WHAT Hannibal the Carthaginian did to, and suffered from, the Romans during the sixteen years that he persisted in war against them, from his first march from Spain to Italy until he was recalled by the Carthaginians (their own city being in danger), and was then driven out by the Romans, this book will show. What Hannibal's real reasons for that invasion were, as well as his public pretext, have been very clearly set forth in my Spanish history, yet I shall mention them here by way of reminder.

[2] Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, the father of this Hannibal, was the commander of the Carthaginian forces in Sicily when they contended with the Romans for possession of that island. Being prosecuted by his enemies on a charge of maladministration, and fearing a conviction, he managed to get himself chosen general against the Numidians before he had settled his accounts. Having proved useful in this war and having secured the favor of the army by plunder and largesses, he passed over the straits into Spain and made an expedition against Gades without the authority of Carthage. From thence he sent much booty to Carthage in order to win the favor of the multitude so that if possible he might ward off censure on account of his command in Sicily. Having gained much territory and great glory he inspired the Carthaginians with a desire to possess the whole of Spain, and persuaded them that it would be an easy task. Thereupon the Saguntines and other Greeks who were settled in Spain had recourse to the Romans, and a boundary was fixed to the Carthaginian possessions in that country, namely, that they should not cross the river Iberus (Ebro), and a treaty to this effect was made between the Romans and the Carthaginians. After this, Hamilcar, while settling the affairs of Carthaginian Spain, was killed in battle, and Hasdrubal, his son-in-law, succeeded him as general. The latter while hunting was killed by a slave whose master he had put to death.

Y.R. 534 B.C. 220 [3] After them this Hannibal was chosen by the army as the third commander in Spain because he seemed to have great aptitude and fondness for war. He was the son of Hamilcar and the brother of Hasdrubal's wife, a very young man whose early years had been passed in the company of his father and his brother-in-law. The people of Carthage confirmed his election as general. In this way Hannibal, whose history I am about to write, became the commander of the Carthaginians against the Spaniards. The enemies of Hamilcar and Hasdrubal in Carthage continued to persecute the friends of those men, despising Hannibal on account of his youth. The latter, believing that this persecution was originally directed against himself and that he might secure his own safety by means of his country's fears, began to think about involving it in a great war. Believing, as was the fact, that a war between the Romans and Carthaginians once begun would last a long time, and that the undertaking would bring great glory to himself, even if he should fail (it was said, also, that he had been sworn on the altar by his father, while yet a boy, that he would be an eternal enemy of Rome), he resolved to cross the Iberus in defiance of the treaty. Y.R. 535 B.C. 219 For a pretext he procured certain persons to make accusations against the Saguntines. By continually forwarding these accusations to Carthage, and by accusing the Romans of secretly inciting the Spaniards to revolt, he obtained permission from Carthage to take such steps as he should think fit. Thereupon he crossed the Iberus and destroyed the city of Saguntum with its inhabitants. Thus the treaty, made between the Romans and the Carthaginians after the war in Sicily, was broken.

Y.R. 536 B.C. 218 [4] What Hannibal himself and what the other Carthaginian and Roman generals after him did in Spain, I have related in the Spanish history. Having collected a large army of Celtiberians, Africans, and other nationalities, and put the command of Spain in the hands of his brother Hasdrubal, he crossed over the Pyrenees mountains into the country of the Celts, which is now called Gaul, with 90,000 foot, 12,000 horse, and 37 elephants. He passed through the country of the Gauls, conciliating some with money and some by persuasion, and overcoming others by force. When he came to the Alps and found no road through or over them (for they were exceedingly precipitous), he nevertheless marched boldly forward, but suffered great losses. The snow and ice being heaped high in front, he cut down and burned wood, quenched the ashes with water and vinegar, and thus rendering the rocks brittle he shattered them with iron hammers and opened a passage which is still in use over the mountains and is called Hannibal's pass. As his supplies began to fail he pressed forward, the Romans remaining in ignorance until he was actually in Italy. Scarcely six months after leaving Spain, and after suffering heavy losses of men, he descended from the mountains to the plain.

[5] After a brief pause he attacked Taurasia, a Gallic town, took it by storm, and put the prisoners to death, in order to strike terror into the rest of the Gauls. Then he advanced to the river Eridanus, now called the Padus [Po], where the Romans were at war with the Gallic tribe called the Boii, and pitched his camp. The Roman consul, Publius Cornelius Scipio, was at that time contending with the Carthaginians in Spain. When he learned of Hannibal's incursion into Italy, he left his brother, Gnæus Cornelius Scipio, in charge of affairs in Spain and sailed for Etruria. Marching thence with such allies as he could collect, he came before Hannibal to the Po. He sent Manlius and Atilius, who were conducting the war against the Boii, back to Rome, as they had no right to command when a consul was on the ground, and taking their forces drew them up for battle with Hannibal. After a skirmish and a cavalry engagement, the Romans were surrounded by the Africans and fled to their camp. The next night they took refuge in Placentia, a place strongly fortified, crossing the Po and then breaking down the bridge. Nevertheless Hannibal made a new bridge and crossed the river.

[6] These exploits, one after another, following his passage of the Alps, exalted Hannibal's fame among the Cisalpine Gauls as an invincible commander and one most highly favored by fortune. In order to increase the admiration of those barbarians, who were easily deceived, he frequently changed his clothes and his hair, using carefully prepared devices each time. When the Gauls saw him moving among their people now an old man, then a young man, and again a middle-aged man, and continually changing from one to the other, they were astonished and thought that he partook of the divine nature. Sempronius, the other consul, being then in Sicily and learning what had happened, embarked his forces, came to Scipio's aid, and encamped at a distance of forty stades from him. The following day they all made ready for battle. The river Trebia separated the hostile armies, which the Romans crossed before daylight on a raw, sleety morning of the spring equinox, wading in the water up to their breasts. Hannibal allowed his army to rest till the second hour and then marched out.

[7] The order of battle on each side was as follows. The Roman cavalry were posted on the wings in order to protect the infantry.1 Hannibal ranged his elephants opposite the Roman horse and his foot-soldiers against the legions, and he ordered his own cavalry to remain quiet behind the elephants until he should give the signal. When battle was joined the horses of the Romans, terrified by the sight and smell of the elephants, broke and fled. The foot-soldiers, although suffering much and weakened by cold, wet clothes, and want of sleep, nevertheless boldly attacked these beasts, wounded them, and cut the hamstrings of some, and were already pushing back the enemy's infantry. Hannibal, observing this, gave the signal to his horse to attack the Roman flank. The Roman horse having been just dispersed by fear of the elephants, the foot-soldiers were left without protection, and were now in difficulties. Fearing lest they should be surrounded, they everywhere broke in flight to their own camp. Many foot-soldiers were cut off by the enemy's horse and many perished in the swift stream, for the river was now swollen with melting snow so that they could not wade, on account of its depth, nor could they swim, on account of the weight of their armor. Scipio, who followed trying to rally them, was wounded and almost killed, and was with difficulty rescued and carried to Cremona. There was a small arsenal near Placentia which Hannibal laid siege to, where he lost 400 men and was himself wounded. And now they all went into winter quarters, Scipio in Cremona and Placentia, and Hannibal on the Po.

[8] When the Romans in the city learned of this third defeat on the Po (for they had in fact been beaten by the Boii before Hannibal arrived), they levied a new army of their own citizens which, with those already on the Po, amounted to thirteen legions, and they called for double that number from the allies. At this time the legion consisted of 5000 foot and 300 horse. Some of these they sent to Spain, some to Sardinia (for they were at war there also), and some to Sicily. The greater part were despatched against Hannibal under Cn. Servilius and Gaius Flaminius, who had succeeded Scipio and Sempronius as consuls. Servilius hastened to the Po where he received the command from Scipio. The latter, having been chosen proconsul, sailed for Spain. Flaminius, with 30,000 foot and 3000 horse, guarded Italy within the Apennines, which alone can be properly called Italy. The Apennines extend from the centre of the Alpine range to the sea. The country on the right-hand side of the Apennines is Italy proper. The other side, extending to the Adriatic, is now called Italy also, just as Etruria is now called Italy, but is inhabited by people of Greek descent, along the Adriatic shore, the remainder being occupied by Gauls, the same people who at an early period attacked and burned Rome. When Camillus drove them out and pursued them to the Apennines, it is my opinion that they crossed over these mountains and made a settlement near the Adriatic instead of their former abode. Hence this part of the country is still called Gallic Italy.

Y.R. 537 B.C. 217 [9] Thus had the Romans divided their large armies at this juncture for many campaigns. Hannibal, learning this fact, moved secretly in the early spring, devastated Etruria, and advanced toward Rome. The citizens became greatly alarmed as he drew near, for they had no force at hand fit for battle. Nevertheless, 8000 of those who remained were brought together, over whom Centenius, one of the patricians, although a private citizen, was appointed commander, there being no regular officer present, and sent into Umbria to the Plestine marshes to occupy the narrow passages which offered the shortest way to Rome. In the meantime Flaminius, who guarded the interior of Italy with 30,000 men, learning of the rapidity of Hannibal's movement, changed his position hastily, giving his army no chance to rest. Fearing for the safety of the city and being inexperienced in war (for he had been wafted into power on a popular breeze), he hastened to engage with Hannibal.

[10] The latter, well aware of his rashness and inexperience, moved forward and took a position with a mountain and a lake [Thrasimenus] before him, concealing his light-armed troops and his cavalry in a ravine. Flaminius, seeing the enemy's camp in the early morning, delayed a little to let his men rest from their toilsome march and to fortify his camp, after which he led them straightway to battle, although they were still weary with night-watches and hard labor. Caught between the mountain and the lake and the enemy (for the ambush suddenly appeared everywhere), he lost his own life, and 20,000 men were slain with him. The remaining 10,000 escaped to a village strongly fortified by nature. Maharbal, Hannibal's lieutenant, who had himself acquired very great renown in war, not being able to take them easily and thinking it unwise to fight with desperate men, persuaded them to lay down their arms, agreeing that they should go free wherever they pleased. When they had complied with this agreement he brought them disarmed to Hannibal. The latter, denying that Maharbal had authority to make such an agreement without his consent, nevertheless treated the Roman allies with kindness and sent them home without ransom, in order to conciliate their towns. He kept all the Romans as prisoners. He gave the booty to the Gauls who were serving with him, in order to attach them to him by the hope of gain, and then marched forward. When this news reached the consul Servilius on the Po, he marched to Etruria with 40,000 men. Centenius, with his 8000, had already occupied the narrow passage previously mentioned.

[11] When Hannibal saw the Plestine marsh and the mountain overhanging it, and Centenius between them guarding the passage, he inquired of the guides whether there was any way around. When they said there was no path but that the whole region was rugged and precipitous, he, nevertheless, sent a body of light-armed troops, under the command of Maharbal, to explore the district and pass around the mountain by night. When he judged that they had reached their destination he attacked Centenius in front. While the engagement was in progress, Maharbal was seen pushing forward strenuously on the summit above, where he raised a shout. The Romans thus surrounded took to flight, and there was a great slaughter among them, 3000 being killed and 800 taken prisoners. The remainder escaped with difficulty. When this news reached the city they feared lest Hannibal should march against them at once. They collected stones upon the walls, and the old men armed themselves. Being in want of arms they took down from the temples those that had been hung there as trophies of former wars, and, as was customary in times of great danger, they chose a dictator, Fabius Maximus being selected.

[12] But divine Providence turned Hannibal away toward the Adriatic, where he ravaged the sea-coast and gathered vast plunder. The consul Servilius, marching parallel with him, came to Ariminum, being distant from Hannibal by one day's march. He retained his army there in order to hearten those Gauls who were still friendly to Rome. When Fabius Maximus, the dictator, arrived, he sent to Rome Servilius, who could be no longer either consul or general after a dictator had been chosen. Fabius followed Hannibal closely, but did not come to an engagement with him, although often challenged. He kept careful watch on his enemy's movements, and lay near him and prevented him from besieging any town. After the country was exhausted Hannibal began to be short of provisions. So he traversed it again, drawing his army up each day and offering battle. Fabius would not come to an engagement, although his master of horse, Minucius Rufus, disapproved of his policy, and wrote to his friends in Rome that Fabius held back on account of cowardice. As Fabius had occasion to go to Rome to perform certain sacrifices, the command of the army fell to Minucius, and he had a sort of a fight with Hannibal, and as he thought he had the best of it he grew bolder and wrote to the Senate accusing Fabius of not wanting to win a victory; and the Senate, when Fabius had returned to the camp, voted that his master of horse should share the command equally with him.

[13] They accordingly divided the army and encamped near each other; and each held to his own opinion, Fabius seeking to exhaust Hannibal by the lapse of time and meanwhile to receive no damage from him, while Minucius was eager for a decisive fight. Shortly afterward Minucius joined battle, and Fabius looked on to see what would happen, holding his own forces well in hand. In this way he was enabled to receive Minucius when he was beaten, and to drive Hannibal's men back from the pursuit. Thus did Fabius save Minucius from a great disaster, bearing him no malice for his slander. Then Minucius, recognizing his own want of experience, laid down his command and delivered his part of the army to Fabius, who held to the belief that the only time for a skilful captain to fight is when it is necessary. This maxim, at a later time, was often brought to mind by Augustus, who was slow to fight and preferred to win by art rather than by valor. Fabius continued to watch Hannibal as before and prevented him from ravaging the country, not coming to an engagement with his whole army but merely cutting off stragglers, well knowing that Hannibal would soon be short of supplies.

[14] They were now approaching a narrow pass of which Hannibal was ignorant. Fabius sent forward 4000 men to occupy it, keeping the remainder of his force at the other extremity where he encamped on a strong hill. When Hannibal discovered that he had been caught between Fabius and the defended pass he was more alarmed than he had ever been before, for there was no way of escape, but all the country round about was rugged and precipitous. He could not hope to overcome Fabius or those defending the pass, on account of the difficulties of the ground. In this desperate situation he put to death his 5000 prisoners lest they should add a new tumult to the danger. Then he tied torches to the horns of all the cattle he had in the camp (and there were many), and when night came he lighted the torches, extinguished all the camp fires, and commanded the strictest silence. Then he ordered the most courageous of his young men to drive the cattle up the rocky places between Fabius and the pass. These, urged on by their drivers and burned by the torches, ran furiously up the mountain side, and if any of them fell down they would get up and run on again.

[15] The Romans on either side when they observed the silence and darkness in Hannibal's camp and the many and various lights on the mountain side, could not exactly make out what was taking place, because it was night. Fabius, indeed, suspected that it was some stratagem of Hannibal's, but not being sure he kept his army in its position on account of the darkness. But those who held the pass imagined, just as Hannibal wished, that in his extremity he was trying to escape by scaling the cliffs above. So they hastened away to the place where they saw the lights, in order to catch Hannibal there in difficulties. The latter, when he discovered that the pass was deserted, advanced with a flying detachment, in dead silence and without light, in order to conceal the movement. Having seized the pass and strengthened his position he made a signal by trumpet, and the army in camp answered him with a shout and immediately relighted the fires. Then the Romans saw that they had been deceived. The remainder of Hannibal's army and those who drove the cattle now advanced to the pass without fear, and when he had brought them all together he moved forward. Thus did Hannibal succeed beyond expectation and rescue his army from danger. Thence he advanced to Geronia, a city of Apulia, which was well stored with provisions. This town he captured, and here went into winter quarters in the midst of abundance.

[16] Fabius, pursuing the same policy as before, followed and encamped at a distance of ten stades from Geronia, with the river Aufidus flowing between them. The six months which limited the terms of dictators among the Romans now expired, and the consuls Servilius and Atilius resumed their offices and came to the camp, and Fabius returned to Rome. During the winter frequent skirmishes took place between Hannibal and the Romans in which the latter were generally successful, and showed to the better advantage. Hannibal was all the time writing exultingly to the Carthaginians about the events of the war, but now, having lost many men and being in want of assistance, he asked them to send him soldiers and money. But his enemies, who had jeered at all of his doings, replied that they could not understand how Hannibal should be asking for help when he said he was winning victories, since victorious generals did not ask for money but sent it home to their own people. The Carthaginians followed their suggestion and sent neither soldiers nor money. Hannibal, lamenting this short-sighted policy, wrote to his brother Hasdrubal in Spain, telling him to make an incursion into Italy at the beginning of summer with what men and money he could raise, and ravage the other extremity so that the whole country might be wasted at once and the Romans exhausted by the double encounter. Such was the situation of Hannibal's affairs.

Y.R. 538 B.C. 216 [17] The Romans, distressed by the magnitude of the disasters to Flaminius and Centenius, and considering such a succession of surprising defeats unworthy of their dignity, and that a war within their own territory was not to be tolerated, and furious against Hannibal, levied four new legions in the city to serve against him, and hurried the allied forces from all quarters to Apulia. As consuls they chose Lucius Æmilius, who had acquired military fame in the war against the Illyrians, and Terentius Varro, a demagogue who had won popular favor by the usual high-sounding promises. When they sent the consuls forward they begged them as they were leaving the city to end the war by battle, and not to exhaust the city by delay, by conscriptions, by taxes, and by hunger and idleness due to the devastation of the fields. The consuls on taking command of the army in Apulia had altogether 70,000 foot and 6000 horse, and they encamped near a village called Cannæ. Hannibal's camp was near by. Hannibal, who was always ready to fight and impatient of idleness, was especially so now because he was troubled lest his supplies should fail, for which reason he continually offered battle. He feared also lest his mercenaries should desert him, as they had not received their pay, or disperse through the country in search of food. For this reason he challenged the enemy daily.

[18] The opinions of the consuls were diverse. Æmilius thought that it was best to exhaust Hannibal by delay, as he could not hold out long for want of provisions, rather than come to an engagement with a general so skilled in war and an army so accustomed to victory. But Varro, like the demagogue he was, reminded his colleague of the charge which the people had laid upon them at their departure, that they should bring matters to a speedy decision by battle. Servilius, the consul of the previous year, who was still present, alone sustained the opinion of Æmilius. All the senators and the so-called knights who held offices in the army agreed with Varro. While they were still disputing, Hannibal set upon some detachments of theirs that were collecting wood and forage, and he pretended to be defeated, and about the last watch put the bulk of his army in motion as if in retreat. Varro, seeing this, led out the army with the thought of pursuing Hannibal in his flight. Æmilius even then forbade the movement, and as Varro did not obey he consulted the omens alone, according to the Roman custom, and sent word to Varro, just as he was starting, that the day was unpropitious. The latter thereupon came back, not venturing to disregard the omen, but he tore his hair in the sight of the whole army, and cried out that victory had been snatched from him by the envy of his colleague; and the whole crowd shared his anger.

[19] Hannibal, when his scheme failed, returned forth-with to his camp, thus showing that his retreat was feigned, but this did not teach Varro to suspect every movement of Hannibal. Hurrying armed as he was to the praetorium, he complained in the presence of senators, centurions, and tribunes that Æmilius had made a pretence about the omen in order to snatch a sure victory from the city, either hesitating from cowardice or moved by jealousy toward himself. While he was thus venting his wrath the soldiers standing around the tent listened to him and joined in the censure of Æmilius. The latter nevertheless continued to give good advice to those within, but in vain. When all the others, Servilius alone excepted, sided with Varro, he yielded, and on the following day he himself drew up the army in order of battle as commander, for Varro yielded to him that title. Hannibal perceived the movement but he did not come out of his camp because he was not quite ready for battle. On the next day both armies came down to the open field. The Romans were drawn up in three lines with a small interval between them, each part having infantry in the centre, with light-armed troops and cavalry on the wings. Æmilius commanded the centre, Servilius the left wing, and Varro the right. Each had a thousand picked horse at hand to carry aid wherever it should be needed. Such was the Roman formation.

[20] Hannibal had previously observed that a stormy east wind began to blow in that region regularly about noon. So he chose the ground where he should have the wind at his back. Then on a wooded hill cut by ravines he placed some cavalry and light-armed troops in ambush, to whom he gave orders that when the battle was joined and the wind had risen, they should fall upon the enemy's rear. With them were placed 500 Celtiberians who had, in addition to the long swords at their belts, short daggers under their garments. These they were not to use till he himself gave the signal. He divided his whole army into three lines of battle and extended his horse at long distances on the wings in order to outflank the enemy if possible. He gave the command of the right wing to his brother Mago, and of the left to his nephew Hanno, retaining the centre for himself on account of Æmilius' reputation as an experienced commander. He had 2000 picked horse and Maharbal had 1000, who were ordered to move about and give assistance wherever they saw any part of the army in difficulties. In making these arrangements he protracted the time till about the second hour so that the wind might come to his aid the sooner.

[21] When all was in readiness on either side the commanders rode up and down the ranks encouraging their soldiers. The Romans were exhorted to remember their parents, wives, and children, and to wipe out the disgrace of former defeats. They were admonished that this battle was the last hope of safety. Hannibal reminded his men of their former exploits and their victories over these same enemies, and said that it would be shameful to be vanquished now by the vanquished. When the trumpets sounded the foot-soldiers raised a shout and the archers, slingers, and light-armed troops advanced and began the battle. After them the legions took up the work. Now began a great slaughter and a great struggle, each side contending valiantly. Presently Hannibal gave the signal to his horse to surround the enemy's wings. The Roman horse, although inferior in number, advanced against them, and extending their line of battle to a dangerous thinness, nevertheless fought valiantly, especially those on the left toward the sea. Hannibal and Maharbal together now led against them the cavalry they had kept around their own persons, with loud barbarian shouts, thinking to terrify their enemies. Yet the Romans received the shock without flinching and without fear.

[22] When Hannibal saw that his manoeuvre had failed, he gave the signal to his 500 Celtiberians. These passing out of their own line of battle went over to the Romans, holding out their shields, spears, and swords in the manner of deserters. Servilius commended them and at once took possession of their arms and stationed them in the rear, in their tunics alone as he supposed, for he did not think it best to put deserters in chains in the sight of the enemy, nor did he have any suspicion of men whom he saw with nothing but their tunics, nor was there time to take counsel in the thick of the fray. Now some of the African cohorts made a pretence of flight toward the mountains, uttering loud cries. This was the signal to those concealed in the ravines to fall upon the pursuers. Straightway the light-armed troops and cavalry that had been placed in ambush showed themselves, and simultaneously a strong and blinding wind rose carrying dust into the eyes of the Romans, which prevented them from seeing their enemies. The impetus of the Roman missiles was lessened by the opposing wind, while that of the enemy's was increased and their aim made surer. The Romans, not being able to see and avoid the enemy's weapons nor to take good aim with their own, stumbled against each other and soon fell into disorder of various kinds.

[23] At this juncture the 500 Celtiberians, seeing that the expected opportunity had come, drew their daggers from their bosoms and first slew those who were just in front of them, then, seizing the swords, shields, and spears of the dead, made a greater onslaught against the whole line, darting from one to another indiscriminately, and they accomplished all the greater slaughter inasmuch as they were in the rear of all. Now were the Romans in great and various trouble, assailed by the enemy in front, by ambuscades in flank, and butchered by foes amid their own ranks. They could not turn upon the latter on account of the pressure of the enemy in front and because it was not easy to distinguish these assailants, for they had possessed themselves of Roman shields. Most of all were they harassed by the dust, which prevented them from even guessing what was taking place. But (as usually happens in cases of disorder and panic) they considered their condition worse than it was, the ambuscades more dreadful, and the 500 more numerous than 500. In short, they imagined that their whole army was surrounded by hostile cavalry and deserters. So they turned and broke into headlong flight, first those on the right wing where Varro himself led the retreat, and after them the left wing, whose commander, Servilius, however, went to the assistance of Æmilius. Around these the bravest of the horse and foot rallied, to the number of about 10,000.

[24] The generals and all the others who had horses, although surrounded by Hannibal's cavalry, dismounted and fought on foot. They charged the enemy with fury and performed many brilliant exploits, the fruit of military experience, being nerved by the energy of despair. But they fell on all sides, and Hannibal, darting hither and thither, encouraged his soldiers, now exhorting them to make their victory complete, now rebuking and reproaching them because, after they had scattered the main body of the enemy, they could not overcome the small remainder. As long as Æmilius and Servilius survived the Romans stood firm, although giving and receiving many wounds, but when their generals fell they forced their way through the midst of their enemies most bravely, and escaped in various directions. Some took refuge in the two camps where others had preceded them in flight. These were altogether about 15,000, whom Hannibal straightway besieged. Others, to the number of about 2000, took refuge in Cannæ, and these surrendered to Hannibal. A few escaped to Canusium. The remainder were dispersed in groups through the woods.

[25] Such was the result of the battle between Hannibal and the Romans at Cannæ, which was begun after the second hour of the day and ended within two hours of night-fall, and which is still famous among the Romans as a disaster, for in these few hours 50,000 of their soldiers were slain and a great many taken prisoners. Many senators who were present lost their lives and with them all the military tribunes and centurions, and their two best generals. The most worthless one, who was the cause of the calamity, had made good his escape at the beginning of the rout. The Romans, in their two years' war with Hannibal in Italy, had now lost, of their own and their allied forces, about 100,000 men.

[26] Hannibal gained this rare and splendid victory by employing four stratagems in one day: by the force of the wind, by the feigned desertion of the Celtiberians, by the pretended flight, and by the ambuscades in the ravines. Immediately after the battle he went to view the dead. When he saw the bravest of his friends lying among the slain he lifted up his voice and wept, saying that he did not want another such victory. It is said that Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, made the same exclamation aforetime, when he too gained a victory over the Romans in Italy, with like loss to himself. Some of those who escaped from the battle and who had taken refuge in the larger camp and in the evening had chosen Publius Sempronius as their general, forced a passage through Hannibal's guards, who were exhausted by weariness and want of sleep. These men, to the number of about 10,000, made their way to Canusium about midnight. But the 5000 in the smaller camp were captured by Hannibal the following day. Varro, having collected the remains of the army and sought to revive their fainting spirits, put them under the command of Scipio, one of the military tribunes, and himself hastened to Rome.

[27] When the disaster was announced in the city, multitudes thronged the streets uttering lamentations for their relatives, calling on them by name, and bewailing their own fate as soon to fall into the enemy's hands. Women went to the temples with their children and prayed that there might sometime be an end to the calamities to the city. The magistrates besought the gods by sacrifices and prayers that if they had any cause of anger they would be satisfied with the punishment already visited. The Senate sent Quintus Fabius (the same who wrote a history of these events) to the temple of Delphi to seek an oracle concerning the present posture of affairs. They freed 8000 slaves with their masters' consent, and ordered everybody in the city to go to work making arms and projectiles. They also made a conscription, as was allowed, even among certain of the allies. They also changed the destination of Claudius Marcellus, who was about to sail to Sicily, and sent him to fight against Hannibal. Marcellus divided the fleet with his colleague Furius and sent a part of it to Sicily, while he himself took the manumitted slaves and as many others as he could collect of citizens and allies, amounting altogether to 10,000 foot and 2000 horse, and marched to Teanum in order to see what Hannibal would do next.

[28] Hannibal allowed his captives to send messengers to Rome in their own behalf, to see if the citizens would ransom them with money. Three were chosen by them, of whom Gn. Sempronius was the leader, from whom Hannibal exacted an oath that they would return to him. The relatives of the prisoners, collecting around the senate-house, declared their readiness to redeem their friends severally with their own money and begged the Senate to allow them to do so, and the people joined them with their own prayers and tears. Some of the senators thought it was not wise, after such great calamities, to expose the city to the loss of so many more men, or to disdain free men while giving liberty to slaves. Others thought that it was not fitting to accustom men to flight by compassion, but rather to teach them to conquer or die, as would be the case if not even his relative should pity the runaway. Many precedents having been adduced on either side, the Senate finally decided that the prisoners should not be ransomed by their relatives, being of opinion that while so many dangers were still impending present clemency would tend to future harm, while severity, although painful, would be for the public advantage hereafter, and indeed at this very time would startle Hannibal by the very boldness of their action. Accordingly Sempronius and the two prisoners who accompanied him returned to Hannibal. The latter in his anger sold some of his prisoners, put others to death, and made a bridge of their bodies with which he passed over a stream. The senators and other distinguished prisoners in his hands he compelled to fight with each other, as a spectacle for the Africans, fathers against sons, and brothers against brothers. He omitted no act of disdainful cruelty.

[29] Hannibal next turned his arms against the territory of the Roman allies and, having devastated it, laid siege to Petilia. The inhabitants, although few in number, made courageous sallies against him (their women joining in the fight) and performing many noble deeds of daring. They burned his siege engines unceasingly, and in these enterprises the women were in no wise inferior to the men. But their numbers were reduced by each assault, and they began to suffer the pangs of hunger. When Hannibal perceived this he drew a line of circumvallation around them and left Hanno to finish the siege. As their sufferings increased they first thrust outside the walls all those who were incapable of fighting and looked on without grieving while Hanno slew them, considering the dead better off than the living, for which reason the remainder, when reduced to the last extremity, made a sally against the enemy, and after performing many splendid acts of bravery, being nearly starved and completely exhausted, they were unable to return and were all slain by the Africans. Thus Hanno possessed himself of the town. But yet a few escaped, who had sufficient strength to run. These wanderers the Romans carefully collected, to the number of about 800, and replaced them in their own country after the war, being moved by kind feeling toward them and admiration for their exceptional fidelity.

Y.R. 539 B.C. 215 [30] As the Celtiberian horse, who were serving with Hannibal as mercenaries, were seen to be splendid fighters, the Roman generals in Spain obtained an equal number from the towns under their charge and sent them to Italy to contend against the others. These when encamped near Hannibal mingled with their fellow-countrymen and won them over. Thus it came about that many of them went over to the Romans and others deserted or ran away, while the remainder were no longer trusted by Hannibal, as they were under suspicion by him and he by them. Hannibal's affairs began to decline from this circumstance.

Y.R. 541 B.C. 213 [31] There is a city called Arpi in Daunia which is said to have been founded by Diomedes, the Argive. Here a certain Dasius, said to have been a descendant of Diomedes, a very fickle-minded person, quite unworthy of such descent, after the terrible defeat of the Romans at Cannæ drew his people over to the Carthaginian side. But now when Hannibal's power began to wane he rode secretly to Rome, and being introduced to the Senate, said that he could bring the city back to the Roman allegiance and thus atone for his error. The Romans very nearly killed him and drove him from the city forthwith. Then, being in equal fear of them and of Hannibal, he became a wanderer through the country. Hannibal burned his wife and children alive. Arpi was betrayed by a portion of the inhabitants to Fabius Maximus, who captured it by night, and having put to death all the Carthaginians he found there, he established a Roman garrison in the city.

Y.R. 542 B.C. 212 [32] Tarentum, which was held by a Roman garrison, was betrayed by Cononeus in the following manner. Being in the habit of hunting and always bringing a present of game to Livius, the prefect of the guard, he became very familiar with him. As war was raging in the country he said that it was necessary to hunt and bring back his game by night. For this reason the gates were opened to him by night. He made an arrangement with Hannibal in pursuance of which he took a body of soldiers, some of whom he concealed in a thicket near the town; others he ordered to follow himself at no great distance, and still others to go with him, clad outwardly in hunting garments but girded with breastplates and swords underneath. He came by night, a wild boar being carried in front of them on poles. When the guards had opened the gates as usual, those who came with him slew the gate-men immediately. Those following behind made a sudden dash upon the other guards, those from the thicket were admitted, and the gates were opened to Hannibal. When the latter was once inside he speedily possessed himself of the remainder of the town, and having conciliated the Tarentines he laid siege to the citadel, which was held by a Roman garrison. In this way was Tarentum betrayed by Cononeus.

[33] The Romans who held the citadel were about 5000 in number, and some of the Tarentines came to their aid. The prefect of the guard at Metapontum joined them with half of his force, bringing an abundance of missiles and engines with which they expected to drive Hannibal easily back from the walls. But Hannibal had a plentiful supply of these things also. Accordingly he brought up towers, catapults, and tortoises with which he shook some of the walls, pulled off the parapets with hooks attached to ropes, and laid bare the defences. The garrison hurled stones down upon the engines and broke many of them, turned aside the hooks with slip-knots, and making frequent and sudden sallies always threw the besiegers into confusion and returned after killing many. One day when they noticed that the wind was violent some of the Romans threw down firebrands, flax, and pitch upon the engines, while others darted out and put fire under them. Hannibal, despairing of his attempt, threw a wall around the city except on the sea side, where it was not possible to do so. Then turning the siege over to Hanno he advanced into Apulia.

[34] The port of Tarentum looked toward the north and gave entrance through a narrow passage to those sailing in from the sea. The passage was now closed by bridges which were under the control of the Roman garrison, by which means they obtained provisions by sea and prevented the Tarentines from supplying themselves. For this reason the latter began to suffer from want, until Hannibal came back and suggested the making of another passage by excavating the public highway, which ran through the midst of the city from the harbor to the sea on the south. When this was done they had provisions in plenty, and with their triremes they worried the Roman garrison who had no ships, even coming close to the walls, especially in calm weather, and intercepting the supply ships coming to them. The Romans in turn began to suffer from want. When the people of Thurii sent them some ships laden with corn by night, under a convoy of triremes, the Tarentines and the Carthaginians in league with them, getting wind of the affair, laid a trap for them and captured them all, including the corn and the men that brought it. The Thurians sent numerous messengers to negotiate for the release of the captives, and the Tarentines won the negotiators over to Hannibal, who thereupon released all the Thurian prisoners he held. These, when they came home, forced their relatives to open the gates to Hanno. Thus the Thurians, while endeavoring to help the Romans in Tarentum, unexpectedly fell into the power of the Carthaginians. The Roman garrison in Thurii escaped secretly by sea to Brundusium.

Y.R. 543 B.C. 211 [35] The Metapontines, whose prefect had taken half of his force to Tarentum, slew the remainder, who were few in number, and delivered themselves up to Hannibal. Heraclea, which lay midway between Metapontum and Tarentum, followed their example, being moved by fear rather than inclination. Thus Hannibal's affairs again began to wear a flourishing aspect. In the following year some of the Lucanians revolted from Rome, and Sempronius Gracchus, the proconsul, marched against them. A certain Lucanian named Flavius, of the party that had remained faithful to the Romans, who had been also a friend and guest of Gracchus but was now his betrayer, persuaded him to come to a certain place to have a conference with the Lucanian generals, saying that they had repented and wished to return to the Roman allegiance. Suspecting nothing, he went to the place with thirty horsemen, where he found himself surrounded by a large force of Numidians in ambush, with whom Flavius then joined himself. When Gracchus discovered the treachery he leaped from his horse with his companions, and after performing many noble deeds of valor was slain with all the others, except three. These were the only ones captured by Hannibal, who had exerted himself to the utmost to take the Roman proconsul alive. Although he had basely entrapped him, nevertheless in admiration of his bravery in the final struggle he gave him a funeral and sent his bones to Rome. After this he passed the summer in Apulia and collected large supplies of corn.

[36] The Romans decided to attack the Capuans, and Hannibal sent Hanno with 1000 foot and as many horse to enter Capua by night. This he did without the knowledge of the Romans. At daylight the Romans discovered what had taken place by observing greater numbers of men on the walls. So they turned back from the city forthwith and began hurriedly to reap the harvest of the Capuans and the other inhabitants of Campania. When the Campanians bewailed their losses Hannibal said to them that he had plenty of corn in Apulia, and he gave an order that they should send and get it as often as they wished. Accordingly they sent not only their pack animals and men, but also their women and children, to bring loads of corn. They had no fear of danger on the way because Hannibal had transferred his headquarters from Apulia to Campania and was encamped on the river Calor near the country of the Beneventines, whom alone they feared as the latter were still in alliance with Rome. While Hannibal was there they despised all their enemies.

Y.R. 542 B.C. 212 [37] It happened, however, that Hannibal was called by Hanno into Lucania, leaving the greater part of his baggage under a small guard in the camp near Beneventum. One of the two Roman consuls who were in command there (Fulvius Flaccus and Appius Claudius), learning of this, fell upon the Campanians who were bringing corn and slew many who were unprepared for an attack, and gave the corn to the Beneventines. He also took Hannibal's camp and plundered his baggage, and, as Hannibal was still in Lucania, drew a line of circumvallation around Capua. Then the two consuls built another wall outside of this and established their camp between the two. They erected battlements also, some toward the besieged Capuans and others toward the enemy outside. There was the appearance of a great city enclosing a smaller one. The space between the enclosing wall and Capua was about two stades, in which many enterprises and encounters took place each day and many single combats, as in a theatre surrounded by walls, for the bravest were continually challenging each other. A certain Capuan named Taureus having had a single combat with the Roman Claudius Asellus, and seeking to escape, retreated, Asellus pursuing till he came to the walls of Capua. The latter not being able to check his horse dashed at full speed through the gate into Capua, and galloping through the whole city, ran out at the opposite gate and rejoined the Romans, and was thus marvellously saved.

Y.R. 543 B.C. 211 [38] Hannibal, having failed in the task that called him to Lucania, turned back to Capua, considering it very important to defend a city so large, and which had been a city of importance under Roman sway. He accordingly at-tacked their enclosing wall, but as he accomplished nothing and could devise no way to introduce either provisions or soldiers into the city, and as none of them could communicate with him on account of the closeness of the siege, he marched to Rome with his whole army, having learned that the Romans also were hard pressed by famine and hoping to draw the Roman generals away from Capua, or to accomplish something more important than its relief. Moving with the greatest celerity through the country inhabited by many hostile peoples, some of whom were not able to hinder him while others would not incur the risk of battle, he encamped at the river Anio, two and thirty stades from Rome.

[39] The city was thrown into consternation as never before. They were without any suitable force (what they had being in Campania), and now this strong, hostile army came suddenly against them under a general of invincible bravery and good fortune. Nevertheless, for the present emergency those who were able to bear arms manned the gates, the old men mounted the walls, and the women and children brought stones and missiles, while those who were in the fields flocked in all haste to the city. Confused cries, lamentations, prayers, and mutual exhortations on every side filled the air. Some went out and cut down the bridge over the river Anio. The Romans had at one time fortified a small town among the Æqui, which they called Alba after the name of their mother city. Its inhabitants with the lapse of time, either because of carelessness of pronunciation or corruption of language, or to distinguish them from the Albanians, were called Albenses. Two thousand of these Albenses hastened to Rome to share the danger. As soon as they arrived they armed themselves and mounted guard at the gates. Such zeal did this one small town, out of many colonies, exhibit, just as the little city of Platæa came to the aid of the Athenians at Marathon and shared their danger.

[40] Appius, one of the Roman generals, remained at Capua, believing that he could capture the place by him-self. Fulvius Flaccus, the other one, marched with untiring haste by other roads and encamped opposite Hannibal, with the river Anio flowing between them. When Hannibal found that the bridge had been destroyed and that Fulvius was occupying the opposite bank, he decided to go around by the sources of the stream. Fulvius moved parallel with him on the other side. Here, again, as was his custom, Hannibal devised a stratagem. He left some Numidian horse behind, who, as soon as the armies had moved off, crossed the Anio and ravaged the Roman territory until they had come very near to the city itself, and had carried consternation into it, when they rejoined Hannibal according to their orders. The latter, when he had passed around the sources of the stream, whence the road to Rome was not long, is said to have reconnoitred the city with three body-guards secretly by night, and to have observed the lack of force and the confusion prevailing. Nevertheless he went back to Capua, either because divine Providence turned him aside this time as in other instances, or because he was intimidated by the valor and fortune of the city, or because, as he said to those who urged him to attack it, he did not wish to bring the war to an end lest the Carthaginians should deprive him of his command. At any rate, the army under Fulvius was by no means a match for him. Fulvius followed him as he retreated, merely preventing him from foraging and taking care not to fall into any traps.

[41] Hannibal, on a certain moonless night, having observed that Fulvius, at the close of the day, had neglected to throw up a wall in front of his camp (but had merely dug a ditch with certain spaces in lieu of gates, and the earth thrown outward instead of a wall), quietly sent a body of cavalry to a fortified hill overlooking Fulvius' camp, and ordered them to keep silence until the Romans should believe the hill unoccupied. Then he ordered his Indians to mount their elephants and break into the camp of Fulvius through the open spaces, and over the piles of earth, in any way they could. He also directed a number of trumpeters and horn-blowers to follow at a short distance. When they should be inside the entrenchments some of them were ordered to run around and raise a great tumult so that they might seem to be very numerous, while others, speaking Latin, should call out that Fulvius, the Roman general, ordered the evacuation of the camp and the seizure of the neighboring hill. Such was Hannibal's stratagem, and at first all went according to his intention. The elephants broke into the camp, trampling down the guards, and the trumpeters did as they were ordered. The unexpected clamor striking the ears of the Romans as they started out of bed in the darkness of the night was some-thing fearful. Hearing orders given in Latin directing them to take refuge on the hill, they hurried in that direction.

[42] Fulvius, who was always looking out for some stratagem and suspecting one in everything that Hannibal did, being guided either by his own intelligence or by divine inspiration, or having learned the facts from some prisoner, quickly stationed his military tribunes in the roads leading to the hill to stop those who were rushing that way, and to tell them that it was not the Roman general but Hannibal who had given the command in order to lead them into an ambush. Then he stationed strong guards at the ramparts to repel any new attack from without, and with others passed rapidly through the camp exclaiming that there was no danger and that those who had broken in with the elephants were but few. Torches were lighted and fires kindled on all sides. Then the smallness of the attacking force was so manifest that the Romans utterly despised them, and, turning from fear to wrath, slew them the more easily since they were few in number and light-armed. The elephants not having room to turn around, and being entangled among the tents and huts, furnished an excellent mark for darts by reason of the narrowness of the place and the size of their bodies. Enraged with pain and unable to reach their enemies, they shook off their riders and trampled them under foot with fury and savage outcries, and broke out of the camp. Thus did Fulvius Flaccus by his constancy and skill bring to naught this unexpected ambush, frustrate Hannibal, and save his army, which had always been in terror of Hannibal's stratagems.

[43] When his scheme had failed, Hannibal moved his army to Lucania and went into winter quarters, and here this fierce warrior gave himself up to unaccustomed luxury and the delights of love. From this time, little by little, his fortune changed. Fulvius returned to his colleague at Capua and both of them pressed the siege vigorously, hastening to take the city during the winter while Hannibal remained quiet. The Capuans, their supplies being exhausted and no more being obtainable from any quarter, surrendered themselves to the Roman generals, together with the Carthaginian garrison and their two commanders, another Hanno and Bostar. The Romans stationed a garrison in the city and cut off the hands of all the deserters they found there. They sent the Carthaginian nobles to Rome and the rest they sold as slaves. Of the Capuans themselves they put to death those who had been chiefly responsible for the defection of the city. From the others they only took away their land. All the country round about Capua is very fertile, being a plain. When Capua was once more restored to the Romans the principal advantage possessed by the Carthaginians in Italy was taken from them.

Y.R. 544 B.C. 210 [44] In Bruttium, which is a part of Italy, there was a man of the town of Tisia (which was garrisoned by the Carthaginians) who was in the habit of plundering and sharing his booty with the commander of the garrison, and who had by this means so ingratiated himself with the latter that he almost shared the command with him. This man was incensed at the arrogant behavior of the garrison toward his country. Accordingly, by an arrangement with the Roman general, with whom he exchanged pledges, he brought in a few soldiers each day as prisoners and lodged them in the citadel, to which place he took their arms also as spoils. When he had introduced a sufficient number he released and armed them, and overpowered the Carthaginian garrison, after which he brought in another garrison from the Roman forces. But as Hannibal passed that way not long afterwards, the guards fled in terror to Rhegium, and the inhabitants of Tisia delivered themselves up to Hannibal, who burned those who had been guilty of the defection and placed another garrison in the town.

[45] In Salapia, subject to Carthage in Apulia, were two men preeminent by birth, wealth, and power, but for a long time enemies to each other. One of these, named Dasius, sided with the Carthaginians, the other, Blatius, with the Romans. While Hannibal's affairs were flourishing Blatius remained quiet, but when the Romans began to recover their former supremacy he endeavored to come to an understanding with his enemy, simply for the sake of their country, lest, if the Romans should take it by force, some irreparable harm should befall it. Dasius, pretending to agree with him, communicated the matter to Hannibal. Hannibal took the part of a judge between them, Dasius accusing and Blatius defending himself, and saying that he was slandered by reason of his accuser's personal enmity. He was emboldened to use such language in the presence of his enemy, because he foresaw that such a foe would be likely to be distrusted on account of his private grudge. Hannibal thought that it was not wise to reject the accusation altogether, or to put too much faith in an accuser who was a personal enemy; so he dismissed them as though he would consider of the matter by himself. As they were going out by a very narrow passage Blatius said to Dasius in a low tone, “Are you not willing to save your country, good sir?” The latter immediately repeated the words in a loud voice, thus letting Hannibal know.

[46] Then in a piteous tone Blatius cried out with much appearance of credibility, that his cunning enemy had made a plot against him. “This present scheme,” he said, “will relieve me from all suspicion, if there was any, as to the former one. For who would have made a confidant of an enemy in such matters in the first place, or, if he had been so thoughtless before, would now, while still in danger and under trial and denying the charge against him, dare to say the same things a second time to one who had been his false accuser concerning these very matters, and especially in the judgment hall where many can hear his words and where his accuser stands ready to renew the charge against him. Even supposing the accuser had suddenly become friendly and well disposed, how would he be able to cooperate with me in saving the country after what has happened? Why should I ask the aid of one who is not able to give any?” I think that Blatius again designedly whispered those things to Dasius because he foresaw the event, in order to discredit him still more, and thus induce Hannibal to disbelieve his former accusations. Nor did Blatius, after he had been acquitted, desist from persuading his enemy to change sides, for he despised him now as a person utterly discredited. So Dasius again pretended to agree with him and sought to learn the plan of the revolt. Blatius replied without hesitation: “I will ride to one of the Roman camps (indicating one that was very far distant) the commander of which is my particular friend, and obtain a force which I will bring hither. You will remain here and keep watch upon affairs in the city.”

[47] Having spoken thus he immediately rode away, without the knowledge of Dasius, not to the camp he had named but to Rome by a shorter journey, and having given his son as a hostage to the Senate, he asked for a thousand horse, with which he hastened back with all speed, anticipating what would be the result. Dasius not seeing his enemy during the next few days thought that he had taken in hand the business they had agreed upon, as now having confidence in him. Supposing that Blatius had in fact gone to the more distant camp he rode to Hannibal, not doubting that he should get back before Blatius. “And now,” said he to Hannibal, “I will deliver Blatius to you in the very act of bringing a hostile force into the city.” Having exposed the affair and having received a military force, he hastened back to the town, not imagining that Blatius was yet anywhere near. But the latter was already inside, having slain the Carthaginian garrison, which was small, and taken care to prevent anybody from going out. He had also closed all the gates except that by which Dasius was expected to return. On that side he removed the guards from the wall to avoid suspicion, but the ground inside was intersected by ditches so that an attacking force should not be able to make its way through the whole town. Dasius was delighted when he saw the gates open, thinking that he had anticipated his enemy, and he entered the town rejoicing. Then Blatius shut the gate and slew him and his companions, who were squeezed together in a narrow place and had no way of passage through the ditches. A few of them escaped by leaping from the walls. Thus did Blatius overcome Dasius at the third encounter of their wits.

[48] While Fulvius, the Roman consul, was besieging Herdonia, Hannibal approached him quietly one evening, having given orders that no fires should be lighted and that strict silence should be observed. Early in the morning, which happened to be foggy, he sent a body of horse to attack the Roman camp. The latter repelled them with some confusion as they hurried from their beds, but with boldness, for they believed their foe to be some few men from somewhere or other. As Hannibal was passing around to the other side of the town with a body of infantry in order to reconnoitre, and at the same time to encourage the people inside, he fell in with the Romans in the course of his circuit, either by chance or by design, and surrounded them. Being attacked on both sides they fell confusedly and in heaps. About 8000 of them were killed, including the consul Fulvius himself. The remainder took refuge inside a fortification in front of their camp, and by fighting bravely preserved it and prevented Hannibal from taking the camp.

Y.R. 545 B.C. 209 [49] After this, the Romans ravaged the country of the revolted Apulians, and Hannibal that of the Campanians, all of whom had returned to the Roman allegiance except the Atellæi. The latter he settled in Thurii in order that they might not suffer by the war that was raging in Bruttium, Lucania, and Apulia. The Romans settled the exiles of Nuceria in Atella and then, continuing their attacks on Hannibal's allies, they took Aulonia and overran the territory of the Bruttians. They also laid siege by land and sea to Tarentum, which was under the command of Carthalo. The latter, as he had few Carthaginian soldiers present, had taken Bruttians into his service. The captain of these Bruttians was in love with a woman whose brother was serving with the Romans, and the latter managed, by means of his sister, that this captain should surrender that part of the wall which he commanded to the Romans, who were directing their engines against it. In this way the Romans again got possession of Tarentum, a place admirably situated for the purposes of war both by land and by sea.

B.C. 208 [50] Hannibal was hastening to its relief when he learned of its capture. He turned aside to Thurii greatly disappointed, and proceeded thence to Venusia. There Claudius Marcellus, who had conquered Sicily and was now consul for the fifth time, and Titus Crispinus took the field against him, not venturing, however, to fight a pitched battle. But Marcellus happening to see a party of Numidians carrying off plunder, and thinking that they were only a few, attacked them confidently with three hundred horse. He led the attack in person, being a man of daring courage in battle and ever despising danger. Suddenly, a large body of Africans started up and attacked him on all sides. Those Romans who were in the rear early took to flight, but Marcellus, who thought that they were following him, fought valiantly until he was thrust through with a dart and killed. When Hannibal stood over his body and saw the wounds all on his breast, he praised him as a soldier but criticised him as a general. He took off his ring, burned his body with distinguished honors, and sent his bones to his son in the Roman camp.

Y.R. 546 [51] Being angry with the Salapians, Hannibal sent a Roman deserter to them with a letter stamped with the signet ring of Marcellus, before the latter's death had become generally known, saying that the army of Marcellus was on the way thither and that Marcellus gave orders that the gates should be opened to receive them. But the citizens had received letters a little before from Crispinus, who had sent word to all the surrounding towns that Hannibal had got possession of Marcellus' ring. So they sent Hannibal's messenger back in order that he might not know by remaining there what was going on, and they promised to do as they had been ordered. Then they armed them-selves and having taken their station on the walls awaited the result of the stratagem. When Hannibal came with his Numidians, whom he had armed with Roman weapons, they drew up the portcullis as though they were gladly welcoming Marcellus. When they had admitted as many as they thought they could easily master, they dropped the portcullis and slew all those who had gained entrance. Upon those who were still standing around outside the walls they hurled missiles from above and covered them with wounds. Hannibal, having failed in his second attempt against the city, now withdrew.

Y.R. 547 B.C. 207 [52] In the meantime his brother Hasdrubal, with the army he had enlisted in Celtiberia, marched to Italy. Being received in a friendly way by the Gauls he had passed over the Alps by the road that Hannibal had opened, accomplishing in two months the journey which had previously taken Hannibal six. He debouched in Etruria with 48,000 foot, 8000 horse, and fifteen elephants. He sent letters to his brother announcing his arrival. These letters were intercepted by the Romans so that the consuls, Salinator and Nero, learned the number of his forces. They combined their own forces in one body, moved against him, and encamped opposite him near the town of Sena. He did not intend to fight yet, but hastening to join his brother, moved off, marching by night among swamps and pools and along an unfordable river, where he lost his way. At daybreak the Romans came up with them, while they were scattered about and wearied with toil and want of sleep, and slew most of them with their officers, while they were still assembling and getting themselves in order of battle. Hasdrubal himself was slain with them. Many of them were taken prisoners. Thus was Italy delivered from a great fear, since Hannibal could never have been conquered if he had received this addition to his forces.

[53] It seems to me that a god gave this victory to the Romans as a compensation for the disaster of Canna, as it came not long afterward and was about equal to it in other respects. In both cases the commanding generals lost their lives, and the number of soldiers killed and the number of prisoners taken were very nearly the same in each case. Each side also captured the other's camp and a vast quantity of baggage. Thus did Rome taste good and bad fortune alternately. Of the Celtiberians who escaped the slaughter, some made their way to their own country and some to Hannibal.

[54] Hannibal was greatly depressed by the loss of his brother and of so great an army, destroyed suddenly through ignorance of the roads. Deprived of all that he had gained by the untiring labors of fourteen years, during which he had fought with the Romans in Italy, he with-drew to Bruttium, whose people were the only ones that remained in alliance with him. Here he remained quiet, awaiting new forces from Carthage. They sent him 100 merchant ships laden with supplies, soldiers, and money, but as they had not a sufficient force of rowers they were driven by the wind to Sardinia. The praetor of Sardinia attacked them with his war-ships, sunk twenty and captured sixty of them. The remainder escaped to Carthage. Thus was Hannibal still further straitened and he despaired of assistance from the Carthaginians. Nor did Mago, who was collecting mercenaries in Gaul and Liguria, send him any aid, but waited to see what turn affairs would take. Perceiving that he could not stay there long, Hannibal now began to despise the Bruttians themselves as men who would soon be strangers to him, and he loaded them with taxes. He transferred the strongholds of their towns to the plains as though they were planning a revolt. He despoiled many of their men, bringing accusations against them in order that he might confiscate their property. Such was his situation.

Y.R. 549 B.C. 205 [55] In Rome the consuls at this time were Licinius Crassus and Publius Scipio, the conqueror of Spain. Crassus conducted the war against Hannibal in Apulia, but Scipio advised the people that they would never drive Hannibal and the Carthaginians out of Italy except by sending a Roman army into Africa and so bringing danger to their own doors. By persisting strenuously and persuading those who hesitated he was himself chosen general for Africa and sailed forthwith to Sicily. Having collected and drilled an army there he sailed suddenly to Locri in Italy which was garrisoned by Hannibal. Having slain the garrison and put the town under the command of Pleminius he embarked for Africa. Pleminius visited upon the Locrians every kind of outrage, licentiousness, and cruelty, and ended by robbing the temple of Proserpina. For this the Romans put him and his companions in wrong-doing to death in prison, and gave the property they left to the Locrians to be deposited in the treasury of the goddess. All the rest of the plunder that they could find they restored to the goddess, and what they could not find they made good out of their own public treasury.

Y.R. 550 B.C. 204 [56] During the same time Crassus detached Consentia, a large town of Bruttium, and six others, from Hannibal. As certain direful prodigies sent by Jupiter had appeared in Rome, the decemviri, having consulted the Sibylline books, said that something would soon fall from heaven at Pessinus in Phrygia (where the mother of the gods is worshipped by the Phrygians), which ought to be brought to Rome. Not long after, the news came that it had fallen and the image of the goddess was brought to Rome, and still to this day they keep holy to the mother of the gods the day that it arrived. It is said that the ship which bore it stuck in the mud of the river Tiber, and could by no means be moved until the soothsayers proclaimed that it would follow only when drawn by a woman who had never committed adultery. Claudia Quintia, who was under accusation of that crime but not yet tried (being suspected of it on account of fast living), vehemently called the gods to witness her innocence, and fastened her girdle to the ship, whereupon the goddess followed. Thus Claudia acquired the greatest fame in place of her previous bad reputation. But before this affair of Claudia the Romans had been admonished by the Sibylline books to send their best man to bring the image from Phrygia. Scipio Nasica, son of Gn. Scipio, who had been general in Spain and had lost his life there, and cousin of Scipio Africanus the elder, was judged to be their best man. In this way was the goddess brought to Rome by the best of their men and women.

[57] When the Carthaginians were continually beaten by Scipio in Africa those of the Bruttians who heard of it revolted from Hannibal, some of them slaying their garrisons and others expelling them. Those who were not able to do either of these things sent messengers to Rome secretly to explain the necessity under which they had acted and to declare their good will. Hannibal came with his army to Petelia, which was not now occupied by the Petelians, as he had expelled them and given the town to the Bruttians. He accused the latter of sending an embassy to Rome. When they denied it he pretended to believe them, but in order, as he said, that there might be no ground for suspicion, he delivered their principal citizens over to the Numidians, who were ordered to guard each one of them separately. He also disarmed the people, armed the slaves, and stationed them as guards over the city. He did the same to the other cities that he visited. He removed 3000 citizens of Thurii, who were particularly friendly to the Carthaginians, and 500 others from the country, but gave the goods of the remainder as spoils to his soldiers. Leaving a strong garrison in the city he settled these 3500 people at Croton, which he found to be well situated for his operations and where he established his magazines and his headquarters against the other towns.

Y.R. 551 B.C. 203 [58] When the Carthaginians summoned him to hasten to the aid of his own country, which was in danger from Scipio, and sent Hasdrubal, their admiral, to him that there might be no delay, he lamented the perfidious and ungrateful conduct of the Carthaginians toward their generals, of which he had had long experience. Moreover, he had apprehensions for himself touching the cause of this great war, which had been begun by himself in Spain. Nevertheless, he recognized the necessity of obeying, and accordingly he built a fleet, for which Italy supplied abundant timber. Despising the cities still allied to him now as foreigners, he resolved to plunder them all, and thus, by enriching his army, render himself secure against his calumniators in Carthage. But being ashamed of such a breach of faith, he sent Hasdrubal, the admiral, about, on pretence of inspecting the garrisons. The latter, as he entered each city, ordered the inhabitants to take what things they and their slaves could carry, and move away. Then he plundered the rest. Some of them, learning of these proceedings before Hasdrubal came, attacked the garrisons, overcoming them in some places and being over-come by them in others. Indiscriminate slaughter, accompanied by the violation of wives and the abduction of virgins, and all the horrors that usually take place when cities are captured, ensued.

[59] Hannibal himself, knowing that the Italians in his army were extremely well-drilled soldiers, sought to persuade them by lavish promises to accompany him to Africa. Those of them who had been guilty of crimes against their own countries willingly expatriated themselves and followed him. Those who had committed no such wrong hesitated. Collecting together those who had decided to remain, as though he wished to say something to them, or to reward them for their services, or to give them some command as to the future, he surrounded them with his army unexpectedly, and directed his soldiers to choose from among them such as they would like to have for slaves. Some made their selections accordingly. Others were ashamed to reduce their comrades in so many engagements to servitude. All the rest Hannibal put to death with darts in order that the Romans might not avail themselves of such a splendid body of men.2 With them he slaughtered also about 4000 horses and a large number of pack animals, which he was not able to transport to Africa.

[60] Thereupon he embarked his army and waited for a wind, having left a few garrisons on the land. These the Petalini and other Italians set upon, slew some of them, and then ran away. Hannibal passed over to Africa, having devastated Italy for sixteen successive years, and inflicted countless evils upon the inhabitants, and reduced Rome several times to the last extremity, and treated his own subjects and allies with contumely as enemies. For, just as he had made use of them for a time, not from any good will but from necessity, so now that they could be of no further service to him he scorned them and considered them enemies.

[61] When Hannibal had departed from Italy the Senate pardoned all the Italian peoples who had sided with him, and voted a general amnesty except as to the Bruttians, who remained most zealous for him to the end. From these they took away a considerable part of their land, also their arms, if there were any that Hannibal had not taken. They were also forbidden to be enrolled in the military forces thereafter, as being no longer free persons, and they were required to attend as servants upon the consuls and praetors who went about inspecting the affairs of government and the public works of the provinces. Such was the end of Hannibal's invasion of Italy.

Horace White The accusation against Hannibal that he put to death those of his Italian soldiers who refused to follow him to Africa is referred to by Livy (xxx. 20) in these words: “Many of Italian birth who refused to follow him to Africa and withdrew to the shrine of Juno Lacinia, hitherto inviolate, were foully slain in the temple itself.” The tale is generally discredited by modern historians as an impossible crime and as inconsistent with the relations that existed between Hannibal and his soldiers as related by Livy himself (xxviii. 12), viz.: –

“No battle was fought with Hannibal that year, for neither did he take the offensive after the recent public and private wound [at the Metaurus], nor did the Romans disturb his quiet, so great a power resided in him, although everything else around him was going to ruin. And I know not whether he was not more wonderful in adversity than in prosperity, because, although he waged war in a hostile country thirteen years, far from home, with varying fortune, not with an army composed of his own citizens but of the mingled riff-raff of all nations, who had no law, custom, or language in common, but were different in character, dress, arms, religious belief and ceremony, and I had almost said in their gods, he held them together by such a bond that no disturbance ever broke out, either among themselves or against their commander, although, in the territory of enemies, he was often in want of money to pay them and of supplies to feed them, the lack of which in the former Punic war had been the cause of many dreadful scenes between the commanders and the soldiers. After the army of Hasdrubal and its chief, in whom all hope of victory had been reposed, had perished, and he had yielded the rest of Italy by retiring to the corner of Bruttium, to whom does it not seem wonderful that no commotion took place in his camp? For, to other things, this also was added, that there was no hope of feeding his soldiers except from the Bruttian territory, which, even if it were all cultivated, would be very scant for supporting so great an army, whereas the war absorbed a large part of the young men, who were drawn away from the tillage of the fields, and a custom ingrafted on a depraved people prevailed of carrying on military operations by robbery. Nor was anything sent to him from home, where they were solicitous about retaining their hold on Spain, as though all their affairs were flourishing in Italy.”

The foregoing is in part copied from a passage in Polybius, viz.: “Who can fail to be struck with admiration for the generalship, the courage, the ability of this man in the field, when we think of the length of time the war lasted; when we look at it as a whole, and at the particular battles, sieges, and revolts of cities, and at the turns of fortune; when we contemplate the totality of the design and execution in the course of which Hannibal waged continuous war against the Romans in Italy for sixteen years and never once dismissed his forces from field service, but held them like a good pilot in subjection to himself, and restrained such a multitude from mutiny and from strife with each other, although the forces he made use of were not all of one nation or even of the same race? They were composed of Africans, Spaniards, Ligurians, Gauls, Phoenicians, Italians, and Greeks, who had neither law, custom, speech, nor anything else naturally in common. Yet such was the skill of the general that, notwithstanding these great diversities, he made them all attentive to one command and obedient to one will, although circumstances were not always propitious but varied; although fortune did not always come in favoring but sometimes in adverse gales. In view of these facts one may well be astonished at his commanding ability in military affairs, and may confidently affirm that if he had begun with other parts of the earth and had attacked the Romans last, he would not have failed of any part of his designs. But now, as he began with those who should have been the last, he made both the beginning and the end of his exploits among them.” (Fragment xi. 19.)

1 At this point there is a lacuna in the text.

2 See Appendix to this Book.