of expenditure, but has been deeply wounded by all these indignities and insults. I feel sure too that he was elected by you to collect money due, and not to reproach every man with his private misfortunes and so make them public. For if the charges were true, Androtion （and we all have our undesirable experiences）, you had no right to publish them; and if you invented them without any authority, is any punishment too light for you? [63] Here is yet another proof that will convince you that they all hate him, not because of the collection, but for his acts of drunken insolence. Satyrus, the superintendent of the dock-yards, collected for you not seven, but thirty-four talents from these very same men, and used the money to equip the ships that were put in commission; and he can tell you that he has made no enemies in consequence, and that none of those from whom he levied the taxes is at open war with him. Naturally! He, I suppose, simply discharged the duty assigned to him, but you in your wanton, headstrong effrontery, being armed with authority, thought fit to terse with foul and lying reproaches men who had spent large sums on the State, better men than yourself and of better birth. [64] After this, are the jury to believe that you did it all for their sakes? Are they to make themselves responsible for your acts of callous wickedness? They ought in justice to detest you all the more for this rather than protect you. For the man who is acting for the State ought to imitate the spirit of the State, and you, Athenians, ought to encourage such men and hate men like the defendant. For though you are probably aware of it, I must none the less tell you this: whatever sort of men you are seen to honor and protect, you will be thought to be like them yourselves. [65]

9 However, I will make it quite clear to you without more ado that he did not carry out these exactions for your benefit at all. If he were asked whether, in his opinion, the greater injury is done to the common wealth by tillers of the soil, who live frugally, but, because of the cost of maintaining their children, or of household expenses, or of other public burdens, are behindhand with their taxes, or by people who plunder and squander the money of willing taxpayers and the revenue that comes from our allies, I am sure that, for all his hardihood, he would never have the audacity to reply that those who fail to contribute their own money are worse transgressors than those who embezzle public money. [66] What is the reason, you abominable wretch, that though you have taken part in public life for more than thirty years, and though during that time many commanders have defrauded the commonwealth, and many politicians as well, who have been tried in this court, and though some of them have suffered death for their crimes, and others have slipped away into exile, you never once appeared as prosecutor of any of them or expressed any indignation at the wrongs of the city, bold and clever speaker though you are, but made your first exhibition of anxiety for our welfare on an occasion that called for harsh treatment of a great many people? [67] Do you wish me to tell you the reason, men of Athens? [He has his share in the proceeds of certain iniquities, and he also gets his pickings from the collection of revenue. In his insatiable greed he reaps a double harvest from the State. Now it is not an easier matter to make enemies of a multitude of petty offenders than of a few big offenders; neither of course is it a more popular thing to have an eye for the sins of the many than for the sins of the few. However, the reason is what I am telling you.] He knows indeed that he is one of them, one of the criminals, but he thought you beneath his notice; and that was why he treated you in this way. [68] If you had confessed, men of Athens, that you are a nation of slaves and not of men who claim empire over others, you would never have put up with the insults which he repeatedly offered you in the marketplace, binding and arresting aliens and citizens alike, bawling from the platform in the Assembly, calling men slaves and slave-born who were better men than himself and of better birth, and asking if the jail was built for no object. I should certainly say it was, if your father danced his way out of it, fetters and all, at the procession of the Dionysia. All his other outrages it would be impossible to relate; they are too numerous. For all of them taken together you must exact vengeance today, and make an example of him to teach the rest to behave with more restraint. [69]

Yes, it may be said, this is the sort of man he was in his public conduct, but there are other things which he has managed with credit. On the contrary, in every respect his behavior towards his fellow-citizens has been such that the story you have heard is the least of the reasons you have for hating him. What do you wish me to mention? How he “repaired” the processional ornaments? How he broke up the crowns? His success as a manufacturer of saucers? Why, for those performances alone, though he had committed no other fraud on the city, it seems to me he deserves not one but three sentences of death; for he is guilty of sacrilege, of impiety, of embezzlement, of every monstrous crime. [70] The greater part of the speech by which he threw dust in your eyes I will leave unnoticed; but, by alleging that the leaves of the crowns were rotten with age and falling off,—as though they were violet-leaves or rose-leaves, not leaves made of gold—he persuaded you to melt them down. And then, in providing for the collection of taxes, he had put in a clause that the public accountant should attend. That was very honest of him; only every taxpayer was certain to check the accounts. But in dealing with the crowns that he was to break up, he left out that very proper regulation; one and the same man was orator, goldsmith, business manager, and auditor of accounts. [71] Now if you, sir, had claimed our entire confidence in all your public business, your dishonesty would not have been equally manifest; but, seeing that in the matter of the taxes you laid down the just principle that the city must trust, not you, but her own servants, and then, when you took up another job and were tampering with the consecrated plate, some of it dedicated before we were born, you forgot to provide the precaution that was taken at your own instance in respect of the tax collection, is it not perfectly clear what you were aiming at? Of course it is. [72] Again, men of Athens, consider those glorious and enviable inscriptions that he has obliterated for all time, and the strange and blasphemous inscriptions that he has written in their stead. You all, I suppose, used to see the words written under the circlets of the crowns: “The Allies to the Athenian People for valor and righteousness,” or “The Allies to the Goddess of Athens, a prize of victory”; or, from the several states of the alliance, “Such-and-such a City to the People by whom they were delivered,” or, “The liberated Euboeans,” for example, “crown the People”; or again, “Conon from the sea-fight with the Lacedaemonians.” Such, I say, were the inscriptions of the crowns. [73] They were tokens of emulation and honorable ambition; but now they have vanished with the destruction of the crowns, and the saucers which that lewd fellow has had made in their place bear the inscription, “Made by direction of Androtion.” And so the name of a man whom the laws forbid to enter our temples in person because of his prostitution, has been inscribed on the cups in those temples. Just like the old inscriptions, is it not? and an equal incentive to ambition? [74] [You may, then, mark three scandalous crimes committed by these persons. They have robbed the Goddess of her crowns. They have extinguished in the city that spirit of emulation that sprang from the achievements which the crowns, while in being, commemorated. They have deprived the donors of a great honor,—the credit of gratitude for benefits received. After this long series of evil deeds they have grown so callous and so audacious that they recall those crimes as admirable examples of their administration, so that one of them expects you to acquit him for the sake of the other, and the other sits by his side and does not sink into the ground for shame at his conduct.] [75] Not only is he lost to shame when money is in question, but he is so dull-witted that he cannot see that crowns are a symbol of merit, but saucers and the like only of wealth; that every crown, how ever small, implies the same regard for honor as if it were large. that drinking-cups and censers, if very numerous, attach to their owners a sort of reputation for wealth, but that, if a man takes pride in trifles, instead of winning some honor by them, he is disdained as a man of vulgar tastes. This man, then, has destroyed the possessions of honor, and made the possessions of wealth mean and unworthy of your dignity. [76] There is another thing that he did not understand, that the Athenian democracy, never eager to acquire riches, coveted glory more than any other possession in the world. Here is the proof: once they possessed greater wealth than any other Hellenic people, but they spent it all for love of honor; they laid their private fortunes under contribution, and recoiled from no peril for glory's sake. Hence the People inherits possessions that will never die; on the one hand the memory of their achievements, on the other, the beauty of the memorials set up in their honor, yonder Propylaea, the Parthenon, the porticoes, the docks,—not a couple of jugs, or three or four bits of gold plate, weighing a pound apiece, which you, Androtion, will propose to melt down again, whenever the whim takes you. [77] To dedicate those buildings they did not tithe themselves, nor fulfil the imprecations of their enemies by doubling the income-tax, nor was their policy ever guided by such advisers as you. No; they conquered their enemies, they fulfilled the prayers of every sound-hearted man by establishing concord throughout the city; and so they have bequeathed to us their imperishable glory, and excluded from the market-place men whose habits of life were what yours have always been. [78] But you, men of Athens, have grown so extremely good-natured and pliable, that, with those examples ever before you, you do not imitate them, and Androtion is the repairer of your processional plate. Androtion! Gracious Heavens! Do you think impiety could go further than that? I hold that the man who is to enter the sacred places, to lay hands on the vessels of lustration and the sacrificial baskets, and to become the director of divine worship, ought not to be pure for a prescribed number of days only; his whole life should have been kept pure of the habits that have polluted the life of Androtion.

1 In 357.

2 The last stage of the Peloponnesian War, 413 to 404.

3 Terminated by the peace of Callias in 371.

4 The treasurer should have been elected by the people; the Council, by appointing him illegally, made themselves responsible for his defalcations. The corruption of this passage is as old as Harpocration. Mss. have ἁυτῇ or ἁυτήν . With the latter and a comma after τοῦτον, editors have tried to translate ἐχειποτόνησεν “voted itself guilty.” Jurinus was the first to suggest αὐτὴ and to refer τοῦτον to the treasurer.

5 The little that is known of this law is derived from Aeschines' speech against TimarchusAeschin. 1

6 The ἀντιγραφεὺς τῆς βου;ῆς checked all financial transactions with which the Council was concerned. He must be distinguished from the γραμματεύς , who dealt with the decrees. The two men named are unknown.

7 This figure is probably corrupt, being too large for a single year, and too small for the twenty-three years from the archonship of Nausinicus （378-377） to the date of this speech.

8 The metoeci paid tax on one-sixth of their capital; but possibly, as Mr. Wayte has suggested, they paid the same quotas as the citizen, plus an additional charge of one-sixth.

9 The rest of this speech is almost entirely repeated in that against Timocrates, Dem. 24.172-186.

Men of Athens, I beg that none of you will imagine that I have come here to arraign the defendant Aristocrates from any motive of private malice, or that I am thrusting myself so eagerly into a quarrel because I have detected some small and trivial blunder, but if my judgement and my views are at all right, the purpose of all my exertions in this case is that you may hold the Chersonese securely, and may not for the second time be cheated out of the possession of that country. [2] If, then, it is your desire to learn the truth about this business, and to give a righteous and legitimate verdict on the indictment, you must not confine your attention to the mere phrasing of the decree, but also take into consideration its probable consequences.

Had it been possible for you, at a first hearing, to discover the trick that had been played, you would not, perhaps, have been deceived at the outset; [3] but, inasmuch as one of our grievances is that certain persons make speeches and move resolutions designed to avert your suspicions and put you off your guard, you must not be greatly astonished if we convince you that this decree also is so worded that, while apparently offering some personal protection to Charidemus, it really robs our city of an honest and effective safeguard for the Chersonese. [4]

You will be well advised, men of Athens, to grant me your attention, and give a favorable hearing to what I have to say. I am not one of the orators who worry you; I am not one of the politicians who enjoy your confidence; yet I undertake to convince you of the importance of this transaction; and therefore, if you will cooperate with me to the best of your power and listen to me with goodwill, you will avert this peril, and at the same time you will overcome the reluctance of any of us plain citizens who may believe himself able to do the State a good turn. And he will so believe, if only he is satisfied that it is not difficult to get a hearing in this court; [5] though at present many of us,—inexpert speakers, perhaps, and yet better men than the experts—so dread this ordeal that they never think even of examining any public question. You may be sure that I for one, as Heaven is my witness, would never have dared to lay this indictment, if I had not thought it entirely dishonorable that at this time, when I see people engaged in a project to the disadvantage of our commonwealth, I should hold my peace, and close my lips,—I who, on a former occasion, when I sailed for the Hellespont in command of a war-galley, spoke out and denounced certain men who, in my judgement, were doing you wrong. [6]

I am not ignorant that Charidemus is regarded by some as a benefactor of Athens. But if I can find ability to tell you what I mean, and what I know him to have done, I hope to prove that, so far from being our benefactor, he is particularly ill-disposed to us, and that exactly the wrong conception has been formed of his character. [7] If, men of Athens, the most serious offence committed by Aristocrates had been that in his decree he was so solicitous for the safety of such a man as I undertake to prove Charidemus to be that he provided a special and illegal penalty, in case anything happened to him, I should have tried to deal with that point at once, for the purpose of proving that the man is very far from deserving the favour of this decree. There is, however, a much graver iniquity involved in the decree, of which you must first be informed, and against which you must take precaution. [8]

It is essential that at the outset I should explain to you the circumstances to which you owe the secure possession of the Chersonese, for in the light of that knowledge you will get a clear perception of the wrong that has been committed. The circumstances, men of Athens, are these. On the demise of Cotys three persons instead of one became kings of Thrace—Berisades, Amadocus, and Cersobleptes; and the natural result was that they competed with one another and that they all flattered you and courted your favour. [9] Well, men of Athens, certain persons who wanted to put a stop to that state of affairs, to get rid of the other kings, and to put Cersobleptes in possession of an undivided monarchy, contrived to equip themselves with this provisional resolution. If one listened only to the wording, they were far from appearing to pursue any such purpose; and yet such was in fact their main object, as I will proceed to explain. [10] On the death of Berisades, one of the three kings, Cersobleptes, in violation of a sworn treaty concluded with you, began to levy war upon the sons of Berisades and upon Amadocus; and it was at once foreseen that Athenodorus would come to the aid of the sons of Berisades, and Simon and Bianor to that of Amadocus, the former being related by marriage to Berisades and the two latter to Amadocus. [11] Accordingly the persons I have mentioned began to consider by what means those commanders might be compelled to remain inactive, so that, the rival princes being friendless, Charidemus, who was striving to win the monarchy for Cersobleptes, might make himself master of the situation. The first plan was to get a decree enacted by you, making any man who should kill Charidemus liable to arrest; and the second was that Charidemus should receive from you a general's commission. [12] For neither Simon nor Bianor, both of whom had been admitted to your citizenship, and who were, apart from that, thoroughly well affected towards you, was likely to take the field against a general of yours while Athenodorus, an Athenian citizen by birthright, would never dream of doing so, nor would he incur the criminal charge set up by the decree, which would certainly be brought against those commanders, if anything happened to Charidemus. By these means, the kings being denuded of allies, and impunity provide for themselves, they hoped easily to drive them out and seize the monarchy. [13] Of such intentions and of such artifices they are accused by the evidence of facts; for, at the moment when they began hostilities, Aristomachus of Alopece visited you as their ambassador, and in his oration before the assembly, not content with commending Cersobleptes and Charidemus and enlarging on their generous sentiments towards you, [14] he declared that Charidemus was the only man in the world who could recover Amphipolis for Athens, and advised you to appoint him as general. But this preliminary resolution had already been drafted and preconcerted by them, in order that, if you should be captivated by the promises and expectations which Aristomachus held out to you, it might be ratified there and then by the Assembly, and no impediment might remain. [15] Yet what more ingenious and cunning device could these men have concocted to obtain the expulsion of the other kings, and the subjection of the whole realm to the monarch whom they preferred, than when they intimidated the commanders who would otherwise have supported the two rivals, and put them on their guard against that spiteful accusation which they might reasonably expect to encounter by the operation of this decree; and when on the other hand they conferred upon the man who was scheming to get the monarchy for one king, and was laying plans entirely opposed to your interests, such ample licence to proceed without fear? [16]

Nor is it only these considerations that prove that such was the purpose for which the resolution was moved: the decree itself supplies evidence of great weight. After drafting the words “if any person put Charidemus to death,” and omitting any proviso of what Charidemus might be doing, whether for or against your advantage, the mover forthwith added, “he shall be liable to seizure and removal from the territory of our allies.” [17] Now no man who is an enemy of ours as well as of Charidemus will ever enter allied territory, whether he has put him to death or not, and therefore it is not against such men that this retribution has been directed. The man who will be alarmed by this decree, and will be on his guard against be coming our certain enemy, is one who is a friend of ours, and also an enemy of his, if he should attempt anything inimical to us. And that man is Athenodorus, or Simon, or Bianor, kings of Thrace, or any other man who may wish to lay you under obligation by restraining Charidemus when he is trying to act in opposition to you. [18]

Such, men of Athens, are the purposes for which the provisional resolution was moved, in the hope that it would be ratified by a deluded Assembly; and such the reasons why we, desiring to frustrate its ratification, have brought this present indictment. As I have undertaken to prove three propositions,—first that the decree is unconstitutional, secondly that it is injurious to the common weal, and thirdly that the person in whose favour it has been moved is unworthy of such privilege,—it is, perhaps, fair that I should allow you, who are to hear me, to choose what you wish to hear first, and second, and last. [19] Consider what you prefer, that I may begin with that.—You wish me to deal first with the illegality? Very well; I will do so. There is a favour which I not only ask but claim from you all,—with justice, as I am inclined to think. I beg that none of you, men of Athens, taking a partisan view, because you have been deceived in Charidemus and look on him as a benefactor, will give an unfriendly hearing to my remarks on the point of law. Do not, for that reason, rob yourselves of the power to cast an honest vote, and me of the right to present my whole case as I think fit. You must listen to me in the manner following,—and observe how fairly I will put it. [20] When I am discussing the point of law, you must disregard the person, and the character of the person, in whose favour the decree has been proposed, and attend to the question whether it is legal or illegal,—that and that alone. When I am bringing the man's deeds home to him, and relating in what fashion you have been overreached by him, you must look only at the transactions,—do I relate them accurately or untruly? [21] And when I inquire whether or not the enactment of this decree is conducive to the public good, dismiss everything else and watch my reasoning on that point,—is it sound or unsound? Listen to me in that manner, and you will get a better understanding of what you ought to know, by looking at one question at a time, instead of inquiring into all the issues at once, while I shall have no difficulty in explaining what I mean. On every topic my remarks shall be brief. [22]

Now take and read the actual statutes, that I may prove thereby the illegality of their proposal.“One of the Laws of the Areopagus Concerning Homicide

The Council of the Areopagus shall take cognizance in cases of homicide, of intentional wounding, of arson, and of poisoning, if a man kill another by giving poison.” [23]

Stop there. You have heard the statute, men of Athens, and you have also heard the decree. Let me tell you how you will more readily grasp the arguments on the question of illegality. Consider the status of the person in whose favour the decree has been proposed: is he an alien, a resident alien, or a citizen? If we call him a resident alien, we shall not be telling the truth; and if we call him an alien, we shall be doing him wrong, for it is only fair to him to admit the validity of that grace of the people by which he was made a citizen. It seems, then, that we must treat him as a citizen in our arguments. [24] Now I beg you to observe how candidly and honestly I am going to treat the question; for I assign him to that class which entitles him to the greatest respect, though I do deny his right to acquire illegally privileges not enjoyed by us who are citizens by birthright,—the privileges, I mean, which the defendant has specified in this decree. In the statute it is provided that the Council shall take cognizance of homicide, intentional wounding, arson, and poisoning, if a man kills another by giving him poison. [25] The legislator, while he presumes the killing, has nevertheless directed a judicial inquiry before specifying what is to be done to the culprit, and thereby has shown a just respect, men of Athens, for the religious feeling of the whole city. I say of the whole city, because it is impossible that all of you should know who the manslayer is. He thought it scandalous to give credit to such accusations, when made, without a trial; and he conceived that, inasmuch as the avenging of the sufferer is in our hands, we ought to be informed and satisfied by argument that the accused is guilty, for then conscience permits us to inflict punishment according to knowledge, but not before. [26] Moreover he argued that before the trial is held such expressions as “if a man kill,” “if a man rob a temple,” “if a man commit treason,” and the like, are merely phrases of accusation: they become definitions of crime only after trial and conviction. To a formula of accusation he thought it proper to attach not punishment, but only trial; and therefore, when enacting that, if one man killed another, the Council should take cognizance, he did not lay down what should be done to the culprit if found guilty. [27] So much for the legislator; but what of the author of the decree? “If any man kill Charidemus,” he says. So he defines the injury in the same phrase, “if any man kill,” as the legislator; but the sequel is not the same. He struck out submission to trial, and made the culprit liable to immediate seizure; he passed by the tribunal appointed by law, and handed over to the accusers, to be dealt with as they chose, a man untried, a man whose guilt is not yet proven. [28] When they have got him, they are to be allowed to torture him, or maltreat him, or extort money from him. Yet the next ensuing statute directly and distinctly forbids such treatment even of men convicted and proved to be murderers. Read to the jury the statute that follows.“Law

It shall be lawful to kill1 murderers in our own territory, or to arrest them as directed on the first turning-table,2 but not to maltreat or amerce them, on penalty of a payment of twice the damage inflicted. The Archons, according to their several jurisdictions, shall bring cases into court; for any man who so desires and the court of Heliaea shall adjudicate.” [29]

You have heard the law, men of Athens; and I beg you to examine it and observe how admirably and most righteously it is framed by the legislator. He uses the term “murderers”; but in the first place you see that by murderer he means a man found guilty by verdict; for no man comes under that designation until he has been convicted and found guilty. [30] That is made clear both in the earlier statute and in this one; for in the former, after the words “if any man kill,” the legislator directs the Council to take cognizance, and here, after designating the man as “the murderer,” he has directed what is to be done to him. That is to say, when it is a question of accusation, he has ordered a trial, but when the culprit, being found guilty, is liable to this designation, he has specified the penalty. Therefore he should be speaking only of persons found guilty. Well, what does he direct? That it shall be lawful to kill them and to put them under arrest. [31] Does he say that they are to be taken to the house of the prosecutor, or as he pleases? No, indeed. How are they to be arrested? “As directed on the first turning-table,” is the phrase; and you all know what that means. The judicial archons are there authorized to punish with death persons who have gone into exile on a charge of murder. Only last year you all saw the culprit who was arrested by them in the Assembly. It is to the archons, then, that the murderer is to be taken on arrest; [32] and that differs from being taken to the house of the prosecutor in this respect, men of Athens,—that the captor who carries a man to the judges gives control of the malefactor to the laws, while the captor who takes him home gives such control to himself. In the former case punishment is suffered as the law enjoins; in the latter, as the captor pleases; and of course it makes a vast difference whether the retribution is controlled by the law or by a private enemy. [33] “Not to maltreat or amerce,” says the statute. What does that mean? Every one, I am sure, understands that not to maltreat means that there is to be no scourging, no binding nor anything like that, and that not to amerce means not to extort blood-money, for the ancients called fining amercement. [34] Note that in this manner the law lays down not only how the murderer or convict is to be punished, but also where, for it specifies the country of the person injured, and it directly prescribes that the penalty is to be inflicted in that way and in no other, in that place and in no other. Yet the author of the decree is far indeed from making this distinction,—his proposals are exactly contrary. After the words, “if anyone shall kill Charidemus,” he adds, “he shall be liable to seizure everywhere.”— [35] What do you mean, sir? The laws do not allow even convicted criminals to be arrested elsewhere than in our own country, and do you propose that a man shall be liable to seizure without trial in any allied territory? And when the laws forbid seizure even in our own territory, do you permit seizure? Indeed, in making a man liable to seizure you have permitted everything that the law has forbidden,—extortion of blood-money, maltreatment and misusage of a living man, private custody and private execution. [36] How could a man be convicted of a more clearly unconstitutional proposal, or of drafting a resolution more outrageously than in this fashion? You had two phrases at your disposal: “if any man kill,” directed against a person under accusation, and “if any man be a murderer, directed against a culprit found guilty; yet in your description you adopted the expression that applies to a man accused, while you propose for untried culprits a penalty which the law does not permit even after conviction. You have eliminated the intermediate process, for between accusation and conviction comes a trial.—There is not a word about trial in the decree proposed by the defendant. [37]

Read the statutes that come next in order.“Law

If any man shall kill a murderer, or shall cause him to be killed, so long as the murderer absents himself from the frontier-market, the games, and the Amphictyonic sacrifices, he shall be liable to the same penalty as if he killed an Athenian citizen;and the Criminal Court shall adjudicate.”

You must be informed, men of Athens, of the intention with which the legislator enacted this statute. You will find that all his provisions were cautious and agreeable to the spirit of the law. [38] ”If any man,“ he says, shall kill a murderer, or shall cause him to be killed, so long as he absents himself from the frontier-market, the games, and the Amphictyonic sacrifices, he shall be liable to the same penalty as if he killed an Athenian citizen; and the Criminal Court shall adjudicate.” What does this mean? In his opinion it was just that, if a man who had gone into exile, when convicted on a charge of murder, should make good his flight and escape, he should be excluded from the country of the murdered man; but that it was not righteous to put him to death anywhere and everywhere. His view was that, if we put to death people who have gone into exile elsewhere, others will put to death people who have come into exile here; [39] and that, in that event, the only chance of salvation left for all those who are unfortunate will be destroyed, that is to say, the power of migrating from the country of those whom they have injured to a country where no one has been wronged by them, and there dwelling in security. To avert that misfortune, and to prevent an endless succession of retributions, he wrote: “if any man kill a murderer, so long as he absents himself from the frontier-market,”—meaning thereby the confines of the man's own country. It was there, I suppose, that in old times borderers of our own and neighboring countries used to forgather; and so he speaks of a “frontier-market.” [40] Or take the words, “from Amphictyonic sacrifices.” Why did he also exclude the murderer from them? He debars the offender from everything in which the deceased used to participate in his lifetime; first from his own country and from all things therein, whether permitted or sacred, assigning the frontier-market as the boundary from which he declares him excluded; and secondly from the observances at Amphictyonic assemblies, because the deceased, if a Hellene, also took part therein. “And from the games,”—why from the games? Because the athletic contests of Hellas are open to all men,—the sufferer was concerned in them because everybody was concerned in them; therefore the murderer must absent himself. [41] Accordingly the law excludes the murderer from all these places; but if anyone puts him to death elsewhere, outside the places specified, the same retribution is provided as when an Athenian is slain. He did not describe the fugitive by the name of the city, for in that name he has no part, but by that of the act for which he is chargeable. Accordingly he says: “if any man kill the murderer;” and afterwards, when he prescribed the places from which the man is debarred, he introduces the name of the City for the lawful assignment of punishment: “he shall be liable to the same penalty as if he killed an Athenian.” Gentlemen, that phrase is very different from the wording of the decree before us. [42] Yet is it not scandalous to propose the surrender of men whom the law has permitted to go into exile and to live in security, provided they absent themselves from the places I have mentioned, and to rob them of that benefit of mercy which the unfortunate may justly claim from those who are unconcerned in their crimes, although, in our ignorance of the future destiny of every man, it is uncertain for which of us that benefit is in store? In this case, if the man who slays Charidemus （supposing the thing really to happen） is slain in his turn by men who capture him as an outcast, after he has gone into exile, and while he absents himself from the places specified in the law, they will be liable to a charge of bloodguiltiness,—and so will you, sir. [43] For it is written: “if any man shall cause to be killed,” and you will have caused, because it is you who have granted the licence implied in your decree. Therefore if, when the event has happened, we let you and your friends go free, we shall be living in the society of the unholy, and on the other hand, if we prosecute, we shall be constrained to act in opposition to our own resolution.—Gentlemen, is it a trifling or a casual reason that you have for annulling this decree? [44]

Read the next statute.“Statute

If any man outside the frontier pursue or violently seize the person of any homicide who has quitted the country, and whose goods are not confiscate, he shall incur the same penalty as if he so acted within our own territory.”

Here is another law, men of Athens, humanely and excellently enacted; and this law the defendant shall in like manner be proved to have transgressed. [45] “If any man,” it begins, and then, “any homicide who has quitted the country and whose goods are not confiscate,” meaning any man who has migrated by reason of involuntary manslaughter. That is quite clear, because it speaks of those who have “quitted the country,” not of those who have gone into exile, and because it specifies persons “whose goods are not confiscate,” for the property of willful murderers is forfeited to the State. The legislator, I say, is speaking of involuntary offenders. To what purport? [46] If they are pursued or violently seized, he says, “outside the frontier.” What is the significance of “outside the frontier”? For all homicides alike the “frontier” implies exclusion from the country of the person slain. From that country he permits them to be pursued and seized; but outside of it he permits neither seizure nor pursuit. For anyone who contravenes this rule he orders the same punishment as if he had done the man wrong at home, in the words, “shall incur the same penalty as if he had so acted at home.” [47] Now suppose the defendant Aristocrates were asked,—you must not think it a silly question—first if he knows whether Charidemus will be killed by someone, or will die in some other way. He would reply, I take it, that he does not know. However, we will presume that somebody will kill him. Next question: will the man who is to do it be a voluntary or an involuntary agent, an alien or a citizen,—do you know, Aristocrates? You cannot say that you do know. [48] Then of course you ought to have supplied these particulars, and written, “if any man, whether alien or citizen, shall kill, with or without intention, rightfully or wrongfully,” in order that any man soever, by whom the deed should have been done, might have received his deserts according to law; but assuredly, after merely naming an accusation, you ought not to have added, “he shall be liable to seizure.” What boundary have you left in this clause? [49] Yet the law distinctly provides that beyond the frontier a man shall not be pursued, whereas you permit him to be seized anywhere. Beyond the frontier the law forbids not only pursuit but also seizure; and yet according to your decree anyone who chooses will take as an outcast and forcibly seize a man who has slain without intention, and carry him by violence into the country of the slain man. Are you not treating human conduct indiscriminately, and ignoring the motives according to which a given act is either virtuous or immoral?— [50] Observe, gentlemen, that this is a universal distinction: it does not apply only to questions of homicide. “If a man strike another, giving the first blow,” says the law. The implication is that he is not guilty, if the blow was defensive. “If a man revile another,”—“with false hoods,” the law adds, implying that, if he speaks the truth, he is justified. “If a man slay another with malice aforethought,”—indicating that it is not the same thing if he does it unintentionally. “If a man injures another with intention, wrongfully.” Everywhere we shall find that it is the motive that fixes the character of the act. But not with you: you say, without qualification, “if any man slay Charidemus, he shall be seized,” though he do it unwittingly, or righteously, or in self-defence, or for a purpose permitted by law, or in any way whatsoever. [51]

Read the statute that comes next.“Law

No man shall be liable to proceedings for murder because he lays information against exiles, if any such exile return to a prohibited place.”

This statute, men of Athens, like all the other excerpts from the law of homicide which I have cited for comparison, is a statute of Draco; and you must pay attention to his meaning. “No man is to be liable to prosecution for murder for laying information against manslayers who return from exile illegally.” Herein he exhibits two principles of justice, both of which have been transgressed by the defendant in his decree. In the first place, though he allows information to be laid against the homicide, he does not allow him to be seized and carried off; and secondly, he allows it only if an exile returns, not to any place, but to a prohibited place. [52] Now the prohibited place is the city from which he has gone into exile. That the law makes very clear indeed when it says, “if any man return,”—a word that cannot be used in relation to any other city except that from which he has fled; for of course a man cannot return from exile to a place from which he was never expelled. What is allowed by the statute is an information, and that only in case of return to a prohibited place; whereas Aristocrates has proposed that a man shall be liable to seizure even in places where the law does not forbid him to take refuge. [53]

Read another statute.“Law

If a man kill another unintentionally in an athletic contest, or overcoming him in a fight on the highway, or unwittingly in battle, or in intercourse with his wife, or mother, or sister, or daughter, or concubine kept for procreation of legitimate children, he shall not go into exile as a manslayer on that account.”

Many statutes have been violated, men of Athens, in the drafting of this decree, but none more gravely than that which has just been read. Though the law so clearly gives permission to slay, and states under what conditions, the defendant ignores all those conditions, and has drawn his penal clause without any suggestion as to the manner of the slaying. [54] Yet mark how righteously and admirably these distinctions are severally defined by the lawgiver who defined them originally. “If a man kill another in an athletic contest,” he declared him to be not guilty, for this reason, that he had regard not to the event but to the intention of the agent. That intention is, not to kill his man, but to vanquish him unslain. If the other combatant was too weak to support the struggle for victory, he considered him responsible for his own fate, and therefore provided no retribution on his account. [55] Again, “if in battle unwittingly”—the man who so slays is free of bloodguiltiness. Good: If I have destroyed a man supposing him to be one of the enemy, I deserve, not to stand trial, but to be forgiven. “Or in intercourse with his wife, or mother, or sister, or daughter, or concubine kept for the procreation of legitimate children.” He lets the man who slays one so treating any of these women go scot-free; and that acquittal, men of Athens, is the most righteous of all. [56] Why? Because in the defence of those for whose sake we fight our enemies, to save them from indignity and licentiousness, he permitted us to slay even our friends, if they insult them and defile them in defiance of law. Men are not our friends and our foes by natural generation: they are made such by their own actions; and the law gives us freedom to chastise as enemies those whose acts are hostile. When there are so many conditions that justify the slaying of anyone else, it is monstrous that that man should be the only man in the world whom, even under those conditions, it is to be unlawful to slay. [57] Let us suppose that a fate that has doubtless befallen others before now should befall him—that he should withdraw from Thrace and come and live somewhere in a civilized community; and that, though no longer enjoying the licence under which he now commits many illegalities, he should be driven by his habits and his lusts to attempt the sort of behavior I have mentioned, will not a man be obliged to allow himself to be insulted by Charidemus in silence? It will not be safe to put him to death, nor, by reason of this decree, to obtain the satisfaction provided by law. [58] If anyone interrupts me with a question, “And where, pray, are such things likely to happen?” there is nothing to prevent me from asking, “And who is likely to kill Charidemus?” Well, we need not go into those questions; only, inasmuch as the decree now on trial refers, not to any past transaction, but to something of which nobody knows whether it will happen or not, let the uncertainty of the future be common ground to both sides; let us, as mankind are wont, adjust our expectations thereto, and consider the matter on the presumption that both the one contingency and the other may possibly happen. [59] Moreover, if you annul the decree, should anything happen to Charidemus, the legitimate means of avenging him are still there. On the other hand, if you let it stand, and if before he dies he maltreats any man, the man whom he insults has been defrauded of his legal remedy. Therefore on every ground the decree is contrary to law, and ought to be annulled. [60]

Read the next statute.“Law

If any man while violently and illegally seizing another shall be slain straightway in self-defence, there shall be no penalty for his death.”

Here are other conditions of lawful homicide. If any man, while violently and illegally seizing another, shall be straightway slain in self-defence, the legislator ordains that there shall be no penalty for his death. I beg you to observe the wisdom of this law. By adding the word “straightway” after indicating the conditions of lawful homicide, the legislator has excluded any long premeditation of injury and by the expression, “in self-defence,” he makes it clear that he is giving indulgence to the actual sufferer, and to no other man. Thus the law permits homicide in immediate self-defence; but Aristocrates has made no such exception. He says, without qualification, “if anyone ever kills,”—that is, even if he kill righteously, or as the laws permit. [61] I shall be told that this is a quibble of ours; who will ever be “violently and illegally seized” by Charidemus? Everybody. Surely you are aware that any man who has troops at command lays hands on whomsoever he thinks he can overpower, demanding ransom. Heaven and Earth! Is it not monstrous, is it not manifestly contrary to law,—I do not mean merely to the statute law but to the unwritten law of our common humanity,—that I should not be permitted to defend myself against one who violently seizes my goods as though I were an enemy? And that will be so, if the slaying of Charidemus is forbidden even on those terms,—if even though he be iniquitously plundering another man's property, his slayer is to be liable to seizure, though the statute ordains that he who takes life under such conditions shall have impunity. [62]

Read the next statute.“Law

Whosoever, whether magistrate or private citizen, shall cause this ordinance to be frustrated, or shall alter the same, shall be disfranchised with his children and his property.”

You have heard the statute, men of Athens, declaring in plain terms that “whosoever, whether magistrate or private citizen, shall cause this ordinance to be frustrated or shall alter the same, shall be disfranchised with his children and his property.” Do you then count this a trifling or worthless precaution taken by the author of the statute to secure its validity, and to save it from being either frustrated or altered? Yet the defendant Aristocrates, with very little regard for the lawgiver, is trying both to alter it and to frustrate it. For surely, to permit punishment outside the established tribunals and beyond the limits of the prohibited areas, or to rob people of the right of fair hearing, and make them outcasts—what is that but alteration? To draft a series of clauses, all of them exactly contradicting the provisions of the statute-book—what is that but frustration? [63]

Besides the laws cited, he has violated many other statutes, which we have not put on the schedule because they are so numerous. I offer a summary statement. Take the laws which deal with courts of homicide, and which order the contending parties to summon one another, or to tender evidence, or to take their oaths, or which give them any other direction; he has violated every one of them; he has drafted this decree in contravention of them all. What other account can one give, when there is no summons, no evidence by witnesses of the fact, no oath-taking,—when the penalty follows on the heels of the accusation, and that a penalty forbidden by the laws? Yet all the proceedings I have named are in use, as ordered by statute, at five different tribunals.3 [64] —Yes, but,—someone will say,—those tribunals are worthless and unfairly constituted, whereas the proposals of the defendant are righteous and admirable.—I deny it. I say that of all the proposals ever laid before you I know of none more outrageous than this decree, and that of all the tribunals to be found in the whole world there are none that can be shown to be more venerable or more righteous than ours. I desire to speak briefly of certain truths, the relation of which reflects credit and honor upon the city, and which you will be gratified to hear. I will begin with a statement which you will find especially instructive, first referring to the free gift which has already been conferred upon Charidemus. [65]

It was we, men of Athens, who made Charidemus a citizen, and by that gift bestowed upon him a share in our civil and religious observances, in our legal rights, and in everything in which we ourselves participate. There are many institutions of ours the like of which are not to be found elsewhere, but among them one especially peculiar to ourselves and venerable,—I mean the Court of Areopagus. Concerning that Court I could relate a greater number of noble stories, in part traditional and legendary, in part certified by our own personal testimony, than could be told of any other tribunal. It is worth your while to listen to one or two of them by way of illustration. [66] First, then, in ancient times, as we are told by tradition, in this court alone the gods condescended both to render and to demand satisfaction for homicide, and to sit in judgement upon contending litigants,—Poseidon, according to the legend, deigning to demand justice from Ares on behalf of his son Halirrothius, and the twelve gods to adjudicate between the Eumenides and Orestes. These are ancient stories; let us pass to a later date. This is the only tribunal which no despot, no oligarchy, no democracy, has ever dared to deprive of its jurisdiction in cases of murder, all men agreeing that in such cases no jurisprudence of their own devising could be more effective than that which has been devised in this court. In addition to these great merits, here, and here alone, no convicted defendant and no defeated prosecutor has ever made good any complaint against the justice of the verdict given. [67] And so, in defiance of this safeguard of justice, and of the lawful penalties that it awards, the author of this decree has offered to Charidemus a free licence to do what he likes as long as he lives, and to his friends the right of vindictive prosecution when he is dead. For look at it in this light. You are all of course aware that in the Areopagus, where the law both permits and enjoins the trial of homicide, first, every man who brings accusation of such a crime must make oath by invoking destruction upon himself, his kindred, and his household; [68] secondly, that he must not treat this oath as an ordinary oath, but as one which no man swears for any other purpose; for he stands over the entrails of a boar, a ram, and a bull, and they must have been slaughtered by the necessary officers and on the days appointed, so that in respect both of the time and of the functionaries every requirement of solemnity has been satisfied. Even then the person who has sworn this tremendous oath does not gain immediate credence; and if any falsehood is brought home to him, he will carry away with him to his children and his kindred the stain of perjury,—but gain nothing. [69] If, on the other hand, he is believed to be laying a just charge, and if he proves the accused guilty of murder, even then he has no power over the convicted criminal; only the laws and the appointed officers have power over the man for punishment. The prosecutor is permitted to see him suffering the penalty awarded by law, and that is all. Such are the prosecutor's rights. As for the defendant, the rules for his oath are the same, but he is free to withdraw after making his first speech, and neither the prosecutor, nor the judges, nor any other man, has authority to stop him. [70] Now why is that so, men of Athens? Because they who originally ordained these customs, whoever they were, heroes or gods, did not treat evil fortune with severity, but humanely alleviated its calamities, so far as they honestly could. All those regulations, so nobly and equitably conceived, the author of the decree now in question has manifestly infringed, for not a single shred of them is to be found in his decree.—That is my first point: here is one tribunal whose written laws and unwritten usages he has contravened in drafting his decree. [71]

Secondly, there is another tribunal, the court by the Palladium, for the trial of involuntary homicide; and it shall be shown that he nullifies that tribunal also, and transgresses the laws there observed. Here also the order is first the oath-taking, secondly the pleadings, and thirdly the decision of the court; and not one of these processes is found in the defendant's decree. If the culprit be convicted, and found to have committed the act, neither the prosecutor nor any other person has any authority over him, but only the law. And what does the law enjoin? [72] That the man who is convicted of involuntary homicide shall, on certain appointed days, leave the country by a prescribed route, and remain in exile until he is reconciled to one of the relatives of the deceased. Then the law permits him to return, not casually, but in a certain manner; it instructs him to make sacrifice and to purify himself, and gives other directions for his conduct. In all these provisions, men of Athens, the law is right. [73] It is just to allot a lesser penalty for involuntary than for willful homicide; it is quite right, before ordering a man to go into exile, to provide for his safe departure; and the provisions for the reinstatement of the returning exile, for his purification by customary rites, and so forth, are excellent. Well, everyone of these ordinances, so righteously enacted by the original legislators, has been transgressed by the defendant in drafting his decree. So we have now two tribunals, of great antiquity and high character, and usages handed down from time immemorial, which he has insolently overridden. [74]

Besides these two tribunals there is also a third, whose usages are still more sacred and awe-inspiring, for cases in which a man admits the act of slaying, but pleads that he slew lawfully. That is the court held at the Delphinium. It appears to me, gentlemen of the jury, that the first inquiry made by those who originally defined the rules of jurisprudence in these matters was, whether we are to regard no act of homicide as righteous, or whether any kind of homicide is to be accounted righteous; and that, arguing that Orestes, having slain his own mother, confessing the fact, and finding gods to adjudge his case, was acquitted, they formed the opinion that there is such thing as justifiable homicide,—for gods could not have given an unjust verdict. Having formed this opinion, they immediately set down in writing an exact definition of the conditions under which homicide is lawful. [75] The defendant, however, admitted no exception; he simply makes an outcast of any man who kills Charidemus, even though he kill him justly or as the laws permit. And yet to every act and to every word one of two epithets is applicable: it is either just or unjust. To no act and to no word can both these epithets be applied at the same time, for how can the same act at the same time be both just and not just? Every act is brought to the test as having the one or the other of these qualities; if it be found to have the quality of injustice, it is adjudged to be wicked, if of justice, to be good and honest.—But you, sir, used neither qualification when you wrote the words, “if any man kill.” You named the mere accusation, without any definition, and then immediately added, “let him be liable to seizure.” Thereby you have evidently ignored this tribunal and its usages as well as the other two. [76]

There is also a fourth tribunal, that at the Prytaneum. Its function is that, if a man is struck by a stone, or a piece of wood or iron, or anything of that sort, falling upon him, and if someone, without knowing who threw it, knows and possesses the implement of homicide, he takes proceedings against these implements in that court. Well, if it is not righteous to deny a trial even to a lifeless and senseless thing, the object of so grave an accusation, assuredly it is impious and outrageous that a man who may possibly be not guilty, and who in any case,—and I will assume him to be guilty,—is a human being endowed by fortune with the same nature as ourselves, should be made an outcast on such a charge without a hearing and without a verdict. [77]

Then there is a fifth tribunal which he has overruled,—and I beg you to take note of its character; I mean the court held in the precinct of Phreatto. In that court, men of Athens, the law orders every man stand his trial who, having gone into exile on a charge of unintentional homicide, and being still unreconciled to the persons who procured his banishment, incurs a further charge of willful murder. The author of the several rules of court did not let such a man alone, on the ground that he was unable to return to Athens, nor did he, because the man had already committed a like offence, treat the similarity of the accusation as proof positive against him; [78] he found a way of satisfying the requirements of religion without depriving the culprit of a fair hearing and a trial. How did he manage it? He conveyed the judges who were to sit to a place to which the accused was able to repair, appointing a place within the country but on the sea-coast, known as the precinct of Phreatto. The culprit approaches the shore in a vessel, and makes his speech without landing, while the judges listen to him and give judgement on shore. If found guilty, the man suffers the penalty of willful murder as he deserves; if acquitted, he goes his way scot-free in respect of that charge, but still subject to punishment for the earlier homicide. [79] Now with what object have these regulations been made so carefully? The man who drew them up accounted it equally irreligious to let slip the guilty, and to cast out the innocent before trial. But if such great pains are taken in the case of persons already adjudged to be homicides, to ensure for them a hearing, a trial, and fair treatment in every respect upon any subsequent accusation, surely it is most outrageous to provide that a man who has not yet been found guilty, and of whom it is still undecided whether he committed the act or not, and whether the act was involuntary or willful, should be handed over to the mercy of his accusers. [80]

In addition to all these provisions for legal redress there is a sixth, which the defendant has equally defied in his decree. Suppose that a man is ignorant of all the processes I have mentioned, or that the proper time for taking such proceedings has elapsed, that for any other reasons he does not choose to prosecute by those methods; if he sees the homicide frequenting places of worship or the market, he may arrest him and take him to jail; but not, as you have permitted, to his own house or wherever he chooses. When under arrest he will suffer no injury in jail until after his trial; but, if he is found guilty, he will be punished with death. On the other hand, if the person who arrested him does not get a fifth part of the votes, he will be fined a thousand drachmas. [81] The proposals of the defendant are quite different: the accuser is to prosecute without risk, the culprit to be given up incontinently and without trial; and if any person, or indeed any entire city, shall intervene to prevent the destruction of all those usages which I have described and the overthrow of all the tribunals I have mentioned; tribunals introduced by the gods and frequented by mankind from that day to this,—and to rescue the victims of outrage and lawless violence, he proposes that any such person shall be banned; for him also he allows no hearing and no trial, but punishes him instantly and without trial. Could any decree be more monstrous and more unconstitutional? [82]

Have we any statute left? . . . Let me see it. . . . . Yes, that is the one; read it.“Law

If any man die a violent death, his kinsmen may take and hold hostages in respect of such death, until they either submit to trial for bloodguiltiness, or surrender the actual manslayers. This right is limited to three hostages and no more.”

We have many well-conceived laws, men of Athens; but I am inclined to think that this statute is as wise and just as any of them. Observe the spirit of equity and the remarkable humanity with which it is drawn up. [83] “If any man die a violent death,” says the legislator. First, by adding the epithet “violent,” he has given an indication by which we understand his meaning to be, “if a man die wrongfully.” “His kinsmen may take and hold hostages in respect of such death, until they either submit to trial for bloodguiltiness, or surrender the actual manslayers.” You will note what an admirable provision this is. He requires the hostages, in the first instance, to stand trial; and then if they refuse, he enjoins them to give up the murderers; but, if they decline both these duties, he adds that the right to hold hostages is limited to three and no more. The whole of this statute is defied in the wording of the decree. [84] In the first place, when writing the words, “if any man shall kill,” he did not add “wrongfully,” or “violently,” or any qualification at all. Secondly he proposes that the culprit shall be liable to seizure instantly and before any claim of redress has been made. Furthermore, while the statute ordains that, if the persons in whose house the death took place will neither submit to trial nor give up the perpetrators, as many as three may be detained as hostages, [85] Aristocrates dismisses those persons scot-free, and takes no account of them whatever, but proposes to put under a ban those who, in obedience to that common law of mankind which enjoins hospitality to a fugitive, have harbored the culprit, who, as I will assume, has already gone into exile, if they refuse to surrender their suppliant. Thus, by omitting to specify the mode of the homicide, by not providing for a trial, by omitting the claim of redress, by permitting arrest in any place whatsoever, by punishing those who harbor the fugitive, and by not punishing those in whose house the death took place,—in every respect I say that his proposal is in manifest contravention of this statute also. [86]

Read the next one.“Law

And it shall not be lawful to propose a statute directed against an individual, unless the same apply to all Athenians.”

The statute just read is not, like the others, taken from the Laws of Homicide, but it is just as good—as good as ever law was. The man who introduced it was of opinion that, as every citizen has an equal share in civil rights, so everybody should have an equal share in the laws; and therefore he moved that it should not be lawful to propose a law affecting any individual, unless the same applied to all Athenians. Now seeing that it is agreed that the drafting of decrees must conform to the law, a man who draws a decree for the special benefit of Charidemus, such as is not applicable to all the rest of you, must evidently be making a proposal in defiance of this statute also; of course what it is unlawful to put into a statute cannot legitimately be put into a decree. [87]

Read the next statute,—or is that all of them?“Law

No decree either of the Council or of the Assembly shall have superior authority to a statute.”

Put it down.—I take it, gentlemen, that a very short and easy argument will serve me to prove that this statute has been violated in the drafting of the decree. When there are so many statutes, and when a man makes a motion that contravenes every one of them, and incorporates a private transaction in a decree, how can anyone deny that he is claiming for his decree authority superior to that of a statute? [88]

Now I wish to cite for your information one or two decrees drawn in favour of genuine benefactors of the commonwealth, to satisfy you that it is easy to frame such things without injustice, when they are drawn for the express purpose of doing honor to a man, and of admitting him to a share of our own privileges, and when, under the pretence of doing so, there is no malicious and fraudulent intention.—Read these decrees.—To save you a long hearing, the clauses corresponding to that for which I am prosecuting the defendant have been extracted from the several decrees.“ Decrees ” [89]

You see, men of Athens, that they have all drawn them in the same fashion. For instance: “There shall be the same redress for him as if the person slain were an Athenian.” Here, without tampering with your existing laws respecting such offences, they enhance the dignity of those laws by making it an act of grace to allow a share in them to others. Not so Aristocrates: he does his very best to drag the laws through the mire; anyhow, he tried to compose something of his own, as though they were worth nothing; and he makes light even of that act of grace which you bestowed your citizenship upon Charidemus. For when he assumes that you still owe the man a debt of gratitude, and has proposed that you should protect him into the bargain, so that he may do just what he likes with impunity, does not such conduct merit my description? [90]

I am well aware, men of Athens, that, although Aristocrates will be quite unable to disprove the charge of framing his decree in open defiance of the laws, he will make an attempt to shuffle away the most serious part of the accusation,—namely, that from beginning to end of his decree he does not order any trial of a very grave indictment. On that point I do not think I need say much; but I will prove clearly from the actual phrasing of the decree that he himself does not suppose that the man accused will get any trial at all. [91] The words are: “If any man kill Charidemus, he shall be liable to seizure; and if any person or any city rescue him, they shall be put under ban,”—not merely in case they refuse to give up for trial the man they have rescued, but absolutely and without more ado. And yet if he were permitting instead of disallowing a trial, he would have made the penal clause against the rescuers conditional upon their not giving up for trial the person rescued. [92]

I dare say that he will use the following argument, and that he will try very hard to mislead you on this point. The decree, he will urge, is invalid because it is merely a provisional resolution,4 and the law provides that resolutions of the Council shall be in force for one year only; therefore, if you acquit him today, the commonwealth can take no harm in respect of his decree. [93] I think your rejoinder to that argument should be that the defendant's purpose in drafting the decree was, not that it should be inoperative and have no disagreeable results,—for it was open to him not to draft it at all, if he had wished to consult the best advantage of the commonwealth;—but that you might be misled and certain people might be enabled to carry through projects opposed to your interests. That the decree has been challenged, that its operation has been delayed, and that it has now become invalid, you owe to us; and it is preposterous that the very reasons that ought to make you grateful to us should be available as reasons for acquitting our opponents. [94] Moreover the question is not so simple as some suppose. If there were no other man likely to propose decrees like his without regard to your interests, the matter might, perhaps, be a simple one. But in fact there are many such; and that is why it is not right that you should refuse to annul this decree. If it is pronounced flawless, who will not move decrees in future without misgiving? Who will refuse to put them to the vote? Who will impeach them? What you have to take into account is, not that this decree has become invalid by lapse of time, but that, if you now give judgement for the defendant, by that verdict you will be offering impunity to every man who may hereafter wish to do you a mischief. [95]

It also occurs to my mind, men of Athens, that Aristocrates, having no straightforward or honest defence, nor indeed any defence at all, to offer, will resort to such fallacious arguments as this,—that many similar decrees have been made before now in favour of many persons. That is no proof, gentlemen, of the legality of his own proposal. There are many pretences by which you have often been misled. [96] For instance, suppose that one of those decrees which have in fact been disallowed had never been impeached in this Court. It would certainly have been operative; nevertheless it would have been moved contrary to law. Or suppose that a decree, being impeached, was pronounced flawless, because the prosecutors, either collusively or through incompetence, had failed to make good their case: that failure does not make it legal. Then the jurors do not give conscientious verdicts? Yes, they do; I will explain how. They are sworn to decide to the best of an honest judgement; but the view that commends itself to their judgement is guided by the speeches to which they listen, and, inasmuch as they cast their votes in accordance with that view, they are true to their oath. [97] Every man keeps his oath who does not, through spite or favour or other dishonest motive, vote against his better judgement. Suppose that he does not apprehend some point that is explained to him, he does not deserve to be punished for his lack of intelligence. The man who is amenable to the curse is the advocate who deceives and misleads the jury. That is why, at every meeting, the crier pronounces a commination, not upon those who have been misled, but upon whosoever makes a misleading speech to the Council, or to the Assembly, or to the Court. [98] Do not listen to proof that the thing has happened, but only to proof that it ought to have happened. Do not let them tell you that those old decrees were upheld by other juries; ask them to satisfy you that their plea for this decree is fairer than ours. Failing that, I do not think that you ought to give greater weight to the delusions of others than to your own judgement. [99] Moreover, I cannot but think that there is something uncommonly impudent in such a plea as that other people have before now got decrees of this sort.—If, sir, an illegal act has already been done, and you have imitated that act, that is no reason why you should be acquitted. On the contrary, it is an additional reason why you should be convicted. If one of them had been found guilty, you would never have moved our decree and similarly another will be deterred, if you are found guilty today. [100]

I say that I do not expect that Aristocrates will be able to deny that he has moved a decree in open violation of all the laws; but before now, men of Athens, I have seen a man contesting an indictment for illegal measures, who, though convicted by law, made an attempt to argue that his proposal had been to the public advantage, and insisted strongly on that point,—a simple-minded argument, surely, if it was not an impudent one. [101] Admit a man's proposition to be in every other respect advantageous; it is still disadvantageous in so far as he begs you, who are sworn to give judgement according to law, to ratify a decree which he himself cannot prove to have been honestly drawn, seeing that every man is bound to set the highest value upon fidelity to his oath. At the same time the plea, though impertinent, has reason in it; but not a reason which Aristocrates will be able to submit to you. Entirely opposed as his decree is to the laws, it is not less pernicious than illegal. [102] That is the point which I wish now to make good to you; and, in order to do what I wish in as few words as possible, will cite an illustration that is well known to you all. You are aware that it is for the advantage of Athens that neither the Thebans nor the Lacedaemonians should be powerful; that the Thebans should be counterbalanced by the Phocians, and the Lacedaemonians by other communities; because, when that is the position of affairs, you are the strongest nation, and can dwell in security. [103] You must, then, take the view that for those of our fellow-citizens who live in the Chersonese the same condition is advantageous, that is, that no one man shall be all-powerful among the Thracians. In fact the quarrels of the Thracians, and their jealousy of one another, afford the best and most trustworthy guarantee of the safety of the Chersonese. Now the decree before us, by offering security to the minister who controls the affairs of Cersobleptes, and by putting the commanders of the other kings in imminent fear of being accused of crime, makes those kings weak, and the king who stands by himself strong. [104] And that you may not be quite surprised to hear that decrees made in Athens have so powerful an effect, I will remind you of a piece of history within the knowledge of all of you. After the revolt5 of Miltocythes against Cotys, when the war had already lasted a considerable time, when Ergophilus had been superseded, and Autocles was on the point of sailing to take command, a decree was proposed here in such terms that Miltocythes withdrew in alarm, supposing that you were not well disposed towards him, and Cotys gained possession of the Sacred Mountain and its treasures. Now observe that later, men of Athens, although Autocles was put on his trial for having brought Miltocythes to ruin, the time for indicting the author of the decree was past; and, so far as Athens was concerned, the whole business had come to grief. [105] Even so today, if you do not annul this decree, the kings and their commanders will be immensely discouraged. They will regard themselves as altogether slighted, and will imagine that your favour is inclining towards Cersobleptes. Now suppose that on this assumption they surrender their royalty, whenever Cersobleptes seizes opportunity and attacks them; and again observe what will happen.— [106] In heaven's name, tell me this. If Cersobleptes attacks us,—and he is more likely than not to do so, when he has the power,—shall we not have recourse to those kings? Shall we not try to reduce him through them? Very well; then suppose they reply: “Athenians, so far from helping us when we were ill-treated, you made us grievously afraid of defending ourselves, for you issued a decree that anyone who should kill the man who was working against your interests and ours alike, should be liable to seizure. Therefore you have no right to call upon us to help you in a matter which you mismanaged for us as well as for yourselves.” Tell me this, I say: will not they have the best of the argument? I think so. [107]

Again, it cannot possibly be alleged that it was natural that you should be hoodwinked and misled. For even though you had no other basis of calculation, even though you were unable of yourselves to grasp the state of affairs, you had before your eyes the example of those people at Olynthus. What has Philip done for them? And how are they treating him? He restored Potidaea to them, not at a time when he was no longer able to keep them out, as Cersobleptes restored the Chersonesus to you; no,—after spending a great deal of money on his war with you, when he had taken Potidaea, and could have kept it if he chose, he made them a present of the place, without even attempting any other course. [108] Nevertheless, although so long as they saw that he was not too powerful to be trusted, they were his allies and fought us on his account, when they found that his strength had grown too great for their confidence, they did not make a decree that whosoever should kill any man who had helped to consolidate Philip's power should be liable to seizure in the country of their allies. [109] No, indeed; they have made friendship, and promise to make alliance, with you,—you who of all men in the world would be most delighted to kill Philip's friends or even Philip himself. When mere Olynthians know how to provide for the morrow, will not you, who are Athenians, do likewise? It is discreditable that you, who have a reputation for superior ability in political deliberation, should be convicted of a duller perception of your own advantage than Olynthians. [110]

I am informed that Aristocrates will also say something to the same effect as a speech once made in the Assembly by Aristomachus,—that it is inconceivable that Cersobleptes would ever deliberately provoke your enmity by trying to rob you of the Chersonesus, because, even if he should take it and hold it, it will be of no use to him. Indeed when that country is not at war, its revenue is no more than thirty talents, and when it is at war, not a single talent. On the other hand the revenue of his ports, which, in the event supposed, would be blockaded, is more than two hundred talents. They wonder,—as they will put it,—what he could possibly mean by preferring small returns and a war with you, when he might get larger returns and be your friend. [111]

But I am at no loss for plenty of instances in the light of which a man might reasonably be skeptical, instead of putting his trust in those orators, and allowing Cersobleptes to become a potentate. However, I will be content with the instance that lies nearest to hand. Of course, gentlemen, you all know that Macedonian, Philip. It was certainly more profitable for him to draw the revenues of all Macedonia in safety, than the revenue of Amphipolis with risks attached; and more agreeable to have you, his hereditary friends, on his side, than the Thessalians who once ejected his own father. [112] Apart from that, it may be observed that you, Athenians, never yet betrayed any of your friends, while the Thessalians have betrayed every one of theirs. Nevertheless, in spite of all that, you see that he has deliberately chosen small gains, faithless friends, and big risks, in preference to a life of security. [113] Now what can be the reason? For the logic of the thing is certainly not so very obvious. The truth is, men of Athens, that there are two things that are excellent for everybody: good luck, the chiefest and greatest of goods, and good counsel, inferior to good luck, but greater than any other; but men do not get both these good things at once, and no successful man sets any limit or end to his desire to get more. And that is why men, in the desire for more, so often throw away what they already have. [114] But what need to name Philip, or any other man? Why, Cersobleptes' own father, Cotys, whenever he had a quarrel on hand, used to send his ambassadors, and was ready to do anything, and then he could see that being at war with Athens was quite unprofitable. But, as soon as he had all Thrace at his command, he would occupy cities, do mischief, discharge his drunken fury, first on himself, and then on us; he must needs subjugate the whole country; there was no dealing with the fellow. For everybody who attempts improper enterprises for the sake of aggrandizement is apt to look, not to the difficulties of his task, but to what he will achieve if successful. [115] My own opinion, then, is that your policy should be fashioned in such a way that, if Cersobleptes' views in regard to you are what they should be, he shall not be unjustly treated by you, but that, if he is so unreasonable as to treat you unjustly, he may not be too strong to be punished. I will read to you the letter which Cersobleptes sent at the time of the revolt of Miltocythes, and also that which, when the whole kingdom was his, he sent to Timomachus before seizing your outposts.“ Letters ” [116]

Here is a warning, men of Athens, which, if you will be guided by me, you will bear in mind; and, remembering also that, when Philip was besieging Amphipolis, he pretended to be doing so in order to hand the place over to you, but that, when he had got it, he annexed Potidaea into the bargain, you will sh to have the same sort of assurance that, according to the story, Philocrates, son of Ephialtes, once opposed to the Lacedaemonians. [117] It is said that, when the Lacedaemonians were trying to overreach him, and offered any assurance he was willing to accept, Philocrates replied that the only possible assurance would be that they should satisfy him that, if they had a mind to injure him, they would not have the power; “for,” he added, “I am quite certain that you will always have the mind, and there can be no assurance so long as you have the power.” That,—if you will let me advise you,—is the sort of assurance that you will hold against this Thracian. If he ever became master of all Thrace, you need not inquire what his sentiments toward you would be. [118]

That it is entirely the act of insane men to compose such decrees, or to bestow such favours as this, may easily be learned from many examples. I am sure, men of Athens, that you all know as well as I do that you once admitted Cotys over yonder to your citizenship, evidently because you regarded him at the time as a sincere well-wisher. Indeed, you decorated him with golden crowns; and you would never have done that, if you had thought him your enemy. [119] Nevertheless, when he was a wicked, unprincipled man, and was doing you serious injury, you treated the men who put him to death, Pytho and Heracleides of Aenos, as benefactors, made them citizens, and decorated them with crowns of gold. Now suppose that, at the time when the disposition of Cotys was thought to be friendly, it had been proposed that any one who killed Cotys should be given up for punishment, would you have given up Pytho and his brother? Or would you, in defiance of the decree, have given them your citizenship, and honored them as benefactors? [120] Again, there was Alexander of Thessaly.6 At the time when he had imprisoned Pelopidas, and was holding him captive, when he was the most bitter enemy of the Thebans, when his feelings towards you were so fraternal that he applied to you for a commander, when you gave aid to his arms, when it was Alexander here and Alexander there,—why, gracious heavens! if anybody had moved that whoever killed Alexander should be liable to seizure, would it have been safe for any man to try to give him due punishment for his subsequent violence and brutality? [121] But why need one talk about the other instances? Take Philip, who is now accounted our very worst enemy. At the time when, having caught some of our citizens in the act of trying to restore Argaeus, he released them and made good all their losses, when he professed in a written message that he was ready to form an alliance with us, and to renew his ancestral amity, if at that time he had asked us for this favour, and if one of the men he had released had proposed that “whoever shall kill Philip” should be liable to seizure, a fine insult we should have had to swallow! [122] Do you not see, gentlemen, do you not understand, how you would have been chargeable with sheer lunacy in every one of these instances, if you had carried by vote any such resolution as this? I say it is not the part of sane men either to put such confidence in a man, whenever they imagine him to be friendly, as to deprive themselves of all defence against possible aggression, or, on the other hand, when they regard anyone as an enemy, to hate him so fiercely that, if he ever wants to reform and be their friend, they have taken it out of his power to do so. But we should, I think, carry both our friendship and our hatred only so far as not to exceed the due measure in either case. [123]

For my part, I cannot see why everybody who has any sort of claim to be your benefactor should not expect to get this favour, if you bestow it upon Charidemus,—Simon, for example, if you want a name, or Bianor, or Athenodorus, or thousands more. No; if we make the same decree in favour of the whole company, we shall unconsciously make ourselves a bodyguard for every one of them, like jobbing mercenaries; but if we do it for one but not for another, those who are disappointed will have a right to complain. [124] Now just suppose that Menestratus of Eretria were to require us to make the same decree for him, or Phayllus of Phocis, or any other autocrat,—and I need not say that we often make friends, to serve our occasions, with many such people,—are we to vote decrees for all of them, or are we not? You say, Yes. Then what decent excuse shall we have, men of Athens, if, while asserting ourselves as the champions of all Hellas in the cause of liberty, we make our appearance as yeomen of the guard to men who maintain troops on their own account to keep down the populace? [125] If we ought, though I say we ought not, to grant such a favour to anyone, let it be even in the first instance to the man who has never done us wrong; secondly, to the man who will never have the power, though he have the will, to injure us; and finally the man who is known by everyone to be seeking it for his own protection, and not in the hope of maltreating his neighbors with impunity—it is to him truly that it should be given. I will spare you the proof that Charidemus is neither a man void of offence towards us, nor one who, for his own safety, tries to win your support; but I do ask you to listen to me when I declare that he is not even one who can be trusted for the future, and to consider carefully whether my argument is sound. [126]

In my judgement, men of Athens, everyone who desires to become an Athenian citizen, because he has fallen in love with our customs and laws, will make his home in our midst, as soon as he receives our franchise, and will enjoy his share in the advantages he coveted. But as for those who are not moved by any desire or emulation of those institutions, but value only the advantage they derive from the credit of being distinguished by you, I fancy, indeed I am quite certain, that as soon as they discern a prospect of larger advantage elsewhere, they will devote their attention to that prospect, without the least concern for you. [127] For example, to make clear to you my purpose in saying this, when that man Pytho, having just killed Cotys, did not think it safe to take his chance of a place of refuge, he came to you, applied for your citizenship, and thought you the finest people in the world. But now that he thinks relations with Philip more advantageous to him, he takes Philip's side, without the slightest regard for you. No, men of Athens; when men give their lives to the pursuit of their own ambitions, I say that there is no stability and no honesty to be found in them. Every sensible man must get the better of such people by wary conduct: he should not begin by trusting and end by denouncing them. [128] Athenians, if we should assume,—though it is the reverse of the truth,—that Charidemus himself has been, is still, and will remain devoted to us, and that he will never entertain any other sentiment, it is not a whit the more wise to pass such decrees for him. If he had accepted the security offered by the decree for any other purpose than the interests of Cersobleptes, the danger would have been less; but, in fact, I find on a calculation of probabilities that the man for whose benefit he will turn to account the advantage given by the decree is himself equally unworthy of his confidence and of ours. [129]

Observe how honestly I examine the several points, and how entirely reasonable are my apprehensions. I look at Cotys, and I find that he was related by marriage to Iphicrates in the same degree as Cersobleptes to Charidemus; and that the achievements of Iphicrates on behalf of Cotys were far more important and meritorious than anything that Charidemus has done for Cersobleptes. Let us consider it in this way. [130] No doubt you remember, men of Athens, that Iphicrates was a very fortunate man, with his bronze effigy, his free board at the Town Hall, and other grants and distinctions. Nevertheless he had the courage to fight a battle at sea against our commanders in defence of Cotys, setting a higher value on the salvation of that king than upon all the honors he enjoyed in your city. If your resentment had not been more restrained than his impetuosity, nothing could have saved him from being the most miserable of mankind. [131] In spite of that, when Cotys, who owed his deliverance to Iphicrates, and had had practical experience of his loyalty, believed himself to be permanently out of danger, he took no pains to reward him, and never showed you any civility through his agency in the hope of winning forgiveness for his past conduct. On the contrary, he claimed his help in besieging the rest of your strongholds, [132] and, on his refusal, he made an attack in person on the strongholds, taking with him the forces collected by Iphicrates as well as his barbarian troops, and engaging the services of Charidemus. He reduced Iphicrates to such helplessness that he withdrew to Antissa, and afterwards to Drys, and lived there; for he did not think he could honorably return to you, whom he had slighted for the sake of a Thracian and a barbarian. On the other hand, he thought it dangerous to remain at the court of a king whom he had found so negligent of his safety. [133] Now suppose, men of Athens, that Cersobleptes also, having his power enhanced by the immunity that is being procured for Charidemus, should disdain that man, and initiate plots and disturbances against you,—are you content, as long as Charidemus is misled, to have furnished the Thracian with strength to fight you? I hope not! Here is the view that I think the just one: if Charidemus makes it his business to get these decrees, after perceiving and foreseeing that peril, you must distrust him as an intriguer. [134] On the other hand, if he has failed to discern the peril, the more you credit him with good intentions, the more forethought you should exercise for his sake as well as your own. Honest friends should not bestow upon their well-wishers such favours as will bring disaster to both alike, but should rather cooperate in any action that tends to their common advantage; and when a man is more far-sighted than his friend, he should order things for the best, and not treat the gratification of the moment as of more value than all future time. [135]

Moreover, I cannot discover on reflection that Cersobleptes, though both barbarous and faithless, is likely to take any pains not to injure Charidemus so seriously; for when I look backwards and observe the advantages of which Cotys was going to deprive Iphicrates without the slightest consideration for him, I really cannot think that Cersobleptes would trouble himself about the losses that will fall on Charidemus. [136] Cotys expected to rob Iphicrates of honors, of maintenance, of statues, of the country that made him a man to be envied, I may almost say of everything that made life worth living; yet he had no scruple. But, really, what is there of which this man should be anxious not to deprive Charidemus? He has no possessions whatsoever in your city,—neither children, nor a statue, nor kindred, nor anything else. [137] If Cersobleptes is by nature not a man of his word, if he is justly distrusted because of his past behavior, and if there is nothing in the political situation that should induce him, even against his judgement and his character, to promote the welfare of Charidemus, for what reason should we, in sheer absolute stupidity, help him to accomplish his desires, even to our own detriment? I see no reason. [138]

Apart then from the fact that this decree does not further our policy, you must be warned that, as regards reputation also, it does not further the interest of our city to be known to have enacted anything of the sort. If, men of Athens, the decree had been made for the benefit of a man dwelling in a free state, and living under its laws as a free citizen, it would have been less discreditable, though still unwarranted; but in fact it has been made for Charidemus, a man not domiciled in any free state at all, but commanding an army for a Thracian and an autocrat, and maltreating people by royal authority. [139] You cannot but know how all these mercenary officers seize upon free Hellenic cities, and try to dominate them. They march about through country after country as the common enemies, if the truth must be told, of every man whose wish is to reside constitutionally and as a free man in his own fatherland. Men of Athens, is it creditable to you, is it dignified, that you should be known to have carried a measure for the protection of a fellow who, to satisfy his greed, is ready to fall foul of anybody who comes his way, and to have given notice of expulsion from your alliance to the defenders of their own independence? [140] For my part, I cannot regard such action as consistent with your honor or your good fame. It must be discreditable, first to denounce the Lacedaemonians for giving written licence to the King of Persia to do what he likes to the Hellenic inhabitants of Asia,7 and then to put European Hellenes, and everybody whom Charidemus thinks he can overpower, at the mercy of Cersobleptes. And that is precisely the effect of this decree, when no distinction is drawn as to what his general may or may not do, but when all who resist his attacks are menaced with such terrors. [141]

In the next place, men of Athens, I would like to relate a piece of history, which will make it still more evident to you that it is your bounden duty to abrogate this decree. Once upon a time, on a certain occasion, you gave your citizenship to Ariobarzanes,8 and also, on his account, to Philiscus,—just as you have recently given it to Charidemus for the sake of Cersobleptes. Philiscus, who resembled Charidemus in his choice of a career, began to use the power of Ariobarzanes by occupying Hellenic cities. He entered them and committed many outrages, mutilating free-born boys, insulting women, and behaving in general as you would expect a man, who had been brought up where there were no laws, and none of the advantages of a free constitution, to behave if he attained to power. [142] Now there were two men in Lampsacus, one named Thersagoras and the other Execestus, who had formed views about tyranny very much like those that prevail here. These men put Philiscus to death, as he deserved, because they felt it their duty to liberate their own fatherland. Now suppose that one of those orators who spoke on behalf of Philiscus, at a time when he was paymaster of the mercenaries at Perinthus, when he held all the Hellespont, and was the most powerful of viceroys, had then, like Aristocrates today, moved a resolution that whosoever killed Philiscus should be liable to seizure in allied territory. I entreat you to reflect upon the depth of ignominy to which our city would have fallen. [143] Thersagoras and Execestus came to Lesbos and lived there. Well, if any son or any friend of Philiscus had laid hands on them, they would have been given up to justice in pursuance of your decree; and assuredly you would have been guilty of a shameful and a scandalous act if, while ostentatiously setting up bronze statues of the men who performed a similar feat in your own city, and loading them with unparalleled honors, you had condemned to outlawry those who in some other country had exhibited the selfsame spirit of patriotism. I am glad to say that, in the case of Philiscus, it was not your fate to be ensnared and to incur that great dishonor; but in the present case, if you will heed my warning, you will be very careful; for, if there is no limiting clause and if the phrase “whosoever shall kill Charidemus” is unqualified, it is quite possible that the outcome will be such as I have described. [144]

My next purpose is briefly to examine the past history of Charidemus, and to unmask the extraordinary audacity of his flatterers. I pledge myself simply to this,—and I hope no one will take my pledge in bad part,—that I will satisfy you, not only that he is unworthy of the protection proposed by the defendant, but that he deserves to be most severely punished, if chastisement is justly due to those who wish you ill, and cheat you, and are always trying to thwart you. [145] I dare say that some of you, reflecting that the fellow has first been made a citizen, and thereafter has been decorated with crowns of gold, are astonished that it has been such an easy task to delude you so completely. Well, you may be quite sure, men of Athens, that you have been deluded; and I will explain why such a result was to be expected. You have plenty of good judgement; but you do not apply it persistently. [146] I mean this, for instance: suppose you were asked which you regard as the most unprincipled breed of citizens you have; you would not name the farmers, or the traders, or the silver-miners, or any class like those, but if any one named the people who make speeches and move resolutions for hire, I am sure that your assent would be unanimous. So far your judgement is excellent; but it is no longer sound in the sequel. [147] For it is on the very people whom you regard as most unprincipled that you rely for a right opinion of a man's character and they describe this or that man as virtuous or wicked, not when the description is honest and true, but when it brings money into their own pockets. And that is what the orators have constantly done in respect of Charidemus, as you will agree when I have given you an account of his past career. [148]

I do not reckon among his misdeeds those campaigns of his early life, in which he served against Athens as a slinger or light-infantry man; nor that he once owned a piratical ship and preyed on your allies. But I pass these things by. And for what reason? Because, gentlemen, hard necessity does away with all consideration of what anyone should or should not do; and therefore in such matters a candid examiner must not be too fastidious. But let me tell you of the mischief he did to you at the outset of his career as a mercenary officer with troops under his command. [149] First of all, he was hired by Iphicrates, and drew pay in his army for more than three years. When you had cashiered Iphicrates, and dispatched Timotheus as commander-in-chief to Amphipolis and the Chersonesus, the man's first performance was to surrender to the Amphipolitans those hostages of theirs whom Iphicrates had taken from Harpalus, and put under his care, although you had ordered them to be conveyed to Athens. That act prevented you from occupying Amphipolis. Secondly, when Timotheus in his turn wanted to hire him and his troops, he refused the engagement, and repaired by sea to Cotys, taking with him your light galleys, though he was perfectly well aware that Cotys was the most bitter enemy you had in the world. [150] Subsequently, after the decision of Timotheus to take the operations against Amphipolis before those against the Chersonesus, finding that there was no mischief he could do you in that country, he again hired himself out,—this time to the Olynthians, who were your enemies and were then holding Amphipolis. He set sail from Cardia for Amphipolis, with the intention of fighting against Athens, but on the voyage he was captured by our fleet. But in view of the needs of the hour, and because mercenaries were wanted for the war against Amphipolis, instead of being punished for his refusal to deliver the hostages, and for deserting with the light galleys to your enemy Cotys, guarantees were exchanged, and he entered the campaign as your auxiliary. [151] He ought to have been grateful to you because his life was spared when he might justly have been put to death; but instead of that the city, as though she owed gratitude to him, has bestowed upon him crowns and franchise and favours known to you all.—To prove the truth of these allegations, please read the decree respecting the hostages, the dispatch of Iphicrates, the dispatch of Timotheus, and lastly this deposition.—You will find that what I am telling you is not mere gossip and recrimination, but the plain truth.—Read.“ Decree ”“ Letters ”“ Deposition ” [152]

You have heard the evidence of the dispatch and the deposition, proving that at the outset Charidemus sold his services to a country where he expected to fight against you, though he had the choice of many other markets; that later, finding that in that country he could do you no harm, he sailed back to a place where he had a chance of operating against Athens; and that he was the chief cause of your failure to take Amphipolis. Such were the early exploits of Charidemus. You must now look at his later conduct. [153]

After a certain lapse of time, when the war with Cotys had already broken out, he sent a letter to you; or rather, not to you but to Cephisodotus, for, being conscious of his transgressions, he was very much of the opinion that the beguilement of Athens was a task beyond his own powers. In this letter he undertook to recover the Chersonesus for Athens; but his real intention was exactly the opposite. You must be informed of the nature of this epistolary transaction,—it is not a long story—and so get an insight into the fashion of this man's dealings with you from first to last. [154] Being at that time discharged from the service of Timotheus, he withdrew from Amphipolis, crossed the straits to Asia, and there, because of the recent arrest of Artabazus by Autophradates, he hired out his forces and himself to the sons-in-law of Artabazus. He had taken and given pledges, but he ignored and broke his oaths, and, finding the inhabitants of the country, who thought they were dealing with a friend, off their guard, he seized their towns, Scepsis, Cebren, and Ilium. [155] Having taken possession of these strongholds, he had a misadventure into which even an ordinary person, not to say a man calling himself a commander, could never have blundered. Although he held no position on the sea-coast, and had no means of supplying his troops with provisions, and although he had no food in the towns, he remained within the walls, instead of looting the towns and making off in pursuance of his intention to do mischief. But Artabazus, having been released by Autophradates, collected an army, and appeared on the scene; and he could draw supplies from the friendly countries of upper Phrygia, Lydia, and Paphlagonia, while for Charidemus nothing remained but to stand a siege. [156] When he realized what trouble he was in, and came to the conclusion that he would be reduced by famine, if by no other means, he made the discovery, whether by suggestion or by his own wits, that his only chance of salvation lay where there is salvation for everybody. And where is that? In your good-nature, if that is the right term, men of Athens,—or call it what you will. Having reached that conclusion, he dispatched the letter to you,—and it is worth your while to hear it read. His desire was, by means of a promise to recover the Chersonesus for you, and on the pretence that such was also the wish of Cephisodotus, as an enemy of Cotys and Iphicrates, to get a supply of galleys from you, and so scuttle safely out of Asia. [157] Do you remember the immediate sequel, by which the trick was exposed in the very act? Memnon and Mentor, the sons-in-law of Artabazus, were young men, enjoying unexpected good fortune by their relationship to Artabazus. What they wanted was to govern the country peaceably without delay, and to win distinction without warfare and peril. Accordingly, they persuaded Artabazus to forgo his vengeance upon Charidemus, and to send him off under an armistice, advising him that you would bring Charidemus across with or without his consent: he could not possibly stop you. [158] Having gained this unaccountable and unforeseen deliverance, Charidemus crossed the sea to the Chersonesus without your authority by reason of the armistice; but then, so far from attacking Cotys,—although he had told you in his letter that Cotys would not repel his attack,—and so far from helping you to recover the Chersonesus, he entered the service of Cotys once more, and began to beleaguer your last remaining strongholds, Crithote and Elaeus. You will find proof in his route across the straits that he had already decided on this action at the time when he was in Asia and was sending you the letter, and therefore that he was cheating you; for he crossed from Abydus, a place always hostile to you, and the base from which Sestus was captured, to Sestus, which was in the possession of Cotys. [159] Yet you must not imagine that either the Abydenes or the people at Sestus would have admitted him, after that letter had been sent to you, if they had not been aware that he was cheating you, or if they had not been actually parties to the deception. They wanted you to provide a safe passage for the troops, and then, after the passage, to get the use of them for their own purposes; as in fact they did, when Artabazus had granted a safe-conduct.—To prove that such are the facts read the letters,—I mean the letter sent by Charidemus, and those that came from the authorities in the Chersonesus.—You will learn from them that the facts are so.—Read.“ Letter ” [160]

Observe from and to what points he crossed the straits; it was from Abydus to Sestus. Do you suppose that the Abydenes and the Sestians would have admitted him, if they had not been privy to his fraud, when he sent you that letter?—Now read to the jury the letter itself.—Observe, men of Athens, with what extravagance of self-commendation he wrote to you, telling you he had done this, and undertaking to do that.—Read.“ Letter ” [161]

A beautiful letter, is it not, gentlemen? One for which you could not have been too grateful,—if only it had been true! But in fact he wrote it to deceive, when he had no expectation of an armistice; but when he had got his armistice,—read what he did then.“ Letter ”

So, after the gentleman who undertook to recover our lost fortresses had passed the straits, the governor of Crithote informs us that our remaining possessions are in greater danger than ever.—Show me another letter, and then read a bit of it.“ Letter ”

Read a passage from another.“ Letter ” [162]

You see how testimony comes in from every quarter that, when he crossed the straits, he was not marching to attack Cotys but to join Cotys in attacking us. Now here is just one letter more that you must read; but never mind the rest. For it has, I suppose, become quite clear now that he has cheated you. Read.“ Letter ”

Stop. Now reflect how, after writing that he would recover the Chersonesus, he took the pay of your enemies, and tried to rob you of your remaining possessions there; and how, after writing that Alexander had sent envoys to him but that he had refused to see them, he was found behaving exactly like Alexander's filibusters. So much for your single-minded well-wisher; the man who is incapable of writing lies or practising deceit! [163]

Although, then, it is abundantly clear that there is not a sincere word in all his professions of attachment to Athens, yet, if it is not already clear from these facts, it will be more evident in the light of later events. Cotys, I am glad to say,—for he was your enemy, and a bad man,—was killed by Pytho; Cersobleptes, the present king, was a mere boy, and so were all the sons of Cotys; and Charidemus had got control of affairs, because he was on the spot and had a force at his back. Cephisodotus, the man to whom he sent the famous letter, had arrived in command of an army, and so had the galleys, which were to have rescued him, even without the consent of Artabazus, when his deliverance was in doubt. [164] Now what, men of Athens, was the conduct proper for a really single-minded and friendly person, after the arrival of a commander,—not one of those men whom he might have called jealous of himself, but the recipient of his letter, a man whom he had chosen out of all Athens as his special friend,—with Cotys in his grave, and himself in supreme power? Was it not to restore your territory there and then? To cooperate with you in establishing the king of Thrace? To embrace the opportunity of exhibiting his friendly disposition towards you I should say, yes. [165] Well, is that what he did? By no means. For seven whole months he persisted in making war on us, openly displaying his hostility and withholding even the language of goodwill. At the outset we took anchorage at Perinthus with only ten ships, having heard that he was in the neighborhood, and hoping to meet him and talk matters over. He waited till our men were having their breakfast, and then tried to take our ships, killed a number of our sailors, and hunted every man of them into the sea with his cavalry and light infantry. [166] Afterwards, when we set sail—,no, it was not to attack any part of Thrace, or any fortress there. For this at least no man can say: “Ah, yes; he did do a little damage,—in self-defence, you know, and to protect himself.” That is not true; we never went to any place in Thrace; we went to Alopeconnesus, and that is in the Chersonesus and used to belong to you,—a headland running out towards Imbros, a long way from Thrace; a place swarming with robbers and pirates. [167] When we got there, and were besieging these gentry, he marched right across the Chersonesus,—your property, every yard of it,—attacked us, and tried to rescue the robbers and pirates. He took up his position, and persuaded or constrained your commander not to serve your interests, instead of letting himself be persuaded by him to carry out some part of his covenant and undertaking; and then he must needs draw up that convention with Cephisodotus, by which you were so deeply annoyed and exasperated that you dismissed your commander, and fined him five talents, and there was a majority of three votes only against a sentence of death. [168] Why, what a preposterous absurdity a man must account this, men of Athens, when for one and the same transaction he sees one man punished with such severity as a criminal, and another glorified as a benefactor from that day to this!

To prove the truth of my narrative, you are, of course, my witnesses in regard to the fate of the commander; for it was you who tried him, cashiered him, reprimanded him;all this is within your knowledge. In respect of the incidents at Perinthus and Alopeconnesus, please call the ships' captains as witnesses.“ Witnesses ” [169]

Thereafter, when Cephisodotus had been discharged from his command, and you held the view that the convention made with him was improper and unfair, Miltocythes, who had been consistently well-affected to you, was betrayed by Smicythion, and fell into the hands of our honest friend. Knowing that the man's life would be spared if he were taken to Cersobleptes,—for killing one another is not customary among the Thracians,—Charidemus handed him over to your enemies the Cardians. They took Miltocythes and his son, put out in a ship to deep water, cut the boy's throat, and then threw the father overboard, after he had witnessed the murder of his son. [170] These atrocities moved the whole population of Thrace to resentment; Berisades and Amadocus made a coalition; and Athenodorus, recognizing a favorable opportunity, formed alliance with them, and so was in a position to make war. Then Cersobleptes took fright, and Athenodorus proposed a convention, under which he compelled Cersobleptes to make a sworn engagement with you and with the other princes that the kingdom of Thrace should be held in common, and divided among the three, and that they should all restore to you your territory. [171] At the election of magistrates you appointed Chabrias to command in that campaign; but unluckily Athenodorus disbanded his army, because he had no money from you, and no resources for carrying on war; and Chabrias started on his expedition with only one ship. And how does this man Charidemus turn his coat? He repudiates his sworn covenant with Athenodorus, persuades Cersobleptes to disclaim it, and proposes new terms to Chabrias,—terms more monstrous than those made with Cephisodotus. Chabrias was obliged to acquiesce, I suppose because he had no force at his back. [172] When the news reached you, a great many speeches were made in the Assembly; the conventions were read and compared; and, without any respect for Chabrias's good name or for any of his supporters, you in your turn cancelled the new convention, and resolved, on the motion of Glauco, to elect ten citizens as ambassadors. If Cersobleptes would abide by his covenant with Athenodorus, they were to make him renew his oath;if not, they were to accept the oaths of the two kings, and concert measures for making war on him. [173] The ambassadors took their departure; but by mere lapse of time the business came to such a pass, with these men dawdling and refusing to take any plain, honest action in your service, that we sent a relief expedition to Euboea, and Chares, on returning with his mercenaries, was sent out by you to the Chersonesus as plenipotentiary. So Charidemus once more drafts a new convention with Chares, supported by Athenodorus and the two kings: here it is,—the best and most equitable of the lot. He has convicted himself by his conduct of lying in wait for opportunities against Athens; there is no uprightness, no equity, in his policy. [174] When you see that he is your friend only on inducement, and that his estimate of your strength is the measure of his goodwill, do you really think it your duty to allow him to be powerful,—and powerful through you? If that is your opinion, it is wrong.

To satisfy you that I am telling the truth, please take the letter that came after the first convention, and then the letter from Berisades.—You will be helped by these documents to a right conclusion.“ Letter ”

Read also the letter of Berisades.“ Letter ” [175]

The alliance with the two kings was concluded in this manner after the fraud effected by the convention with Cephisodotus. At that time Miltocythes had been got rid of, and Charidemus was known by his conduct to be an enemy of Athens; for surely a man who, having got into his power one known to him as the most loyal friend you had in all Thrace, put him into the hands of your enemies the Cardians, was ostentatiously displaying his great hostility towards you.—Read the convention which Cersobleptes made later, when he was afraid of war with the Thracians and with Athenodorus.“ Convention ” [176]

These are the terms that Charidemus drafted, and this is the convention he signed. He swore the oath to which you have listened; but as soon as he saw that the forces of Athenodorus had been disbanded, and that Chabrias had come with only one galley, he did not give up to you the son of Iphiades; he did not fulfil any other of his sworn promises; he repudiated every other article of the convention, and drew up the convention I have here.—That is it; please take and read it.“ Convention ” [177]

Observe that he claimed the right to take the port-dues and the ten-per-cent customs-duties; that he again talked as though the whole country belonged to him, requiring that the duties should be under the control of his own custom-house officers; and that, though he had taken his oath to Athenodorus that he would surrender the son of Iphiades, the hostage whom he held on behalf of Sestus, he now does not even promise to surrender him.—Take the decree which the Athenians adopted in this emergency. Read it.“ Decree ” [178]

Here is the letter sent by Cersobleptes later, after the arrival of the ambassadors in Thrace,—he would agree to nothing that was fair; and here is the letter sent by the others.—Read this to the jury.“ Letter ”

Now read the letter from the two kings.—Consider whether you really think that they are making no complaint.“ Letter ”

Men of Athens, look at this see-saw of villainy and perfidy, and try to understand it. First he was maltreating Cephisodotus; then he stopped, because he was afraid of Athenodorus. Another time he tried to maltreat Chabrias; changed his mind, and agreed with Chares. He always acted inconsistently,9 ever like an honest, straightforward man. [179]

Since that time, so long as you had forces in the Hellespont, he has continually flattered you and cozened you; but as soon as he found the Hellespont denuded of your forces, he tried to break and to dethrone the two kings, and to bring the whole kingdom under his own thumb, knowing by experience that, until he had ejected them, he could not possibly revoke any part of his agreement with you. [180] For the more expeditious fulfillment of this purpose, he procured from you a decree so worded that, if it had been ratified, as it would have been but for us and for this indictment, the two kings would have been iniquitously treated in the eyes of the world, the commanders of their armies, Bianor, Simon, Athenodorus, would have remained inactive through fear of the spiteful prosecution authorized by the decree, and the man who took advantage of this licence, and brought the whole kingdom into subjection, would have become and remained an enemy, and a powerful enemy, of Athens. [181]

For a base of operations,—on which he has constantly kept his eyes,—he has the city of the Cardians. In all his conventions he has had that city reserved to himself, and in the end he openly stole it from you. Yet why should men who had entirely got rid of any unjust feelings toward us, and had resolved candidly and with entire sincerity to be friendly to us, have left themselves a convenient base of operations for a war against us? [182] I am sure that you all know,—those of you who have visited the place know for certain, and the rest by hearing their report,—that, the condition of Cardia being what it is, if the relations of Cersobleptes with the Thracians ever become favorable, he is able at twenty-four hours' notice to invade the Chersonesus quite safely. Indeed by its situation the city of the Cardians occupies a position in the Chersonesus in relation to Thrace analogous to the position of Chalcis in Euboea in relation to Boeotia. Those of you who know its situation cannot be unaware of the advantage for the sake of which he has acquired it for himself, and has taken great pains to keep it out of our hands. [183] It is not your duty to help him to secure this advantage against yourselves; you must thwart him to the very best of your power, and consider how to prevent it, for he has made it quite clear that he is not the man to let slip any occasion whatsoever. In fact, when Philip came to Maroneia, he sent Apollonides to him, and gave pledges both to him and to Pammenes; and if Amadocus, who had control of the country, had not forbidden Philip to set foot there, there was nothing to prevent our being at war by this time with the Cardians and with Cersobleptes.—To prove that this statement of mine is true, take Chares' letter.“ Letter ” [184]

In view of these facts you ought to distrust him, instead of losing your wits and giving him your attention as a benefactor. There is no reason why you should owe him gratitude for those deceitful professions of friendship which he offers under compulsion, nor for the small sums which he lays out for the benefit of your commanders and politicians,10 thereby contriving to get votes of thanks to himself submitted to you. You have far better cause to resent those efforts to do you harm, which we know him to be making in every place where he has won the power of acting as he pleases. [185] All other persons who have ever received any favour from you have been honored for benefits conferred on you; Charidemus is the one and only man who is honored for the impotence of his efforts to do you harm. Why, to such a fellow exemption from the punishment he had justly earned was a handsome gratuity! But that is not the view of the politicians; no, make him a citizen, dub him benefactor,—here are crowns and presents,—in return for those private doles of his! The rest of you are gulled, and sit there wondering what is going on. [186] And, to crown all, today they would have appointed his protectors by this resolution, if we had not laid the present indictment, and the commonwealth would have done duty as his hired servant and lackey, keeping guard over a Charidemus! A pretty business, is it not? Heaven help us! to think that a man, who once shouldered a pike for hire in the service of your enemies, should now be seen protected by your decree! [187]

Now perhaps I may be asked for what reason I, who had such exact knowledge of these doings, and had given close attention to some of his misdeeds, let them all pass; why I did not object either when you made him a citizen or when you gave him a vote of thanks; why, in short, I found nothing to say at any time earlier than the passing of this decree. Men of Athens, I will tell you the whole truth. I knew that he was undeserving; I was present when he asked these favours; I made no objection. I admit it. [188] What was the reason? In the first place, men of Athens, I imagined that a great many men glibly telling lies about him would overpower one man, namely myself, telling the truth alone. Then as for the favours that he won by misleading you, I solemnly protest that it never entered my head to grudge him any one of them. I could not see that you would buffer any very grievous calamity, if you forgave a man who had done you much wrong, and so encouraged him to do you good service in future. Both these considerations applied to the grant of citizenship and to the grant of a crown. [189] But now, when I perceive that he is contriving a new plan by which, if only he can provide himself with agents here to mislead you on his behalf, our friends abroad, who are ready to serve you and to stop him from acting against you,—I mean such men as Athenodorus, Simon, Archebius of Byzantium, the two kings of Thrace,—will all find it out of their power to oppose or to thwart him, at such a time I come into court and denounce him. [190] I conceive that to speak against grants which he might accept without being likely to do serious injury to the State, is the act of one who has either a private grievance or the spirit of an informer, but that to set myself in opposition to a project by which he was concerting very serious detriment to the commonwealth is the act of an honest man and a patriotic citizen. That is why I was silent then and speak now. [191]

There is another plea of the same sort by which they hope to lead you off the track. “Cersobleptes and Charidemus,” they will say, “did perhaps oppose Athens at a time when they were unfriendly; but now they are our friends, and wish to be useful friends. We really must not be vindictive. When we were rescuing the Lacedaemonians, we dismissed from our minds the injuries they had done to us as enemies; so too with the Thebans, and, quite recently, with the Euboeans.” [192] —But I hold that this plea would have been rightly offered, if they had offered it on some occasion when an expedition in relief of Cersobleptes and Charidemus had been proposed, and we were trying to block it. But, as we have here no such occasion and no such proposal, but only the argument of men trying to make Cersobleptes more powerful than he deserves by means of an immunity received from you by his generals, I regard their action as dangerous. It is not fair, men of Athens, that the pleas of men seeking deliverance should be offered to you in justification of men whose object is the power to do you wrong. [193] Apart from that, if he had injured you as an enemy, but had been reformed after claiming to be your friend, such an excuse might, perhaps, have been acceptable; but, inasmuch as that is not so, and as most of his deceptions fall after the date of his profession of friendship, you ought to distrust him for his later, if not to dislike him for his earlier, conduct. With regard, however, to not being “vindictive,” I have this to say. The vindictive man is the man who hunts up grievances in order to inflict injury; the man who bears them in mind in order to be on his guard and not suffer injury, is a reasonable man. [194]

Perhaps they will make a suggestion of this sort: the man has now embarked on a course of friendship, and really wants to do Athens a good turn; if we condemn the decree, we shall be discouraging him, and filling him with mistrust of us. Well, men of Athens, my attitude is this; please consider it. If he were our friend honestly and in all sincerity, if he really did intend to do us all manner of good, even then I should not think this argument worthy of your attention. In my judgement there is no man who could possibly do you so much service that for his sake you ought to perjure yourselves and vote against proven justice. [195] Seeing that he is convicted of deceit and perpetual dishonesty,—vote against him, and one of two desirable results must follow. Either he will abandon his impostures on the ground that they can no longer escape detection, or else, if it is his desire to be really on good terms with us, he will make a genuine effort to serve us well, having discovered that he can no longer accomplish his purposes by chicanery. For that reason alone, if for no other, you will do well to give your verdict against him. [196]

It is also opportune, men of Athens, to inquire how our forefathers bestowed distinctions and rewards upon genuine benefactors, whether they were citizens or strangers. If you find their practice better than yours, you will do well to follow their example; if you prefer your own, it rests with you to continue it. Take first Themistocles, who won the naval victory at Salamis, Miltiades, who commanded at Marathon, and many others, whose achievements were not on a level with those of our commanders today.11 Our ancestors did not put up bronze statues of these men, nor did they carry their regard for them to extremes. [197] So they were not grateful to those who had served them well? Yes, men of Athens, they were very grateful; they showed their gratitude in a manner that was equally creditable to themselves and the recipients. They were all men of merit, but they chose those men to lead them; and to men of sobriety, who have a keen eye for realities, being raised to the primacy of a brave and noble people is a far greater distinction than any effigy of bronze. [198] The truth is, gentlemen, that they would not rob themselves of their own share in any of those ancient achievements; and no man would say that the battle of Salamis belonged to Themistocles,—it was the battle of the Athenians; or that the victory at Marathon belonged to Miltiades,—it was the victory of the commonwealth. But today, men of Athens, it is commonly said that Corcyra was captured by Timotheus, that the Spartan battalion was cut to pieces by Iphicrates, that the naval victory off Naxos was won by Chabrias. It really looks as though you disclaimed any merit for those feats of arms by the extravagant favours that you lavish on the several commanders. [199]

Thus they distributed rewards within the city righteously and to the public advantage; we do it the wrong way. But what about those bestowed on strangers? When Meno of Pharsalus had given us twelve talents for the war at Eion near Amphipolis, and had reinforced us with three hundred of his own mounted serfs, they did not pass a decree that whoever slew Meno should be liable to seizure; they made him a citizen, and thought that distinction adequate. [200] Or take Perdiccas, who was reigning in Macedonia at the time of the Persian invasion, and who destroyed the Persians on their retreat from Plataea, and made the defeat of the King irreparable. They did not resolve that any man should be liable to seizure who killed Perdiccas, the man who for our sake had provoked the enmity of the great King; they gave him our citizenship, and that was all. The truth is that in those days to be made a citizen of Athens was an honor so precious in the eyes of the world that, to earn that favour alone, men were ready to render to you those memorable services. Today it is so worthless that not a few men who have already received it have wrought worse mischief to you than your declared enemies. [201] Not only this guerdon of the common wealth but all your honors have been dragged through the mire and made contemptible by those execrable and god-forsaken politicians, who make proposals like this on such easy terms; men who, in their inordinate lust of dishonest gain, put up honors and civic rewards for sale, like hucksters vending and cheapening their pitiful, trumpery merchandise, and supply a host of buyers at fixed prices with any decree they want. [202]

In the first place,—let me mention the latest instance first,—they not only claimed that Ariobarzanes and his two sons deserved everything they chose to ask for, but they associated with him two men of Abydus, unprincipled fellows, and bitter enemies of Athens, Philiscus and Agavus. Again, when Timotheus was held to have served your needs in some way, besides conferring on him all manner of great rewards, they associated with him Phrasierides and Polysthenes, who were not even free-born, but were blackguards whose conduct had been such as any man of good feeling will be loth to describe. [203] Finally on this occasion, while demanding for Cersobleptes any honors they thought proper, and while concentrating on that, they attached two other names to his. One is the man of whose many misdeeds you have just heard the story. The other is named Euderces, but nobody in the wide world knows who he is. You see the result, men of Athens: honors that were once great now appear trifling; and the practice is advancing ever farther and farther. The old rewards no longer suffice, and they are not in the least grateful for them, unless you will also protect their persons, man by man, or so it seems. [204]

For this progress along the road of dishonor, men of Athens, if I am to tell the truth in all candor, nobody is more to blame than yourselves. You are no longer willing to bring malefactors to justice: retribution has disappeared from our city. Yet consider how our ancestors castigated those who had done them wrong, and ask whether their way was not better than yours. [205] When they caught Themistocles presumptuously setting himself above the people, they banished him from Athens, and found him guilty of siding with the Medes. Because Cimon had dislocated the ancestral constitution by his personal efforts, they acquitted him by a majority of three votes only on the capital charge, and made him pay fifty talents. Such was their attitude to the men who had rendered those signal services. And they were right; they would not sell to those men their own freedom and their pride in their own achievements;12 they honored them as long as they did right, but resisted them when they tried to do wrong. [206] You, men of Athens, acquit men who have committed the gravest crimes and are clearly proved guilty, if they treat you to one or two pleasantries, or if a few advocates chosen from their own tribe ask you to be so good. If ever you do bring them in guilty, you assess the penalty at five-and-twenty drachmas. In those old times the State was wealthy and splendid, but in private life no man held his head higher than the multitude. [207] Here is the proof: if any of you know the sort of house that Themistocles or Miltiades or any of those distinguished men of old lived in, you may observe that it is no grander than the common run of houses. On the other hand, both the structure and the equipment of their Public buildings were on such a scale and of such quality that no opportunity of surpassing them was left to coming generations. Witness those gate-houses, docks, porticoes, the great harbor, and all the edifices with which you see our city adorned. [208] But today every man who takes part in public life enjoys such superfluity of wealth that some of them have built private dwelling-houses more magnificent than many public buildings; and others have bought larger estates than all you people in this court possess between you; while, as for the public buildings that you put up and whitewash, I am ashamed to say how mean and shabby they are. Can you name anything that you have acquired and that you will bequeath to posterity, as they bequeathed the Chersonesus, and Amphipolis, and the glory of noble exploits? That glory citizens like these are squandering as fast as they can,—but they cannot annihilate it, men of Athens; and we know why. [209] In those days Aristeides had full control of the assessment of the tribute, but his own fortune was not increased by a single shilling; and when he died he was actually buried at the public expense. Whenever you wanted anything, you had more money in your treasury than any other Hellenic people, insomuch that you always started on any expedition with pay for the full period named in the decree authorizing such expedition. Now, while the administrators of public affairs have risen from poverty to affluence, and are provided with ample maintenance for a long time to come, you have not enough money laid by for a single day's expenditure, and when something must be done, you are at once without the means of doing it. The nation was then the master, as it is now the servant, of the politicians. [210] The fault lies with the authors of such decrees as this, who have trained you to think very little of yourselves, and a great deal of one or two individuals. So they are the inheritors of your renown and of your possessions; you get no benefit from that inheritance! You are the witnesses of the prosperity of others, and participate in nothing but delusions. Ah, how loud would be the lamentation of those great men who laid down their lives for glory and for liberty, and left behind them the monuments of many noble achievements, if they could see how today the progress of our city has ended in the form and rank of a dependant, and that the question of the hour is—whether Charidemus is entitled to personal protection! Charidemus! Heaven help us! [211]

But the really scandalous thing is, not that our counsels are inferior to those of our ancestors, who surpassed all mankind in virtue, but that they are worse than those of all other nations. Is it not discreditable that, whereas the Aeginetans yonder, who inhabit that insignificant island, and have nothing whatever to be proud of, have never to this day given their citizenship to Lampis, the largest ship-owner in Hellas, who fitted out their city and their seaport, but have reluctantly rewarded him merely with exemption from the alien-tax; [212] that whereas those detestable Megarians are so obsessed with their own dignity that, when the Lacedaemonians sent and ordered them to admit to their citizenship Hermo, the pilot, who, serving with Lysander, captured two hundred war-galleys on the occasion of our disaster at Aegospotami, they replied that they would make him a Megarian when they saw that the Lacedaemonians had made him a Spartan; [213] that whereas the people of Oreus, who inhabit only a fourth part of Euboea, dealing with this very Charidemus, whose mother belongs to their city,—I will not mention who his father is or where he comes from, for it is not worth while to make unnecessary inquiries about the man,—so that he himself contributed one-half of the birth-qualification, have never to this day thought fit to make up the other moiety, and to this very day he is on the bastards' list, just as here bastards are registered at Cynosarges,— [214] will you, men of Athens, after giving him your full franchise and honoring him with other distinctions,—will you bestow upon him this immunity into the bargain? For what? What ships has he taken for you, to cause the men who have lost them to plot against him? What city has he captured and handed over to you? What perils has he encountered in your defence? When has he chosen your enemies as his own? No man can tell you. [215]

Before I leave the tribune, gentlemen of the jury, I wish to add some brief observations upon the statutes that we have adduced. If you will bear them in mind, I think that you will keep a better look-out for any attempts these men may make to cajole and mislead you. The first statute expressly ordains that, if any man slay another, the Areopagus shall take cognizance. Aristocrates proposes that such a manslayer shall be liable to seizure without more ado. Mark that carefully, and remember that to make a man an outlaw without trial is exactly the opposite of trying him. [216] The second statute forbids personal maltreatment or extortion even in the case of a convicted homicide. Aristocrates, by making him liable to seizure, has permitted such misusage; for it will be competent for captors to treat the man as they will. The statute provides that the culprit shall be conveyed to the judges, even though arrested in the country of his victim. He allows the homicide on seizure to be taken to the house of the prosecutor, even though the capture be effected in foreign parts. [217] There are certain injuries for which the statute permits life to be taken. Aristocrates, even though the life be taken in such circumstances, makes no reservation, but permits a man whom the laws release without penalty to be handed over for punishment. When a man has suffered this misfortune, the law enjoins that satisfaction be first claimed. In defiance of this law he proposes no trial, demands no redress from the persons on whom he has such claim, but declares incontinently that the man is liable to seizure, and puts under an immediate ban anyone who tries to rescue him. [218] The statute provides that not more than three hostages may be taken from the people with whom the offender lives, if they refuse to give satisfaction. The defendant puts under ban without more ado whosoever rescues the accused from his captors because he is unwilling to surrender him before judgement. The statute forbids anyone to introduce a new law without making it applicable to all men alike; he composes a special decree in favour of a particular man. The statute does not permit any decree to override the law. The relevant laws are many, but Aristocrates annuls them all and makes a mere decree supreme. [219]

Bear all this in mind and memory so long as you sit in that box. Dismiss all the fallacious reasons they will allege; do not allow them to be uttered. Tell them to show you the clause in which he has proposed a trial, or the clause that punishes a man duly convicted of murder. If he had provided for the due punishment of a man tried and found guilty elsewhere, or if he had himself proposed a trial to determine whether homicide has been committed or not, and if so whether justifiably or not, he would have done no wrong. [220] But inasmuch as, after a phrase of mere accusation, “if any man kills,” without any such addition as “and is found guilty of murder,” or, “is adjudged to have killed,” or, “he shall submit to judgement for the murder,” or, “he shall be liable to the same penalty as if he had killed an Athenian,” he has omitted every just precaution, and has simply made the man liable to seizure, do not be led astray, but be assured that in this decree the laws have been absolutely contravened.

1 i.e. if they resist capture.

2 Solon's laws were inscribed on square tablets, attached （by hinges?） to an upright post. These posts stood in the Agora, accessible to all.

3 These five courts sat respectively on the Areopagus; at the Palladium or temple of Pallas; at the Delphinium or temple of Apollo Delphinius; in Phreatto, a part of the Peiraeus by the shore; and in the Prytaneum or city-hall of Athens.

4 An order of Council not valid until confirmed by the vote of the Assembly.

5 In 361; See Grote, chap. 80.

6 In 368 Alexander, tyrant of Pherae, detained Pelopidas as a hostage. This led to the Theban invasion of Thessaly.

7 By the Peace of Antalcidas, 387.

8 Satrap of Phrygia. The date is some time between 368 and 362.

9 With πεποίηκε, which Dind. kept but Cobet rightly brackets, the phrase would mean “he has turned everything upside-down,” as in Dem. 9.36

10 Lit. “orators,” but the word has sometimes the derogatory implication of “professional politicians.”

11 By “not equal” Demosthenes seems here to mean “superior.”

12 Or, if ἔργων is, as some take it, genitive of price, “sell their freedom and their pride to those men in return for their achievements.”

I do not think, gentlemen of the jury, that even Timocrates can lay the blame of the present prosecution upon anyone else: he has brought it on himself. Moved by desire to deprive the State of a large sum of money, he has most illegally introduced a law which is both inexpedient and iniquitous. You shall presently learn in detail, if you will listen to me, in how many respects this law, if ratified, will be injurious and detrimental to the common weal; but there is one result, the most important and the most obvious that I can name, which I shall not hesitate to put before you. [2] For it is the decision that you pronounce on oath on every question which is annulled and made worthless by the law proposed by the defendant; and his object is not any public benefit to the State,—that is impossible, for his law robs those Courts of Justice, which are the pillars of the constitution, of all power to impose the additional penalties attached by the laws to transgressions,—but that certain of those men who have long battened on your substance and pillaged your property may not even refund moneys which they were openly caught in the act of embezzling. [3] Also it is so much easier to curry favour privately with certain persons than to stand up in defence of your rights that, while Timocrates has their fee in his pocket, and never introduced his law until he got it, I,so far from getting any reward from you, am risking a thousand drachmas in your defence. [4]

Now it is the common practice of those who take up any piece of public business to inform you that the matter on which they happen to be making their speeches is most momentous, and worthy of your best attention. But if that claim has ever been made with propriety, I think that I am entitled to make it now. [5] For I suppose that no man living will attribute the prosperity of Athens, her liberty, her popular government, to anything rather than to the laws. Well, the question for you today is this: shall all the laws that you have enacted for the restraint of evil-doers be invalidated, and this law alone be valid; or shall this law be annulled and the rest allowed to remain? That, to put it in brief summary, is the issue that you have to determine today. [6]

But to forestall any surprise you may feel that I, who can claim to have hitherto lived a quiet life, should now be making my appearance in actions at law and public prosecutions, I desire to offer a brief explanation, which will not be irrelevant to the issue. Men of Athens, I once fell out with a worthless, quarrelsome, unprincipled fellow, with whom in the end the whole city also fell out,—I mean Androtion. [7] By this man I was far more grievously wronged than Euctemon, inasmuch as Euctemon suffered the loss of some money, but I, if he had made good his attack upon me, should have lost my life as well as my property; indeed, even the common privilege of an easy exit from life would have been denied me. He accused me of a crime which a man of good feeling would be loath even to mention,—of having killed my own father; he concocted an indictment for impiety, and brought me to trial. At that trial he failed to get a fifth part of the votes of the jury, and was fined a thousand drachmas. I was deservedly acquitted, for which I thank first the gods, and secondly those of you who were on the jury; [8] but the man who had wickedly brought me to that pass I accounted an enemy with whom I could make no terms. When I discovered that he had defrauded the whole commonwealth in the collection of the property-tax and in the manufacture of processional utensils, and that he held and refused to restore a great deal of money belonging to the Goddess, the Heroes, and the State, I proceeded against him with the aid of Euctemon, thinking it a favorable opportunity for doing the State a service, and at the same time getting satisfaction for the wrongs I had suffered. My purpose would naturally be that I should accomplish my desire, and that he should get his deserts. [9] The facts were indisputable; the Council condemned him; the Assembly spent a whole day over the case; two juries, each a thousand-and-one strong, brought in their verdict; and then, when there was no subterfuge left by which you could be kept out of your money, this man Timocrates, with the most insolent contempt of the whole proceeding, proposes this law,—a law by which he robs the gods of their consecrated treasure and the city of her just dues, invalidates the judgements pronounced by the Council, the Assembly, and the Courts of Justice, and has given free licence to everybody to plunder the treasury. [10] From all these wrongs we saw only one way of escape, that is, if we could abrogate the law by indicting it and bringing it before this court. I will therefore briefly recount the facts from the outset, in order that you may more readily grasp, and follow step by step, the manifold iniquities involved in the law itself. [11]

A decree was moved by Aristophon in the Assembly, appointing a commission of inquiry, and directing anyone, who knew of any sacred or public money in private hands, to give information to the commission. Thereupon Euctemon laid an information that Archebius and Lysitheides, who had served as naval captains, held property captured in a ship of Naucratis to the value of nine talents and thirty minas. He approached the Council, and a provisional resolution was drafted. Subsequently the Assembly met, and the people voted in favour of further inquiry. [12] Then Euctemon stood up, and in the course of his speech told you the whole story: how the ship in question was taken by the galley that was conveying Melanopus, Glaucetes, and Androtion on their embassy to Mausolus, how the owners presented their petition, and how you voted that the goods were enemy property at the time of capture. He reminded you of the statutes by which in such circumstances the property belongs to the State. [13] You all thought that what he said was just. Androtion, Glaucetes, and Melanopus sprang to their feet,—and here you may judge whether I am telling the truth,—made noisy, indignant, abusive speeches, exonerated the captains, admitted that the money was in their hands, and asked that the inquiry should proceed at their own houses. You listened to them; and, when their clamor had subsided, Euctemon offered a proposal, the fairest that could possibly be made, that you should demand payment from the captains, that they should apply in turn to the men in possession, and that any dispute as to liability should be adjudicated, the loser of such action to be indebted to the State. [14] They challenge the decree; it is brought before this Court; and to cut the story short, it was held to be legal, and escaped condemnation. Now what should have been the sequel? The State should have got the money, and the embezzler should have been punished; but assuredly there was no need of any new statute whatsoever. So far no wrong had been done to you by Timocrates, the defendant in this case; but afterwards he took over responsibility for everything that I have recounted, and it will be shown that the whole of your injuries are due to him. He made himself the hired agent of the artifices and impostures of these men, and, by that offer of his services, as I will prove to your satisfaction, he took upon himself the burden of their iniquities. [15] However, to begin with, I must remind you of dates, and of the conjuncture at which he proposed his new law; and indeed it will be apparent that he was impertinently laughing in your faces. It was the month of Scirophorion when those men lost the action they brought against Euctemon. Then they hired this man, and, without making the least preparation to satisfy your claim, they put up some newsmongers to tell people in the market-place that they were ready to pay the bare amount of the debt, but that they really could not afford to pay it twice over.1 [16] This was a mere manoeuvre, with banter thrown in—a device to divert attention from the enactment of this law. That it was so, we have the testimony of plain fact: all the time they never paid over a shilling of the money, while they disannulled most of the established laws by a single statute, and that the most disgraceful and scandalous ever enacted in your assembly. [17]

Before speaking of the law that I have indicted, I wish to give you a brief account of the existing statutes under which indictments of this kind are laid; for after hearing this account you will find the information useful for the rest of my speech. In our laws at present in force, men of Athens, every condition that must be observed when new statutes are to be enacted is laid down clearly and with precision. [18] First of all, there is a prescribed time for legislation; but even at the proper time a man is not permitted to propose his law just as he pleases. He is directed, in the first place, to put it in writing and post it in front of the Heroes for everyone to see. Then it is ordained that the law must be of universal application, and also that laws of contrary purport must be repealed; and there are other directions with which I do not think I need trouble you now. If a man disobeys any of these directions, anyone who chooses is empowered to indict him. [19] Now if Timocrates had not been liable to prosecution on every count, if he had not contravened every one of these directions when he introduced his law, a single charge, whatever it might be, would have been preferred against him; but, as the matter stands, I am compelled to take the points one by one and address you on each in its turn. I will therefore take his first offence first, that is, that he tried to legislate in defiance of all the statutes. Afterwards I will deal in turn with any other topic on which you are willing to hear me.—Please take the statutes,—here they are,—and read them.—You will find that he has not satisfied any one requirement. I ask your attention, gentlemen of the jury, to the statutes as they are read. [20] “Ratification of Laws

In the first presidency and on the eleventh day thereof, in the Assembly, the Herald having read prayers, a vote shall be taken on the laws, to wit, first upon laws respecting the Council, and secondly upon general statutes, and then upon statutes enacted for the nine Archons, and then upon laws affecting other authorities. Those who are content with the laws respecting the Council shall hold up their hands first, and then those who are not content; and in like manner in respect of general statutes. All voting upon laws shall be in accordance with laws already in force.” [21] “If any law already in force be rejected on show of hands, the presidents in whose term of office the voting takes place shall appoint the last of the three meetings of the Assembly for the consideration of laws so rejected. The commissioners who preside by lot at the Assembly are required, immediately after religious observances, to put the question respecting the sessions of the Legislative Committee, and respecting the fund from which their fees are to be paid. The Legislative Committee shall consist of persons who have taken the judicial oath.” [22] “If the Presidents do not convene the Assembly according to the written regulations, or if the commissioners do not put the question, each president shall forfeit one thousand drachmas of sacred money to Athena, and each commissioner shall forfeit forty drachmas of sacred money to Athena, and information thereof shall be laid before the Judges in such manner as when a man holds office being in debt to the treasury; and the Judges shall bring before the Court according to the law all persons against whom such information is laid; otherwise they shall not be raised to the Council of Areopagus, as obstructing the rectification of the statutes.” [23] “Before the meeting of the Assembly any Athenian citizen who wishes shall write down the laws proposed by him and exhibit the same in front of the Eponymous Heroes, to the end that the People may vote on the question of the time allowed to the Legislative Committee with due regard to the total number of laws proposed. Whosoever proposes a new statute shall write it on a white hoard and exhibit it in front of the Heroes on every day until the meeting of the Assembly. On the eleventh day of the month Hecatombaeon the people shall elect from the whole body of citizens five persons to speak in defence of laws proposed for repeal before the Legislative Committee.” [24]

These are all old-established laws, gentlemen of the jury; they have been repeatedly tested and found advantageous to you, and no man ever denied that they were well-conceived. Naturally; for there is nothing offensive or violent or oligarchical in their provisions; they order business to be done in a courteous, democratic spirit. [25] In the first place, they entrusted to you citizens the decision whether a new law is to be introduced or the existing laws judged satisfactory. Then, if your vote is in favour of introduction, they did not order immediate enactment, but appointed the next assembly but one, and even at that assembly, they do not permit you to legislate, but only to consider the terms on which the Legislative Committee shall sit. In the intervening time they instructed persons wishing to introduce laws to exhibit them in front of the Heroes, so that anyone who chooses may inspect them, and, if he discovers anything injurious to the public interest, may inform you and have time to speak against the laws. [26] Now, of all these rules the defendant Timocrates has not observed one. He never exhibited his law; he gave no one a chance to read it and oppose it; nor did he wait for any of the dates appointed by statute. The assembly at which your vote was taken fell on the eleventh of Hecatombaeon, and he introduced his law on the twelfth, the very next day, although it was a feast of Cronos and the Council therefore stood adjourned; for he had contrived, with the help of persons whose intentions are unfriendly to you, to get by decree a sitting of the Legislative Committee, on an excuse afforded by the Panathenian Festival. [27] I wish to read to you the decree that was adopted on division, to show you that the whole business was managed by collusion, and nothing was left to chance.—Take the decree, sir, and read it to the jury.“Decree

During the first presidency, namely, that of the Pandionid Tribe, and on the eleventh day of that presidency, it was moved by Epicrates that, in order that the sacrifices may be offered, that provision may be adequate, and that any lack of funds for the Panathenian Festival may be made good, the Presidents of the Pandionid Tribe do tomorrow set up a Legislative Committee, and that such Legislative Committee do consist of one thousand and one citizens who have taken the oath, and that the Council co-operate therewith in legislative business.” [28]

Observe, as the decree is read, how ingeniously the man who drafted it, under a pretext of finance and the urgency of the Festival, cancelled the date fixed by statute, and put in his own date,—that they should legislate “to-morrow.” I protest that his intention was, not that something belonging to the Festival should be done as handsomely as possible, for in fact there was nothing left to be done, and no financial deficiency to be made good; but that this law of theirs, the subject of the present trial, might be enacted and come into force without any living man having wind of it beforehand or offering opposition. [29] Here is the proof: when the Legislative Committee was in session, nobody introduced any law, good or bad, in respect of the business specified, that is, of financial provision for the Panathenian Festival, but this man Timocrates coolly and quietly proceeded to legislate about matters that lay outside the terms of the decree, and were forbidden by statute. He assumed that the date specified in the decree was more authoritative than the date prescribed by law; and, while you were all holidaymaking, and though there is a standing law that at such a time we shall do one another no wrong either in private or public life nor transact business that does not concern the Festival, he was not in the least afraid of making an exhibition of himself by doing wrong, not to this or that person, but to the whole community. [30] Yet was it not outrageous that, well knowing that the statutes which you heard read just now were still in force, well knowing also that another law declares that no decree, even though in itself constitutional, shall have higher authority than a statute, he should draft and propose to you a new law, in virtue of a decree that, as he was fully aware, had been moved in defiance of the laws? [31] Was it not atrocious that, when the State had granted to us individually security against any disagreeable or offensive treatment at that time, by declaring a religious holiday, the State itself should have obtained no such immunity from Timocrates, but, during that very holiday, should have been subjected to most grievous ill-treatment? How, indeed, could any private person ill-treat the State more gravely than by subverting the laws by which the State is administered? [32]

That Timocrates has done nothing that he ought to have done, nothing that the laws expressly enjoin, may be concluded from consideration of what I have already said; and before long you shall be satisfied, point by point, that he transgressed not merely in so far as he ignored the dates fixed by statute, and entirely annulled your right of deliberate consideration, by attempting to legislate during the holiday, but also in this respect,—that the law he introduced is inconsistent with all existing statutes.—But first take and read the statute I have here, which expressly forbids the introduction of any conflicting law, and authorizes an indictment if such a law should have been introduced. [33] “Law

It shall not he lawful to repeal any established law except at a Legislative Committee; and then any Athenian citizen may move for such repeal only on condition that he proposes a law to be substituted for the law so repealed. The Commissioners shall take a show of hands upon such laws, in the first instance upon the established law, whether it appear to be advantageous to the Athenian democracy or not, and afterwards upon the law proposed. And whichever law is approved on division by the Legislative Committee shall then be operative. It shall not be lawful to introduce any law contrary to existing laws; and if any person having repealed any existing law proposes in substitution another law that is either disadvantageous to the Athenian democracy or contrary to any established law, an indictment shall lie against him according to the law made and provided in the case of the proposer of a disadvantageous law.” [34]

You have heard the law. Our city possesses many excellent laws, but in my judgement there is not one that has been framed in a more praiseworthy manner than this. Observe in what an equitable and thoroughly democratic spirit it is enacted. It forbids the introduction of anything repugnant to existing laws, except after abrogation of the law previously enacted. What is the purpose? First, to enable a jury to give a just and conscientious verdict; [35] for, if there were two inconsistent laws, and if two litigants were contending in this court, whether in a public or a private dispute, and if each of them, by citing a different law, claimed your verdict, you could not of course give judgement in favour of both of them,—that is absurd,—nor could you give your verdict for either without breaking your oath, because such a decision contravenes the opposite law, which is equally valid. [36] As a safeguard against such a dilemma the lawgiver made this provision in your interest. He also wished to make you the established guardians of the law, well knowing that the other safeguards provided by him may be evaded in many ways. The advocates2 appointed by you, for instance, may be persuaded to hold their peace. He enjoined the exhibition of a proposed law that we may all have knowledge of it beforehand; but it may happen that it is unobserved by those who would oppose it if they knew in time, and that the rest read it without attention. [37] But, it may be objected, it is open to anyone to indict the law, as I have done on this occasion. Well, even in that event the State is outwitted if a man gets the prosecutor to stand aside. What, then, is the only honest and trustworthy safeguard of the law? You, the common people. It is beyond the power of mortal man to take away from you the right to determine and to approve the best policy. No man, by getting you to stand aside, or by bribing you, can ever induce you to substitute a bad law for a good one. [38] Therefore the lawgiver anticipates every avenue of iniquity, thwarting the plans and forbidding the advance of men whose intentions are hostile to you. All these precautions, so admirably and so righteously enacted, Timocrates has subverted and obliterated, so far as in him lay; he has introduced a law repugnant to all or nearly all the existing statutes, without reading any for comparison, without repealing any, without leaving you the right of choice, without taking any other of the steps that he was required to take. [39]

I suppose that you are all satisfied that he is amenable to the indictment, as having introduced a law that contravenes existing statutes; but, to show you the character of the laws he has contravened and of the law he has introduced, the clerk will read to you, first his new law, and then the other laws to which it is repugnant.“Law of Timocrates

During the first presidency, namely, that of the Pandionid Tribe, and on the twelfth day of that presidency, it was moved by Timocrates that, if the additional penalty of imprisonment has been or shall hereafter be inflicted in pursuance of any law or decree upon any person in debt to the treasury, it shall be competent for him or for any other person on his behalf to nominate as sureties for the debt such persons as shall be approved by vote of the Assembly, on an undertaking to pay in full the amount in which he was indebted. The Commissioners are required to put the question whensoever any debtor wishes to nominate sureties.” [40] “The debtor who has given sureties shall be released from the penalty of imprisonment on payment to the State of the money, in respect of which he gave such sureties; but if at the time of the ninth presidency neither he nor his sureties shall have paid in the money, the man who gave sureties shall be imprisoned and the property of the sureties shall be confiscated. But in the case of tax-farmers, their sureties, and their collectors, and of the lessees of leasable revenues and their sureties, the State may exact payment according to the established laws. If any man incur debt during the ninth presidency he shall pay in full during the ninth or the tenth presidency of the next ensuing year.” [41]

You have heard the law, and I beg you to bear in mind this phrase, “if the additional penalty of imprisonment has been or shall hereafter be inflicted,” and also that he excepts from the operation of his law tax-farmers and lessees and their sureties. The law as a whole, but those provisions more especially, is contrary to all existing statutes. That you will recognize when you have listened to the actual laws.—Read. [42] “Law

Moved by Diocles: that laws enacted under democratic government before the archonship of Eucleides and all laws that were enacted during the archonship of Eucleides and are on record shall be in force. Laws enacted after the archonship of Eucleides or laws that shall hereafter be enacted shall be in force as from the day of their several enactment, unless a clause be appended defining the date of their first coming into force. The Clerk of the Council shall affix his mark to all laws now established within thirty days; and hereafter whosoever is acting as clerk shall forthwith make a note that the law is in force as from the date of enactment.” [43]

The existing laws are excellent, gentlemen of the jury; but the law just read has defined them, if I may so put it, and given them new authority. It ordains that every statute shall be operative as from the date of enactment, unless any date is appended, and, in that case, that the specified date shall mark the beginning of its operation. The reason is that a clause had been appended to many statutes, to the effect that “this law shall be in force from the time of the next ensuing archon.” But the man who, to confirm such statutes, proposed the statute that has just been read, did not, in drafting his law at a later date, think it right to carry back to their dates of enactment those laws whose operation had been deferred to a date later than their enactment, and so make them operative earlier than their several authors intended. [44] You must therefore observe how contrary to that statute is the law that Timocrates has proposed. The statute ordains that either the date specified or the date of enactment shall hold good; Timocrates writes, “if the penalty has been inflicted,” referring to past transactions. He did not even define the initial date by naming an archonship; nay, he has made his law operative not merely before the date of enactment, but before any of us were born, for he has included all past time without any limitation.—Your duty, Timocrates, was either not to compose your law, or to repeal the other one; you had no right to throw the whole business into confusion for the furtherance of your own purposes. Read another law. [45] “Law

. . . . nor in respect of disfranchised citizens, for restoration of their franchise, nor in respect of persons indebted to the Gods or to the treasury of the Athenians, for remission or composition of their debt, unless permission be granted by not less than six thousand citizens giving an affirmative vote by ballot. In that event it shall be lawful to put the question in such manner as the Council and the Assembly approve.” [46]

Here is another law which forbids any proposal in respect of disfranchised or indebted persons, for remission or composition, to be made or put to the vote, except after permission granted, and that only if at least six thousand citizens have voted aye. But Timocrates expressly proposed that, if the additional penalty of imprisonment has been inflicted on any debtor, he shall have remission on production of sureties, without any preliminary resolution having been carried, or any permission granted for such a resolution. [47] Even when a man has got his permission, the law does not allow him to do the business as he chooses, but as the Council and the Assembly approve. Timocrates was not satisfied with the simple transgression of making his proposal and introducing his law on the matters in question without permission granted; he went further and, without laying any proposition before the Council or before the Assembly, on the sly, when the Council stood adjourned, and everybody was holiday-making in honor of the festival, he brought in his bill surreptitiously.— [48] Yet, if your intentions had been honest, Timocrates, knowing as you did the statute which I have read, it was your duty, first to make written request for audience before the Council, then to confer with the Assembly, and after that, if the whole body of citizens had approved, to compose and bring in your bill on the matters in question, and even then to wait for the dates prescribed by law, in order that, doing business in that fashion, even though anyone tried to show that your law was disadvantageous to the State, you might not have been suspected of malicious intention, but only of the misfortune of erroneous judgement. [49] As it is, by thrusting your law into the statute-book clandestinely, hastily, and illegally, you have stripped yourself of all claim to indulgence; for indulgence belongs to those who offend unwittingly, not to those who have concerted a plot, as you are convicted of doing. However, I shall have a word to say on that point presently. Meantime,—read the next law. [50] “Law

If any person make petition to the Council or to the Assembly in respect of any sentence of a Court of Justice or of the Council or of the Assembly, if the person who has been fined himself make petition before he has paid the fine, an information shall lie against him in the same manner as when a person sits on a jury being indebted to the treasury; and if another person make petition on behalf of the person fined, his whole property shall be confiscated; and if any Commissioner shall allow the question to be put for anyone, whether for the person fined or for another on his behalf, he shall be disfranchised.” [51]

It is a long task, gentlemen of the jury, if we are to speak of all the laws to which the proposals introduced by the defendant are repugnant; but if any law deserves discussion it is surely that which the clerk has just read. The author of that law knew how kind-hearted and indulgent you Athenians are; he could see that in many instances you had already suffered serious detriment by your own act because of that easy disposition; [52] and therefore, wishing to leave no excuse for public losses, he declared it wrongful that men who had been convicted of misconduct by process and judgement with the sanction of law should enjoy the benefit of your good-nature, falling back upon prayers and solicitation in their distress. Accordingly he strictly forbade either the culprit himself or anyone else to supplicate you or make speeches upon such complaints; they must do what justice demands in silence. [53] Now if you were asked for whom you would more naturally do a service, for those who beg you or for those who bid you, I am sure you would reply, for those who beg; for the former service is the outcome of kindliness, the latter of cowardice. Well, the laws, all of them, command you to do your duty; suppliants beg you to do a favour. Then where supplication is forbidden, can it be permissible to introduce a law that contains a command? I think not. In cases in which you conceived it to be your duty even to refuse favours, it is shameful that you should allow the desires of certain people to be fulfilled against your will.—Read the statute that comes next in order. [54] “Law

When there has been a prior judgement audit or adjudication about any matter in a court of law, whether in a public or a private suit, or where the State has been vendor, none of the magistrates may bring the matter into court or put any question to the vote, nor shall they permit any accusation forbidden by law.” [55]

Why, it looks as though Timocrates were compiling evidence of his own transgressions; for at the very outset of his law he makes a proposal exactly contrary to these provisions. The legislator does not permit any question once decided by judgement of the court to be put a second time; the law of Timocrates reads that, if any penalty has been inflicted on a man in pursuance of a law or a decree, the Assembly must reconsider the matter for him, in order that the decision of the court may be overruled, and sureties put in by the person amerced. The statute forbids any magistrate even to put the question contrary to these provisions; Timocrates proposes that, if sureties are nominated, the Commissioners shall be obliged to submit their names, and adds the phrase, “whenever any debtor wishes.”— [56] Read another statute.“Law

Judgements and awards given under the law while the government was democratic shall be valid.”

No, says Timocrates; they shall not be valid, at least when the penalty of imprisonment has been imposed.—Proceed.“Law

But acts done and judgements delivered during the time of the Thirty Tyrants, whether in private or public suits, shall be invalid.” [57]

Stop. Tell me; hearing that, what would all of you name as the most terrible misfortune?Against what would you pray most earnestly? I suppose that your prayer would be that the state of things under the Thirty Tyrants should never recur. Anyhow, that, as I understand it, is the misfortune against which this statute provides, by ordaining that the acts of that time shall be invalid. Well, the defendant condemns as illegal acts done under popular government, exactly as you condemned the acts of the tyranny; or at least he makes them equally invalid. [58] Then what are we to say for ourselves, men of Athens, if we allow this law to be confirmed? That our tribunals, composed under popular government of men who have taken the judicial oath, are guilty of the same iniquities as the tribunals of the Thirty Tyrants? Preposterous! That they give righteous judgements? Then what reason can we allege for enacting a law to reverse those judgements? Unless indeed we plead that we were out of our minds. We have no other excuse to offer.— [59] Read another statute.“Law

Nor shall it be lawful to propose a law applying to a particular man, unless the same be applicable to all Athenian citizens, except by the votes of not less than six thousand citizens voting in the affirmative by ballot.”

It forbids the introduction of any law that does not affect all citizens alike,—an injunction conceived in the true spirit of democracy. As every man has an equal share in the constitution generally, so this statute asserts his equal share in the laws. You know as well as I do for whose sake Timocrates introduced his law; but, leaving those names out of the question, we have his own admission that his law is not of universal application, for he added a clause excepting from its operation tax-farmers, lessees, and their sureties.—When, sir, there are certain persons whom you have put outside your law, you cannot claim that you have made the same law for all alike. [60] And there is another thing that you cannot say,— that of all persons punished by imprisonment tax farmers are the greatest offenders and do us the gravest wrong, and that that is why you do not give them the benefit of your law. Surely men who are traitors to the commonwealth, men who maltreat their own parents, men who enter the market-place with unclean hands, offend far more heinously; and all those criminals are threatened with imprisonment by the standing laws, while your law offers them instant release. But here again you reveal the men in whose favour you moved your law. They got into our debt not by tax-farming, but by embezzling, or rather by plundering, our money; and that, I warrant you, is the true reason why you had no consideration for the tax-farmers. [61]

Many other excellent statutes might be cited, all contradicted by the law he has proposed. However, if I discuss every one of them, I shall, perhaps, be robbed of my chance of arguing that the law is altogether disadvantageous to the citizens. On the other hand, even if it is repugnant to one only of the existing laws, you can have no doubt that it is open to the indictment. What, then, is my decision? To pass over all the other laws, but to discuss one law proposed on a former occasion by the defendant himself, before I proceed to that part of my accusation in which I allege that the law, if operative, will be most injurious to the commonwealth. [62] To have introduced a law contrary to the laws of others is a serious offence, but one which requires accusation by someone else; but, when a man legislates in opposition to a former enactment of his own, he is really making himself his own accuser. To show you that such is really the case, the clerk will read to you the actual law proposed by him, while I hold my peace.—Read. [63] “Law

Moved by Timocrates: if any Athenian citizens are now in jail or shall hereafter be imprisoned on impeachment by the Council, if the judgement against such prisoners be not delivered to the Judges by the Secretary of the Presidency in pursuance of the law of impeachment, be it enacted that the Eleven shall bring them before the Court within thirty days of the day on which they receive them into custody, unless prevented by public business, and, if so prevented, as soon as possible. Any Athenian qualified as a prosecutor may prosecute. If the culprit be convicted, the Court of Heliaea shall assess such penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, as he appears to deserve. If the penalty assessed be pecuniary, he shall be imprisoned until he has paid the full amount of the fine inflicted.” [64]

You hear that, gentlemen of the jury?—Read those words again.“Law

If the penalty assessed be pecuniary he shall be imprisoned until he has paid the full amount—”

That will do.—Could a man possibly propose two more contradictory enactments than these,—that convicted malefactors shall be kept in jail until they have paid their fines, and that these same malefactors may put in sureties, but must not be imprisoned. Here, then, is an accusation brought against Timocrates by Timocrates, not by Diodorus nor by any other of the great multitude of citizens. [65] Yet from what gain do you think that such a man would restrain his hand, or what would he hesitate to do for lucre's sake, when he did not disdain to legislate in contradiction of himself, though the laws forbid contradiction even of others? It seems to me that, so far as effrontery goes, such a man is ready to do anything. Inasmuch, therefore, as the laws provide that evil doers of other kinds shall upon confession be punished without trial, you, men of Athens, have a right to give your verdict against this man without allowing him to speak or giving him a hearing, now that he has been caught in the act of maltreating the laws; for by proposing this law in contravention of the former law, he has pleaded guilty. [66]

That the law he has proposed is contrary to the statutes just read, to those which I cited before, and, I may almost say, to every law in Athens, is now, I suppose, manifest to every one of you. I really wonder what he will have the face to say about those statutes. He cannot show that his law does not contradict the others; and he will not be able to convince you that he is a simple layman who did not know what he was doing through lack of experience, because for a long time past he has been celebrated for composing and introducing laws at so much apiece. Moreover, there is another course that is not open to him: [67] he cannot admit that he has done wrong and then plead that he deserves forgiveness; for it is quite clear that he did not propose his law unwillingly, or to help the distressed, or his own family, or people who have a claim upon him. He did it by intention, on behalf of men who have done you a grave injury, and who are in no way related to him,—unless he pretends that payment of wages is a bond of kinship. [68]

I will now do my best to prove that the law he introduced is unacceptable and disadvantageous to the citizens. I presume that you will all agree with me that a really wholesome law, such as is calculated to benefit the people, ought, in the first place, to be drawn simply and intelligibly, not in such terms that one man thinks it means this and another that; and, secondly, that the proceedings prescribed by the law ought to be practicable, for if a law, though well-meant, were to enjoin what is impossible, it would be attempting the work not of a law, but of a prayer. [69] Furthermore, it should plainly appear that it does not offer an easy time to any wrongdoer. For if anyone supposes that indulgent laws are the mark of popular government, let him ask this further question: to whom are they to be indulgent? If he will look at the matter rightly, he will find that the answer is, to persons who are going to be tried, not to persons already convicted. For of the former we may say that it is still uncertain whether they have been unjustly calumniated; but the latter can no longer plead that they are not evil-doers. [70] Now it shall be made clear that the law before us exhibits none of the traits I have enumerated, but the very opposite, taking them one by one. There are many ways in which I might make good that statement; the best will be to go through the law itself, phrase by phrase. It is not a law well-conceived in parts, and defective in parts; from beginning to end, from the first syllable to the last, it is enacted to your detriment.— [71] The clerk shall take the actual manuscript, and read the law to the jury as far as the end of the first section.—That is the easiest way for me to explain, and for you to apprehend, what I mean.“Law of Timocrates

During the first presidency, namely, that of the Pandionid Tribe, on the twelfth day of that presidency, the question was put by Aristocles of Myrrhinus, one of the Commissioners: moved by Timocrates, that if the additional penalty of imprisonment has been or shall hereafter be inflicted in pursuance of any law or decree upon any person in debt to the treasury, it shall be competent for him or for any person on his behalf to nominate as sureties for the debt—” [72]

Stop; you shall read it clause by clause presently. This, gentlemen of the jury, is very nearly the most scandalous provision of the whole statute. I do not think that any other man, when introducing a law for the use of his fellow-citizens, ever ventured upon an attempt to rescind judgements passed under earlier statutes. Yet that is what the defendant Timocrates has done without shame and even without concealment, inserting these plain words: “if the additional penalty of imprisonment has been or shall hereafter be inflicted in pursuance of any law or decree upon any person in debt to the treasury.” [73] If he had merely advised us of the right course for the future, there would have been no harm in it but, when a court of justice has given its verdict and determined the issue, is it not outrageous to introduce a law by which that verdict is to be rescinded? It is as though, after allowing the law of Timocrates to become operative, someone should draft a second law to this effect: “if any persons being indebted, and having had the further penalty of imprisonment passed upon them, shall have put in sureties as the law directs, they shall not be entitled to such bail, and it shall not be lawful hereafter to release anyone on bail.” [74] I suppose that no man in his senses would do such a thing; and you, sir, were guilty when you tried to annul those other provisions. For if he thought it a fair thing to do, his proper course was to introduce a law governing future transactions; not to lump together all offences, past and future, proven and unproven, and then register an indiscriminate judgement upon all together. Surely it is outrageous that men who have already been convicted of offences against the common weal should be deemed worthy of the same judicial treatment as men of whom it is not yet known whether they will ever do anything that deserves prosecution? [75]

Again, we may discern how monstrously he has acted in making his law retrospective, by asking ourselves what is the real difference between government by law and oligarchy; and why we regard those who prefer to live under laws as honest, sober-minded persons, and those who submit to oligarchical rule as cowards and slaves. [76] The outstanding difference you will find to be really this: under oligarchical government everybody is entitled to undo the past, and to prescribe future transactions according to his own pleasure; whereas the laws of a free state prescribe what shall be done in the future, such laws having been enacted by convincing people that they will be beneficial to those who live under them. Timocrates however, legislating in a democratically governed city, has introduced into his law the characteristic iniquity of oligarchy; and in dealing with past transactions has presumed to claim for himself an authority higher than that of the convicting jury. [77]

Nor is this the only example of his arrogance. It is further enacted that “if hereafter the additional penalty of imprisonment shall have been imposed, the prisoner may be released on producing sureties for payment of his fine.” If he really thought imprisonment such a dreadful infliction, his proper course was to enact that no man who produces sureties shall be committed to prison; but not, having first found that you have passed sentence of imprisonment and so incurred the resentment of the convict, then to give him a discharge on bail. In fact, he has introduced his law in this fashion by way of advertising himself as one who will, on his own authority, release prisoners, though you may have decided to keep them in jail. [78] Can anyone see any public advantage in a law that is to override the decisions of a court of justice, and that requires unsworn persons to cancel the judgements of sworn juries ? I hope not. It is clear that the law of Timocrates has both these faults; and if you have, each one of you, any regard for the constitution, or if you claim authority for your own decision of the questions on which you give your verdict under oath, you must abrogate a law like this, and not permit it to be made valid today. [79]

He was not satisfied with destroying the authority of this court in respect of additional penalties, but you will find that even the proceedings which he has prescribed in his law, and imposed upon culprits who have been condemned, have not been drafted with honesty and sincerity, but as though his main purpose was to mislead and overreach you. Observe the phrasing: “Moved by Timocrates that, if the additional penalty of imprisonment has been or shall hereafter be inflicted in pursuance of any law or decree upon any person in debt to the treasury, it shall be competent for him or for any other person on his behalf to nominate as sureties for the debt such persons as shall be approved on vote by the Assembly.” [80] See what a long stride he has taken from the court of justice and its sentences! Even to the Assembly; for he steals the person of the criminal, as well as the right to hand him over to the Eleven. What magistrate will ever hand over the delinquent? What member of the Eleven will ever accept custody? The order of Timocrates is that sureties are to be nominated in the Assembly; it is impossible for the Assembly and the Courts to be in session on the same day; and there is no injunction to keep the man in custody until he has named his sureties. [81] Why should he have been afraid to add a distinct injunction that “the magistrate shall keep the delinquent in custody until he shall have put in his sureties”? Is not that quite fair? I am sure you will all say yes. Would it have been contrary to any statute ? No, indeed; it would have been the only clause that does conform to the statutes. Then what was his reason? There is no discoverable reason except this,—that his purpose was not to help but to obstruct the punishment of criminals condemned by you. [82]

Well, how does it go on? “To nominate sureties on an undertaking to pay in full the amount in which he was indebted.” Here again he has stolen away the right of the sacred funds to a tenfold payment, and one-half of the claim of the civil treasury, in cases where double payment is required by law. And how does he manage that? By writing “the amount” instead of “the penalty,” and “in which he was indebted” instead of “which has accrued.” [83] The difference is this: if he had proposed that sureties should be appointed to guarantee the payment of the accruing penalty, he would have embraced in his enactment the statutes under which certain debts are doubled, and others multiplied by ten; and so the debtor would have been obliged not only to pay in full the amount of the debt as recorded, but also to liquidate the penal payments legally added thereto. As it is, by the words “nominate sureties on an undertaking to pay in full the amount in which he was indebted,” he makes the payment depend on the plaint and the documents upon which the several delinquents were brought to trial; and in those documents only the original amount of the debt is recorded. [84]

Again, after making such a big hole in the laws by juggling with words, he adds: “the Commissioners3 are required to put the question whensoever any debtor wishes to nominate sureties,” for right through his law he thinks it his business to rescue the criminal who has been convicted in this court. By allowing the nomination of sureties to take place at the pleasure of the delinquent, he puts it into his power never to pay, and never to go to prison. [85] Of course he will put forward men of straw, and by the time you have rejected them, he will be out of your reach. For if anyone demands his retention in jail for failing to produce sureties, he will reply that he has done so, and intends to do so; and then he will point to the statute of Timocrates, which bids him nominate sureties whenever he likes, but says nothing about custody in the meantime, which gives no instruction for imprisonment in case you reject the sureties, which is, in short, a sort of universal talisman for would-be evil-doers. [86]

“The debtor who has given sureties,” he goes on, “shall be released from the penalty of imprisonment on payment to the State of the money in respect of which he gave sureties.” Here again he persisted in the trick I mentioned just now; he had not forgotten it; he enacted that the man shall be released from prison on payment, not of the accruing penalty, but of the original debt. [87]

“But if at the time of the ninth presidency neither he nor his sureties shall have paid in the money, the man who gave sureties shall be imprisoned, and the property of the sureties shall be confiscated.” In this final clause, you will find, he has at last become the accuser of his own iniquities in the fullest sense. He did not forbid imprisonment on the broad ground that to imprison a free citizen is something shameful or terrible; but he stole from you your chance of catching your criminal in the place where he is, and so he left to you, who are the party aggrieved, the empty name of retribution, but robbed you of the reality. Without your consent he gave a discharge to people who forcibly appropriate your money; and he was within an ace of adding a clause enabling an action at law against the juries that had imposed the penalty of imprisonment. [88]

But of all the objectionable enactments of his law, that of which I will now speak deserves our most vehement indignation. From beginning to end it is addressed to delinquents who put in sureties; but there is neither prosecution nor penalty for the man who offers no sureties, good or bad, but simply defies you. For that man he has provided the fullest imaginable impunity. The days of grace, defined as extending to the ninth presidency, he offers to the man who has put in bail. [89] You will see the point by observing that he adds a clause to the effect that the property of the sureties shall be confiscated, if they do not pay the debt in full. Yes, but suppose a man has not named any sureties,—then of course there are no sureties to punish. He compels the Commissioners, men chosen for that office by lot from the ranks of the citizens, to accept sureties whenever named; but on men who defraud the commonwealth he imposes no sort of compulsion,—he treats them as benefactors, and gives them the right to choose whether they will be punished or not. [90]

Could any conceivable statute be more unsound or more opposed to your interests? First, it enjoins the reversal of your judgements in cases long ago decided; and secondly, in cases still to be tried, while instructing sworn jurors to inflict penalties, it makes those penalties inoperative. Further, it enfranchises state-debtors who do not discharge their liabilities, and, in general, it makes an exhibition of you jurors as men whose oaths, whose penalties, whose verdicts, whose censures, whose acts, in short, are all utterly futile. For my part, I conceive that if the author of the statute had been Critias of the Thirty Tyrants, he would hardly have framed and introduced it in any other fashion than this. [91]

I think that you will easily be convinced that this law upsets the constitution, throws public business into confusion, and denudes the commonwealth of many honorable ambitions. For you cannot be unconscious that our city has often owed her safety to the warlike adventures of our navy and our land forces; and that you have frequently performed glorious achievements in the deliverance, or the chastisement, or the reconciliation, of other cities. What do I infer? [92] Such successes could only have been organized by the aid of those decrees and laws under which you levy contributions on some citizens, and require others to furnish war-galleys; bid some to serve in the navy, and others to perform their several duties. With that object, therefore, you impanel juries, and punish the insubordinate with imprisonment. Now mark how this gallant gentleman's statute vitiates and makes havoc of all that business. [93] His clause reads, you remember: “if the penalty of imprisonment has been or shall hereafter be inflicted upon any debtor, he shall, on nominating sureties on an undertaking to pay the money during the ninth presidency, be released from imprisonment.” Then where are our resources? How shall any expedition be dispatched? How shall we collect ways and means, if every defaulter nominates sureties under this man's act instead of discharging his obligation? [94] I presume that our reply to the Hellenic world will be: “We have a law here,—the statute of Timocrates. Kindly wait till the ninth presidency; then after that we will start.” No other excuse is left. And if you have to fight in self-defence, do you really think that the enemy will wait for the evasions and rogueries of every scoundrel in Athens? If our city enacts laws for her own discomfiture, laws exactly contrary to her own interests, do you think she will ever be able to play her true part in the world? [95] Men of Athens, we may well be satisfied if, with everything in good order, and with no such law as this, we hold advantage over our enemies, keep pace with the swift emergencies and sudden chances of warfare, and are never behindhand.—But if you, sir, distinguish yourself as the author of a law that makes havoc of everything by which our city has earned the respect and admiration of the world, is there any punishment that you do not deserve to suffer? [96]

Moreover, men of Athens, the law shatters our financial system, both sacred and civil; and I will tell you how. You have a law in operation, as good a law as ever was enacted, that holders of sacred or civil moneys shall pay the money in to the Council house, and that, failing such payment, the Council shall recover the money by enforcing the statutes applicable to tax-farmers; [97] and on that law the administration of the treasury depends. That is the law that ensures the supplementary supply for the expenses of meetings of the Assembly, religious services, the Council, the cavalry, and so forth, because the revenue from taxation is not sufficient for current expenses, and what we call the supplementary payments are made under the constraint of that law. [98] It follows that the whole business of the State must go to rack and ruin when, the payments on account of taxation being insufficient, there is a large deficiency, when that deficiency cannot be made up until towards the end of the year, and when, as regards the supplementary payments, neither the Council nor the law-courts have authority to imprison defaulters, if they put in sureties until the ninth presidency. [99] What are we to do for the first eight ? Tell us this, Timocrates: are we never to meet and deliberate? If so, shall we still be living under popular government? Shall there be no sessions of the courts, civil or criminal? If so, what security will there be for complainants? Shall the Council not attend at their office to transact their legal business? If so, what remains but complete disorganization? You nay reply that we shall go on without payment of fees. Then is it not monstrous that the Assembly, the Council, and the law-courts must go unpaid for the sake of a statute which you were paid to introduce? [100] You ought at least to have added a clause, as you did in dealing with the tax-farmers and their sureties, that “if in any other statute or decree it is provided that the debts of any defaulter may be recovered as in the case of tax-farmers, recovery from such defaulters shall be effected in accordance with the existing laws.” [101] —But in fact he went out of his way to avoid the statutes of tax-farming; and, because Euctemon's decree did authorize recovery from losers of suits according to those statutes, for that very reason he omitted to add the clause. In that manner, by cancelling the existing punishment of public defaulters without substituting any other, he makes havoc of all our business,—the Assembly, the cavalry, the Council, the sacred funds, the civil revenue. And for that offence, men of Athens, if you are wise men, he will be chastised and treated as he deserves, and so made an example to deter others from bringing in such laws. [102]

Not only, then, does he deprive the court of authority in respect of supplementary payments, offer immunity to defrauders of the State, cripple our national service, and undermine our financial system, but also, by abrogating the penalties imposed by the existing statutes, he has enacted his law for the benefit of swindlers, parricides, and shirkers. [103] The statutes enacted by Solon, a very different legislator from the defendant, provided that if a man is convicted of theft, and not punished with death, he shall suffer imprisonment; that if a man found guilty of ill-treating his parents intrudes upon the market-place, he shall go to jail; and that if a man, having been convicted of shirking military service, behaves as though he were not disfranchised, he also shall be imprisoned. Timocrates gives impunity to all these offenders, for he abolishes imprisonment if they put in bail. [104] Therefore, in my judgement ）and though you may think what I am going to say rather coarse, I will say it without hesitation（, he deserves, on that very account, to be punished with death, so that he may pass this law in Hell for the benefit of the wicked, and leave us who are still alive in the continued enjoyment of our holy and righteous laws.—Read also the laws I have mentioned. [105] “Laws Concerning Theft, Maltreatment of Parents, and Desertion

If a man has recovered the property lost, the penalty shall be twice the value of such property; if he has not recovered it, ten times the value in addition to the lawful amercement. The thief shall be kept in the stocks for five days and five nights, if an additional penalty is awarded by the court; and such additional penalty may be proposed by anyone, when the question of sentence is raised.—If any man be put under arrest after being found guilty of ill-treating his parents or of shirking service, or for entering any forbidden place after notice of outlawry, the Eleven shall put him into prison and bring him before the Court of Heliaea, and any person being a lawful prosecutor may prosecute him. If he be found guilty, the Court shall determine what penalty, corporal or pecuniary, he shall suffer; and if the penalty be pecuniary, he shall be kept in prison until he has paid the fine.” [106]

Much alike these two legislators, Solon and Timocrates,—are they not, men of Athens? Solon aims at the reformation of the living and of the unborn; Timocrates points the scoundrels of the past to a road by which they may escape justice, and invents a scheme of impunity for malefactors present and malefactors to come, providing deliverance and reprieve for past, present, and future sinners alike. [107] —What adequate satisfaction can you render, or by what punishment can you be punished as you deserve, you who, to say nothing of the rest, subvert the laws that protect old age, that compel the maintenance of parents in their lifetime, and ensure that they shall be honored with due observance when they die? How can you escape being adjudged the basest of mankind, you reprobate, who openly account thieves and scoundrels and shirkers of more value than your fatherland, and for their sake bring in a law to our detriment? [108]

Now I propose to reckon up how I have fulfilled the promises I made at the outset of my address. I undertook to prove that he is amenable to the indictment in every respect, first, because he legislated illegally; secondly, because his proposals were contrary to existing statutes; and thirdly, because they were injurious to the commonwealth. Well, you have now heard the statutes, and what they enjoin upon the author of a new law; and again I have satisfied you that the defendant has not observed any one of those injunctions. [109] Further, you have also heard the statutes with which the defendant's law is manifestly at variance; and you are aware that he has introduced it without repeal of those statutes. And you have certainly heard that the law is detrimental, for I have only just left off telling you so. Therefore he is unquestionably guilty on every count, and in nothing has he shown consideration or scruple; but, as it seems to me, if anything else had been forbidden by the existing statutes, he would have done that as well. [110]

From every point of view it is clear that he framed his proposals with a sinister purpose, and that he offends of malice prepense and not by error of judgement, especially as the character of his law is preserved down to the very last syllable. He proposed nothing that was right, nothing likely to be serviceable to you, even unintentionally. Surely you are bound to abhor and to punish a man who had no thought for wrongs done to the people, but enacted laws for the benefit of those who have injured you before and will injure you again. [111] Gentlemen of the jury, I am amazed at the man's effrontery. To think that, when he and Androtion were in office, he never had any compassion for the great body of your fellow-citizens, who were exhausted with paying income-tax, and that then when Androtion was called upon to refund money, both sacred and civil, which he had long before stolen from the State, he must needs propose a law to deprive you of the double repayment of civil, and the tenfold repayment of sacred, liabilities! Thus the whole mass of you citizens has been attacked by a man who was immediately afterwards to pretend that he had framed his law as a friend of the people. [112] In my view, no punishment could be too severe for a man who, when some market-clerk, or street-inspector, or judge of a local court,—some poor, unskilled man, without experience, and appointed to his office by lot,—has been found guilty of peculation at the audits, demands from him a tenfold restitution, and has no new law to propose for the relief of such delinquents, and then, when ambassadors, elected by vote of the people, men of substance, have embezzled and long retained large sums of money, the property in part of the temples, in part of the treasury, is at great pains to invent for them a way of escape from penalties ordained both by decree and by statute. [113] And yet Solon, gentlemen of the jury,—and even Timocrates cannot pretend to be a legislator of the same calibre as Solon,—so far from providing such defaulters with the means of swindling in security, actually introduced a law to ensure that they should either refrain from crime or be adequately punished. For a theft in day-time of more than fifty drachmas a man might be arrested summarily and put into custody of the Eleven. If he stole anything, however small, by night, the person aggrieved might lawfully pursue and kill or wound him, or else put him into the hands of the Eleven, at his own option. A man found guilty of an offence for which arrest is lawful was not allowed to put in bail and refund the stolen money; no, the penalty was death. [114] Or suppose that he stole a cloak, or an oil-flask, or any such trifle, from the Lyceum, or the Academy, or Cynosarges, or any utensil from the gymnasia or the harbors, above the value of ten drachmas, for such thefts also Solon enacted the capital penalty. If a man was found guilty on a private prosecution for theft, while the normal penalty was double reparation, the court was empowered to add to the fine the extra penalty of imprisonment for five days and as many nights, so that everybody might see the thief in jail. You heard those laws read not long ago. [115] Solon's view was that the doer of infamous deeds ought not to get off with mere repayment of the money stolen; for it seemed to him that there would be no lack of thieves on such terms,—if they had the chance of keeping their booty if undetected, and of simply restoring it if caught. They must pay double; they must be imprisoned as well as fined, and so live in disgrace for the rest of their lives. Not so Timocrates; he made arrangements for a simple, instead of a double, reparation, and for no sort of additional penalty. [116] Nor was he content to be guilty of this iniquity in respect of future offences only; he released even the man who had already committed his crime, and already been punished. I, however, used to suppose that legislators were concerned with the future, making laws to direct how people should behave, how every thing should he managed, and what should be the proper penalties for different transgressions. That is what is meant by making the laws the same for all citizens. To frame statutes for past transactions is not to legislate, but to rescue malefactors. [117] You may judge that what I am telling you is true by reflecting that, if Euctemon had been convicted on the charge of illegal legislation, Timocrates would never have proposed his law, and the State would never have wanted his law; his friends would have been content to plunder the property of the State, without any concern for other people. But in fact Euctemon was acquitted and therefore Timocrates demands that your decision, the judgement of the court, and every other statute shall be invalidated, and that he and his law shall alone be authoritative. [118] —And yet, Timocrates, laws which are still authoritative have given supreme authority to the gentlemen of the jury. The laws permit them, after hearing the case, to adjust their condemnation of the offender to their view of the gravity of the offence; light for light, heavy for heavy. Whenever the phrase is, “what penalty, corporal or pecuniary, should be awarded,” the award is at the discretion of the jury. [119] You, then, abolish the corporal penalty by remitting imprisonment. For whom? For thieves and temple-robbers, for parricides, murderers, shirkers, and deserters. All such men you protect by your law. And yet does not a man who, under a free constitution, legislates, not to protect the temples, not to protect the people, but to protect such people as I have named, deserve to suffer the extreme penalty? [120] —Certainly he cannot deny that such people ought to be, and that the laws make them, liable to the heaviest punishments. Neither can he deny that the men for whose protection he has invented his law are thieves and temple-robbers; for the have robbed the temples of the ten per cent due to Athena and of the two per cent due to the other gods; they keep the money in their own pockets instead of making restitution, and they have stolen the public share, which belonged to you. Their sacrilege differs from other forms of sacrilege to this extent,—that they never even paid the money into the Acropolis as they ought. [121] As Heaven is my witness, gentlemen of the jury, I believe Androtion became the victim of this arrogant, overbearing temper, not by accident, but by the visitation of the gods, to the end that, as the mutilators of the statue of Victory perished by their own hands,4 so these men should perish by litigation among themselves, and should either make tenfold restitution, as the laws direct, or be cast into prison. [122]

I should like to make an observation about his law which occurred to my mind while I was speaking about these matters,—something quite out of the common, indeed surprisingly so. The defendant, gentlemen of the jury, has proposed that the penalty inflicted upon farmers of taxes, if they did not pay their dues, should be in accordance with the earlier statutes, in which the penalty provided is imprisonment and double restitution for men who, in consequence of losses on their contract, might possibly do the State a wrong unintentionally. On the other hand, he abolishes imprisonment for men who steal the property of the State and rob the temples of the Goddess.—If you tell us, Timocrates, that the latter are guilty of a less serious offence than the former, you must admit that you are out of your senses; and if you think their offence more serious, as indeed it is, and yet release them and refuse to release the others, is it not evident that you have sold your services to these men for a bribe? [123]

Another remark worth making, gentlemen of the jury, is that you are far more magnanimous than the politicians. Anyhow you do not repeal the harsh enactments made against the common people,—against those, for instance, who take fees from both parties, or attend the Assembly or sit on a jury while in debt to the treasury, or do anything else forbidden by the laws,—although you know that any man who commits one of these offences may do so because he is poor. You do not enact laws to give liberty of transgression, but rather to take it away. They, on the other hand, make laws to rescue from punishment persons guilty of the most infamous and outrageous misconduct. [124] And then in private they talk insultingly about you, as though they were superior persons, though they are really behaving like ill-conditioned, ungrateful servants. Servants who have been manumitted, you know, gentlemen of the jury, are never grateful to their masters for their liberation, but hate them more bitterly than they hate anyone else, as sharing in the secret of their former servitude. In the same spirit politicians are not satisfied with having risen from poverty to affluence at the expense of the City, but calumniate the common people,—because the common people know what their style of life was when they were young and poor. [125]

But it would perhaps, as he may suggest, have been a great shame for Androtion to be sent to prison, or for Glaucetes, or Melanopus. No, indeed, gentlemen of the jury! It will be a far greater shame if an injured and insulted commonwealth shall exact no retribution for the Goddess or for itself. Does not imprisonment run in Androtion's family? Why, you know yourselves that his father often went to jail for five years at a stretch; and then he was not discharged—he ran away. [126] Or has he earned forgiveness by his conduct in youth? Why, he deserves imprisonment for that conduct just as much as for his embezzlements. Do you mean because he frequented the market-place before he was qualified, and with his own hands haled men of respectable life from the market-place to the jail? But there is Melanopus, you say, and what a dreadful thing it would be if Melanopus were committed to prison today! [127] Well, about his father I will say nothing disrespectful; though I could tell you a long story about thieving,—however, so far as I am concerned, let his father be worthy of all the compliments that Timocrates may lavish upon him. But suppose that the son of this virtuous father was himself a rascal and a thief; suppose that he once paid a fine of three talents on conviction for treason; suppose that, after he had sat in the Allied Congress,5 the court found him guilty of embezzlement, and ordered him to make tenfold restitution; suppose that he played false when he went on embassy to Egypt; suppose that he swindled his own brothers—does he not deserve imprisonment all the more if his father was virtuous, and he is what he is? For my part, I fancy that, if Laches6 really was virtuous and patriotic, he should himself have sent his degenerate son to jail for implicating him in such infamous scandals. However, let us pass Melanopus by, and fix our gaze upon Glaucetes. [128] Was not he the man who first ran away to Deceleia, and, with Deceleia as his base, overran and harried your country? But you all know that. Was it not he who scrupulously paid to the Spartan governor at that place tithes due upon your wives and children and all the rest of his booty; [129] and yet, when you had honored him with the office of ambassador, robbed the Goddess at Athens of her tithe of the plunder he took from your enemies? Was it not he who, being appointed treasurer at the Acropolis, stole from that place those prizes of victory which our ancestors carried off from the barbarians, the throne with silver feet, and Mardonius's scimitar, which weighed three hundred darics? These exploits, however, are so celebrated that they are known to everybody. But in everything else is he not a man of violence? Aye, he has no equal for that. [130] Is it right, then, that you should deal tenderly with any one of them, and disregard for their sakes the tithes of Athena or the double repayment of public moneys? Is it right to leave unpunished the man who is exerting himself to save them? What is there, gentlemen, to prevent everybody turning knave, if knavery is to be profitable? Nothing that I can see. [131]

You must punish crime, not encourage it by your own teaching. Do not let them make a grievance of going to prison with your money in their pockets, but bring them under the yoke of law. People convicted under the alien acts do not think themselves aggrieved when they are kept in yonder building7 until the trial for false evidence is over; they simply stay there without expecting to get the freedom of the streets by putting in bail. [132] The commonwealth, having decided to distrust them, did not choose to be cheated of retribution by the process of putting in bail, but preferred that they should stay in a place where many genuine Athenians have sojourned. Yet. people have been imprisoned there before now both for debt and on judgement, and have taken it quietly. Perhaps it is rather invidious to mention names, but I cannot help giving you a list for comparison with the men before you. [133] I will not mention very ancient instances, or any earlier than the archonship of Eucleides8; but I must observe that many men, who in their own generation were highly esteemed for their earlier conduct, were nevertheless most severely treated by the People for the offences of their later life. The commonwealth was not content with a period of honesty followed by knavery, but expected uninterrupted honesty in public dealings. The previous honesty of such a person was not, in their view, attributable to innate virtue; it was part of a scheme to attract confidence. [134] But after the archonship of Eucleides, gentlemen of the jury, first, you all remember that the well-known Thrasybulus of Colyttus was twice imprisoned and condemned at both his trials before the Assembly; and yet he was one of the heroes of the march from Phyle and Peiraeus.9 Then there was Philepsius of Lamptra. Next take Agyrrhius of Colyttus, a good man, a liberal politician, and an ardent defender of popular rights; [135] and yet even he admitted that the laws must be as binding upon him as upon people without influence, and he stayed in that building for many years, until he had repaid the money in his possession which was adjudged to be public property; nor did Callistratus, who was in power, and who was his nephew, try to make new laws to meet his particular case. Or take Myronides; he was the son of that Archinus who occupied Phyle, and whom, after the gods, we have chiefly to thank for the restoration of popular government, and who had achieved success on many occasions both as statesman and as commander. [136] In spite of their merits, these men all submitted to the laws. Again, the treasurers of Athena and of the other gods, during whose term the Inner Treasury was burned down, were lodged in yonder building pending their trial; so too were the persons suspected of the corn-market frauds, and many others, gentlemen of the jury,—all better men than Androtion. [137] Then if it was right that for them the old-established laws should be operative, and that they should be punished in accordance with the existing laws, can it be right that for the sake of Androtion, Glaucetes, and Melanopus, a brand-new statute should be made,—for men who have been found guilty and condemned by verdict in pursuance of old-established laws, and who are declared to be detaining sacred and public moneys? Will not Athens be a laughing-stock if she is discovered enacting laws for the deliverance of temple robbers? [138] So I should say. Then do not tolerate any insult to yourselves or to the State. Remember how, no longer ago than the archonship of Evander, you put Eudemus of Cydathenaeum to death, because you held him to have proposed an objectionable statute; and that you were within an ace also of putting to death Philip, the son of Philip the ship-owner, but, by a very small majority, you accepted his own counter-assessment of the penalty, and made him pay a very heavy fine. Treat the defendant today in the same spirit of severity. And there is another consideration for you to bear in mind,—how injuriously you would have been treated by Timocrates, if he alone had been your ambassador. I really believe that there is nothing from which such a fellow would have kept his hands. Have regard also to the disposition of the man; for the law which he has had the audacity to propose is significant of his character. [139]

I should like, gentlemen of the jury, to give you a description of the method of legislation among the Locrians. It will do you no harm to hear an example, especially one set by a well-governed community. In that country the people are so strongly of opinion that it is right to observe old-established laws, to preserve the institutions of their forefathers, and never to legislate for the gratification of whims, or for a compromise with transgression, that if a man wishes to propose a new law, he legislates with a halter round his neck. If the law is accepted as good and beneficial, the proposer departs with his life, but, if not, the halter is drawn tight, and he is a dead man. [140] In very truth they are not bold enough to propose new laws, but punctually obey the old ones. And, during quite a long series of years, we are told, gentlemen of the jury, that they have enacted only one new statute. They had a law in that country that, if any one destroyed his neighbor's eye, he must submit to the destruction of one of his own eyes; and there was no alternative of a fine. The story goes that a man, whose enemy had only one eye, threatened to knock that one eye out. [141] The one-eyed man was much perturbed by the threat, and, reflecting that his life would not be worth keeping after such a loss as that, he plucked up courage, as we are told, to introduce a law that whosoever struck out the eye of a man who had only one, should submit to the loss of both his own eyes, in order that both might suffer the same affliction. And that, according to the story, is the only new statute adopted by the Locrians for more than two hundred years. [142] But in this city, gentlemen of the jury, our politicians rarely let a month go by without legislating to suit their private ends. When in office they are always haling private citizens to jail; but they disapprove of the application of the same measure of justice to themselves. They arbitrarily repeal those well-tried laws of Solon, enacted by their forefathers, and expect you to obey laws of their own, proposed to the detriment of the community. [143] If, then, you decline to punish the men before you, in a very little time the People will be in slavery to those beasts of prey. But you may be sure, gentle men of the jury, that, if you are really very angry with them, their ferocity will soon be mitigated. If not, you will have plenty of ruffians to insult you under pretence of patriotic fervor. [144]

Let me now say a word, gentlemen of the jury, about the statute which, as I am informed, he intends to cite as a precedent and which he will claim to have followed in his own proposal. I mean the statute which contains these words: “Nor will I imprison any Athenian citizen who offers three sureties taxed in the same class as himself, except any person found guilty of conspiring to betray the city or to subvert popular government, or any tax-farmer or his surety or collector being in default.” Listen to my reply. [145] I will say nothing about Androtion himself dragging people to prison and putting them in irons after the enactment of this law, but I must inform you to whom it really applies. This statute, gentlemen of the Jury, is not intended for the protection of people who have stood their trial and argued their case, but for those who are still untried and its purpose is that they shall not plead at a disadvantage, or even without any preparation at all, because they have been sent to jail. But Timocrates is going to speak to you of regulations made for untried culprits, as though they had been framed to include everybody. [146] Let me give you a proof that my account of the matter is correct. It would not have been lawful10 for you, gentlemen of the jury, to assess any penalty, corporal or pecuniary,for imprisonment is a corporal punishment, and therefore you could not have inflicted it as a penalty, nor could it have been provided by statute, in cases where information is laid or summary arrest is allowed, that “the Eleven shall put in the stocks any man against whom information is laid, or who has been arrested,” if it had been unlawful to imprison any offenders other than those who conspire to betray the commonwealth, or to overthrow popular government, or tax-farmers who do not satisfy their contract. [147] But as matters stand you must accept these facts as proving that imprisonment is lawful, otherwise penal sentences would at once have been entirely inoperative. In the second place, gentlemen of the jury, the formula, “I will not imprison any Athenian citizen,” is not in itself a statute; it is merely a phrase in the written oath taken by the Council, to prevent politicians who are in the Council from caballing to commit any citizen to prison. [148] Solon therefore, wishing to deprive the Council of authority to imprison, included this formula in the Councillors' oath; but he did not include it in the judicial oath. He thought it right that a Court of Justice should have unlimited authority, and that the convicted criminal should submit to any punishment ordered by the court. To make good this view the clerk will read the judicial oath of the Court of Heliaea. Read. [149] “The Oath of the Heliasts

I will give verdict in accordance with the statutes and decrees of the People of Athens and of the Council of Five-hundred. I will not vote for tyranny or oligarchy. If any man try to subvert the Athenian democracy or make any speech or any proposal in contravention thereof I will not comply. I will not allow private debts to be cancelled, nor lands nor houses belonging to Athenian citizens to be redistributed. I will not restore exiles or persons under sentence of death. I will not expel, nor suffer another to expel, persons here resident in contravention of the statutes and decrees of the Athenian People or of the Council.” [150] “I will not confirm the appointment to any office of any person still subject to audit in respect of any other office, to wit the offices of the nine Archons or of the Recorder or any other office for which a ballot is taken on the same day as for the nine Archons, or the office of Marshal, or ambassador, or member of the Allied Congress. I will not suffer the same man to hold the same office twice, or two offices in the same year. I will not take bribes in respect of my judicial action, nor shall any other man or woman accept bribes for me with my knowledge by any subterfuge or trick whatsoever.” [151] “I am not less than thirty years old. I will give impartial hearing to prosecutor and defendant alike, and I will give my verdict strictly on the charge named in the prosecution. The juror shall swear by Zeus, Poseidon, and Demeter, and shall invoke destruction upon himself and his household if he in any way transgress this oath, and shall pray that his prosperity may depend upon his loyal observance thereof.”

The oath, gentlemen of the jury, does not contain the words “I will not imprison any Athenian citizen.” The courts alone decide every question brought to trial; and they have full authority to pass sentence of imprisonment, or any other sentence they please. [152]

That you are empowered to pass sentence of imprisonment I prove by this argument; and I take it that everybody will agree that to invalidate judicial decisions is monstrous, impious, and subversive of popular government. Our commonwealth, gentlemen of the jury, is administered by laws and by votes of the people; and if once decisions by vote are repealed by a new law, where will be the end of it? Can we justly call this thing a law? Is it not rather the negation of law? Does not such a lawgiver merit our strongest resentment? [153] Indeed in my view he merits the severest punishment, not merely for proposing this law, but for revealing to everyone else a method of destroying the courts of Justice, restoring exiles, and introducing every sort of atrocity. If the author of this law goes on his way rejoicing, what is there, gentlemen of the jury, to prevent another man from coming forward to overthrow our most powerful institutions with a fresh statute? [154] In my opinion, nothing. I have been told that in time past popular government was overthrown in this way, when indictments for illegal legislation were abolished, and courts of justice were stripped of authority. Someone may perhaps object that, when I talk of subverting popular government, I am ignoring the difference of conditions between that time and this. Yes, but no man ought even to drop the seed of such a policy in our commonwealth, though for the moment it may not germinate; rather should every man who by word or deed attempts anything of the kind be brought to justice. [155]

It is also proper that you should be informed how craftily he laid his plans to injure you. Having observed that everybody, whether in public life or outside it, constantly attributes all the prosperity of Athens to her laws, he began to consider how he could destroy those laws without detection, and how, even if caught in the act, he might be thought to have done nothing formidable or presumptuous. [156] He invented the method which he has actually employed, that of overthrowing old laws by a new one, in the hope that his iniquities might be described as preservative. It is true that the city is preserved by laws; and the thing he introduced, though widely different from other laws, certainly was a law. He saw that the beneficent associations of that name were bound to win your approval; and he did not choose to see that in its actual effect it would be found very different. [157] But tell me this,—is there any chairman or any president who would ever have put to the vote the proposals contained in his law? I should say, none. Then how did the thing slip through? He gave the name of law to his own knaveries. For these men do not injure you artlessly or casually, but deliberately and of set purpose; and I do not mean these men alone, but a great company of politicians, who will shortly appear and reinforce the defence,—not, I need hardly say, because they want to oblige Timocrates,—why should they?—but because every man of them imagines that Timocrates' law will serve his own purposes. As these people, then, rally round one another to your prejudice, so it is your business to rally round yourselves. [158] Somebody asked him for what purpose he had chosen to bring forward such a proposal, and tried to explain to him that he had a difficult task before him in this trial. His reply was: “You talk like a fool. Androtion will be there to help me; and he has thought out at leisure such fine arguments on every point, that I am quite certain that no harm will come to me from this indictment.” [159] I am simply amazed at the effrontery of the pair of them,—of Timocrates, if he calls Androtion, and of Androtion, if he appears and speaks for the defence; for, of course, you will then have the clearest testimony that Timocrates proposed his law for the special benefit of Androtion, not as a law of general application. Nevertheless, it will be useful to you to hear a brief account of Androtion's political performances, including those in which the defendant took part, and for which he, no less than the other, should be the just object of your detestation. I will tell you nothing that you have heard already, unless indeed any of you were in court at the trials of Euctemon. [160]

Let us first of all inquire into the exploit on which he chiefly prides himself,—his collection of the money which he extracted from all of you, with the help of this honorable gentleman. Having accused Euctemon of retaining revenue money in his own hands, he promised that he would either make good the charge, or pay the money out of his own pocket; and on that pretext he turned out a magistrate appointed by lot, and insinuated himself into the tax-collecting business. He also proposed the appointment of Timocrates, pleading his own ill-health; “I shall be glad of his help in the work of the office,” he said. [161] He made a speech to the people on that occasion, advising you that you had the choice of three courses, either to break up the processional plate, or to pay your taxes over again, or to recover arrears from defaulters. You naturally preferred to collect your debts; and as by virtue of his promises he had the upper hand, and enjoyed special powers to suit the emergency, he did not think proper to observe the statutes made and provided for such business, nor, if he considered them unsatisfactory, to propose new ones. Instead of that, he moved at the Assembly some truculent and unconstitutional decrees, and used those decrees for jobbery, with Timocrates as his jackal. [162] With the help of this man he has stolen a great deal of your property, for he had included in his decree an order that the police-magistrates, the receivers, and their clerks, should all follow his instructions. Taking these officers with him, he proceeded to invade your dwelling-houses; and you, Timocrates, were the only one of his colleagues, though there were ten of them, who went with him. And let no one suppose that I am hinting that payment ought not to be exacted from defaulters. It ought; but how? As the law directs, and disinterestedly; that is the democratic way. Men of Athens, you got far less benefit from the five talents that this man collected, than injury from the practices that he introduced into your government. [163] For if you care to inquire why a man would rather live under democracy than under oligarchy, you will find that the most obvious reason is that under democracy things are done more considerately. I will not insist that the conduct of these men was more outrageous and intolerable than under any oligarchy, no matter where. But take our own city: at what time was the greatest severity practised here? I am sure you will all reply, in the days of the Thirty Tyrants. [164] And yet, even at that time, as we are told, no man who had concealed himself in his own house was deprived of his security; indeed, the particular charge brought against the Thirty is that they wrongfully carried men to jail from the market-place. But these men carried their atrocity to far greater lengths than that, insomuch that, under democratic government, they made every man's house his prison, bringing the police into our very homes. [165] What do you think of this, men of Athens? A poor man, or, for the matter of that, a rich man, who had spent a great deal and was, perhaps, in a certain sense short of money, was not only afraid to show himself in the market-place, but found it unsafe even to stay at home. And to think that Androtion was responsible for those fears,—Androtion, whose past life and conduct disqualify him for seeking satisfaction at law even for himself, much more for imposing Property-taxes for the State. [166] If anyone asked him,—or asked you, Timocrates, the apologist and abettor of that gang,—whether our property or our persons are amenable to taxation, you would reply, if you chose to tell the truth, our property, because it is from our property that we pay. Then why, you unparalleled scoundrels, instead of confiscating estates and houses, and putting them on the schedule, did you imprison and maltreat men who were full citizens, as well as those unhappy aliens, whom you treated more outrageously than your own domestic slaves? [167] If, gentlemen of the jury, you will turn over in your minds the question what is the difference between being a slave and being a free man, you will find that the biggest difference is that the body of a slave is made responsible for all his misdeeds, whereas corporal punishment is the last penalty to inflict on a free man. These men reversed that principle, and applied punishment to the bodies of their victims, as though they were bondservants. [168] Androtion's behavior towards you was so unfair and so greedy that, whilst approving the conduct of his own father, who had been confined in jail for a debt to the State and made his escape without payment or trial, he thought it quite proper that any other citizen, who was unable to pay out of his own resources, should be dragged by him from his home to the jail and there imprisoned. [169] And Timocrates, at the time when he was levying double payment, would never have consented to accept bail, I do not say till the ninth presidency, but even for a single day, from any of us common people; we must either pay down the money or incontinently be lodged in prison. He used to hand over to the police even a man who had never been condemned in any court. Yet today he has dared, taking full responsibility, to introduce a law to enable persons on whom you have passed sentence, to go where they will in freedom. [170]

Nevertheless they will allege that both then and now they were acting in your interests. Will you then accept their exploits as due to zeal in your interests? Or will you indulgently tolerate the handiwork of their audacity and wickedness? No, men of Athens; you ought to abhor such men rather than liberate them. He who claims your indulgence as having acted for the good of the commonwealth must be shown to possess the spirit of the common wealth. [171] That spirit is a spirit of compassion for the helpless, and of resistance to the intimidation of the strong and powerful; it does not inspire brutal treatment of the populace, and subservience to the potentates of the day.—And such is your conduct, Timocrates; and therefore the jury will have better reason to refuse you a hearing and condemn you to death than to acquit you for the sake of Androtion. [172]

However, I will make it quite clear to you without more ado that they did not carry out those exactions for your benefit. If they were asked whether, in their opinion, the greater injury is done to the commonwealth by tillers of the soil, who live frugally, but, because of the cost of maintaining their children, or of household expenses, or of other public burdens, are behindhand with their taxes, or by people who plunder and squander the money of willing taxpayers and the revenue that comes from our allies, I am sure that, for all their hardihood, they would never have the audacity to reply that those who fail to contribute their own money are worse transgressors than those who embezzle public money. [173] —What then is the reason, Timocrates and Androtion, that, though one of you has taken part in public life for more than thirty years, though during that time many commanders have defrauded the commonwealth, and many politicians as well, who have been tried in this court, and though some of them have suffered death for their crimes, and others have condemned themselves by slipping away and disappearing altogether, neither of you ever once appeared as prosecutor of those offenders, or expressed any indignation at the wrongs of the city, but made your first exhibition of anxiety for our welfare in an affair which involved harsh treatment of a great many people? [174] —Do you wish me to tell you the reason, men of Athens? These men share in the frauds that certain persons practise on you, and they also get their pickings from the collection of revenue. In their insatiable greed they reap a double harvest from the State. For it is not an easier matter to make enemies of a multitude of petty offenders than of a few big offenders; neither of course is it a more popular thing to have an eye for the sins of the many than for the sins of the few. [175] However, the reason is what I am telling you. You must, therefore, take these facts into account, and, bearing in mind their several misdeeds, punish every one of them as soon as you have caught him. Never mind how long ago the offence was committed; consider only whether they committed it. If you are indulgent today to crimes that aroused your indignation then, it will look as though you sentenced them to repay the money because you were angry, not because you suffered any wrong. For to do something spiteful on the spur of the moment to the man who has hurt you is a symptom of anger; if you are really aggrieved, you wait till you have the malefactor at your mercy, and then punish him. You must not let it be inferred from your placability today that you disregarded your oaths and gratified an unjust passion then. You ought to detest them; you ought to be impatient of the sound of the voice of either of those two men, whose public conduct has been what I describe. [176]

Yes, but, in spite of those public delinquencies, there was, it may be said, other business which they managed with credit. On the contrary, in every respect their behavior towards their fellow-citizens has been such that the story you have heard is the least of the reasons you have for hating them. What do you wish me to mention? How they repaired the processional ornaments? How they broke up the crowns? Their success as manufacturers of saucers? [177] Why, for those performances alone, though they had committed no other fraud on the City, it seems to me that they deserve not one but three sentences of death; for they are guilty of sacrilege, of impiety, of embezzlement, of every monstrous crime. The greater part, then, of the speech by which Androtion threw dust in your eyes I will leave unnoticed; but, by alleging that the leaves of the crowns were rotten with age and falling off,—as though they were violet-leaves or rose-leaves, not leaves made of gold—he persuaded you to melt them down. Being appointed to perform that operation, he chose as his assistant Timocrates, the constant partner of his misdeeds. [178] And then, in providing for the collection of taxes, he had put in a clause that the public accountant should attend. That was very honest of him; only every taxpayer was certain to check the accounts. But in dealing with the crowns that he was to break up, he left out that very proper regulation; he was himself orator, goldsmith, business-manager, and auditor of accounts. [179] —Now if you, sir, had claimed our entire confidence in all your public business, your dishonesty would not have been equally manifest; but, seeing that in the matter of the taxes you laid down the just principle that the City must trust, not you, but her own servants, and then, when you took up another job, and were tampering with the consecrated plate, some of it dedicated before we were born, you forgot to provide the precaution that was taken at your own instance in respect of the tax-collection, is it not perfectly clear what you were aiming at? Of course it is. [180] Again, men of Athens, consider those glorious and much-admired inscriptions that he has obliterated for all time, and the strange and blasphemous inscriptions that he has written in their stead. You all, I suppose, used to see the words written under the circlets of the crowns: “The Allies crowned the People for valor and righteousness,” or “The Allies dedicated to the Goddess of Athens a prize of victory”; or, from the several states of the Alliance, “Such-and-such a city crowned the People by whom they were delivered,” or “The liberated Euboeans,” for example, “crowned the People,” or again “Conon from the sea-fight with the Lacedaemonians,” “Chabrias from the sea-fight off Naxos.” [181] Such, I say, were the inscriptions on the crowns. They were tokens of emulation and honorable ambition; but now they have vanished with the destruction of the crowns, and the saucers which that lewd fellow has had made in their place bear the inscription “ Made by direction of Androtion.” And so our temples contain gold plate marked with the name of a man whom the laws forbid to enter those temples in person because of his filthy life. Just like the old inscriptions,—Is it not?—and the same incentive to your ambitions! [182] You may, then, mark three scandalous crimes committed by these persons. They have robbed the Goddess of her crowns. They have extinguished in the City that spirit of emulation that sprang from the achievements which the crowns, while in being, commemorated. They have deprived the donors of a great honor,—the credit of gratitude for benefits received. And after this long series of evil deeds they have grown so callous and so audacious that one of them expects you to acquit him for the sake of the other, and the other sits by his side and does not sink into the ground for shame at his conduct. [183] Not only is he lost to shame when money is in question, but he is so dull-witted that he cannot see that crowns are a symbol of merit, but saucers and the like only of wealth; that every crown, however small, implies the same regard for honor as if it were large; that drinking-cups and censers and such possessions, if very numerous, attach to their owners a sort of reputation for wealth; but, if a man takes pride in trifles, instead of winning some honor by them, he is disdained as a man of vulgar tastes. This man, then, after destroying the possessions of honor, has made the possessions of wealth mean and unworthy of your dignity. [184] There is another thing that he did not understand, that the Athenian democracy, never eager to acquire riches, coveted glory more than any other possession in the world. Here is the proof: once they possessed greater wealth than any other Hellenic people, but they spent it all for love of honor; they laid their private fortunes under contribution, and recoiled from no peril for glory's sake. Hence the People inherits possessions that will never die; on the one hand the memory of their achievements, on the other, the beauty of the memorials set up in their honor,—yonder Gate-houses, the Parthenon, the porticoes, the docks—not a couple of jugs, or three or four bits of gold plate, weighing a pound apiece, which you, Timocrates, will propose to melt down again whenever the whim takes you. [185] To dedicate those buildings they did not tithe themselves, nor fulfil the imprecations of their enemies by doubling the income-tax; nor was their policy ever guided by such advisers as you. No, they conquered their enemies, they fulfilled the prayers of every sound-hearted man by establishing concord throughout the city, and so they have bequeathed to us their imperishable glory,and excluded from the marketplace men whose habits of life were what yours have always been. [186] But you, men of Athens, have grown so extremely good-natured and pliable, that, with those examples ever before you, you do not imitate them,—and Androtion is the repairer of your processional plate. Androtion! Gracious Heavens! Do you think impiety could go further than that? I hold that the man who is to enter the holy places, to lay hands on the vessels of lustration and the sacrificial baskets, and to become the director of divine worship, ought not to be pure for a prescribed number of days only his whole life should have been kept pure of the habits that have polluted the life of Androtion. [187]

Of Androtion I may speak at greater length hereafter. As for what he will say in support of Timocrates, I have still much more to say, but I will refrain. I am sure that he will not be able to deny that this law is undesirable, that it was introduced unconstitutionally, and that it is iniquitous in every respect; but I understand that he alleges that the money has now been paid in full by Androtion, Glaucetes, and Melanopus, and that he would be most infamously treated if, when the people on whose behalf he is accused of proposing his law have made full restitution, he should nevertheless be convicted. [188] In my judgement, it is not open to him to make the slightest use of that plea.—If you, sir, admit that you did bring in your law on behalf of the persons who, as you say, have now done their duty, you must clearly be found guilty on this count,—that statutes still valid distinctly forbid you to introduce a law that does not apply equally to every citizen; and the jury have sworn to give judgement in accordance with those statutes. [189] On the other hand, if you say that you legislated for the general good, you must not plead the payment made by these men,—it has nothing to do with your law,—you must prove that the law itself is acceptable and well conceived. That is the motive you allege; that is what I deny, and have therefore indicted you; that is the issue which the jury is to decide.—I should, indeed, have no difficulty in proving that respect for law is by no means the reason why these persons have paid their debt; but as that is not the question on which the jury have to vote, why trouble them by discussing it now? [190]

He will not, I suppose, spare you the argument that it would be very hard on him to be punished for proposing that no Athenian citizen shall be sent to jail; and that it is for the benefit more especially of people without influence that laws should be as merciful and humane as possible. To avoid being led astray, you will do well to listen to a brief rejoinder to that plea. [191] For when he uses the phrase, “that no Athenian citizen shall be sent to jail,” do not forget that he is lying. That is not his proposal; it is that you jurors shall lose your control over penalties. He is trying to establish the right of appeal against a verdict returned on oath, after argument and trial. Do not let him pick out of his law and read a few phrases that have a benevolent sound to the ear let him produce the whole statute, clause by clause, and allow you to consider its effects. You will find that it is what I describe, not what he pretends. [192] Again, with regard to the plea that merciful and humane laws are good for the common people, you must consider this. There are two sorts of problems, men of Athens, with which the laws of all nations are concerned. First, what are the principles under which we associate with one another, have dealings with one another, define the obligations of private life, and, in general, order our social relations? Secondly, what are the duties that every man among us owes to the commonwealth, if he chooses to take part in public life and professes any concern for the State? [193] Now it is to the advantage of the common people that laws of the former category, laws of private intercourse, shall be distinguished by clemency and humanity. On the other hand it is to your common advantage that laws of the second class, the laws that govern our relations to the State, shall be trenchant and peremptory, because, if they are so, politicians will not do so much harm to the commonalty. Therefore, when he makes use of this plea, refute it by telling him that he is introducing clemency, not into the laws that benefit you, but into the laws that intimidate politicians. [194]

It would take a long speech to prove, point by point, that everything he will say will be intended to hoodwink and mislead you. Most of his topics I will pass over, but I will mention one leading point which you will bear in mind. Watch all his pleas, however various, and see if he will be able to advance one to prove his contention that a legislator may justly make the same ordinance for bygone issues, already determined, as for cases yet to come. Every clause of his law is infamous and outrageous; but that provision is the most outrageous and unconstitutional of all. [195] But, if neither the defendant nor any other man can make good that contention, you must clearly recognize that you are being deluded, and you must ask yourselves how it ever occurred to his mind to legislate in this fashion.—You did not bring in your law gratuitously, Timocrates. No, indeed! far from it. You can offer no excuse for daring to introduce such a measure, except that cursed greediness of yours. Not one of these men is your kinsman, or a member of your household, or has any natural claim on you. [196] Nor can you plead that you took compassion on ill-used men, and therefore resolved to help them. That long after date they should restore money belonging to the citizens, reluctantly, unwillingly, and after conviction in three courts of justice,—you certainly never thought that ill-usage. That means ill-conduct, and should rather provoke our indignation than incline us to pity. Nor do you take pity on them because a humane and considerate disposition is a peculiar trait of your character. [197] Compassion for Androtion, Glaucetes, and Melanopus, because they have to repay stolen money, shows a temper quite different from your refusal of compassion to everyone of the many persons here present, and of all the other citizens, whose houses you invaded with police-magistrates, receivers, and clerks at your heels; with demolishing their front-doors, dragging their bed-clothes from under them, and levying distraint on a man's maidservant, if he was living with her; and that is how you and Androtion were employed for a whole twelve-month. [198] —Yes, it was you citizens who were the more infamously ill-used;—and as for you, you reprobate, you had far more reason to pity your fellow-citizens, who, thanks to you speech-makers, never get a moment's respite from taxpaying. Even that is not enough they are compelled to pay double, compelled by you and Androtion, who never paid income-tax in your lives. [199] —And yet this fellow was so self-confident,—as though he could never be brought to justice for his doings,—that, with ten colleagues in office, he alone joined Androtion in making his return. Yes indeed; gratuitously and from purely unselfish motives, Timocrates provokes your hostility, introducing laws that contradict every statute, and that even, to crown all, contradict a statute of his own making! By our Lady, I think that even you must recognize his generosity! [200]

I will now tell you, without any hesitation, something that, in my opinion, deserves your sternest indignation. Men of Athens, while he is doing all this for money, while he has, to tell the truth, deliberately adopted the profession of paid agent, he does not spend his earnings on purposes that might claim the indulgence of anyone who heard of them. What purposes do I mean? Well, gentlemen of the jury, the defendant's father is in debt to the Treasury. I do not mention that by way of reproach, but because I cannot help it. And this dutiful son allows him to remain in debt! [201] Here is a man who is going to inherit disfranchisement, if anything happens to his father, and yet does not think proper to pay the debt, but prefers to pocket the profit of his meanness so long as his father lives. Is such a man likely to keep his hands off anything?—For your own father you have no compassion; you do not think him ill-used because, while you are getting your pickings and making your profits out of the taxes you used to collect, out of the decrees you move, out of the laws you introduce, he is losing his citizen-rights for lack of a trifling sum of money. And yet you call yourself a compassionate man! [202] —Ah, but he was a good manager for his sister. Why, if he had committed no other crime, he deserves destruction on that account alone. He has not given her in marriage, he has sold her. An enemy of yours from Corcyra, one of the faction now in power there, used to lodge at his house whenever he came here on embassy, and wanted to have his sister,—I will not say on what terms. He took the man's money, and he has given him the girl; and she is in Corcyra to this day. [203] A man who pretends to have given his sister in marriage, but has really sold her for export; a man who supports his father's old age in the manner you know; a toad-eater who drafts decrees and does political jobs for hire,—now that you have caught him, will you not make an end of him? If not, we shall think, men of Athens, that you like lawsuits and vexations, and that you do not want to be quit of scoundrels. [204]

I am sure that you would all agree, if asked, that all evil-doers ought to be punished; but I will try to satisfy you that this malefactor in particular deserves punishment for introducing a law detrimental to the common people. A thief, or a cutpurse, or any rogue of that sort, in the first place really injures only the man who encounters him; it is out of his power to strip everybody, or steal everybody's property; and in the second place, he brings disgrace on no one's reputation or manner of life but his own. [205] But if a man introduces a law by which unlimited license and immunity is granted to those who seek to defraud their fellow-citizens, he is guilty in respect of the whole city, and he brings disgrace upon everybody; for an infamous statute, when ratified, is a discredit to the government that enacted it and an injury to everyone who lives under it. Will you not, then, punish, when you have caught him, a man who is doing his utmost to injure you, and to pollute you with infamy? If not, what excuse will you have? [206] The best way to ascertain with what far-reaching designs he has framed his law, and how inimical those designs are to the established constitution, is to reflect that this is just the way that all conspirators begin, when they are trying to overthrow democracy by innovations,—they first of all release all who were formerly by law suffering this penalty for some offence. [207] Does not this man, then, deserve, if possible, not one but three sentences of death, because, standing by himself, and of course with no expectation of crushing you, but rather of meeting his own doom in this court, if you do justice as you ought, he nevertheless imitated that crime, and attempted to release men whom the tribunals have imprisoned, by his impudent enactment that if the penalty of imprisonment has already been inflicted, or if you hereafter inflict it, upon any man, that man shall be discharged from prison? [208] Suppose that in a moment's time you were to hear an outcry hard by this court, and suppose that you were told that the jail had been thrown open and that the prisoners were escaping, there is not a man, however old or however apathetic, who would not rally to the rescue to the utmost of his power. And if someone came forward and informed you that the man who had let them out was the defendant, he would be incontinently arrested and executed without a hearing. [209] Well, men of Athens, you hold in your power today this man, who has not done that deed in secret, but after beguiling and deceiving you has openly enacted a law that does not merely throw open but demolishes the prison, and that includes in that destruction the courts of justice as well. For of what use are either courts or prisons, if persons sentenced to imprisonment are set free, and if you are to get no benefit from any such sentence henceforward? [210]

You ought also to consider this point, that many Hellenic nations have often resolved by vote to adopt your laws; and in this you take an honorable pride, naturally; for there seems to me to be truth in an observation once made, as we are told, in this court, that all wise men regard laws as the character of the State. Therefore we should take pains that they be accounted as good as possible, and we should punish those who debase and pervert them; for, if they are impaired by your neglect, you will lose that high distinction, and will create an unfavorable reputation for your city. [211] If you are justified in praising Solon and Draco, although you can credit neither of them with any public service except that they enacted beneficial and well-conceived statutes, it is surely right that you should visit men whose enactments are contrary to the spirit of those lawgivers with indignation and chastisement. But as to Timocrates I know that he brought in this law chiefly for his private advantage, because he felt that many of his political acts in your city deserve imprisonment. [212]

I would also like to repeat to you a saying attributed to Solon, when he was prosecuting a man who had carried an undesirable law. We are told that, after stating his other charges, he observed that in all, or nearly all, states there is a law that the penalty for any man who debases the currency is death. He proceeded to ask the jury whether they thought that a just and good law; [213] and when the jury replied that they did, he said that in his opinion money had been invented by private persons for private transactions, but laws were the currency11 of the State; and therefore if a man debased that currency, and introduced counterfeit, the jury had graver reason to abhor and punish that man than one who debased the currency of private citizens. [214] By way of proof that it is a more heinous crime to debase laws than silver coinage, he added that many states that use without concealment silver alloyed with copper and lead are safe and sound and suffer no harm thereby; but that no nation that uses bad laws or permits the debasement of existing laws has ever escaped the consequence. Now that is the accusation to which Timocrates stands open today, and he may justly receive from you the punishment that is adequate to his guilt. [215]

While, therefore, you should be indignant with every man who brings in shameful and wicked laws, your indignation ought chiefly to be directed against those who vitiate the laws upon which depends the greatness, or the weakness, of the commonwealth. And what are they? The laws that avenge you upon evil-doers, and all the laws that confer certain honors on the well-conducted. [216] If all men alike were zealous to serve the community, because they had become ambitious of the honors and rewards of such service, and if all were to recoil from noxious acts, through fear of the pains and penalties enacted for malefactors, could anything prevent our commonwealth from becoming very great? Does not Athens possess more war galleys than any other Hellenic city? Is she not rich in infantry and cavalry, in revenue, in military positions, in harbors? And how are those possessions preserved and consolidated? By the laws; for they are profitable to the community only so long as our public conduct conforms to the laws. [217] If conditions were reversed, if there were no recompense for the virtuous, if evil-doers were to enjoy all the immunity that Timocrates has sought to enact, what utter confusion would be the natural result! For you may be quite sure that from these possessions that I have enumerated, even if they were twice as great as they now are, you would not then get an atom of advantage. Therefore the defendant is proved to be striving to do you wrong in respect of that law by which punishments are provided for would-be criminals. [218]

For all the reasons I have set before you, it is incumbent upon you to show your resentment, to chastise these men, and to make them an example to others. To be lenient to such offenders, or to convict them and then inflict a light penalty, is to habituate and train the greatest possible number to do you wrong.

1 See Dem. 24.82 below.

2 Five advocates were officially appointed to defend in the court of Heliasts any law which it was proposed to repeal.

3 See Dem. 24.22 above.

4 Nothing is known of this incident.

5 The Second Athenian Confederacy, as reformed in 377.

6 The father of Melanopus; probably not the well-known general who fell at Mantinea, 418.

7 οἴκημα is a common euphemism for δεσμωτήριον. There seems to have been only one prison at Athens, and this passage suggests that it was in view of the Agora; but τούτῳ is not necessarily deictic.

8 403 B.C.

9 To end the rule of the Thirty Tyrants.

10 i.e. if, as Timocrates contends, imprisonment was repugnant to the spirit of Athenian law, the law would not have given you the option of imposing corporal or pecuniary punishment.

11 The play upon words between νόμος “law” and νόμισμα “coin” is impossible to render in English.

Gentlemen of the jury, as I sat here for a long time and listened with you to the speech of Lycurgus for the prosecution, I thought it in general an excellent speech; but when I observed him unduly exerting himself, I was surprised that he should not realize that the strength of our case does not really depend on the arguments that he has used or that I am going to use, but on the disposition of each juryman either to be indignant at wickedness or to condone it. [2] For myself, I admit it was our duty to undertake the prosecution and to deliver full speeches in accordance with custom and for your information; but I feel that the case has been already decided by each one of you in his inmost conscience, and that now, if the majority of you are men disposed to admire and protect rascals, all our declamation will be wasted, but if you are disposed to hate them, then this man, please God! shall pay the penalty. [3]

Though much has been said, and all of it well said, I shall not scruple to put my own views before you, because the present suit seems to me quite different from all others. Just consider. To all our courts the juries come to learn from plaintiff and defendant the facts upon which they are to give their votes, and each litigant comes to prove that the legal right is strong on his side. [4] But how stands it with the present trial? You who are to give the verdict have come here knowing better than we, the accusers, that this man, since he is a state-debtor and registered as such in the Acropolis, has no right to speak at all; so that each of you is in the position of an accuser, knowing the facts and not needing to be told them. [5] But the defendant is here with nothing whatever to support his acquittal, with no sound plea based on the facts, with no past record of a decent life, with not a single point in his favour. He imagines that he may be saved by what would have frightened anyone else, though innocent; for he bases the hope of his acquittal on the enormity of his wickedness. [6]

This being so, it seems to me that one would not be wrong in saying that, while Aristogeiton is on his trial, it is your character that is being tested, your reputation that is at stake. For if you make it quite clear that you are angry at such patent and gross offences and are determined to punish them, then it will be seen that you have come here to play your true part as judges and guardians of the law. [7] But if some other motive prevails, some motive which none would care to confess, but which your votes will betray, then I am afraid that to some you will appear to be playing the part of trainers of any citizen who has a taste for wickedness. For every bad man is in himself weak; he only becomes strong by your countenance and support. Whoever wins that support finds in it his advantage and his strength; to you who give that support, it is a source of shame. [8]

But before I speak of the private affairs of the defendant, men of Athens, I should like you seriously but briefly to calculate how much shame and discredit is brought upon our city by these monsters, of whom the defendant is at once the midmost, the first, and the last. [9] To mention only one matter; they mount the platform in the Assembly, where you look to your orators to explain their policy, not to flaunt their wickedness; they come equipped with a hardened front, a raucous voice, false charges, intimidation, shamelessness, and all such gifts as these, than which one could name no qualities more hostile to the spirit of debate nor, I think—so Heaven help me!—more discreditable. By these vile tricks they gain supremacy over all that is respectable in the State, over the laws, the committees, the course of public business, and the maintenance of order. [10] Now if that is what you want, if their practice accords with your ideas, we must just let them go their own way; but if you think that even at the eleventh hour you ought to put all this right, and reform what has been allowed to go too far, and has been disgracefully misdirected by these men, you must today avert your eyes from all such practices and give a righteous verdict. [11] You must magnify the Goddess of Order who loves what is right and preserves every city and every land; and before you cast your votes, each juryman must reflect that he is being watched by hallowed and inexorable Justice, who, as Orpheus, that prophet of our most sacred mysteries, tells us, sits beside the throne of Zeus and oversees all the works of men. Each must keep watch and ward lest he shame that goddess, from whom everyone that is chosen by lot derives his name of juror, because he has this day received a sacred trust from the laws, from the constitution, from the fatherland,—the duty of guarding all that is fair and right and beneficial in our city. [12] For if you do not cherish that temper, if you come here and take seats with your usual easy good nature, I am afraid that the case may be reversed, and that we who seem to accuse Aristogeiton may be found to be accusing you; for the more convincingly we prove his guilt without arousing your interest, the greater will be your shame. But enough of that subject! [13]

Men of Athens, I shall certainly tell you the truth with the utmost frankness. When I saw you in the Assembly indicating and proposing me as the accuser of Aristogeiton, I was troubled, and I call Heaven to witness that I did not relish the task. For I was not unaware that he who plays such a part in your courts suffers for it in the end, not perhaps so as to feel it at once, but if he undertakes many such tasks and perseveres in them, his character will soon be recognized. I thought it, however, my duty to accede to your wishes. [14]

Now as regards the laying of the injunction and the legal points, I considered that Lycurgus would deal adequately with them; and I also saw that he was producing witnesses to the wickedness of the defendant. But I resolved to devote my speech to those points which ought always to be considered and examined by those who are deliberating in the interests of the State and of the laws; and I will now proceed to deal with those points. But do you, men of Athens, in Heaven's name grant me the privilege of addressing you on these topics in the way that suits my natural bent and the scheme of my speech, for indeed I could not speak in any other way. [15]

The whole life of men, Athenians, whether they dwell in a large state or a small one, is governed by nature and by the laws. Of these, nature is something irregular and incalculable, and peculiar to each individual; but the laws are something universal, definite, and the same for all. Now nature, if it be evil, often chooses wrong, and that is why you will find men of an evil nature committing errors. [16] But the laws desire what is just and honorable and salutary; they seek for it, and when they find it, they set it forth as a general commandment, equal and identical for all. The law is that which all men ought to obey for many reasons, but above all because every law is an invention and gift of the gods, a tenet of wise men, a corrective of errors voluntary and involuntary, and a general covenant of the whole State, in accordance with which all men in that State ought to regulate their lives. [17] But that Aristogeiton has been convicted on all the heads of the information, and that he has not a single counter-argument worth considering, can be easily proved. For there are two objects, men of Athens, for which all laws are framed—to deter any man from doing what is wrong, and, by punishing the transgressor, to make the rest better men; and it will be shown that both these objects will be secured by the punishment of the defendant. For by his original transgressions he has incurred the due penalties, and for his refusal to acquiesce in them he is now brought into court to receive your punishment; so that no one has any excuse left for acquitting him. [18]

Nor is it possible to say, “After all, these things do no harm to the State.” I will not dwell on the fact that all the fines due to the State are lost, if you admit his sophistries, or that if we must forgive any of our debtors, it ought to be the most decent and respectable and those who have been fined on the least serious charges, not the greatest villain of all, who has committed most offences and incurred the most deserved fines on the most serious charges. [19] For what could be more serious than chicanery and breach of the constitution, for both of which the defendant has been condemned? Nor will I urge that even if you let off all other offenders, it is surely wrong to give way to one who resorts to force, for that is surely an outrage. I waive such considerations as these; but I do think that I can clearly prove to you that the defendant's example confounds and destroys all order in law and in government. [20]

I shall say nothing novel or extravagant or peculiar, but only what you all know to be true as well as I do. For if any of you cares to inquire what is the motive-power that calls together the Council, draws the people into the Assembly, fills the law-courts, makes the old officials resign readily to the new, and enables the whole life of the State to be carried on and preserved, he will find that it is the laws and the obedience that all men yield to the laws; since, if once they were done away with and every man were given licence to do as he liked, not only does the constitution vanish, but our life would not differ from that of the beasts of the field. [21] You see what the defendant is, when the laws are in force: what do you think he would do, if the laws were done away with? Since then it is admitted that, next after the gods, the laws preserve the State, it is the duty of all of you to act just as if you were sitting here making up a contribution to your club.1 If a man obeys the laws, respect and commend him for paying his contribution in full to the welfare of his fatherland; if he disobeys them, punish him. [22] For everything done at the bidding of the laws is a contribution made to the State and the community. Whoever leaves it unpaid, men of Athens, is depriving you of many great, honorable, and glorious benefits, which he is destroying to the best of his ability. [23] One or two of these benefits I will name for the sake of example, choosing the best known.

The Council of the Five Hundred, thanks to this barrier,2 frail as it is, is master of its own secrets, and no private citizen can enter it. The Council of the Areopagus, when it sits roped off in the King's Portico, enjoys complete freedom from disturbance, and all men hold aloof. [24] All the magistrates who are chosen from you by lot, as soon as the attendant cries “Strangers must withdraw,” control the laws which they were appointed to administer and cannot be disturbed by the most unruly. There are thousands of other benefits. All the noble and reverend qualities that adorn and preserve our city,—sobriety, orderliness, the respect of your younger men for parents and elders—hold their own, backed by the laws, against the base qualities of indecency, audacity, and shamelessness. For vice is vigorous, daring, and grasping; on the other hand probity is peaceful, retiring, inactive, and terribly liable to come off second-best. Therefore those of you who sit upon juries ought to protect and strengthen the laws, for with the help of the laws the good overcome the bad. [25] If not, all is dissolved, broken up, confounded, and the city becomes the prey of the most profligate and shameless. For tell me this, in Heaven's name; if everyone in the city copied the audacity and shamelessness of Aristogeiton and argued in the same way as he, that in a democracy a man has an unlimited right to say and do whatever he likes, as long as he does not care what reputation such conduct will bring him, and that no one will put him to death at once for any of his misdoings; [26] if, acting on this principle, the citizen rejected at the ballot or at the election should put himself on an equality with the chosen citizen; if, in a word, neither young nor old should do his duty, but each man, banishing all discipline from life, should regard his own wish as law, as authority, as all in all—if, I say, we should act like this, could the government continue to be carried on? What? Would the laws be any longer valid? What violence, insolence and lawlessness there would be throughout the city every day! What scurrility instead of our present decency of language and behavior! [27] Why need one repeat that order is everywhere maintained by the laws and by obedience to the laws? You yourselves have the sole right of judging our case, though every Athenian was in the ballot and all, I am sure, wanted to be allotted to this court. Why is this? Because by lot you were chosen and then assigned to this case. Those are the instructions of the law. And then will you, who owe your presence here to the laws, allow a man, who flouts the laws by word and deed, to escape from your grasp? Will none of you show anger or bitterness at this shameless ruffian's defiance of the laws? [28]

Vilest of all living men! Shut out from your right of speech, not by barriers or doors which any man might break open, but by so many heavy penalties, which are registered in the temple of the Goddess, you are trying to force your way in and to approach those precincts from which the laws exclude you. Debarred by every right that holds good in Athens, by the decisions of three tribunals, by the registers of the archons and of the collectors of taxes, by the indictment for wrongful entry in which you yourself are the plaintiff, curbed, I might almost say, by chains of steel, you wriggle and force your way through all and imagine that by weaving excuses and trumping up false charges you can overturn all the principles of justice. [29]

I will, however, by a clear and forcible example show the jury that they ought not to overlook such conduct; no, not in a single particular. Imagine for a moment that someone proposed that speakers in the Assembly should be confined to the youngest citizens, or to the richest, or to those who had performed a public service, or to some similar category. I am sure you would have him put to death for trying to overthrow the democracy. And indeed you would be justified. [30] Yet any one of these proposals is less dangerous than if it were proposed that speakers should belong to one of the classes to which the defendant belongs—law-breakers, jail-birds, sons of criminals put to death by the people, citizens disqualified after obtaining office by lot, public debtors, men totally disfranchised, or men who by repute and in fact are utter rascals. All these descriptions fit the defendant and apply to those who resemble him in disposition. I think, men of Athens, that he deserves death both for what he is doing now and much more, or at least no less, for what he obviously will do, if he gets the power and opportunity from you; which Heaven forfend! [31] It is also strange if anyone of you is ignorant that for nothing that is honorable or useful or worthy of our city is he of any use. May Zeus and all the gods grant that Athens may never be so short of real men that any honorable task should have to be performed by an Aristogeiton! We ought to pray Heaven that the occasion may never arise for which such a monster could be found useful. But should it possibly arise, it would be a greater blessing for the city that those who wish for its fall should lack the instrument of their designs than that this fellow should be released and ready to their hand. [32] For what fatal or dangerous act will he shrink from, men of Athens,—this polluted wretch, infected with hereditary hatred of democracy? What other man would sooner overthrow the State, if only—which Heaven forbid!—he should gain the power? Do you not see that his character and his policy are not guided by reason or by self-respect, but by recklessness?3 Or rather, his policy is sheer recklessness. Now that is the very worst quality for its possessor, terribly dangerous for everyone else, and for the State intolerable. For the reckless man has lost all control of himself, all hope of rational safety, and can only be saved, if at all, by some unexpected and incalculable accident. [33] Who, then, that is wise would bind up his own or his country's interests with this failing? Who would not shun it as far as possible, and keep its possessor at arm's length, that he may not be involved in it even against his will? Patriotic statesmen, Athenians, ought to seek out some adviser who will contribute, not recklessness, but intelligence, sound judgement, and ample forethought; for these qualities conduct all men to happiness; the other leads to that goal for which Aristogeiton is bound. [34]

In considering this question, look not at my speech, but at the general character of mankind. All our cities contain shrines and temples of all the gods, and among them is one of Athena, Our Lady of Forethought,4 worshipped as a beneficent and powerful goddess, and close to the temple of Apollo at Delphi, immediately as you enter the precincts, she has a large and beautiful temple. Apollo, a god and prophet both, knows what is best. But there is no temple of Recklessness or of Shamelessness. [35] Of Justice too and Order and Modesty all men have shrines, some, the fairest and holiest, in the very heart and soul of each man, and others built for the common worship of all. But none is raised to Shamelessness or Chicanery or Perjury or Ingratitude—all qualities of the defendant. [36]

Now I know that he will avoid the straight and honest path of defence, and will take a devious course, abusing, slandering, and threatening to prosecute, arrest, imprison, and the like. But he will find all this futile, if you duly attend to the case; for which of these tricks has not been exposed over and over again? [37] To pass over other occasions, seven times, Aristogeiton, have you indicted me, when you had taken the pay of Philip's agents, and twice you accused me at my audit. As a mere mortal I pay my respects to Nemesis, and I am deeply grateful both to the gods and to all the citizens of Athens for their protection. But as for you, it was never once found that you had spoken the truth; you were always convicted of chicanery. If, then, these gentlemen make the laws invalid by acquitting you today, will you convict me now? On what charge? [38] I ask the jury to reflect. For two years he has been asserting his claim to address you, though it is illegal for him to do so; but he speaks all the same. All that time he saw the State injured by the wretched Phocides, by the coppersmith from Peiraeus, by the tanner, and by all the others whom he has accused in your courts; but had he no eyes for me, the orator with whom he was at open war, or for Lycurgus, or for the other orators about whom he will have so much to say presently? Yet either way he deserves death; in the one case, if he had a charge against us that he could prove, but passed it over to assail private citizens, or on the other hand, if he has no charge against us, but wants to deceive and hoodwink you by his statements. [39] If there really is in our city a man whose disposition prompts him diligently to search for someone ready to accuse and blackmail others, but who does not trouble himself about the justice or injustice of the charges, he could not find an agent less fitted for his purpose than the defendant. And why? Because one who is prepared to accuse others and bring them all to trial, ought to be himself unimpeachable, so that his victims may not escape through his own wickedness. But no one in the city has a record of more numerous and more serious crimes than the defendant. [40]

Now what is the defendant? “He is the watch dog of the democracy,” cry his friends. Yes, but what sort of dog? One that never snaps at those whom he accuses of being wolves, but himself devours the sheep he pretends to guard. To which of the orators has he done so much harm as to the private citizens against whom he has been convicted of moving unlawful decrees? What statesman has he brought to trial, since he again took to public speaking? Not a single one-but plenty of private citizens. But they say that dogs who taste mutton ought to be cut to bits; so the sooner he is cut up the better. [41]

Men of Athens, he serves no purpose that he claims to serve, but he has turned his attention to an abominable and disgusting trick. In the Assembly he recklessly abuses and attacks all alike, and for all the misrepresentations that he thus foists upon you collectively, he gets his remuneration from each of you separately, when he descends from the platform, by threatening prosecution and by demanding and extorting money.5 Not from the orators, you may be sure: they know how to throw mud back at him: but from the inexperienced private citizens, as those know who have felt his blows. [42]

But perhaps, while admitting the truth of this, you will say that you consider him a useful servant of the State, so that we must overlook all this and spare him. Men of Athens, when you have had practical experience of something, you should never take a merely theoretical view of it. This man had no dealings with you in the five years when he was deprived of the right to address you. Well, who in all that time regretted him? What neglect of the city's interests has anyone observed in consequence of his absence, or what improvement now that he is allowed to speak? On the contrary, it seems to me that as long as he did not come before you, the city had respite from the troubles that he caused to everyone, but since he started his harangues again, Athens is in a state of siege from the factious and unruly speeches that he delivers at every meeting of the Assembly. [43]

I will now trench upon a dangerous topic and offer some remarks to those who, for these reasons, admire him. How such persons ought to be regarded, you shall judge for yourselves; I will say nothing myself, except that they are not wise in taking his part. Now of you who are here in court, I assume that this does not apply to any: it is only fair, men of Athens, and honorable and proper that I should both say and think that of you. [44] But of the rest of our citizens—to confine the reproach to as few as possible—his pupil, or, if you like, his teacher, Philocrates of Eleusis, is the only one whom I account as such, not as if there were not more （for I would that no one else found satisfaction in Aristogeiton）, but I have no right publicly to bring a charge against other citizens which I shrink from bringing against you. Moreover the argument, though it applies to one man alone, will have the same force. [45]

I will not discuss too minutely what character we must assign to an admirer of Aristogeiton, for fear lest I should be committed to a long tirade of vituperation. But one thing I will say. If Aristogeiton is in plain language a rascally and malicious blackmailer, the sort of man in fact that he professes to be, then you have my hearty consent, Philocrates, to support one who so closely resembles you; because, if every one else does his duty and upholds the law, I do not think that your attitude will produce any effect. [46] But if he is a jobber and pedlar and retail-dealer in wickedness, if he has all but sold by scale and balance every action of his whole life, why, you silly fellow, do you egg him on? Surely a cook has no use for a knife that does not cut, and in the same way a man who wants by his own efforts to cause trouble and annoyance to everybody has no use for a blackmailer who is ready to sell such services. [47] That, I may tell you, is the sort of man the defendant is, though you now it already. You remember how he sold the impeachment of Hegemon. You know how he threw up his brief against Demades. At the trial of Agathon, the olive-merchant, a day or two ago, he bellowed and ranted and cried “Ha-ha!” and threw the Assembly into confusion, saying it was a case for the rack; and after pocketing some trifle or other, though he was present at his acquittal, he kept his mouth shut. He held the threat of impeachment over Democles' head, and what did he make of it? There are thousands of other cases. I should find it a task to mention them all, but you, who were his jackal, must have notes of them. [48] Then what man, be he good or bad, wants to spare such a fellow? Why spare one who is the betrayer of those who resemble him, and the foe, by instinct and by inheritance, of good men; unless one thinks that the State should preserve, as a farmer might do, the seed and stock of the blackmailer and rascal? But that would be a disgrace, men of Athens; yes, by Heaven! and I account it an impiety too. I cannot believe that your ancestors built you these law-courts as a hotbed for rogues of this sort, but rather to enable you to check and chastise them, until no man shall admire or covet vice. [49]

Depravity may prove a difficult thing to check. When Aristogeiton, for acknowledged misdeeds, is only now on his trial and has not been put to death long ago, what is one to do or say? His wickedness has reached such a pitch that after information had been laid against him, he did not cease to bluster and blackmail and threaten; and because the generals, to whom you have entrusted the most important interests, refused to give him money, he said that they did not deserve to be appointed inspectors of latrines. [50] This affront did not touch the generals—no, for they could have silenced his abuse by paying him a trifling sum, but it was a gross insult to your action as electors and a proof of his own depravity. The officials chosen by lot he worried with his demands, extorting money from them and sparing them no insult. And now his latest exploit is to stir up confusion and dissension among us all by publishing false letters, for he was born to be the bane of all men, and his character is clearly shown by his life. [51]

Just consider. There are something like twenty thousand citizens in all. Every single one of them frequents the market-place on some business （you may be sure）, either public or private. Not so the defendant. He cannot point to any decent or honorable business in which he has spent his life; he does not use his talents in the service of the State; he is not engaged in a profession or in agriculture or in any other business; he takes no part in any charitable or social organization: [52] but he makes his way through the market-place like a snake or a scorpion with sting erect, darting hither and thither, on the look-out for someone on whom he can call down disaster or calumny or mischief of some sort, or whom he can terrify till he extorts money from him. He never calls at the barber's or the perfumer's or any other shop in the city. He is implacable, restless, unsociable; he has no charity, no friendliness, none of the feelings of a decent human being; he is attended by those companions whom painters couple with the damned souls in hell—by Malediction, Evil-speaking, Envy, Faction, Dissension. [53] This man, then, who is likely to find no mercy from the powers below, but to be thrust out among the impious for the depravity of his life—this man, when you have caught him doing wrong, will you not only decline to punish, but actually dismiss him with greater rewards than you would bestow on your benefactors? For what defaulter to the treasury have you ever allowed to enjoy full rights, unless he paid his debt? Not one! Then do not grant this favour to the defendant now, but punish him and make him a warning to the others. [54]

The sequel too, men of Athens, is worth hearing. What you have just heard from Lycurgus is serious, or, rather, impossible to exaggerate, but the rest will be found to rival it and to be of the same character. Not content with abandoning his father in prison when he quitted Eretria, as you have heard from Phaedrus, this unnatural ruffian refused to bury him when he died, and would not refund the expenses to those who did bury him, but actually brought a law-suit against them. [55] Not content with offering violence to his mother, as you have just heard from witnesses, he actually sold his own sister—not indeed a sister by the same father, but his mother's daughter, whatever her parentage （for I pass that by）—yes, sold his sister for export, as is stated in the indictment of the action which was brought against him on these grounds by his good brother here, who in the present action will help to defend him. [56]

All this is bad enough, Heaven knows; but you shall hear another dreadful performance. On the occasion when he broke prison and ran away, he visited a certain woman named Zobia, with whom he had probably cohabited at one time. She kept him in safe hiding during the first few days, when the police were searching and advertising for him, and then she gave him eight drachmas journey-money and a tunic and a cloak and packed him off to Megara. [57] When this same woman, who had been such a benefactress, complained to him, seeing that he was giving himself airs and making a great show here among you, and when she reminded him of her services and claimed some recompense, on the first occasion he cuffed her and threatened her and turned her out of his house. But when she persisted and, woman-like, went about among her acquaintance with complaints of his conduct, he seized her with his own hands and dragged her off to the auction-room at the aliens' registry, and if her tax had not happened to be duly paid, she would have been put up for sale, thanks to this man who owed his safety to her. [58] To prove the truth of this statement, please call the man who buried the defendant's father without payment, and also the arbitrator in the action which the witness here in court brought against him for the sale of his sister, and produce the indictment. But first of all please summon the protector of Zobia, who gave him shelter, and the sale-commissioners before whom he carried her. You yourselves just now expressed your indignation at his accusing the man who had contributed towards his defence. Athenians, he is an unclean beast; his touch is pollution. Read the depositions.“ Depositions ” [59]

What penalty is adequate for a man who has committed such offences? What retribution does he deserve? To my thinking death is too light a sentence. [60]

One more instance, then, of his private crimes, and I will pass over the rest. Before Aristogeiton was released, a man of Tanagra was thrown into the prison until he could find bail. Aristogeiton accosts him and, while chatting on some topic or other, filches the pocket-book that he had on him; and when the man charged him with the theft and made a to-do about it, saying that no one else could have taken it, he so far forgot all decency that he tried to strike him. [61] But the Tanagran, a fresh-caught fish, was getting the better of the defendant, who was thoroughly pickled, having been long in jail. So when it came to this, he swallows the other man's nose. Then the unfortunate victim of this outrage abandoned the search for his pocket-book, which was afterwards found in a chest of which the defendant possessed the key. After that the inmates of the prison passed a resolution not to share fire or light, food or drink with him, not to receive anything from him, not to give him anything. [62] To prove the truth of my statements, please call the man whose nose this monster bit off and swallowed.“ Deposition ”What a fine performance for your popular orator! What a privilege to hear words of wisdom from a man with such a record as this! Now read also the precious resolution that was passed about him.“ Resolution ” [63]

Are you not ashamed then, men of Athens, if the men who had been thrown into prison for villainy and vice thought him so much more villainous than them selves that they forbade all intercourse with him, while you are ready to admit him to intercourse with yourselves, though the laws have placed him outside the pale of the constitution? What did you find to commend in his life or conduct? Which of all his actions has failed to move your indignation? Is he not impious, blood-thirsty, unclean, and a black mailer? [64]

And yet, in spite of his performances and his character, he misses no opportunity in the Assembly of bellowing, “I, only I, am your sincere well-wisher. All these others are in a cabal. You are betrayed. My patriotism is all you have left.” I should like to examine the source and origin of this great and wonderful patriotism of his, so that, if it is as he says, you may trust it and benefit by it; but if not, that you may be on your guard. [65] Because you condemned his father to death and sold his mother when she was found guilty of defrauding her emancipator, do you suppose that that makes him well-disposed to you? By Zeus and all the gods, that is absurd. For if he is well-disposed towards father and mother, and so observes the great law of nature, which is laid down alike for man and beast, that all should love their parents, [66] then he must clearly be ill-disposed to those who have destroyed them and to their laws and their constitution. But if he has no regard for these things, I should like to know who that sees how he has renounced all affection for his parents, can believe in his pretended zeal for the people; for the man who neglects his parents I regard as unworthy of trust and hateful alike to gods and men. [67] But I shall be told it is because you condemned him on information laid and twice put him and his brother into prison; it is for this reason that he is your well-wisher. But that too is ridiculous. Or because you disqualified him for the office to which he had been allotted? Or because you found him guilty of a breach of the constitution? Or because you fined him ten talents? Or because you habitually point the finger of scorn at him as the vilest of all men in the world? [68] Or because, as long as the present laws and constitution stand, he cannot clear himself of these reproaches? Then why is he well-disposed to you? It is because, in his own words, he is impudent. Why is the impudent man so called save because, being lost to a sense of shame, he dares to state what is not, and never will be, true? And that is precisely what the defendant does. [69]

Now there are some facts about the information laid against him which Lycurgus seems to have passed over, but which I had better lay before you; for I think you should examine the defendant and the rights of the present case as carefully as you would scrutinize a private debt. Suppose then that A accused B of owing him money, and B denied it. If the registered terms of the loan were still to be read, or if the pillars which marked the mortgaged property were still standing, you would clearly regard as impudent the man who denied the transaction; but if it was shown that these proofs no longer existed, then you would regard the accuser as impudent. That is natural. [70] Well, of Aristogeiton's debt to the State the terms still exist, namely the laws under which all defaulters are registered; and the pillar is the wooden table of the law deposited in the temple of the Goddess. Now if these have been destroyed and the debt wiped out, we are talking nonsense, or rather telling lies; but if they are still in existence and will remain valid until he pays his debt, then there is no truth in his plea, but he is committing a serious crime in trying to suppress the rights of the State. [71] For the point to be argued and decided is not whether all his debts are unpaid, but whether he is still in debt. Otherwise it would be hard on those who are registered for a debt of one drachma, if their indebtedness is to tell against them, because they have done some trifling wrong or even no wrong at all, whereas if a man has committed serious wrongs, he is to regain his civic rights by paying one or two instalments. Moreover, there are three distinct debts registered and forming the ground of the information. Two Aristogeiton has entered in the register;6 the third he has not registered, but he is prosecuting Aristo of Alopece for malicious entry. [72]

“Yes,” says he, “for he has registered my name as a debtor unjustly.” Of course it is evident that you have a right to satisfaction for this; but then you ought first to give satisfaction and abide by the penalty you have brought on yourself. Or again, for what do you expect to obtain satisfaction? If you are at liberty to do everything that other citizens do, how are you wronged? [73] I beg the jury in Heaven's name to consider this point also. If he convicts Aristo of malicious intent, what will it mean? His name, of course, will be erased and Aristo's substituted, because that is the law. Good! Then henceforward will this man, whose name has been erased, be a State-debtor, and will the other man, registered as a debtor, retain his full citizenship? That is what follows from the defendant's claim, for if he is not a debtor when his name has been registered, then, when his name has been erased, he will obviously be a debtor. But that is absolutely untrue. No; when his name is erased, then he will be no longer a debtor. In that case the defendant is a debtor now.7 [74]

Again; if Aristo is acquitted, to whom is the State to look for compensation for the defendant's illegal acts? And what about the men whose execution and imprisonment he tries to procure, as he bustles to and fro in the court? How will they recover their lives or escape from the sufferings they have already endured? For this man, to whom the laws refuse a share in our common everyday privileges, is the cause of intolerable wrongs to others by methods that are neither correct nor constitutional nor convenient. [75] When I see all this, I wonder what meaning you attach to the phrase “upside down.” Is it for the earth to be up there and the stars down here? That is impossible, and let us hope it always will be. But when those who have no rights enjoy rights at your pleasure, when villainy is honored and virtue spurned, when justice and expediency are sacrificed to personal spite, then we must suppose that the universe has indeed been turned upside down. [76]

I have before now seen men on their trial, who were being convicted by the actual facts and were unable to prove their innocence, taking refuge some of them in the respectability and moderation of their lives, others in the achievements or public services of their ancestors, or in similar pleas, by which they succeeded in moving their judges to compassion and goodwill. But I cannot see that any one of these topics offers an easy path for the defendant; there is nothing before him but precipices, ravines, and gulfs. [77] What true plea can he find? Something perhaps that his father did? But you yourselves condemned that father to death in these very courts as a detected rascal who deserved his doom. Or perhaps, if there is a difficulty about his father, he will appeal to the sobriety and respectability of his own life. What life? Where has he lived it? For the life that you have all seen him leading is not of that description. [78] “But, my dear sir, he will rely on public services.” When and where performed? His father's? Why, there are none. His own? You will find record of delations, arrests, informations—but no services. Or perhaps, putting these aside, his numerous and highly respectable kinsmen will come forward and beg him off. But there are none and never were. How could there be, when he is not even a free-born citizen? [79] No; I am wrong. He has a brother, who is present here in court and who brought that precious action against him. What need to say anything about him? He is own brother to the defendant, born of the same father and mother, and, to add to his misfortunes, he is his twin. It was this brother—I pass over the other facts—who got possession of the drugs and charms from the servant of Theoris of Lemnos, the filthy sorceress whom you put to death on that account with all her family. [80] She gave information against her mistress, and this rascal has had children by her, and with her help he plays juggling tricks and professes to cure fits, being himself subject to fits of wickedness of every kind. So this is the man who will beg him off! This poisoner, this public pest, whom any man would ban at sight as an evil omen rather than choose to accost him, and who has pronounced himself worthy of death by bringing such an action. [81]

What help, then, remains for him, Athenians? The help, I suppose, that comes to all defendants alike from the natural temper of the jury, the help that no man on his trial provides for himself, but that each of you brings with him from home to the court—I mean pity, pardon, benevolence. But of such help religion and justice alike demand that this unclean wretch should receive no share. Why? Because whatever law each man's nature prompts him to apply to his neighbors, that law it is only fair that they should apply to him. [82] What law do you think Aristogeiton applies to all other men, and what are his wishes concerning them? Does he wish to see them enjoying prosperity, happiness and good fame? If so, what becomes of his livelihood? For he thrives on the misfortunes of others. Therefore he likes to see everyone involved in trials, lawsuits and vile charges. That is the crop he sows; that is the trade he plies. Men of Athens, what sort of man deserves to be called the complete villain, the thrice-accursed, the common foe, the universal enemy, against whom one prays that the earth may neither yield him fruit nor receive him after death? Is it not such a man as this? That is my opinion. [83] What pardon, what pity did the victims of his blackmail obtain from him, the men whose execution he was always demanding in your courts—yes, even before the first verdict was decided?8 Those against whom this wretch showed such cruelty and bitterness were saved from death by the righteous conduct of those of you who had been allotted to try their case, who acquitted the men he was falsely accusing and withheld from him the necessary fifth part of the votes. [84] But his bitterness, cruelty and blood-thirstiness were displayed and proved. The sight of the children of some of the defendants and their aged mothers standing in court did not move him to pity? And do you, Aristogeiton, look for pardon? Whence? From whom? Are your children to be pitied? Far from it. You have yourself thrown away their right to pity; nay, you have destroyed it once for all. Do not then seek anchorage in harbors that you have yourself blocked up and filled with stakes; for that is unfair. [85]

If you heard the slanderous language that he used against you, as he paraded the market-place, you would hate him even more than you do, and with justice. For he says there are many men in debt to the treasury, and all of them in the same case as himself. I admit that these unfortunate men are “many,” though there are but a couple of them; for every state-debtor is one too many,9 and no others ought to be in debt to the State. But I solemnly swear that their case is not the same as the defendant's, nor anything like it, but quite the contrary. Look at it in this way. [86] And do not imagine, Athenians, that I am debating the point with you, as if you were debtors to the treasury. That is not so, and I hope it never may be; it is no idea of mine. But if any of you has a friend or acquaintance among the debtors, I propose to show you that for that friend's sake he ought to hate the defendant.

My first reason is that honest folk, who are hampered by security for others and kind offices and private debts involving no wrong to the State, but who happen to have been unlucky, are placed by him in the same infamous category as himself, contrary to what is right and fitting. [87] When you, Aristogeiton, were convicted of a breach of the constitution for having moved that three citizens should be executed without trial, and you escaped with a fine, though you ought to have suffered the extreme penalty, there is no parallel, not the slightest, between your case and that of a man who has gone bail for a friend and then finds himself unable to pay an unexpected fine. My second reason is that the bond of mutual kindness, which you yourselves naturally preserve towards one another, is broken and destroyed by Aristogeiton, as far as in him lies. You will understand this from what I am going to say. For you, Athenians, observing what I have called the natural bond of mutual kindness, live as a corporate body in this city just as families live in their private homes. [88] How then do such families live? Where there is a father and grown-up sons and possibly also grandchildren, there are bound to be many divergent wishes; for youth and age do not talk or act in the same way. Nevertheless whatever the young men do, if they are modest, they do in such a way as to avoid notice; or if this is impossible, at any rate they make it that such was their intention. The elders in their turn, if they see any lack of moderation in spending or drinking or amusement, manage to see it without showing that they have seen it. The result is that everything that their various natures suggest is done, and done satisfactorily. [89] And that is just how you, men of Athens, live in this community on humane and brotherly principles, one class watching the proceedings of the unfortunate in such a way that, as the saying runs, “seeing, they see not; hearing, do not hear”; while the others by their behavior show that they are both on their guard and alive to a sense of shame. Hence it is that that general harmony, which is the source of all our blessings, is firmly established in our city. [90] Those feelings, so happily implanted in your nature and your habits, Aristogeiton would change and remove and overturn. What every other citizen does with as little noise as possible, he performs, one might almost say, with a peal of bells hung about his neck. Neither the president nor the crier nor the chairman nor the tribe on duty can control him. [91] So when any of you, annoyed at his outrageous conduct, cries, “To think that he should act like this, and he a debtor to the treasury!” the reply is, “What! Is not So-and-so a debtor too?”—each man suggesting his personal enemy. Thus his wickedness is the cause of the scandals which are circulated about men who do not resemble him. [92]

Therefore the one thing left, men of Athens, for those who wish to get rid of this man, now that they can charge him with a clear and manifest offence against the laws, is, if possible, to punish him with death, or, if not, to impose such a money fine as he will not be able to pay. For depend upon it, there is no other way to be rid of him. [93] Among other men, Athenians, you may see the best and most respectable ready at the prompting of nature to do what is right; those who are worse men, but are not classed as the very bad, are careful of offending, because they are afraid of you and are sensitive to disgrace and reproach; the utterly wicked, the moral lepers, as we call them, are said to be taught wisdom only by suffering. [94] Now here is Aristogeiton, who has so far outstripped all men in wickedness that his punishments have not disciplined him and he is once more detected in the same illegal and rapacious acts. Also he is the more deserving of your anger now than before, inasmuch as previously it was only by moving decrees that he ventured to transgress the laws, but now he transgresses them in every possible way—by accusations, by public speeches, by calumnies, by demanding the death penalty, by impeaching and maligning the fully qualified citizens, when he himself is a state-debtor. For nothing is more abominable than that. [95] Surely, then, to admonish such a fellow is madness. A man who never yielded or shrank before the storm of protest with which the whole Assembly admonishes those who offend it, would readily heed the protest of an individual! His case is incurable, men of Athens, quite incurable. Just as physicians, when they detect a cancer or an ulcer or some other incurable growth, cauterize it or cut it away, so you ought all to unite in exterminating this monster. Cast him out of your city; destroy him. Take your precautions in time and do not wait for the evil consequences, which I pray may never fall either on individuals or on the community. [96] Let me put it in this way. Perhaps none of you has ever been bitten by an adder or a tarantula, and I hope he never may be. All the same, whenever you see such creatures, you promptly kill them all. In just the same way, men of Athens, whenever you see a false accuser, a man with the venom of a viper in his nature, do not wait for him to bite one of you, but always let the man who comes across him exact punishment. [97]

Lycurgus did well to call Athena and the Mother of the gods to witness. But I will invoke your ancestors and the virtues of your ancestors, whose memory time has not effaced. It is right that I should do so; for their policy was not to lend themselves to cooperation with the worst of rascals and false accusers, not to foster the mutual jealousy that lurks within doors, but to honor those public and private men who were wise and good, and to loathe and chastise those who were wicked and unscrupulous; and that was how they all became competitors in the rivalry of noble deeds. [98]

One more thing I have to say before I sit down. You will soon be leaving this court-house, and you will be watched by the bystanders, both aliens and citizens; they will scan each one as he appears, and detect by their looks those who have voted for acquittal. What will you have to say for yourselves, Athenians, if you emerge after betraying the laws? With what expression, with what look will you return their gaze? [99] How will you make your way to the Sanctuary of the Mother-goddess,10 if you wish to do so? For surely you will never go individually to consult the laws as if they were still valid, unless you have now collectively confirmed them before you depart. How on the first of each month will you climb the Acropolis and pray for blessings on the State and on yourselves, when the defendant and his worthy father are registered there,11 and you have given your verdict clean against your oaths and the documents there preserved? [100] Or what will you say, Athenians, what will you say, if someone detects and questions those of you who have voted for acquittal? What will you answer? That you were satisfied with him? But who will dare to say that? Who will choose to inherit this fellow's wickedness, with the execration and infamy that it entails? Will each of you deny that he acquitted him? In that case you will have to invoke a curse on the acquitters, as a guarantee from each of you that he was not himself one of them. [101] What need to do this, when you can keep your lips undefiled, and can all of you pray for every blessing upon all, both on yourselves and on all other citizens and, I may add, on all aliens and women and children? For the evil influence of the defendant has.extended, yes, extended to all classes, and all alike are anxious to be rid of his wickedness and to see that he has paid the penalty.

1 πληρωταί seems to mean either those who pay the contribution or those who see that it is paid.

2 The wooden lattice-work doorway, giving admission through the bar to the council-chamber or law-court. The corresponding Lat. term is cancelii.

3 We have no exact equivalent for this Greek word; “moral insanity” has been suggested. Read the 16th Characterof Theophrastus with Jebb's commentary.

4 The goddess with a temple at the entrance to the precincts of Apollo at Delphi was Ἀθήνη Προναία, whom the Pytho addresses at the beginning of the Eumenides （Aesch. Eum. 21 and to whom Croesus offered a golden shield （Hdt. 1.92）. Perhaps by popular etymology she became the goddess of Providence, which title she is named also in Aeschines （Aeschin. 3.108）. Pausanias mentions both titles （Paus. 9.10.2 and Paus. 10.8.6）.

5 Editors confess themselves unable to understand the drift of this sentence.

6 The defendant admitted these two debts by mortgaging his land for them.

7 To the reader who fails to follow the argument of this paragraph it may perhaps occur that the jury were not intended to follow it either.

8 The jury voted first on the question of guilty or not guilty, and secondly on the penalty, if guilty.

9 Lit. “They are more by everyone than is right.”

10 Where copies of all Athenian laws were deposited for reference.

11 See Dem. 25.4.

It has been conclusively proved, men of Athens, that the defendant, Aristogeiton, is a state-debtor and disfranchised, and that the laws expressly forbid all such to address the Assembly. But it is your duty to restrain and check all law-breakers, but especially those who hold office and take part in public affairs, [2] because such men tend to injure the community, if they are unprincipled, and on the other hand to confer the greatest benefit upon it, if they are honest men and willing to abide by the laws. If you once allow those who administer any part of our public affairs to break the laws and override the established principles of justice, everyone who has a stake in the country is bound to suffer from their wickedness. [3] For just as on a voyage an error committed by a common sailor causes little damage, but, when the helmsman is at fault, he brings disaster on everyone aboard, so the faults of private persons cause loss not so much to the general public as to themselves, while the faults of rulers and statesmen come home to all citizens alike. [4] That was why Solon ordained that the penalties for private citizens should be slow, but for magistrates and political leaders swift, assuming that from the former one can get satisfaction even after some delay, but that one cannot wait for the latter, because there will be no prospect of punishment if the constitution is destroyed. No one will be so impudent or so pretentious that he will attempt to gainsay these principles, except Aristogeiton here with his reckless wickedness. On the contrary we shall find that, when once you have given an adverse verdict, all magistrates and all statesmen accept them. [5] For on the one hand, whenever any officials have been rejected by vote, they instantly cease to hold office and are stripped of their official crowns; and on the other hand, all the judicial archons who are disqualified for promotion to the Areopagus forbear to force their way in and submit humbly to your decision. And this is only reasonable; for just as they believe that private citizens ought to obey them when they are rulers, so when they in their turn descend to the rank of private citizens, they ought to submit to the laws, which are the real rulers of the State. [6] Again, all the statesmen, if you will pass them in review from the earliest times, can be proved to have submitted in the same way to your constitutional decrees. It is said that Aristeides was banished by your ancestors and lived in Aegina till the people recalled him, and that Miltiades and Pericles, being fined thirty and fifty talents respectively, did not try to harangue the people until they had paid in full. [7] It would be a most scandalous state of things if, while these men, to whom you were indebted for so many services, were not allowed to do anything contrary to your established laws, this man, who has never done you a single good service, but has committed a prodigious number of offences, should be found to have received at your hands, so readily and so contrary to justice and expediency, the right to transgress the laws. And why appeal to ancient history? Count up the men of your own days and see if anyone has ever been found so shameless. A careful scrutiny will not reveal a single instance. [8] Now apart from all this, whenever a man lodges with the judicial Archons an objection against a decree or law, that law or decree is invalid and the mover or proposer has not the impudence to employ violence, but loyally accepts your decision, even if he is the foremost orator or administrator in your city. Yet is it not absurd that, while decrees passed by you in full assembly as in accordance with the laws should be invalid, you should imagine that you ought to make the whim of Aristogeiton to flout the laws more authoritative than the laws themselves? [9]

Again, when a plaintiff fails to obtain a fifth part of the votes, in cases where the laws forbid him henceforward to indict anyone or arrest him or give him into custody, in the same way none of those liable to these disqualifications ever dreams of defying them. But for Aristogeiton, it seems, and for Aristogeiton alone, no court, no law has authority higher than his own caprice. [10] Neither you nor your ancestors ever repented of observing these rules, for it is the salvation of democracy that it overcomes its enemies either by good counsel or by arms, but submits to its laws either by free choice or under constraint; and that this principle is sound, is allowed even by the defendant himself. [11] For after the disasters to the Greek forces at Chaeroneia, when the very foundations of our State were threatened with the utmost danger, when Hypereides proposed that the disfranchised citizens should be reinstated in order that, if any such danger should menace our State, all classes might unite wholeheartedly in the struggle for liberty, the defendant indicted this decree as unconstitutional and conducted his case in court. [12] But is it not monstrous that, where the safety of the State is involved, the defendant should allow none of his fellow-citizens to obtain enfranchisement, but should claim that same favour from you all, in order to cover his own lawlessness? Yet the former vote, Aristogeiton, was far more lawful and equitable than the vote which you now require the jurors to cast in your favour. [13] For the one was fair and equal for all citizens alike, but this is unfair and brings profit to you alone of all the people of Athens. The first was intended to prevent a peace by which one man would have been put in control of the whole government; the effect of this vote will be that you have received authority to transgress with impunity the decisions of the jury and the laws handed down by our ancestors—to do, in fact, whatever you please. [14] I should like to ask him whether his indictment of the decree was lawful and right or on the other hand unjust and illegal. For if the indictment was inexpedient and against the interests of the people, on that very ground he richly deserves death; but if it was useful and advantageous to the majority, why, pray, do you now insist on the jury giving a verdict which is contrary to your indictment? No; your proceedings then were unjust and now are neither lawful nor beneficial to the citizens. [15] I can see that you, men of Athens, are of this opinion in your own behalf, for you have ere now decided many such “informations” laid against private men. Yet is it not all wrong that in your own case you should so scrupulously examine the laws, but in the case of these mischief-makers, who annoy everyone alike and pretend to be superior to the rest, you should display such indifference? [16]

It is impossible that any of you are of opinion that things ought to be as I say, but that, because of the decorous behavior of Aristogeiton and his usefulness to you, you ought to wink even at his violation of the laws. I think Lycurgus in his speech has satisfactorily proved that the defendant is an unscrupulous man and has an extraordinary faculty for injustice; and that he is not a useful citizen, anyone can see from his public performances. [17] For whom has he brought into court that he succeeded in convicting on the charges that he laid against him? Or what source of revenue has he provided for you? Or what decree has he ever drafted that you were not afterwards glad to disown? The truth is, he is so tactless, so un-Greek in his temperament, that when he sees you somewhat angry with anyone and rather more exasperated than the occasion calls for, he at once anticipates your wishes in the moment of your wrath and so opposes your interests. [18] But a statesman, acting on your behalf, ought not to follow up the hasty sentiments that accompany your anger, but should be guided by reasons, by events, by the opportunities that present themselves. For sentiments are wont to change quickly, but reasons to subsist for a longer period. Paying no regard to this the defendant detects the secret weakness of community, so that the same policy is bound to be ratified one day and repealed the next. [19]

But perhaps because the role he adopts is to rail at everyone, to shout people down and find fault with their speeches, therefore it is convenient in these times to protect him. Gentlemen of the jury, I swear by the goddess of Athens that what takes place on the hustings is a disgrace to our city, and it is through the recklessness of such speakers that political life is now discredited with all decent citizens. But if any of you happen to like that sort of thing, you will never want for such performers. Why, even now the platform swarms with them. For to pick holes in the counsel offered is not difficult, but it is difficult to advise you and persuade you to pass any indispensable resolution. [20] Furthermore, if he had not already deceived you by using these same arguments, when he was on trial at the earlier information, even so it would not be just to make any concession contrary to the existing laws; for you must not allow some persons to break the law and insist on the rest obeying it. Yet just possibly it might then have been more reasonable to trust him and grant him privileges and sacrifice some of these principles. [21] But after you had let him off, admittedly in hope of amendment, and then shortly after had to punish the same man again for speaking and acting against the best interests of the city, what reasonable excuse is left you if you are a second time hoodwinked? When you have tried him by deeds, why need you trust his words? In cases where you have not yet an accurate test ready to hand, it may perhaps be necessary to judge by words. [22] But, for myself, I am amazed that there are men so constituted that, though they deposit private property with those only whose past record shows them to be honest, they entrust public affairs to men who have been admittedly proved unscrupulous. No one would dream of setting a sorry mongrel to guard a flock; yet some people say that, to keep watch on those who administer the State, one need only employ the first comers, men who pretend to detect delinquents, but need the most careful watching themselves. [23]

If you are wise, you will bear this in mind. Turn a deaf ear to those who profess to be devoted to you, and take your own precautions to ensure that you grant to no one the power to make your laws null and void, especially to no one of those who pretend to be able to speak and legislate in the interests of the masses. It is preposterous that your ancestors faced death to save the laws from destruction, but that you do not even punish those who have offended against the laws; that you set up in the market-place a bronze statue of Solon, who framed the laws, but show yourselves regardless of those very laws for the sake of which he has received such exceptional honor. [24] Is it not an absurd situation that you should by legislating express your anger against the criminals, but, when you have caught any of them red-handed, should proceed to let them go unscathed? That the lawgiver, a single individual, should on your behalf incur the hostility of all the worthless, but that you yourselves, collected together to defend your own interests, should not even display your hatred of the wicked, but should be overpowered by the wickedness of a single individual? That you should have fixed death as the penalty if anyone cites a law which does not exist, and yet should allow men to escape unpunished who reduce the existing laws to the level of laws which do not exist? [25]

The surest way to realize the blessing of obedience to the established laws, and the curse of despising and disobeying them, is to put before your eyes and examine separately the advantages that you derive from the laws and the results of lawlessness. For you will find that the fruits of lawlessness are madness, intemperance and greed, but from the laws come wisdom, sobriety and justice. [26] This is clearly so, because we can see that those cities are best ordered which have given birth to the best lawgivers. For as the distempers of the body are arrested by the discoveries of physicians, so savagery is expelled from the soul by the wise purposes of the legislator. To sum up we shall find nothing venerable or admirable which is not associated with law, [27] since the whole round world, the heavenly bodies and what we call the seasons are plainly, if we can trust our senses, controlled by law and order. Therefore, men of Athens, exhort one another to come to the rescue of the laws, and cast your votes against those who deliberately dishonor what is divine; and if you do this, you will be doing your duty and making the best use of your votes.

If Aphobus, men of the jury, had been willing to do what is fair, or to submit the matters in dispute between us to the arbitration of friends, there would be no occasion for a troublesome lawsuit; for I should have been satisfied to abide by their decision, and we should have had no controversy with him. Since, however, he has refused to let those well acquainted with our affairs give a decision, and has come before you, who have no accurate knowledge of them, it must be in your court that I try to win from him what is my due. [2] I know well, men of the jury, that it is a hard task to enter into a contest in which all my fortune is at stake with men who are able speakers and clever in preparing their case, while I because of my youth am wholly without experience in affairs. Yet nevertheless, although they have every advantage over me, I have strong hopes that I shall obtain justice in your court, and that, as far at least as relating the facts, I shall myself speak well enough to ensure that not a single detail shall escape you, and that you will not be in the dark regarding the matters concerning which you are to cast your vote. [3] I beg of you, men of the jury, to give me a favorable hearing, and, if you judge that I have been wronged, to render me the aid which is my due. I shall make my speech as brief as possible, and shall begin by endeavoring to inform you of the facts from which you will most readily understand the case. [4]

Demosthenes, my father, men of the jury, left at his death an estate of nearly fourteen talents, a son, myself, aged seven, and my sister, aged five, and his widow, our mother, who had brought him a fortune of fifty minae. He had taken thought for our welfare, and, when he was about to die, put all this property in the hands of the defendant, Aphobus, and Demophon, son of Demo, nephews of his, one by his brother, the other by his sister, and of Therippides of Paeania,1 who was not a relative, but had been his friend from boyhood. [5] To Therippides he gave the interest on seventy minae of my property, to be enjoyed by him until I should come of age,2 in order that avarice might not tempt him to mismanage my affairs. To Demophon he gave my sister with a dowry of two talents, to be paid at once, and to the defendant himself he gave our mother with a dowry of eighty minae, and the right to use my house and furniture. His thought was that, if he should unite these men to me by still closer ties, they would look after my interests the better because of this added bond of kinship. [6] But these men, who took at once their own legacies from the estate, and as my guardians administered all the remainder for ten years, have robbed me of my entire fortune except the house, and fourteen slaves and thirty silver minae, which they have handed over to me—amounting in all to about seventy minae. [7] This, men of the jury, to put it as briefly as possible, is a summing up of the wrongs they have done me. But of the fact that the amount of property left by my father was as much as I have stated these men themselves have proved the most convincing witnesses, for in the tax-company3 they agreed on my behalf to a tax of five hundred drachmae on every twenty-five minae4—a tax equal to that paid by Timotheus, son of Conon,5 and those possessing the largest fortunes. However, I had better inform you in detail what portions of the property were producing a profit and what were unproductive, and what were their respective values; for when you have accurate information regarding these matters, you will know that of all who have ever acted as trustees none have so shamelessly and so openly plundered an estate as these men have plundered ours. [8] I shall produce witnesses to prove, first, that in the tax-company they agreed on my behalf to be taxed to the amount which I have stated, and, next, that my father did not leave me a poor man, nor one possessing an estate of merely seventy minae. On the contrary, my estate was so considerable that these men were themselves unable to hide its value from the state.

Take,6 please, and read this deposition.“ Deposition ” [9]

From this evidence it is clear what the value of the property was. Three talents is the tax on an estate of fifteen, and this tax they saw fit to pay. But you will see this more clearly if you hear what the property was. My father, men of the jury, left two factories, both doing a large business. One was a sword-manufactory, employing thirty-two or thirty-three slaves, most of them worth five or six minae each and none worth less than three minae. From these my father received a clear income of thirty minae each year. The other was a sofa-manufactory, employing twenty slaves, given to my father as security for a debt of forty minae. These brought him in a clear income of twelve minae. In money he left as much as a talent, loaned at the rate of a drachma a month,7 the interest of which amounted to more than seven minae a year. [10] This was the amount of productive capital which my father left, as these men will themselves admit, the principal amounting to four talents and five thousand drachmae,8 and the proceeds to fifty minae each year. Besides this, he left ivory and iron, used in the factory, and wood for sofas, worth about eighty minae; and gall9 and copper, which he had bought for seventy minae; furthermore, a house worth three thousand drachmae, and furniture and plate, and my mother's jewelry and apparel and ornaments, worth in all ten thousand drachmae, and in the house eighty minae in silver. [11] To these sums left by him at home we must add seventy minae, a maritime loan to Xuthus; twenty-four hundred drachmae in the bank of Pasion, six hundred in that of Pylades, sixteen hundred in the hands of Demomeles, son of Demon, and about a talent loaned without interest in sums of two hundred or three hundred drachmae. The total of these last sums amounts to more than eight talents and fifty minae, and the whole taken together you will find on examination to come to about fourteen talents.10 [12]

This, then, men of the jury, was the amount of property left by my father. How much of it has been squandered, how much they have severally taken, and of how much they have jointly robbed me, it is impossible to tell in the time11 allotted to one plea. I must discuss each one of these questions separately. I pass over the question as to what property of mine Demophon or Therippides are holding. It will be time enough to discuss this when I bring in my accusations against them. I shall speak to you now of the defendant and shall state what his colleagues prove that he has in his hands, and what I know he has taken. In the first place I shall show that he has the marriage-portion, the eighty minae, and after that shall take up the other matters and discuss them with the utmost brevity. [13]

Immediately after my father's death the defendant came and dwelt in the house according to the terms of the will, and took possession of my mother's jewels and the plate. In these he received the equivalent of about fifty minae. Furthermore, he received from Therippides and Demophon the proceeds of the sale of the slaves until he had made up the full amount of the marriage-portion, eighty minae; [14] and after getting this, when he was about to set sail for Corcyra as trierarch,12 he sent Therippides a written acknowledgement that he had these sums in his possession, and admitted that he had received the marriage-portion. Of these matters Demophon and Therippides, his co-trustees, are witnesses, and, besides this, his own acknowledgement of having received these moneys is attested by Demochares, of Leuconion,13 who is the husband of my aunt, and by many other witnesses. [15] For when it proved that Aphobus, though he had her fortune, would not maintain my mother, and refused to let the property, choosing rather to administer it himself in conjunction with the other guardians, Demochares remonstrated with him about the matter; and Aphobus, when he had heard him, neither denied that he had the money nor waxed indignant as one who had received nothing, but admitted the fact, and said that he was having a little dispute with my mother about her jewels, and that, when he had settled this matter, he would act regarding the maintenance and all else in such a way that I should have no ground for complaint. [16] Yet, if it be shown that he made these admissions before Demochares and the others who were present; that he received from Demophon and Therippides the money accruing from the sale of the slaves in part settlement of the marriage portion; that he gave to his co-trustees a written acknowledgement that he had received the portion; and that he occupied the house immediately after the death of my father; will it not be clear—the matter being admitted by everybody—that he has received the portion, the eighty minae, and that his denial of having received it is a piece of shameless impudence? [17]

To prove that what I say is true, take and read the depositions.“ Depositions ”

The dowry, then, he got in this way, and kept. But in the event of his not marrying my mother the law declares that he owes me the amount of the dowry with interest at nine obols a month.14 However, I set it down at a drachma a month only. This comes, if one adds the principle and the interest for ten years, to about three talents. [18] This money I have thus shown you that he received and that he confessed in the presence of a host of witnesses that he had it. Then he has also in his possession thirty minae besides, which he received as the revenue from the factory, and of which he has tried to defraud me in the most shameless manner possible. My father left me a revenue of thirty minae accruing from the factory; and after the sale by these men of one-half of the slaves, I should receive the proportionate sum of fifteen minae. [19] Therippides, however, who had charge of the slaves for seven years, has submitted an account of eleven minae a year, four minae a year less than it should have been; and the defendant who had charge of the business at the first for two years shows no profit whatever, but says sometimes that the factory was idle, and sometimes that he was not himself the manager, but that the foreman, Milyas, a freedman of ours, had charge of it, and that I should look for an accounting from him. If he persists even now in making any of these statements he will easily be convicted of falsehood. [20] If he declares that the factory was idle, yet he has himself rendered an account of money expended, not on provisions for the men, but for their work—ivory for the trade, swordhandles, and other supplies—indicating that the workmen were busy. Furthermore, he charges me with money which he has paid to Therippides for the hire of three slaves of his who were in my factory. Yet if no work was being done, Therippides should have received no pay, nor should these expenditures have been charged to me. [21] Again, if he alleges that the work was done, but that there was no market for goods manufactured, he ought at any rate to show that he has delivered to me these goods, and to produce witnesses in whose presence he delivered them. Seeing that he has done neither of these things, how can you doubt that he is keeping thirty minae, the two years' income from the factory, since the business has so manifestly been carried on? [22] If, however, he shall make none of these statements, but shall assert that Milyas had charge of everything, how can you believe him, when he alleges that he himself made the disbursements amounting to more than five hundred drachmae, but that any profits which accrued are in the hands of Milyas? For my part, I think it likely that the very opposite is the case, supposing that Milyas actually did have charge of the work,—that he made the disbursements, and that Aphobus received the profits, if we may draw any conclusion from the general character and the shamelessness of the man.

Take now and read these depositions to the jury.“ Depositions ” [23]

These thirty minae, then, he has received from the factory, and the interest on them for eight years; and if one sets this down at the rate of a drachma only,15 it will make thirty minae more. These sums he has himself embezzled, and, if they be added to the marriage-portion, the total is about four talents, principal and interest combined. Now I shall go on to show you what sums he has embezzled in conjunction with his co-trustees, and what sums he asserts were never left by my father at all. [24] First, regarding the twenty sofa-makers, given to my father as security for a debt of forty minae, whom my father certainly left behind him at his death, but of whom these men show not a trace—let me prove to you with what utter shamelessness and how openly they are seeking to cheat me of these. That these slaves were left by my father in the house they all admit, and that they brought him in an income of twelve minae every year. Yet these men report no receipts as having come in to my credit from them in ten years, and Aphobus reckons up a total expenditure on them of nearly a thousand drachmae. To such a pitch of effrontery has he come! [25] And these slaves themselves, upon whom he alleges that he has expended the money, they have never handed over to me. On the contrary, they tell the idlest tale imaginable, to the effect that the man who pledged the slaves to my father is the vilest sort of a fellow, who has left many friendly loans16 unpaid, and who is overwhelmed with debt; and to prove this against him they have called a large number of witnesses. But as for the slaves—who got them; how they went out of the house; who took them away; or in what suit they lost them by judgement, they are unable to say. [26] Yet, if there were any truth in what they allege they would not be bringing forward witnesses to prove this man's vile character （with which I have no concern）, but would be holding on to the slaves, or would show who took them, and would have left not one of them out of sight. But as it is, though they admit that the slaves were left by my father, and though they took possession of them and enjoyed the profits from them for ten years, they have in the most ruthless manner possible done away with the whole factory.

To prove that I am speaking the truth in this, take, please, and read the depositions.“ Depositions ” [27]

That, moreover, Moeriades was not without resources and that my father did not act foolishly in making the contract with him about the slaves, I will show you by the clearest proof. For after Aphobus took into his own hands the factory as you have yourselves heard from the witnesses, when it was his duty as my guardian to prevent anyone else from advancing money on the same security, he himself loaned to Moeriades on the security of these same slaves the sum of five hundred drachmae, which he admits he has duly recovered from him in full. [28] And yet is it not outrageous that we who made the prior loan should, besides having received no profit from the slaves, have lost our security, while this fellow, who loaned money on security belonging to us, and whose loan was so long subsequent to ours, should from funds that were ours have recovered both principal and interest, and have suffered no loss whatever? To prove that what I say is true, take the deposition and read it.“ Deposition ” [29]

Consider now of how large a sum they are defrauding me in the matter of these sofa-makers: the principal alone, forty minae, and interest upon it for ten years, two talents; for they obtained from the slaves a profit of twelve minae each year. Is this a trifling sum drawn from some obscure source, which might easily have been miscalculated, or have they not manifestly robbed me of nearly three talents17? Of this sum which they have jointly scattered to the winds, it is surely right that I should recover a third from the defendant. [30]

Furthermore, men of the jury, they have dealt in much the same way with the ivory and iron which were left me. They do not produce them. Yet it is impossible that one who possessed so many sofa-makers and so many sword-makers should not also have left iron and ivory. These things must have been available, for what could the slaves have produced without these materials? [31] Well then, though my father possessed more than fifty slaves and conducted two factories, one of which easily consumed two minae worth of ivory per month for the sofas, while the sword-factory consumed as much more, and iron besides, these men declare that he left no ivory and no iron; to such a pitch of shamelessness have they come! [32] From these facts alone it is easy to see that no credence is to be given to their statements; but that my father actually did leave such an amount of these materials as not only to suffice for his own workmen to use in their trade, but also for sale to anyone else who wished to buy, is made clear by the fact that he himself during his lifetime used to sell these materials, and that after his death Demophon and the defendant continued to sell them from out my house to those wishing to buy. [33] And yet how large must one suppose the quantity left by my father to have been, when it is shown to have sufficed for such extensive factories, and to have been sold by the guardians besides? Was it a small amount, or not rather much more than I have charged?

Take now these depositions and read them to the jury.“ Depositions ”

Of this ivory, you see, there is more than a talent's worth of which they make no report—neither of the raw material nor of the finished product. No; this also they have utterly and absolutely made away with. [34]

Furthermore, men of the jury, I shall prove to you from the account which they render, and from the receipts admitted by themselves, that these three men have in their possession more than eight talents of my money, and that of this amount Aphobus has separately taken three talents and one thousand drachmae. I shall set down separately at a higher figure than they do themselves the moneys they have expended, and shall deduct all the sums they have paid me, that you may see the utter shamelessness of their attempts. [35] They confess to have received from my estate, Aphobus one hundred and eight minae （besides what I shall now show to be in his hands）; Therippides two talents; and Demophon eighty-seven minae. This makes altogether five talents and fifteen minae. Of this sum there are nearly seventy-seven minae, the income from the slaves, which were not received all at once, and a little less than four talents of which they got possession immediately. Now, if you add to this last sum the interest for ten years, reckoned at a drachma only18 you will find that the whole, principal and interest, amounts to eight talents and four thousand drachmae. [36] From the seventy-seven minae, the profits of the factory, the cost of maintenance of the men must be deducted, for Therippides expended for this seven minae a year, and I admit having received thus much. Thus they expended on our behalf in the ten years seventy minae for maintenance; to this I add the balance, seven hundred drachmae, and thus credit them with a larger expenditure than they do themselves. There must also be deducted from the eight talents and more the sum they handed over to me when I came of age, and the taxes which they have paid to the state. [37] The defendant and Therippides paid me thirty-one minae, and they compute that they have paid eighteen minae in taxes. I will go beyond them and will make this sum thirty minae, that they may have not a word to say in protest. Well, then, if you take away one talent from the eight, seven are left, which, according to their own admissions of receipts, they must necessarily have in their possession. This sum, then, even if they rob me of everything else and deny that they have it, they ought at least to have paid me, seeing that they admit having received it from my estate. [38] But what is it that they do? They report no return in interest for this money, and tell me that they have expended the entire principal together with the seventy-seven minae; and Demophon has, moreover, actually set me down as indebted to him. Is not this absolute and barefaced effrontery? Is it not the very excess of outrageous rapacity? What is the meaning of outrageous, if matters pushed to this extreme are not to be so called? [39] The defendant, then, for his own part, since he admits having received one hundred and eight minae, has in his possession these and the interest on them for ten years, in all about three talents and one thousand drachmae.

In proof that what I say is true—that each one of them in the account of his guardianship admits that he has received the money, but claims to have spent it all—take the depositions and read them.“ Depositions ” [40]

I think, men of the jury, that you have now been fully informed regarding the theft and wrongdoings of each of these men. You would, however, have had more exact knowledge of the matter, if they had been willing to give up to me the will which my father left; for it contained （so my mother tells me） a statement of all the property that my father left, along with instructions regarding the funds from which these men were to take what had been given them, and regarding the letting of the property. [41] But as it is, on my demanding it, they admit that there was a will, but they do not produce it; and they take this course because they do not want to make known the amount of the property which was left, and which they have embezzled, and to the end that they may not appear to have received their legacies—as though they would not easily be convicted by the facts themselves.

Take now, and read them the evidence of those in whose presence they made their answers.“ Depositions ” [42]

This man19 declares that a will was made and testifies that in it the two talents were given to Demophon, and the eighty minae to Aphobus; but he declares there was no additional clause regarding the seventy minae which Therippides received, or regarding the amount of the property bequeathed, or instructions as to the letting of it; for it was not to his interest to make these further admissions.

Now take the answer of the defendant.“ Deposition ” [43]

He also declares that the will was made, and that the money accruing from the copper and the gall was duly paid to Therippides, which Therippides denies; and that the two talents were paid to Demophon; but in regard to the money given to himself, while he admits that the clause was written in the will, he declares that he did not assent to it, in order that he may not appear to have received it. But as to the amount of the estate he, too, reveals absolutely nothing, nor as to letting the property. For it was not to his interest either to make these further admissions. [44] The amount of the property that was left is, however, none the less clear （though these men seek to conceal it） from the terms of the will, in accordance with which they state that such large sums were given to them severally. When a man out of four talents and three thousand drachmae has given to two of these men three talents and two thousand drachmae as marriage-portions, and to the third the interest on seventy minae, it is clear, I fancy, that he took these sums, not from a small estate, but from one bequeathed to me of more than double this amount. [45] For, I take it, he would not wish to leave me, his son, in poverty, and be eager further to enrich these men, who were already wealthy. No; it was because of the size of the estate left to me that he gave to Therippides the interest on a sum so considerable, and to Demophon that on the two talents—though he was not yet to marry my sister—in order to accomplish one or the other of two ends: either he would by his gifts encourage them to act the more honorably in the guardianship, or, if they should prove dishonest, they would meet with no leniency at your hands, seeing that, after being so liberally treated, they sinned so grievously against us. [46] Well now, the defendant, who in addition to my mother's marriage-portion has taken the female servants, and has lived in the house, when it becomes necessary to render an account of these matters, says he is busy with his own affairs; and he has come to such a pitch of rapaciousness, that he has even cheated my instructors of their fees, and has left unpaid some of the taxes, although he charges me with the amounts.

Take these depositions too, and read them to the jury.“ Depositions ” [47]

How could one show more clearly that he has made havoc of the whole estate, sparing nothing, however small, than by proving, as I have done by so many witnesses and proofs, that he admitted having received the marriage-portion, and that he acknowledged in writing to the guardians that he had it; that he enjoyed the profits of the factory, but makes report of none; [48] that of our other effects he has sold some without paying to us the proceeds, while others he has taken to himself and hidden; that according to the account which he has himself rendered, he has embezzled large sums; that in addition to all this he has made away with the will, sold the slaves, and in all other respects has administered the estate as not even the bitterest enemies would have done? I do not see how anyone could prove the matter more clearly. [49]

He had the audacity to say before the arbitrator20 that he had paid many debts for me out of the estate to Demophon and Therippides, his fellow-guardians, and that they received a large part of my property, yet neither of these facts was he able to prove. He did not show by the books that my father left me in debt, nor has he brought forward as witnesses the men whom he says he paid; nor, again, is the amount of money which he charged against his fellow-guardians equal to the amount which he is shown to have received himself. On the contrary, it is much less. [50] When the arbitrator questioned him about each of these matters, and asked him whether he had managed his own estate from the interest or had spent the principal, and whether,if he had been under guardianship, he would have accepted an account of this sort from his guardians or would have demanded that the money be duly paid to him with the accrued interest, he made no answer to these questions, but tendered me a challenge21 to the effect that he was ready to show that my property was worth ten talents, and said that, if it fell short of this amount, he would himself make up the difference. [51] When I bade him prove this to the arbitrator, he did not do so, nor did he show that his fellow-guardians had paid me （for if he had, the arbitrator would not have given judgement against him）; but he put in a piece of evidence22 of a sort regarding which he will try to find something to say.

If even now he still tries to assert that I am in possession of property, ask him who handed it over to me, and demand that he produce witnesses to prove each statement. [52] If he declares that it is my possession in this sense, that he reckons up what is in the hands of either of the trustees, it will be clear that he accounts for only a third part, and still does not prove that I have possession of it. For as I have convicted the defendant of having in his possession the large amount I have stated, I shall also prove that each of them has not less than he. This statement, therefore, will not help him. No; he must show that either he or his fellow-trustees really handed the money over to me. If he fails to prove this, why should you pay any attention to his challenge? He still does not prove that I have the money. [53]

Being sorely at a loss to explain any of these matters before the arbitrator, and being convicted on each point, just as he is now before you, he had the audacity to make an outrageously false statement, to the effect that my father left me four talents buried in the ground, and that he had put my mother in charge of them. He made this statement in order that, if I should assume that he would repeat it here, I might waste my time in refuting it, when I ought to be preferring the rest of my charges against him; or if I should pass it over, not expecting him to repeat it, then he himself might now bring it up, in the hope that I, by seeming to be rich, might meet with less compassion from you. [54] Yet he who dared to make such a statement put in no evidence to prove it, but relied on his bare word, as though you would lightly give him credence. When one asks him upon what he has spent so much of my money, he says he has paid debts for me, and so represents me as poor; yet, when it pleases him, he makes me rich, as it seems, seeing that my father left such a sum of money in the house. It is easy to see, however, from many considerations that he is lying, and that there is no basis of fact in this story. [55] For if my father had no confidence in these men, it is plain that he would neither have entrusted to them the rest of his property, nor, if he had left this money in the way alleged, would he have told them of it. It would have been the height of madness to tell them of hidden treasure, when he was not going to make them trustees even of his visible property. But if he had confidence in them, he would not, I take it, have given into their hands the bulk of his property, and not have put them in control of this. Nor would he have entrusted this remainder to my mother to keep, and then have given her herself in marriage to this man who was one of the guardians. For it is not reasonable that he should seek to secure the money through my mother, and yet to put one of the men whom he distrusted in control both of her and of it. [56] Furthermore, if there were any truth in all this, do you suppose Aphobus would not have taken my mother to wife, bequeathed to him as she was by my father? He had already taken her marriage-portion—the eighty minae—as though he were going to marry her; but he subsequently married the daughter of Philonides of Melite23 But if there had been four talents in the house and in her custody, as he alleges, don't you imagine he would have raced to get possession both of her and of them? [57] Would he have joined with his co-trustees in so shamefully plundering my visible property, which many of you knew had been left me, and have refrained, when he had the chance, from seizing a fund to the evidence of which you would not be able to testify? Who can believe this? It is impossible, men of the jury; it is impossible. No; my father entrusted to these men all the property which he left, and the defendant will tell this story, that I may meet with less compassion from you. [58]

I have many other charges to make against him, but summing them all up in one, I will break down every defence of his. He could have avoided all this trouble, had he let the estate in accordance with these laws.

Take the laws and read them.“ Laws ”

In the case of Antidorus, as a result of his property having been let in accordance with these laws, there was given over to him, at the end of six years, an estate of six talents and more from an original amount of three talents and three thousand drachmae; and this some of you have seen with your own eyes; for Theogenes of Probalinthus,24 who leased the estate, counted out that sum in the market-place. [59] But in my case, fourteen talents in ten years, when consideration is given to the time and the terms of his lease, ought to have been more than trebled. Ask him why he did not do this. If he declares that it was better not to let the estate, let him show, not that it has been doubled or trebled, but that the mere principal has been paid back to me in full. But if out of fourteen talents they have handed over to me not even seventy minae, and one of them has actually recorded me as in his debt, how can it be right to accept any word they say? It is surely impossible. [60]

Seeing that the fortune left me was of so great value, as you heard at the beginning, the third part of it bringing in an income of fifty minae, these men, albeit insatiate in their greed, even if they refused to let the property, might out of this income and leaving the principal untouched, have maintained us, paid the taxes to the state, and saved the residue. [61] The rest of the estate—an amount twice as large—they might have invested profitably, and, if greedy for money, have taken a reasonable amount for themselves, and have increased my estate from the income, besides keeping the principal intact. Yet they did nothing of the sort. Instead, by selling to one another the most valuable of the slaves and by absolutely doing away with the rest, they destroyed the existing source of my income and secured a considerable one for themselves at my cost. [62] Having taken all the rest thus shamefully, they unite in maintaining that more than half of my property was never left to me at all. They have rendered an account as though the estate were one of five talents only; they do not produce the principal, though reporting no income from it, but have the impudence to tell me that the capital itself has been expended. And for this audacity they feel no shame! [63] What, pray, would have been my plight, if I had continued longer as their ward? They would have hard work to tell. For when, after the lapse of ten years, I have recovered so little from two of these men, and by the third am even set down as a debtor, have I not good ground for indignation? Nay, it is wholly clear. If I had been left an orphan of a year old, and had been six years longer under their guardianship, I should never have recovered even the pitiful amounts I now have. For, if the expenditures they have made were justifiable, the sums they have handed over to me would not have lasted six years, but they would either have had to support me themselves or to have let me perish from hunger. [64] Yet is it not an outrage, if estates left to others of a value of one or two talents have as a result of letting been doubled or trebled, so that the owners have been called upon for state services,25 while mine, which has been wont to equip triremes and to make large contributions in taxes, will be unable to contribute even small sums thanks to the shameless acts of these men? What words are gross enough to describe their conduct? They have done away with the will, thinking to avoid discovery, their own estates they have administered from the income, and have greatly increased their capital by drawing upon my funds, while, as for my own estate, they have destroyed my entire capital, as if in requital for some grievous wrong we had done them. [65] You, on your part, do not act thus even toward those who sin against you: when you give judgement against any of them, you do not take away all that they have, but in pity for their wives and children you leave something even to these. But these men are so different from you that, although they had received legacies from us to make them administer their trust faithfully, they have done us these outrageous wrongs. They felt no touch of shame for their ruthlessness toward my sister, who, though my father left two talents as the dowry due her, will now get no fitting portion. Nay, they have recked nothing of kinship, as though they had been left to us, not as friends and kinsfolk, but as bitterest enemies. [66]

For myself, I am the most wretched of men. I am helpless both to give my sister a portion and to maintain myself. Besides this, the state is pressing me hard, demanding taxes, and with right, for my father left me an estate large enough to pay them; but these men have taken all the money left me. [67] And now, in seeking to recover what is mine, I have come into the greatest peril; for if the defendant is acquitted （which heaven forbid!） I shall have to pay one-sixth of the damages,26 one hundred minae. The defendant, if you give judgement against him, will be liable for a sum to be determined, and will make payment, not out of his own funds, but out of mine; while in my case the sum is fixed, so that I shall not only have been robbed of my inheritance, but shall also lose my civic rights, unless you now take pity on me. [68] I beg you, therefore, men of the jury, I entreat, I implore you, to remember the laws and the oaths which you took as jurors, to render me the aid that is my due, and not to count the pleas of this man of higher worth than mine. It is your duty to show pity, not toward the guilty, but toward those in unmerited misfortune; not upon those who so cruelly rob another of his goods, but upon me, who have for so long a time been deprived of my inheritance and treated with outrage by these men, and who am now in danger of losing my civic rights. [69] Loudly methinks, would my father groan, should he learn that I, his son, am in danger of being forced to pay the sixth part of the marriage-portions and legacies given by himself to these men; and that, while others of our countrymen out of their own funds have dowered the daughters of impoverished kinsfolk and even friends, Aphobus refuses to pay back even the marriage-portion which he took, and that too in the tenth year.

1 Paeania was a deme of the tribe Pandionis.

2 At Athens a youth, on reaching the age of eighteen, was, after an official examination （δοκιμασία）, duly entered on the list of the members of his tribe, and assumed the status and the duties of a citizen.

3 Each of the ten Athenian tribes selected one hundred and twenty men as their richest members. These twelve hundred men were divided into twenty groups of sixty each （called συμμορίαι）, and from them certain men were designated to bear the burdens of public service （the treirarchy, choregia, etc.） and of the special property-tax imposed in time of need.

4 This was a tax of 20 percent of the man's entire property, and was the maximum.

5 Timotheus was one of the leading citizens of Athens. His father, Conon, was the famous general who in 395 had destroyed the Lacedemonian fleet at Cnidos.

6 These words were addressed to the clerk of the court.

7 A drachma, that is, on each mina. This （12 percent） was the normal rate of interest on well-secured loans.

8 In mercantile affairs the Greeks often preferred to reckon in thousands of drachmae instead of tens of minae.

9 This was obtained from the oak-apple and was used for staining wood or ivory.

10 Strictly, thirteen talents and forty-six minae; see the Introduction.

11 Literally, “water,” the time allotted to each speaker being measured by a water-clock.

12 That is, in command of a trireme which he had himself equipped for service.

13 Leuconion, or Leuconoe, was a deme of the tribe Loentis.

14 That is, at 18 percent.

15 That is, at 12 percent, instead of 18 percent, which was normal in the case of marriage-portions.

16 The ἔρανος, originally a meal to which each contributed his due portion, came not unnaturally to mean a “club” to which each member contributed, and from which he could claim help, if need arose. Then it was also used, as here, of the “contribution” or better, the “loan,” made to such members.

17 Strictly, two talents and forty minae. See the table on p. 11.

18 That is, at 12 percent, as above. Demosthenes is liberal indeed in his allowances. The entire sum of seventy-seven minae is crossed off as balanced by expenditures; the interest on four talents for ten years is set down as four talents forty minae, instead of four talents forty-eight minae, so that the total amount becomes eight talents and forty minae. From this there are deducted the moneys paid to him （thirty-one minae） and those paid in taxes （set down as thirty minae, instead of eighteen） and the balance （roughly, eight talents less one talent）, is reckoned as seven talents.

19 “This man” appears to refer to Therippides.

20 The public arbitrators at Athens were chosen from a body of citizens of advanced age. To one or another of these men （selected by lot） the magistrate would refer civil cases before trial in hopes of bringing about a settlement of the points at issue out of court.

21 The challenge was often used in Athenian lawsuits. Here Aphobus virtually offers Demosthenes a compromise, fixing the value of the estate at ten talents instead of thirty. Sometimes the challenger “dares” his opponent to give an oath, or to offer a slave for torture.

22 The speaker would have the jury think that the bit of evidence in question is unworthy of further notice.

23 Melite was a deme of the tribe Cecropis.

24 Probalinthus was a deme of the tribe Pandionis.

25 That is, they have been classed among the wealthy citizens. See note a on Dem. 27.7, above.

26 The plaintiff in a private suit who was so far from being able to prove his case that he did not receive a fifth part of the votes, was subject to a fine of one-sixth of the damages claimed （an obol for each drachma）. Failure to pay entailed the loss of civic rights. Compare Dem. 28.18, end. In the case of Aphobus, the amount for which he would be held liable, if he lost suit, would be fixed by the court.

Of the many outrageous lies which Aphobus uttered in his address to you, I shall try to refute first, that one at which I felt greater indignation than at anything else he said. For he declared that my grandfather was a debtor to the state, and that for this reason my father would not have the property let, for fear of the risks he would run.1 This is the pretence he uses; but he brought forward no proof that my grandfather died indebted to the state. He did introduce evidence that he became a state-debtor, but he waited until the last day,2 and kept this evidence for his second speech, thinking that by it he would be able to give a malicious turn to the matter. So, if he reads it, give close heed. [2] For you will find that the evidence adduced proves not that my grandfather is a state-debtor, but that he was one. I shall undertake first to refute this charge of which he thinks to make so much, and which we declare to be false. If I had been able to do so, and had not been thus ensnared by lack of time, I should have brought forward witnesses to prove that the money was paid in full, and that everything was settled between my grandfather and the state; as it is, I shall show by strong proofs that he was not indebted at the time of his death, and that we incurred no risks in letting our wealth be known. [3]

In the first place Demochares, who married my mother's sister, a daughter of Gylon, has not concealed his property, but acts as choregus and as trierarch, and performs other public services, without any fear of such consequences. In the second place, my father voluntarily revealed the rest of his property, and in particular the four talents and three thousand drachmae, which these men by their accusations against one another admit to have been mentioned in the will, and to have been received by them. [4] Furthermore, Aphobus himself in conjunction with his co-trustees revealed to the state the amount of the property left me, when he appointed me leader of the tax-group and that at no low rating, but at one so high as to entail a payment of five hundred drachmae on each twenty-five minae.3 And yet, if there were any truth in what he says, he would not have acted thus, but would have taken every precaution. But, as it is, Demochares, and my father, and these men themselves have manifestly let their wealth be known; they plainly feared no such risk as that of which he speaks. [5]

Strangest of all is it that, though they allege that my father would not permit them to let the property, they should never produce this will from which one could have learned the truth, and that having destroyed so important a piece of evidence, they should expect you to believe them on their mere word. It was their duty on the contrary, as soon as my father died, to call in a number of witnesses and to bid them seal the will, so that, in case any dispute should arise, it would have been possible to refer to the writing itself, and so learn the whole truth. [6] But, as it is, they thought proper to have some other papers sealed, in which many items of the property left were not inscribed—papers which were mere memoranda; but the will itself, which gave them possession of the papers to which they affixed their seals, and all the rest of the property, and which acquitted them of all responsibility for not letting the estate, they did not seal, nor yet produce. You ought presumably to believe them in anything they say about this matter. [7]

I, for my part, cannot understand what it is they mean. My father, they say, would not suffer them to let the estate, or to disclose the value of the property. To me, do you mean, or to the state? Quite the contrary: you have plainly disclosed it to the state, but have hidden it absolutely from me. You have not even revealed the fund which was the basis for your assessment in the payment of the property-tax. Show me this fund. What was it? Where did you deliver it over to me, and in whose presence? [8] Of the four talents and three thousand drachmae, you received the two talents and eighty minae, so that you did not include even these in the return you made on my behalf to the public treasury; for at that time they were your property. But the house and the fourteen slaves and the thirty minae which you gave over into my hands, could not have been assessed at any such sum as that which you agreed to pay to the tax-group. [9] Nay; it is absolutely certain that the property left by my father was much more than this, and that it is all in your possession. It is because you are plainly proved to have made havoc of it that you have the audacity to make up such falsehoods. Sometimes you refer the responsibility to one another; again you mutually accuse one another of having received funds; you claim to have received but little, yet you have made reports of large expenditures. [10] You have acted jointly as my guardians, but thereafter you scheme each one for himself. The will from which we could have learned the truth about everything you have made to disappear; and it appears that you are never in agreement when you speak of one another.

Take the depositions and read them all in turn to the jury, that they may bear in mind the testimony that has been brought and the statements that have been made, and so reach a more correct decision.“ Depositions ” [11]

There you have the assessment to which these men consented in my name, placing my estate in the class of those possessing fifteen talents, whereas the property which the three together have handed over to me is not worth seventy minae.

Read the next.“ Depositions ”

This dowry, his possession of which is proved by the testimony of the trustees and of others to whom he confessed that he had received it, he has never paid back, nor has he furnished maintenance.

Take the others and read them.“ Depositions ” [12]

For two years he conducted the business of the factory and paid to Therippides the hire of the slaves, but to me, though he took the profits for two years, amounting to thirty minae, he has turned over neither that sum nor the interest upon it.

Take and read the next.“ Deposition ”

These slaves the defendant took to himself, together with all the other things given to us as surety with them. He has reckoned up so heavy an outlay for their maintenance, but absolutely nothing as profit from them; and the men themselves he has made to vanish, though they brought in a clear profit of twelve minae each year.

Read the next.“ Deposition ” [13]

After selling this ivory and iron, he declares that none had been left me, but tries to defraud me of the value of these articles also, about a talent.

Read these.“ Depositions ”

These three talents and one thousand drachmae he has in his hands besides the rest—five talents of capital of which he has taken possession. Adding the interest, if one reckons it at a drachma a month only, he holds more than ten talents.

Read the next ones.“ Depositions ” [14]

That these items were written in the will, and were received by them, is proved by their testimony against one another. But Aphobus, though admitting that he was sent for by my father, and though he came to the house, declares that he did not come into the presence of my father, who had sent for him, nor enter into any agreement in regard to these matters, but merely heard Demophon read a document and Therippides say that my father made these arrangements; whereas in fact he was the first to go in and had agreed with my father to carry out in all respects precisely what he wrote in his will. [15] For my father, men of the jury, when he saw that he was not to recover from his sickness, called together these three men, and causing his brother Demon to sit with them by his side, placed our persons in their hands, calling us a sacred deposit. My sister he gave to Demophon with a dowry of two talents to be paid at once, and betrothed her to him in marriage; me, together with my property, he committed to the care of them all in common, charging them to let the property, and by their joint efforts to preserve the estate for me. [16] At the same time he gave to Therippides the seventy minae, and betrothed my mother to the defendant with her portion of eighty minae, and placed me on his knees. To all this Aphobus, the most impious of men, has paid no heed, although these were the terms upon which he became possessed of my estate. Nay, after joining with his co-trustees in robbing me of everything, he will now claim your compassion, although what he with the two others has paid back to me does not amount even to seventy minae, and even this he is plotting to get back again. [17] For when I was on the point of instituting this suit against them they attacked me by having an exchange of estates tendered me,4 in order that, if I accepted it, I might not be allowed to pursue my action against them,5 since （they thought） this suit would then belong to the one tendering the exchange; and if I did not do so, I might undertake the service with slender means, and so be absolutely ruined. In this matter Thrasylochus of Anagyrus6 was their tool. I, with no thought of the consequences, accepted the exchange with him, but excluded him from the premises hoping to win a court decision,7 but, failing of this, and being hard pressed for time, rather than be forced to give up my suit, I mortgaged my house and all my property, and paid the cost of the service in question,8 being eager to bring before you my suit against these men. [18]

Is not the wrong I have suffered from the beginning great indeed, and great the harm they are striving to do me now, because I seek to obtain redress? Who of you would not rightly feel indignation against this man and pity for me, seeing that to the estate of more than ten talents which he inherited there has been added my own of such considerable size, while I have not only been defrauded of my inheritance, but am by the rascality of these men being robbed even of what they have now repaid me? To what are we to turn, if you give a different decision regarding them? To the goods mortgaged to our creditors? But they belong to the holders of the mortgage. To what is left after the creditors are paid? But that becomes the property of the defendant, if you condemn me to pay an obol on each drachma.9 [19] Do not, men of the jury, be to us the cause of such deep distress; do not allow my mother, my sister and myself to suffer undeserved misfortunes. It was not to prospects such as these that my father left us. Nay, my sister was to be the wife of Demophon with a dowry of two talents, my mother the wife of this most ruthless of all men with a dowry of eighty minae, and I as my father's successor was to perform state services as he had done. [20] Succor us, then, succor us, for the sake of justice, for your own sakes, for ours, and for my dead father's sake. Save us; have compassion on us since these, our relatives, have felt no compassion. It is to you that we have fled for protection. I beseech you, I implore you by your children, by your wives, by all the good things you possess. So may heaven give you joy of them, do not look upon me with indifference nor cause my mother, deprived of the hopes in life that are left her, to suffer a lot unworthy of her. [21] She now thinks that she is to welcome me home after I have won a just verdict from you, and that my sister will not be portionless. But, if you decide adversely （which may heaven forfend） what, think you, will be her anguish of soul when she sees me not only robbed of my patrimony, but disenfranchised as well, and has no hope that my sister will find an establishment that befits her station because of the poverty that will be ours? [22] I have not deserved, men of the jury, to fail of justice at your hands, nor has Aphobus deserved that he should retain all the money that he has wrongfully taken. Regarding myself, even though you have as yet had no experience to prove what manner of man I am in my relations to you, yet it is fair to expect that I shall not be worse than my father; but of this man you have had experience, and you know well that, though he inherited a large estate, he has shown no generosity toward you, but has been proven to be a defrauder of others. [23]

Look, then, to this, and bear in mind the other facts; and then cast your vote on the side of justice. You have evidence that is adequate, evidence from witnesses, from depositions, from probabilities, from the statements of these men themselves who acknowledge that they took possession of my entire estate. They say they have spent it, but they have not spent it; they have it all in their own possession. [24]

All these things should be in your minds, and you should show some consideration for us, knowing that, if I recover my property through your aid, I shall naturally be ready to undertake public services, being grateful to you for rightfully restoring to me my estate; while this fellow, if you make him master of my goods, will do nothing of the kind. Do not imagine that he will be ready to undertake public services for you on behalf of property which he denies having received. Nay; he will conceal it rather, that it may appear that he was justly acquitted.

1 The property would be let at a public hearing before the Archon, and its value could not be concealed. If, therefore, the elder Demosthenes, as the heir of Gylon, was indebted to the state, the property might be confiscated to satisfy the debt.

2 All documents, citations of statutes, etc., pertaining to the case had to be submitted in written form before the suit was called. They were then sealed in a box （ἐχῖνος）, which might not be opened until the documents in question were wanted in the trial. By waiting until the last day to file this particular bit of evidence Aphobus prevented Demosthenes from filing any documents to combat it. The latter was therefore “ensnared by lack of time” （Dem. 28.2）.

3 See Dem. 27.7, with the notes.

4 See note in the introduction to Dem. 27.

5 That is, they hoped that the exchange of properties, if carried out, would transfer to Thrasylochus also the claims of Demosthenes against them, and so debar the latter from taking further action.

6 Thrasylochus was the brother of the Meidias against whom Demosthenes brought action for assault （see Dem. 21）. Anagyrus was a deme of the tribe Erectheis.

7 If the exchange of properties was accepted, either party had the right to enter and search the house and land of each other. Demosthenes denies this right to Thrasylochus, hoping that he might win a decision from the generals, before whom such cases were heard, as to whether or not his claim against his guardians would pass to Thrasylochus together with his visible property. From the oration against Meidias we learn that Meidias and Thrasylochus came jointly to Demosthenes' house, and with great violence forced themselves even into the women's apartments before they were finally ejected.

8 The service was the trierarchy, and the cost entailed amounted to twenty minae.

9 See note on Dem. 27.67. The entire property of the plaintiff would be exhausted in payment of the damages imposed.

If I were not conscious, men of the jury, that in a former suit against Aphobus I had readily （so absolutely manifest were his wrongdoings） convicted him of lies greater and more outrageous than these which he now utters, I should have grave doubts of my ability to show how he seeks to lead you astray in regard to each one of them. As it is, however （be it said with the favor of heaven）, if you prove fair and impartial hearers, I have strong hopes that you will become as fully aware of the shamelessness of this man as were the jurors in the former trial. If the case required eloquence or cleverness I should shrink through distrust of my youth; but, as matters are, I need merely point out and rehearse to you what the plaintiff's conduct toward us has been. From this it will be easy, I think, for all of you to determine which of us is the villain. [2]

I know that the plaintiff has instituted this suit, not because he believes he can convict anyone of having borne false witness against him, but because he thinks that the large amount of damages which he was condemned to pay will give rise to a feeling of prejudice against me, and of compassion toward himself. For this reason he is now seeking to defend himself against charges made in a suit that has already been decided, regarding which he had at the time no reasonable defence to make. I, for my part, men of the jury, if I had proceeded to execute the judgement against him and had been unwilling to make any reasonable concession, should even so have done no wrong in exacting the damages awarded by your decision; but for all that it might have been said that I had shown undue ruthlessness and enmity toward a man who is a relative in depriving him of all his property. [3] But, as it is, the precise contrary is the truth. This man with his co-trustees has robbed me of my entire patrimony, and, even after being clearly convicted in your court, he does not consider himself obliged to do anything reasonable. On the contrary he has dispersed his property, giving his farm-buildings to Aesius and his farm to Onetor, against whom he has forced me to engage in a troublesome lawsuit. He himself stripped the house of its furniture, took away the slaves, destroyed the wine-vat, tore off the doors, and all but set fire to the house itself; then he made off to Megara, where he has settled and paid the alien's tax. You would, therefore, with better ground loathe this man for deeds like these, than judge me guilty of undue severity. [4]

Regarding the rapacity and vile character of the plaintiff I purpose to speak at length before you later on, though what you have even now heard gives you a fair idea of it. But I shall now undertake to show you, that the testimony which has been given, about which you are going to cast your votes, is true. But one request I make of you, men of the jury, and it is a reasonable one—that you will give us both a fair hearing. This is as much in your interest as in mine, for the more accurate your knowledge of the facts, the more just and in harmony with your oaths will be the vote you will cast regarding them. [5] I shall show that Aphobus has not only acknowledged Milyas to be a freeman, but has even proved it by his actions; that, furthermore, about this matter he has declined the absolutely sure test by torture,1 and does not wish to have the truth brought to light that on the contrary he has recourse to trickery, brings forward false witnesses, and by his own words distorts the truth regarding what has taken place. So strong and so plain is the evidence by which I shall prove these statements that you will all see clearly that it is I who am speaking the truth, and that he has uttered not a word worthy of credence. I shall begin at a point which will make it easiest for you to learn the facts, and for me to instruct you regarding them in the briefest time. [6]

I instituted suit, men of the jury, against Demophon, Therippides and the plaintiff for breach of trust in their guardianship, for I had been defrauded by them of all my inheritance. When my suit against Aphobus in the first instance came up for trial, I proved clearly to the jury, as I shall prove to you, that he, in conjunction with the others, had robbed me of all the property that had been left me; and I relied upon no false testimony. [7] Here is a clear proof of this. A host of depositions was read at the trial, some of the deponents declaring that they had given to the plaintiff property of mine, others that he had received such property in their presence, still others that they had purchased goods from him, and paid him the price; yet he has charged not a single one of these with bearing false testimony. He has dared to attack this one piece of testimony, and it alone, although in it he cannot show that there was mention even of one single drachma. [8] And yet for the computation of the sums of which I had been robbed, I relied not so much on this man's testimony, for there was no mention of money in it, but on the several statements of the others, against whom the plaintiff has made no charges. Therefore the jurymen who at that time heard my plea, not only found him guilty, but fixed the damages at the full amount stated in my complaint. Why was it, then, that he passed over the other witnesses and sued the defendant alone? I will tell you. [9] In regard to all the witnesses who testified that he had received the money, he knew that the more discussion there should be over each separate point, the more convincingly would he be convicted of possessing it, and this was bound to be the case in a trial for false witness; for the accusations which I then made along with all the others in a small part of the time allotted me, I should now discuss severally and in detail in the time of an entire speech; [10] whereas, if he attacked an answer given, he thought that as he had made an admission before, so now it would be in his power to make a denial.2 That is the reason why he attacks the testimony of this witness, the truth of whose testimony I mean to prove conclusively to you all, not on the basis of probabilities, or of arguments made up to fit the occasion, but by reasoning which, I am sure, will approve itself to you all as just and fair. Listen, and judge. [11]

I knew, men of the jury, that I should find the whole contest centring about the deposition inserted in the record, and that it would be regarding the truth or falsehood of this that you would cast your votes, and I therefore determined that the first step for me to take was to offer Aphobus a challenge. What, then, did I do? I offered to surrender to him for examination by torture a slave who knew how to read and write, and who had been present when Aphobus made the admission in question, and who wrote down the statement of the witness. This man had been ordered by me not to use any fraud or trickery, nor to write down some and suppress others of the statements made by the plaintiff regarding the matters at issue, but simply to write the absolute truth, and what Aphobus actually said. [12] What better opportunity could he have had of convicting us of falsehood than by putting my slave to torture? But Aphobus knew better than anyone else that the slave had borne true testimony, and therefore he declined the test. And in truth it is not one or two only who know these facts; the challenge was not made in secret, but in the midst of the agora where many were present.

Call, please, the witnesses to these facts.“ Witnesses ” [13]

The fellow is so cunning, and so ready to pretend ignorance of what is right, that, although he is pressing a suit for false witness, and although you are to cast your votes regarding this, and have sworn so to do, he refused the proffered examination by torture in regard to the testimony （the point to which he should have devoted his argument）, and declares that he requires the slave to be given up for testing in regard to other matters. In this he is lying. [14] Is it not indeed monstrous that he should claim that he is being outrageously treated by my refusal of his demand to have delivered to him for torture a freeman （for such I shall conclusively prove Milyas to be）, and should not consider that my witnesses are being outrageously treated, when I offer him one who is admittedly a slave, to be tested by torture regarding their testimony, and he refuses? For he surely cannot maintain this, that for some matters, which he himself desires, torture is a certain test, and for others not. [15]

Furthermore, men of the jury, the first witness to give this testimony was Aesius, the brother of the plaintiff. He now denies it, because he has allied himself in the suit with Aphobus; but at that time he gave this testimony along with the other witnesses, for he had no desire to perjure himself, or to suffer the penalty which would straightway follow. Surely now, if I had been getting up false testimony, I should not have put this man in my list of witnesses, seeing that he was more intimate with Aphobus than with anyone else in the world, and knowing that he was going to plead for him in the suit, and that he was an adversary of my own. It is not reasonable that one should call as witness to a false statement one who is an opponent of his own, and a brother of his adversary. [16] I have many witnesses to these facts, and circumstantial proofs no fewer in number than the witnesses. In the first place, if he did not in very truth give this testimony, he would not be denying it now, but would have done so at once in the courtroom, when the deposition was read, for it would have answered his purpose better then than now. In the second place Aesius would not have kept quiet, but would have sued me for damages, if without cause I had made him liable to a charge of bearing false witness against his brother, a charge on which men run the risk both of damages in money and the loss of citizenship. [17] Again, in seeking to bring the truth of the matter to light, he would have demanded of me the slave who wrote the depositions, in order that, if I refused to give him up, I might seem to have no just ground for my statements. But, as it is, so far from doing anything of the sort, he refused to accept the slave for torture, when I, on his denial that he had given the evidence, offered him. So plain is it that regarding this matter too both he and Aphobus as well were alike unwilling to have recourse to torture. [18]

To prove that my words are true, that after Aesius had given his testimony with the other witnesses, he made no denial of the fact, when, standing by the plaintiff's side in the courtroom, he heard the deposition read, and that, when I offered the slave to them to be questioned by torture regarding all these matters, he refused to accept the offer—regarding each of these points severally I shall produce witnesses. Please call them here.“ Witnesses ” [19]

I wish now to set forth to you, men of the jury, what I consider a stronger proof than all those that have been mentioned, to show that the plaintiff did give this answer. When, despite the admissions which he is proved to have made, he demanded of me Milyas for torture, I was so eager to show on the spot that this, too, was a subterfuge on his part, that what do you think I did? [20] I summoned Aphobus to give evidence against Demo, his uncle and a partner in his crimes. I wrote out the testimony which he now attacks as false and ordered him to make a deposition to it. At first he brazenly refused, but when the arbitrator bade him depose, or deny the fact under oath, he deposed, sorely against his will. And yet if the man was a slave, and had not been already admitted by Aphobus here to be free, what in the world induced him to make this deposition? Why did he not deny it on oath, and so get free of the affair? [21] Pray note that in regard to this matter also I was ready to give over to him for torture the slave who had written the deposition, who would know his own handwriting, and who clearly remembered that Aphobus had made the deposition. I was ready to do this, not for want of witnesses who were present, for there were some; but in order that he might not accuse these men of giving false testimony, and that the result of the torture might support them. Yet it is not fair to condemn the witnesses on his account. They alone of men who have as yet stood trial before you can show that the plaintiff himself has borne witness to their testimony as to these matters.

To prove that I am speaking the truth, take the challenge and the deposition.“ Challenge ”“ Deposition ” [22]

Such are the legal tests which he has refused, and so numerous the proofs by which he is shown to be acting with malice and insincerity; yet he demands that you put credence in his own witnesses, and he slanders mine, and declares that their testimony is false.

I wish now to speak of the matter on the basis of probabilities. I am certain that you would all agree that those who give false testimony are led to do so by bribes through stress of poverty, or by friendship, or else by enmity toward the opposite party in the suit. [23] Now no one of these reasons would have led the men to testify in my favor. Not friendship; how could that be, seeing that they are not engaged in the same pursuits, nor are they of like age, I will not say with me, but with one another? Not enmity against my adversary, that is plain; for one of them is his brother and pleads on his side; Phanus is a close friend and a member of the same tribe; and Philip is neither friend nor enemy, so that this motive, too, cannot be justly charged against them. [24] Furthermore, no one could say that poverty was the ground, for they all possess means so ample that they willingly assume the expense of public services, and discharge whatever duties are laid upon them. Besides all this, they are well known to you, and you know nothing to their discredit; for they are worthy citizens. Yet, if they are not poor, nor enemies of the plaintiff, nor friends of mine, how can it be right to suspect them of bearing false witness? I certainly do not know. [25]

My opponent was aware of all this, and knew better than anybody else that their testimony was true, but nonetheless he brings forward a malicious charge against them, and not only declares that he did not make the statement which I have proved in the most conclusive manner that he did make, but even asserts that the man, Milyas, is in fact a slave. I wish in a very few words to prove that in this, too, he is lying. I was ready, men of the jury, regarding this point also to give over to him to be tested by torture my female slaves, who remember that my father on his death-bed set this man free. [26] Besides this, my mother was ready to call to her side my sister and myself, and swear, with imprecations on our heads if she spoke falsely—we were her only children, and it was for our sakes that she gave herself up to a life of widowhood—that my father when he was about to die had set this man free, and that Milyas was regarded by us as free thereafter. Let no one of you assume that she would have been willing to make this oath with imprecations on our heads if she had not known well that what she was to swear to was true.

Come now, to prove that I am speaking the truth and that we were ready to do these things, call the witnesses thereto.“ Witnesses ” [27]

So many were the just arguments we had to urge, and so ready were we to have recourse to the most infallible tests regarding the testimony given; and yet the plaintiff evades all these, and fancies that by slandering me regarding the trial which has already taken place, and bringing accusations against me, he can induce you to convict the witness,—a piece of trickery the most unfair and the most rapacious imaginable. [28] For he has himself suborned men to bear false witness about these matters, having as co-workers his brother-in-law Onetor, and Timocrates3; we had no forewarning of this, and supposed that the contest would be regarding the deposition alone, and therefore have not come prepared with witnesses regarding the guardianship accounts. Nevertheless, despite the fellow's trickery, I think that, simply by reciting the facts, I shall easily convince you that no man was ever more justly convicted than he. [29] It was not because I refused to allow Milyas to be put to the torture, nor because he himself admitted the man to be a freeman, nor yet because these witnesses gave their testimony; but because he was proved to have taken possession of large sums belonging to me, and because he did not let the estate, though the laws so ordered and my father had so directed in his will, as I shall plainly show you. For these were things that anyone could see, the laws, namely, and the amount of my property which these men had taken as plunder; but as for Milyas, nobody knew even who he was. You will see from the charges brought against Aphobus that these things are so. [30]

For, men of the jury, when I instituted my suit against him concerning his guardianship, I did not fix the damages at a lump sum, as one bringing forward a baseless charge out of malice would have done, but specified each item, stating the source of each, the precise amount, and the person from whom it had been received. In no case did I add mention of Milyas as having knowledge of any of these matters. [31] Hence this is the beginning of the complaint: “Demosthenes makes the following charges against Aphobus. Aphobus has in his possession moneys of mine, received by him in his capacity as guardian, as follows: eighty minae, which he received as the marriage-portion of my mother in accordance with the terms of my father's will.” This is the first of the sums of which I claim to have been defrauded. Now what was the declaration of the witnesses? “That they were present before the arbitrator, Notharchus, when Aphobus admitted that Milyas was a freeman, having been emancipated by the father of Demosthenes.” [32] Consider now for yourselves whether in your judgement there could be an orator, or sophist or magician so wondrously clever in speaking as by means of this testimony to convince any man on earth that Aphobus is in possession of the marriage-portion of the speaker's mother. What in heaven's name would he say? “Aphobus has admitted that Milyas is a freeman.” And why on that account is he any the more in possession of the marriage-portion? The statement would surely not seem to prove it. [33] But how was it proved? In the first place, Therippides, his co-trustee, testified that he had given him the money. Secondly, Demo, his uncle, and the rest of the witnesses who were present, testified that he agreed to supply my mother with maintenance, as being in possession of her portion. Against these men he has lodged no charges, plainly because he knew that their testimony was true. Besides this, my mother was ready to call to her side my sister and myself, and swear with imprecations on our heads, if she spoke falsely, that Aphobus had received her marriage-portion according to the terms of my father's will. [34] Shall we, then, say, or shall we not, that he has possession of these eighty minae? And was it on the evidence of these witnesses here or of those that he was convicted? I think it was on the evidence of truth. He has enjoyed the interest on this sum for ten years, and even though judgement has been given against him, cannot bring himself to pay it back. Despite this, he declares that he has been outrageously treated and that he lost the suit by reason of these witnesses. Yet not one of them testified that he had received the marriage-portion. [35]

With regard to the maritime loan,4 the sofa-makers, and the iron and the ivory that were left me, and my sister's marriage-portion, at the purloining of which Aphobus connived in order to secure for himself the right to take whatever he pleased of my goods, listen, and see how just was the verdict given against him, and how absurd it would have been to examine Milyas by torture regarding any of these matters. [36]

For as regards the purloining of funds at which you connived there is a law which expressly declares that you are responsible for them exactly as if you had them in your own possession. So what has the law to do with the testing of a slave by torture? But in the matter of the maritime loan you made common cause with Xuthus,5 divided the money with him, and destroyed the contract, and now that you have arranged everything to suit your wish, and have done away with the documentary evidence （as Demo testified against you）, you have recourse to trickery, and endeavor to mislead these gentlemen. [37] Regarding the sofa-makers, if you took money, and made large profits for yourself by making loans on security that was mine—you, who should rather have prevented others from doing so—and finally made away with the slaves altogether, what, pray, can the witnesses do in your behalf? These men at any rate have not testified that you admitted lending money on the security of my slaves, and that you appropriated the slaves to yourself. On the contrary, it was you who acknowledged this in your account, and the witnesses testified to the fact against you. [38]

Now look you, as to the ivory and iron, I have this to say: all the slaves of the household know that the plaintiff used to sell these articles. I am ready now, as I was then, to give over to him any one of these slaves whom he may choose to be examined by torture. If then, he alleges that I refuse to surrender the man who has knowledge of the facts, and offer him others who have no such knowledge, he will but show that he ought all the more to have accepted my offer. For if those whom I offered to him as having knowledge of the facts, declared that he had none of these articles in his possession, he would of course have been acquitted of the charge. [39] But nothing of the sort is the truth. It would have been proved past all question that he had sold the goods, and appropriated the profits. Therefore, he passed over those who were admittedly slaves, and demanded that a freeman be examined by torture, whom it would have been a crime for me to surrender; for it was not his purpose that he should sift out the matter, but that he might make a specious argument out of the fact that his demand was refused.

Regarding, therefore, all these facts, first the marriage-portion, then his connivance with fraud, then all the rest, there shall be read to you the laws and the depositions, that you may have full knowledge.“ Laws ”“ Depositions ” [40]

Not only from the facts already adduced can you see that Aphobus was not in any respect whatever prejudiced by my refusal to give the man up for torture, but also from a consideration of the matter itself. Let us suppose that Milyas is being racked upon the wheel, and consider what Aphobus would most wish him to say. Would it not be that he was not aware that the plaintiff had any of the property in his possession? Well, suppose he says so. Does that prove that the plaintiff has none? Far from it; for I produced men who knew, men who paid him the money, men who were present in person, as witnesses. It is convincing proof, not if one is ignorant that a man has something in his possession （for there might be many such）, but if one knows that he has it. [41] But of the many witnesses who testified against you, what one have you sued for false testimony? Tell us. But you cannot. Yet you plainly convict yourself, and prove that you lie when you declare that you have been outrageously treated, and that you lost the suit unjustly, because this man was not given up to you—you who made no charge of giving false testimony against the witnesses who testified that you received and had in your possession the property, concerning which you demanded Milyas for torture to prove that it was never left us. If you had really been wronged, it would have been more fitting to proceed against them. But you were not wronged, and are bringing a baseless suit out of malice. [42]

There are many points from which one may see your rascality, but most of all if one hears how you acted regarding the will. For although my father, men of the jury, wrote a will containing an inventory of all that he left, with instructions for letting the property, this will Aphobus never gave up to me, lest I should learn from it the value of the estate, and admitted possessing only those items which were so well known that he could not deny that he had them. [43] The will, according to his statement, contained these provisions: that Demophon should at once receive two talents, and should marry my sister when she should come of age （this would be in ten years）; that Aphobus himself should have eighty minae with my mother, and the house to live in; and that Therippides should enjoy the interest on seventy minae until I should reach manhood. All the rest of the property left to me apart from these items, and the clause regarding the letting of the estate, he suppressed from the will, not thinking that it was to his interest that these matters should be made known in your court. [44] However, since it was admitted by Aphobus himself that my father on his death-bed gave to each of these men such large sums of money, the jurymen at the former trial considered these admissions to be a proof of the size of the estate. For when a man gave out of his estate four talents and three thousand drachmae by way of marriage-portion and legacy, it was plain that he took these sums, not from a small estate, but from one （bequeathed to me） of more than double this amount. [45] 6 For it cannot be supposed that he would wish to leave me, his son, in poverty, and be eager further to enrich these men, who were already wealthy. No; it was because of the size of the estate left to me that he gave to Therippides the interest on seventy minae, and to Demophon that on the two talents—though he was not yet to marry my sister. These moneys it has been proved that Aphobus never gave over to me, nor even an amount slightly less. Part of it he said he had spent, part he had never received, part he knew nothing about, part was in the hands of so-and-so, part was in the house, and of part he could say anything except when and where he had paid it over. [46]

As to his story of money left in the house I shall clearly prove to you that he is lying. This argument he speciously introduced, when it had become clear that the property was large and was unable to show that he had paid it back, in order that it might appear a reasonable inference that I was wrongfully seeking to recover what was already in my possession. [47] 7 If my father had no confidence in these men it is plain that he would neither have entrusted them with the rest of his property, nor, if he had left this money in the way alleged, would he have told them of it. How, then, do they know about it? But, if he had confidence in them, he would not, I take it, have given into their hands the bulk of his property, and not have put them in charge of the rest. Nor would he have entrusted this remainder to my mother to keep and then have pledged her herself in marriage to this man, who was one of the guardians. For it is not reasonable that he should seek to make the money secure through her, and yet put one of the men whom he distrusted in control both of her and of it. [48] Furthermore, if there were any truth in all this, do you suppose that Aphobus would not have taken my mother to wife, bequeathed to him as she was by my father? He had already taken her marriage-portion—the eighty minae—as though he were going to marry her; but he subsequently married the daughter of Philonides of Melite, from motives of avarice, in order that, in addition to what he had received from us, he might get from him other eighty minae. But, if there had been four talents in the house, and in her custody, as he alleges, don't you imagine he would have raced to get possession both of her and of them? [49] Would he have joined with his co-trustees in so shamefully plundering my visible property, which many of you knew had been left me, and have refrained, when he had the chance, from seizing a fund to the existence of which you would not be able to testify? Who can believe this? It is impossible, men of the jury; it is impossible. No; all the money which my father left was indeed buried on the day on which it came into the hands of these men; and the defendant, not being able to tell when and where he paid back any of it, makes use of these arguments, hoping that I may seem to be a rich man, and so meet with no compassion from you. [50]

I have many other charges to make against him, but I have not the right to speak of the injuries I myself have suffered, when the witness is in danger of losing his civic rights. Still I wish to read to you a challenge, for you will know, when you have heard it, that the testimony was true, and that Aphobus, who now declares that he demands Milyas to be examined about all the matters involved in the suit, at first demanded him only in regard to a question of thirty minae; and, furthermore, that he has been put to no disadvantage because of the testimony. [51] For I, in my desire to refute him in every particular, and in my attempt to make clear to you his tricks and his villainies, asked him how large the sum was regarding which he demanded to examine Milyas, as one who had knowledge of the facts. To this he replied falsely, that it was in regard to the whole amount. “Well then,” said I, “as to this I will give up to you for examination by torture the slave who has the copy of your challenge to me. [52] If, when I have given oath that you acknowledged the man to be free, and that you so testified against Demo, you will swear to the contrary with imprecations upon your daughter, I release to you the entire sum, for which you shall be shown by the examination of the slave to have at the first demanded Milyas; and the damages which you were condemned to pay shall be lessened by thus much—that is, by the amount in regard to which you demanded Milyas, to the end that you may be found to have been put to no disadvantage by the witnesses.” [53] This challenge I made to him in the presence of many witnesses; but he said he could not accept it. Yet, if a man refused to give this judgement in his own favor, how can it be right for you, who are upon your oaths, to give credence to his words and convict the witnesses, and not rather to regard this man as the most shameless of humankind?

To prove that my words are true, call the witnesses to these facts.“ Witnesses ” [54]

Do not suppose that while I was ready to take this course, the witnesses did not hold the same opinion. No; they too were ready to place their children by their side, and in confirmation of the testimony they had given, to take an oath with imprecations upon them, if they swore falsely. But Aphobus did not see fit to allow an oath to be given either to them or to me. Instead, he rests his case on arguments subtly planned and on witnesses accustomed to perjury, and thinks thereby easily to mislead you. So take and read to the jury this deposition also.“ Deposition ” [55]

How could one prove more clearly than I have proved that we are the object of a malicious charge; that the evidence brought forward against my opponent is true; and that his condemnation was just? I have shown that he refused to examine by torture the slave who wrote the testimony regarding the very things to which he had testified; that his brother, Aesius, has attested the facts which he on his part declares to be false; [56] that Aphobus himself has, at my summons, given against Demo,8 his uncle and co-trustee, the same testimony as the witnesses whom he is suing; that he refused to examine my women-servants as to the fact of Milyas being a freeman; that my own mother was ready to give an oath regarding these matters with imprecations upon us; that he refused to accept for examination any one of my other slaves who knew all the circumstances better than Milyas did; that he has not brought a charge of false witness against any one of those who testified that he had the money; [57] that he did not give over the will, nor let the house, although the laws so bade; and finally that he did not see fit to give an oath, after the witnesses and I myself had sworn, whereby he could have secured release to the amount of the sums regarding which he had demanded Milyas for torture. By heaven, I certainly could think of no better way than this to establish these facts. Yet, plain as it is that he falsely attacks the witnesses; that he suffers no damage from the facts adduced; that he was justly condemned; he still tries to brazen it out. [58] If it were not that he uses his present language after having at the outset been judged to be in the wrong by his own friends and by the arbitrator, there would be less reason to wonder at all this. But the fact is, that after persuading me to refer the matter to Archeneus and Dracontides and Phanus （the last of whom he is now suing on a charge of giving false witness）, he rejected them （having heard them say that, if they decided on oath, they would condemn his conduct as guardian）, and appeared before the official arbitrator, who, since Aphobus was unable to clear himself from the charges which I brought, gave judgement against him. [59] The jury, to whom he then appealed, having heard the case, gave the same decision that his own friends and the arbitrator had given, and fixed the damages at ten talents. This was not, heaven knows, because he had admitted Milyas to be a freeman （for this was nothing to the point）, but because, a fortune of fifteen talents having been left me, he had not let the property; because further, he with his co-trustees had the management of the estate for ten years, and agreed on behalf of me, a child, to pay a property-tax at the rate of five minae,9 [60] the same rate at which Timotheus, son of Conon, and those possessing the largest fortunes were assessed; and because, after administering for so long an estate, on which he voluntarily chose to pay so high a tax, he turned over to me, as the amount due from him, property not even of the value of twenty minae, having together with those others robbed me of my whole estate, principal as well as interest. The jurymen, therefore, although they allowed interest on the whole property at the lowest rate, and not that at which estates are ordinarily let, found that these men had robbed me of more than thirty talents, and accordingly fixed the damages against Aphobus at ten talents.

1 On the high value attributed by the Greeks to evidence extracted from a slave by torture see Dem. 30.37, and Aristot. Rh. 1.15

2 That is, in attacking the testimony of the deponent he would deny his own previous admissions.

3 Timocrates: possibly the same as the Timocrates against whom Demosthenes delivered Dem. 24

4 With reference to these items see Dem. 27

5 In the inventory of the estate of the father of Demosthenes, given in Dem. 27, there is mention of a bottomry loan to Xuthus, amounting to seventy minae.

6 The following passage up to the middle of the section is repeated almost verbatim from Dem. 27.45

7 This passage repeats very closely the language of Dem. 27.55-57

8 Demo was not actually a trustee, but in Dem. 28.15 it is stated that the elder Demosthenes had called him to be present, when, on his death-bed, he had entrusted his affairs and the guardianship of his children to the three named as trustees. He was the father of Demophon, and had very possibly taken part in the management of the trust. Another alternative suggestion is that Demosthenes may have instituted suit against Demo on quite other grounds of which we have no knowledge. This complicated problem is ably discussed by Calhoun, l.c. pp. 88 ff.

9 See notes b and c on Dem. 27.7

I should have been most glad, men of the jury, had the difference which I have had with Aphobus, and also that in which I am now involved with this man Onetor, his brother-in-law, not come about. Accordingly, I made to them both many fair offers, but I have been unable to secure any reasonable action from either of them. On the contrary, I have found this man far harder to deal with, and more worthy of punishment than the other. [2] In the case of Aphobus, I held that his controversy with me should be settled among our friends, and not come to trial before you, but I could not persuade him. But this man, when I bade him act as judge in his own case, that he might not risk a trial before you, treated me with such contempt, that not only did he not think fit to give me a hearing, but I was even in the most outrageous manner driven off the land, which belonged to Aphobus, when he lost his suit to me. [3] Since, therefore, he joins with his brother-in-law in seeking to deprive me of what is mine, and has come before you, trusting in the measures he has concocted, there is no other course open to me than to try in your court to get justice from him. I know well, men of the jury, that I have to contend against arguments craftily prepared, and against witnesses who are going to give false testimony; nevertheless I think that I shall have such an advantage over him because of the justice of my cause, [4] that, even if any one of you heretofore thought him an honest man, he will learn from the defendant's acts toward me that even in time past he has been, without your knowing it, the basest and most unrighteous of men. I shall show, namely, that he has not only never paid the marriage-portion, to secure which he alleges that the land has been mortgaged, but from the very start has schemed to defraud me of my rights; that, further, the lady, on whose behalf he drove me from the land in question, has not been divorced at all; [5] and that he is now screening Aphobus, and standing this trial with the purpose of depriving me of what is mine. This I shall show by such strong and manifest proofs, that you will see how just and proper it is that I have instituted this action against him. I shall commence with matters which will best enable you to grasp the facts of the case. [6]

In common with many others of the Athenians, men of the jury, this man was well aware that my guardians were proving false to their trust. Indeed, it became clear very early that I was being wronged, so many were the discussions and arguments regarding my affairs held before the archon and before other officials. For the value of the property left me was well known, and it was pretty clear that the administrators were leaving it unlet in order that they might have the use of the money themselves. There was not a single one, therefore, among those who realized what was going on, who did not expect that I should obtain a judgement for damages from these men, as soon as I should attain my majority. [7] Among those who from first to last held this opinion were Timocrates and Onetor. Of this I can give you the strongest of proofs. For the defendant wished to give his sister in marriage to Aphobus, seeing that he had got into his hands his own patrimony and mine （which was not inconsiderable） as well; but he had not confidence enough in him to abandon her marriage-portion. It was as if he felt, forsooth, that the property of guardians was a security for their wards.1 He did, however, give him his sister, but the portion, Timocrates, who had been her former husband, agreed to keep as a loan with interest at the rate of five obols.2 [8] When I had won my suit against Aphobus in the matter of the guardianship and he still refused to make any just settlement, Onetor did not even try to settle our dispute, but, alleging that his sister had been divorced, and that he was unable to get back her marriage-portion, which he had paid （although he had not paid it, and it was even then in his possession）, declared that he had taken a mortgage on the land, and had the effrontery to expel me from it; such was his contempt for me, and for you, and for the laws which were in force. [9] These, men of the jury, are the facts because of which he is defendant in the present suit, and regarding which you are to cast your vote. I shall bring forward witnesses, and in the first instance Timocrates himself, who will testify that he agreed to hold the dowry as a loan, and that he continued to pay interest on it to Aphobus according to the agreement; also that Aphobus himself acknowledged that he received the interest from Timocrates.

Take the depositions.“ Depositions ” [10]

From the very first, you see, it is admitted that the dowry was not paid to Aphobus, and that he did not get it under his control. And it seems very probable that on account of the facts which I have mentioned, they chose to continue as debtors for the dowry, rather than to have it involved in the estate of Aphobus which was sure to be so seriously endangered. For it is impossible for them to claim that poverty prevented their paying it over at once, since Timocrates has an estate of more than ten talents, and Onetor one of more than thirty; so this cannot have been the reason why they have not made an immediate payment. [11] Nor can they claim that they had property indeed, but no ready money, or that the lady was a widow, and that they therefore hastened to conclude matters without at once paying her portion. For these men are in the habit of lending considerable sums to others, and moreover, the lady was not a widow, but when they gave her in marriage, it was from the house of Timocrates, where she was living with him as his wife; so that there is no reasonable ground why one should accept this excuse either. [12] Further, men of the jury, I think you would all agree to this, that, in arranging a matter of this sort, anyone would choose to borrow money of another, rather than fail to pay the dowry to his sister's husband. For if a man does not settle this matter he becomes a debtor, regarding whom it is uncertain whether he will meet his just obligations or not; but if together with the lady he gives also what is hers, he becomes a kinsman and a brother-in-law, [13] for he is not under any suspicion, since he has done all that justice demanded. Seeing that the matter stands thus, and that they were not forced by a single one of the causes which I have mentioned to let this debt stand, and could not have desired to do so, it is not possible to suggest any other excuse for non-payment. It must be for the reason which I have mentioned—that they did not trust Aphobus enough to pay him the dowry.3 [14]

I have established this point, then, in this way beyond all controversy; and I think I shall easily demonstrate from the facts themselves that they did not pay the portion subsequently either; so that it will be clear to you that even if they withheld the money, not for the reasons I have mentioned, but with the intention of speedy payment, they would never actually have paid it, or let it slip out of their hands; with such urgency did the case press upon them. [15] There was an interval of two years between the marriage of the woman and their declaration that the divorce had taken place. She was married in the archonship of Polyzelus, in the month of Scirophorion,4 and the divorce was registered in the month of Poseidon,5 in the archonship of Timocrates. I, on my part, was admitted to citizenship6 immediately after the marriage, laid my charges, and demanded an accounting; and, finding that I was being robbed of all my property, instituted my suit under the last-mentioned archon. [16] The shortness of the time makes the continuance of the debt in accordance with the agreement not unlikely, but it is incredible that it should have been paid. For do you suppose that the defendant here, a man who at the first chose to owe the money and to pay interest on it, in order that his sister's dowry might not be jeopardized along with the rest of her husband's property, would have paid it when suit had already been instituted against that husband? Why, even if he had at the first trusted him with the money, he would then at once have sought to recover it. No, men of the jury; the supposition is, I presume, impossible. [17]

To prove that the woman married at the time I mention; that in the interim Aphobus and I had already gone to law; and that those men did not register the divorce with the archon until after I had instituted my suit, take, please, these depositions regarding each point.“ Depositions ”

After this archon came Cephisodorus and then Chion. During their term of office, having been admitted to citizenship, I continued to press my charges, and in the archonship of Timocrates I began my suit.

Take this deposition, please.“ Deposition ” [18]

Read also this deposition.“ Deposition ”

It is clear, then, from the evidence adduced that it is not because they have paid the dowry, but because they wish to save his property for Aphobus, that they have had the audacity to act as they have done. For when in so short a time they allege that they owed the money; that they paid it; that the woman was divorced and could not recover the dowry; and that they took a mortgage on the land; how can it be other than clear that they are acting in collusion in their attempt to defraud me of the damages awarded me by you? [19] I shall now endeavor to prove to you from the answers given by the defendant himself, and by Timocrates, and Aphobus, that it is impossible that the dowry should have been paid. For, men of the jury, I questioned each of these men in the presence of many witnesses. I asked Onetor and Timocrates whether any witnesses were present when they paid the dowry, and Aphobus himself whether any were present when he received it; [20] and they all answered severally that no witness was present, but that Aphobus got it from them by instalments, in such sums as he needed from time to time. And yet can any one of you believe this, that, when the dowry was a talent, Onetor and Timocrates put so large a sum into the hands of Aphobus without witnesses? Why, in paying him money, I will not say in this manner, but even in the presence of many witnesses, one would have taken every possible precaution7 in order, if a dispute should arise, to be able readily to recover in your court what was due. [21] No man, in concluding a transaction of such importance, I will not say with such a man as Aphobus, but with anybody whatever, would have acted without a witness. This is the reason why we celebrate marriage-feasts and call together our closest friends and relations, because we are dealing with no light affair, but are entrusting to the care of others the lives of our sisters and daughters, for whom we seek the greatest possible security. [22] The presumption is, then, that the defendant made the settlement in the presence of the same witnesses before whom he had admitted the indebtedness and promised to pay the interest, if he really did pay the dowry to Aphobus. For, if he had acted in this way, he would have cleared himself of the whole matter; but by paying him when they were alone, he would have left those in whose presence he had made the agreement as witnesses that he was still a debtor. [23] As it was, they could not induce their friends, who were more honest men than themselves, to bear witness to the payment of the money, and they thought that, if they produced other witnesses, not related to them, you would not believe them. Again, if they said the payment had been made all at once, they knew that we should demand for examination by torture the slaves who had brought the money. These, if the payment had not been made, they would have refused to give up, and so they would have been convicted of fraud. But if they maintained that they had paid the money without witnesses in the manner alleged, they thought to escape detection. [24] For this reason they were driven through stress of necessity to make up this false story. By such tricks and pieces of villainy, while hoping themselves to pass for simple folk, they think they will easily deceive you; whereas in the slightest matter affecting their interest they acted, not with simplicity, but with every possible precaution.

Take now the depositions of the persons in whose presence they gave their answers, and read them to the jury.“ Depositions ” [25]

Now, men of the jury, I shall prove to you that the woman made a merely nominal divorce, but was in reality living with Aphobus as his wife. I think that, if you are thoroughly convinced of this, you will be more inclined to distrust these men, and to give me the aid that is my due. Of some of the facts I shall produce witnesses: others I shall establish by strong presumptions and by adequate proofs. [26] When I saw, men of the jury, that after the woman's divorce had been registered with the archon, and after the defendant's declaration that he had taken a mortgage on the farm to secure her marriage-portion, Aphobus continued to hold and till the land just as before, and to dwell with his wife, I knew well that all this was fiction and a pretence to cover up the facts. [27] And wishing to make this clear to you all, I deemed it right to convict him in the presence of witnesses, in case he should deny that matters are as I have stated; and I offered to him for torture a slave who knew well all the facts—one whom I had taken from among those of Aphobus, since he had not paid the damages within the time fixed by law. When I made this demand, Onetor declined to put the slave to torture as to the question of his sister's living with Aphobus; and, as to Aphobus's tilling the land, the fact was too plain to be denied, so he confessed it. [28] Nor are these the only proofs which make it easy to see that Aphobus continued to live with his wife and to possess the land up to the time when the suit was begun; it is plain also from the way in which he dealt with the land after judgement was given against him. For, as though the property had not been mortgaged, but was to belong to me according to the court's decision, he made off with everything that could be carried away—the produce, and all the farm implements, except the storage-tanks.8 What he could not take away he necessarily left behind, so that Onetor was now at liberty to lay claim merely to the bare land. [29] It is an outrage, though, that one of them should say that the land was mortgaged to him, while the mortgagor is to be seen cultivating it; that he should claim that his sister has left her husband, when he is shown to have refused to accept the test by torture regarding this very point; and that the one who is not living with his wife （as Onetor claims） should carry off all the produce and implements from the farm, while the man acting as guardian for the divorced woman, to secure whose portion he claims to have taken a mortgage on the land, plainly shows no anger at a single one of these acts, but takes everything quietly. [30] Is the whole thing not absolutely clear? Is it not confessedly a scheme to protect Aphobus? One certainly would so declare, if he duly considered each one of the facts.

Now, to prove that the defendant acknowledged that Aphobus farmed the land up to the time of the commencement of my action against him; that he refused the inquiry by torture as to his sister's continuing to live with Aphobus; and that the farm was stripped after the court's decision of everything save what was attached to the soil; take these depositions, and read them.“ Depositions ” [31]

Although I have so many proofs ready to hand it is Onetor himself who most convincingly showed that the divorce was not a genuine one. He, who should have felt outraged, when, after paying the dowry, as he claims, he got back, not the money, but a farm whose title was under dispute,—this very man, as though he had had no quarrel, and were in no way being wronged, but as though he were on the most intimate terms possible with Aphobus, pleaded for the latter in the suit which I brought against him! As for myself, though I had done him no conceivable injury, he leagued with Aphobus, and sought by every means in his power to join in robbing me of my patrimony, while for Aphobus, whom he should have regarded as a stranger, if there is any truth in their present story, he sought to acquire possession of my property in addition to what he already had. [32] Nor was it only at the trial that he acted thus, but after judgement had been rendered against Aphobus, he got up before the court and begged the jurymen, beseeching and imploring them on behalf of Aphobus with tears in his eyes, to fix the damages at a talent, and offered himself as surety for this amount. These facts are admitted on all hands. Those who were then serving on the jury in the courtroom and many of the bystanders know them well. Nevertheless I will produce witnesses.

Take, and read this deposition.“ Deposition ” [33]

Besides all this, men of the jury, there is strong evidence from which it is easy to see that the woman in reality continued to live with Aphobus and even up to the present day has not separated from him. In fact, this woman, before she came to Aphobus, was not unwedded for one single day, but left her living husband, Timocrates, to come and live with Aphobus; and now during the space of three years she has manifestly married no one else. Can anyone believe that she then went directly from husband to husband, in order to avoid living as a widow, but that now, supposing she has really left her husband, she would have endured to remain a widow for so long when she might have married someone else, seeing that her brother possessed so large a fortune, and she herself was so young? [34] There is no truth in it, men of the jury; you cannot believe it. It is a pure fiction. No; the woman is living openly with Aphobus, and makes no secret of the matter. I shall bring before you the evidence of Pasiphon, who cared for her when she was ill, and who saw Aphobus sitting by her side in this very year, when my suit against the defendant had already been instituted.

Take Pasiphon's deposition.“ Deposition ” [35]

I knew, men of the jury, that the defendant, immediately on the conclusion of the suit, had received the goods from the house of Aphobus, and had come into control of his property and all my estate as well, and I knew, further, that beyond all doubt the woman was living with Aphobus. I therefore demanded of Onetor three female slaves, who knew that the woman was living with Aphobus and that the effects were in the hands of these men, in order that we might not have mere statements but that the matters might be established by proof from the torture. [36] But Onetor, when I made this challenge to him, and all those present declared that my proposal was just, refused to have recourse to this certain test, but, as though there were other and surer proofs regarding such matters than torture and testimony, he produced no witnesses to prove that he had paid the dowry, nor would he give up for torture the female slaves who knew the fact, to prove that his sister was not living with Aphobus; and, because I made this demand of him, he in an outrageous and insulting manner refused to let me talk to him. Could there be a man more impossible to deal with than he, or more ready to pretend ignorance of what is right? Take the challenge itself and read it.“ Challenge ” [37]

You on your part hold that in both private and public matters the torture is the most certain of all methods of proof, and when slaves and freemen are both available, and the truth of a matter is to be sought out, you make no use of the testimony of the freemen, but seek to ascertain the truth by torturing the slaves; and very properly, men of the jury. For of witnesses who have given testimony there have been some ere now who have been thought not to tell the truth; but of slaves put to the torture no one has ever been convicted of giving false testimony. [38] Yet Onetor, after refusing a test so fair, and rejecting proofs so clear and so convincing, will produce Aphobus and Timocrates as witnesses, the one that he has paid the dowry, and the other that he has received it, and will demand that you believe him, when he pretends that his transactions with them were without witnesses. For such simpletons does he take you. [39] But that their words are neither true nor like the truth I think I have—by the fact that at the first they confessed that they had not paid the dowry, that again they pretended to have paid it without witnesses, that the dates do not admit of their having paid the money, seeing that the property was already in litigation, and finally by all the other evidences adduced I have, as I think, conclusively proved.

1 The remark is sarcastic. Demosthenes represents Onetor as fearing lest the suit of Demosthenes against Aphobus might make it questionable whether the latter would be in a position to repay the marriage-portion, if called upon to do so.

2 That is, at 10 percent, instead of the ordinary 18 percent.

3 To understand the argument of the speech the reader should bear in mind certain facts regarding the Athenian laws concerning marriage and divorce. To make a marriage legal at Athens it was necessary that both bride and bridegroom be of pure Athenian stock, and that the bride be given away by her father, or, if she had no father living, by her nearest male relative （her guardian or κύριος）. The marriage-contract was between the bridegroom and this guardian, and the marriage-portion was paid by the guardian to the bridegroom. In the case of Onetor's sister Demosthenes asserts that the portion was not paid outright to Aphobus, but was retained by her former husband, Timocrates, who was to pay interest on it at 10 percent. The husband might divorce his wife, but he was required to send her back to her guardian with her personal effects and her portion, or to pay interest on the portion, normally at 18 percent until it was paid. His action in sending away his wife was technically called ἀπόπεμψις. On the other hand the wife might leave her husband with his consent, or for cause. If the husband's consent could not be obtained, the woman presented herself before the archon and stated her case. The act, taken on her initiative, was termed ἀπόλειψις, and in this case, too, her portion went with her.

4 That is, in June 366.

5 That is, in December 364.

6 See note b, on Dem. 27.5, and Aristot. Ath. Pol. 42.2

7 More literally, “one would have been rash to have trusted him.”

8 These were underground, as appears from the phrase πλὴν τῶν ἐγγείων in Dem. 30.30.