Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969. 

====== Plato: Republic Book 9 ======


[571a]

Socrates

“There remains for consideration,” said I, “the tyrannical man himself—the manner of his development out of the democratic type and his character and the quality of his life, whether wretched or happy.” “Why, yes, he still remains,” he said. “Do you know, then, what it is that I still miss?” “What?” “In the matter of our desires I do not think we sufficiently distinguished their nature and number. And so long as this is lacking [571b] our inquiry will lack clearness.” “Well,” said he, “will our consideration of them not still be opportune1?” “By all means. And observe what it is about them that I wish to consider. It is this. Of our unnecessary pleasures2 and appetites there are some lawless ones, I think, which probably are to be found in us all, but which, when controlled3 by the laws and the better desires in alliance with reason, can in some men be altogether got rid of, or so nearly so that only a few weak ones remain, [571c] while in others the remnant is stronger and more numerous.” “What desires do you mean?” he said. “Those,” said I, “that are awakened in sleep4 when the rest of the soul, the rational, gentle and dominant part, slumbers, but the beastly and savage part, replete with food and wine, gambols and, repelling sleep, endeavors to sally forth and satisfy its own instincts.5 You are aware that in such case there is nothing it will not venture to undertake as being released from all sense of shame and all reason. It does not shrink from attempting to lie with a mother [571d] in fancy or with anyone else, man, god or brute. It is ready for any foul deed of blood; it abstains from no food, and, in a word, falls short of no extreme of folly6 and shamelessness.” “Most true,” he said. “But when, I suppose, a man's condition is healthy and sober, and he goes to sleep after arousing his rational part and entertaining it with fair words and thoughts, and attaining to clear self-consciousness, while he has neither starved [571e] nor indulged to repletion his appetitive part, so that it may be lulled to sleep7 [572a] and not disturb the better part by its pleasure or pain, but may suffer that in isolated purity to examine and reach out towards and apprehend some of the things unknown to it, past, present or future and when he has in like manner tamed his passionate part, and does not after a quarrel fall asleep8 with anger still awake within him, but if he has thus quieted the two elements in his soul and quickened the third, in which reason resides, and so goes to his rest, you are aware that in such case9 he is most likely to apprehend truth, and [572b] the visions of his dreams are least likely to be lawless.”10 “I certainly think so,” he said. “This description has carried us too far,11 but the point that we have to notice is this, that in fact there exists in every one of us, even in some reputed most respectable,12 a terrible, fierce and lawless brood of desires, which it seems are revealed in our sleep. Consider, then, whether there is anything in what I say, and whether you admit it.” “Well, I do.”

“Now recall13 our characterization of the democratic man. [572c] His development was determined by his education from youth under a thrifty father who approved only the acquisitive appetites and disapproved the unnecessary ones whose object is entertainment and display. Is not that so?” “Yes.” “And by association with more sophisticated men, teeming with the appetites we have just described, he is impelled towards every form of insolence and outrage, and to the adoption of their way of life by his hatred of his father's niggardliness. But since his nature is better than that of his corrupters, [572d] being drawn both ways he settles down in a compromise14 between the two tendencies, and indulging and enjoying each in moderation, forsooth,15 as he supposes,16 he lives what he deems a life that is neither illiberal nor lawless, now transformed from an oligarch to a democrat.” “That was and is our belief about this type.” “Assume,17 then, again,” said I, “that such a man when he is older has a son bred in turn18 in his ways of life.” “I so assume.” “And suppose the experience of his father [572e] to be repeated in his case. He is drawn toward utter lawlessness, which is called by his seducers complete freedom. His father and his other kin lend support to19 these compromise appetites while the others lend theirs to the opposite group. And when these dread magi20 and king-makers come to realize that they have no hope of controlling the youth in any other way, they contrive to engender in his soul a ruling passion21 to be the protector22 [573a] of his idle and prodigal23 appetites, a monstrous winged24 drone. Or do you think the spirit of desire in such men is aught else?” “Nothing but that,” he said. “And when the other appetites, buzzing25 about it, replete with incense and myrrh and chaplets and wine, and the pleasures that are released in such revelries, magnifying and fostering it to the utmost, awaken in the drone the sting of unsatisfied yearnings,26 why then this protector of the soul has madness for his body-guard and runs amuck,27 and if it finds in the man [573b] any opinions or appetites accounted28 worthy and still capable of shame, it slays them and thrusts them forth until it purges29 him of sobriety, and fills and infects him with frenzy brought in from outside.30” “A perfect description,” he said, “of the generation of the tyrannical man.” “And is not this analogy,” said I, “the reason why Love has long since been called a tyrant31?” “That may well be,” he said. “And does not a drunken man,32 my friend,” I said, [573c] “have something of this tyrannical temper?” “Yes, he has.” “And again the madman, the deranged man, attempts and expects to rule over not only men but gods.” “Yes indeed, he does,” he said. “Then a man becomes tyrannical in the full sense of the word, my friend,” I said, “when either by nature or by habits or by both he has become even as the drunken, the erotic, the maniacal.” “Assuredly.”

“Such, it seems, is his origin and character,33 but what is his manner of life?” “As the wits say, [573d] you shall tell me.34” “I do,” I said; “for, I take it, next there are among them feasts and carousals and revellings and courtesans35 and all the doings of those whose36 souls are entirely swayed37 by the indwelling tyrant Eros.” “Inevitably,” he said. “And do not many and dread appetites shoot up beside this master passion every day and night in need of many things?” “Many indeed.” “And so any revenues there may be are quickly expended.” “Of course.” “And after this [573e] there are borrowings and levyings38 upon the estate?” “Of course.” “And when all these resources fail, must there not come a cry from the frequent and fierce nestlings39 of desire hatched in his soul, and must not such men, urged, as it were by goads, by the other desires, and especially by the ruling passion itself as captain of their bodyguard—to keep up the figure—must they not run wild and look to see who has aught that can be taken from him by deceit [574a] or violence?” “Most certainly.” “And so he is compelled to sweep it in from every source40 or else be afflicted with great travail and pain.41” “He is.” “And just as the new, upspringing pleasures in him got the better of the original passions of his soul and robbed them, so he himself, though younger, will claim the right to get the better42 of his father and mother, and, after spending his own share, to seize and convert to his own use a portion of his father's estate.” “Of course,” he said, “what else?” “And if they resist him, [574b] would he not at first attempt to rob and steal from his parents and deceive them?” “Certainly.” “And if he failed in that, would he not next seize it by force?” “I think so,” he said. “And then, good sir, if the old man and the old woman clung to it and resisted him, would he be careful to refrain from the acts of a tyrant?” “I am not without my fears,” he said, “for the parents of such a one.” “Nay, Adeimantus, in heaven's name, do you suppose that, for the sake of a newly found belle amie bound to him by no necessary tie, such a one would strike the dear mother, [574c] his by necessity43 and from his birth? Or for the sake of a blooming new-found bel ami, not necessary to his life, he would rain blows44 upon the aged father past his prime, closest of his kin and oldest of his friends? And would he subject them to those new favorites if he brought them under the same roof?” “Yes, by Zeus,” he said. “A most blessed lot it seems to be,” said I, “to be the parent of a tyrant son.” “It does indeed,” he said. “And again, when the resources of his father and mother are exhausted45 and fail such a one, [574d] and the swarm46 of pleasures collected in his soul is grown great, will he not first lay hands on the wall47 of someone's house or the cloak of someone who walks late at night, and thereafter he will make a clean sweep48 of some temple, and in all these actions the beliefs which he held from boyhood about the honorable and the base, the opinions accounted just,49 will be overmastered by the opinions newly emancipated50 and released, which, serving as bodyguards of the ruling passion, will prevail in alliance with it—I mean the opinions that formerly were freed from restraint in sleep, [574e] when, being still under the control of his father and the laws, he maintained the democratic constitution in his soul. But now, when under the tyranny of his ruling passion, he is continuously and in waking hours what he rarely became in sleep, and he will refrain from no atrocity of murder nor from any food or deed, [575a] but the passion that dwells in him as a tyrant will live in utmost anarchy and lawlessness, and, since it is itself sole autocrat, will urge the polity,51 so to speak, of him in whom it dwells52 to dare anything and everything in order to find support for himself and the hubbub of his henchmen,53 in part introduced from outside by evil associations, and in part released and liberated within by the same habits of life as his. Is not this the life of such a one?” “It is this,” he said. “And if,” I said, “there are only a few of this kind in a city, [575b] and the others, the multitude as a whole, are sober-minded, the few go forth into exile and serve some tyrant elsewhere as bodyguard or become mercenaries in any war there may be. But if they spring up in time of peace and tranquillity they stay right there in the city and effect many small evils.” “What kind of evils do you mean?” “Oh, they just steal, break into houses, cut purses, strip men of their garments, plunder temples, and kidnap,54 and if they are fluent speakers they become sycophants and bear false witness and take bribes.” [575c] “Yes, small evils indeed,55” he said, “if the men of this sort are few.” “Why, yes,” I said, “for small evils are relatively small compared with great, and in respect of the corruption and misery of a state all of them together, as the saying goes, don't come within hail56 of the mischief done by a tyrant. For when men of this sort and their followers become numerous in a state and realize their numbers, then it is they who, in conjunction with the folly of the people, create a tyrant out of that one of them who has [575d] the greatest and mightiest tyrant in his own soul.” “Naturally,” he said, “for he would be the most tyrannical.” “Then if the people yield willingly—’tis well,57 but if the city resists him, then, just as in the previous case the man chastized his mother and his father, so now in turn will he chastize his fatherland if he can, bringing in new boon companions beneath whose sway he will hold and keep enslaved his once dear motherland58—as the Cretans name her—and fatherland. And this would be the end of such a man's desire.59” [575e] “Yes,” he said, “this, just this.” “Then,” said I, “is not this the character of such men in private life and before they rule the state: to begin with they associate with flatterers, who are ready to do anything to serve them, [576a] or, if they themselves want something, they themselves fawn60 and shrink from no contortion61 or abasement in protest of their friendship, though, once the object gained, they sing another tune.62” “Yes indeed,” he said. “Throughout their lives, then, they never know what it is to be the friends of anybody. They are always either masters or slaves, but the tyrannical nature never tastes freedom63 or true friendship.” “Quite so.” “May we not rightly call such men faithless64?” “Of course.” “Yes, and unjust to the last degree, [576b] if we were right in our previous agreement about the nature of justice.” “But surely,” he said, “we were right.” “Let us sum up,65 then,” said I, “the most evil type of man. He is, I presume, the man who, in his waking hours, has the qualities we found in his dream state.” “Quite so.” “And he is developed from the man who, being by nature most of a tyrant, achieves sole power, and the longer he lives as an actual tyrant the stronger this quality becomes.” “Inevitably,” said Glaucon, taking up the argument.

“And shall we find,” said I, “that the man who is shown to be the most evil [576c] will also be the most miserable, and the man who is most of a tyrant for the longest time is most and longest miserable66 in sober truth? Yet the many have many opinions.67” “That much, certainly,” he said, “must needs be true.” “Does not the tyrannical man,” said I, “correspond to the tyrannical state in similitude,68 the democratic to the democratic and the others likewise?” “Surely.” “And may we not infer that the relation of state to state in respect of virtue and happiness [576d] is the same as that of the man to the man?” “Of course.” “What is, then, in respect of virtue, the relation of a city ruled by a tyrant to a royal city as we first described it?” “They are direct contraries,” he said; “the one is the best, the other the worst.” “I’ll not ask which is which,” I said, “because that is obvious. But again in respect of happiness and wretchedness, is your estimate the same or different? And let us not be dazzled69 by fixing our eyes on that one man, the tyrant, or a few70 of his court, but let us enter into and survey the entire city, [576e] as is right, and declare our opinion only after we have so dived to its uttermost recesses and contemplated its life as a whole.” “That is a fair challenge,” he said, “and it is clear to everybody that there is no city more wretched than that in which a tyrant rules, and none more happy than that governed by a true king.71” “And would it not also be a fair challenge,” said I, [577a] “to ask you to accept as the only proper judge of the two men the one who is able in thought to enter with understanding into the very soul and temper of a man, and who is not like a child viewing him from outside, overawed by the tyrants' great attendance,72 and the pomp and circumstance which they assume73 in the eyes of the world, but is able to see through it all? And what if I should assume, then, that the man to whom we ought all to listen is he who has this capacity of judgement and who has lived under the same roof with a tyrant74 and has witnessed his conduct in his own home and observed in person [577b] his dealings with his intimates in each instance where he would best be seen stripped75 of his vesture of tragedy,76 and who had likewise observed his behavior in the hazards of his public life—and if we should ask the man who has seen all this to be the messenger to report on the happiness or misery of the tyrant as compared with other men?” “That also would be a most just challenge,” he said. “Shall we, then, make believe,” said I, “that we are of those who are thus able to judge and who have ere now lived with tyrants, so that we may have someone to answer our questions?” “By all means.” [577c]

“Come, then,” said I, “examine it thus. Recall the general likeness between the city and the man, and then observe in turn what happens to each of them.” “What things?” he said. “In the first place,” said I, “will you call the state governed by a tyrant free or enslaved, speaking of it as a state?” “Utterly enslaved,” he said. “And yet you see in it masters and freemen.” “I see,” he said, “a small portion of such, but the entirety, so to speak, and the best part of it, is shamefully and wretchedly enslaved.77” “If, then,” I said, [577d] “the man resembles the state, must not the same proportion78 obtain in him, and his soul teem79 with boundless servility and illiberality, the best and most reasonable parts of it being enslaved, while a small part, the worst and the most frenzied, plays the despot?” “Inevitably,” he said. “Then will you say that such a soul is enslaved or free?” “Enslaved, I should suppose.” “Again, does not the enslaved and tyrannized city least of all do what it really wishes80?” “Decidedly so.” “Then the tyrannized soul— [577e] to speak of the soul as a whole81—also will least of all do what it wishes, but being always perforce driven and drawn by the gadfly of desire it will be full of confusion and repentance.82” “Of course.” “And must the tyrannized city [578a] be rich or poor?” “Poor.” “Then the tyrant soul also must of necessity always be needy83 and suffer from unfulfilled desire.” “So it is,” he said. “And again, must not such a city, as well as such a man, be full of terrors and alarms?” “It must indeed.” “And do you think you will find more lamentations and groans and wailing and anguish in any other city?” “By no means.” “And so of man, do you think these things will more abound in any other than in this tyrant type, that is maddened by its desires and passions?” “How could it be so?” he said. “In view of all these [578b] and other like considerations, then, I take it, you judged that this city is the most miserable of cities.” “And was I not right?” he said. “Yes, indeed,” said I. “But of the tyrant man, what have you to say in view of these same things?” “That he is far and away the most miserable of all,” he said. “I cannot admit,” said I, “that you are right in that too.” “How so?” said he. “This one,” said I, “I take it, has not yet attained the acme of misery.84” “Then who has?” “Perhaps you will regard the one I am about to name as still more wretched.” [578c] “What one?” “The one,” said I, “who, being of tyrannical temper, does not live out85 his life in private station86 but is so unfortunate that by some unhappy chance he is enabled to become an actual tyrant.” “I infer from what has already been said,” he replied, “that you speak truly.” “Yes,” said I, “but it is not enough to suppose such things. We must examine them thoroughly by reason and an argument such as this.87 For our inquiry concerns the greatest of all things,88 the good life or the bad life.” “Quite right,” he replied. “Consider, then, if there is anything in what I say. [578d] For I think we must get a notion of the matter from these examples.” “From which?” “From individual wealthy private citizens in our states who possess many slaves. For these resemble the tyrant in being rulers over many, only the tyrant's numbers are greater.89” “Yes, they are.” “You are aware, then, that they are unafraid and do not fear their slaves?” “What should they fear?” “Nothing,” I said; “but do you perceive the reason why?” “Yes, because the entire state [578e] is ready to defend each citizen.” “You are right,” I said. “But now suppose some god should catch up a man who has fifty or more slaves90 and waft him with his wife and children away from the city and set him down with his other possessions and his slaves in a solitude where no freeman could come to his rescue. What and how great would be his fear,91 do you suppose, lest he and his wife and children be destroyed by the slaves?” “The greatest in the world,92” he said, “if you ask me.” [579a] “And would he not forthwith find it necessary to fawn upon some of the slaves and make them many promises and emancipate them, though nothing would be further from his wish93? And so he would turn out to be the flatterer of his own servants.” “He would certainly have to,” he said, “or else perish.” “But now suppose,” said I, “that god established round about him numerous neighbors who would not tolerate the claim of one man to be master of another,94 but would inflict the utmost penalties on any such person on whom they could lay their hands.” “I think,” he said, [579b] “that his plight would be still more desperate, encompassed by nothing but enemies.” “And is not that the sort of prison-house in which the tyrant is pent, being of a nature such as we have described and filled with multitudinous and manifold terrors and appetites? Yet greedy95 and avid of spirit as he is, he only of the citizens may not travel abroad or view any of the sacred festivals96 that other freemen yearn to see, but he must live for the most part cowering in the recesses of his house like a woman,97 [579c] envying among the other citizens anyone who goes abroad and sees any good thing.” “Most certainly,” he said.

“And does not such a harvest of ills98 measure the difference between the man who is merely ill-governed in his own soul, the man of tyrannical temper, whom you just now judged to be most miserable, and the man who, having this disposition, does not live out his life in private station but is constrained by some ill hap to become an actual tyrant, and while unable to control himself99 attempts to rule over others, as if a man with a sick and incontinent body100 should not live the private life but should be compelled [579d] to pass his days in contention and strife with other persons?” “Your analogy is most apt and true,101 Socrates,” he said. “Is not that then, dear Glaucon,” said I, “a most unhappy experience in every way? And is not the tyrant's life still worse than that which was judged by you to be the worst?” “Precisely so,” he said. “Then it is the truth, though some may deny it,102 that the real tyrant is really enslaved [579e] to cringings and servitudes beyond compare, a flatterer of the basest men, and that, so far from finding even the least satisfaction for his desires, he is in need of most things, and is a poor man in very truth, as is apparent if one knows how to observe a soul in its entirety; and throughout his life he teems with terrors and is full of convulsions and pains, if in fact he resembles the condition of the city which he rules; and he is like it, is he not?” [580a] “Yes, indeed,” he said. “And in addition, shall we not further attribute to him all that we spoke of before, and say that he must needs be, and, by reason of his rule, come to be still more than he was,103 envious, faithless, unjust, friendless, impious, a vessel and nurse104 of all iniquity, and so in consequence be himself most unhappy105 make all about him so?” “No man of sense will gainsay that,” he said. “Come then,” said I, [580b] “now at last, even as the judge of last instance106 pronounces, so do you declare who in your opinion is first in happiness and who second, and similarly judge the others, all five in succession, the royal, the timocratic, the oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannical man.” “Nay,” he said, “the decision is easy. For as if they were choruses I judge them in the order of their entrance, and so rank them in respect of virtue and vice, happiness and its contrary.” “Shall we hire a herald,107 then,” said I, “or shall I myself make proclamation that the son of Ariston pronounced the best man108 and the most righteous to be the happiest,109 [580c] and that he is the one who is the most kingly and a king over himself;110 and declared that the most evil and most unjust is the most unhappy, who again is the man who, having the most of the tyrannical temper in himself, become, most of a tyrant over himself and over the state?” “Let it have been so proclaimed by you,” he said. “Shall I add the clause ‘alike whether their character is known to all men and gods or is not known’111?” “Add that to the proclamation,” he said.

“Very good,” said I; “this, then, would be one of our proofs, [580d] but examine this second one and see if there is anything in it.” “What is it?” “Since,” said I, “corresponding to the three types in the city, the soul also is tripartite,112 it will admit,113 I think, of another demonstration also.” “What is that?” “The following: The three parts have also, it appears to me, three kinds of pleasure, one peculiar to each, and similarly three appetites and controls.” “What do you mean?” he said. “One part, we say, is that with which a man learns, one is that with which he feels anger. But the third part, owing to its manifold forms,114 we could not easily designate by any one distinctive name,115 [580e] but gave it the name of its chief and strongest element; for we called it the appetitive part116 because of the intensity of its appetites concerned with food and drink and love and their accompaniments, and likewise the money-loving part,117 because money is the chief instrument [581a] for the gratification of such desires.” “And rightly,” he said. “And if we should also say that its pleasure and its love were for gain or profit, should we not thus best bring it together under one head118 in our discourse so as to understand each other when we speak of this part of the soul, and justify our calling it the money-loving and gain-loving part?” “I, at any rate, think so,” he said. “And, again, of the high-spirited element, do we not say that it is wholly set on predominance and victory and good repute?” [581b] “Yes, indeed.” “And might we not appropriately designate it as the ambitious part and that which is covetous of honor?” “Most appropriately.” “But surely it is obvious to everyone that all the endeavor of the part by which we learn is ever towards119 knowledge of the truth of things, and that it least of the three is concerned for wealth and reputation.” “Much the least.” “Lover of learning120 and lover of wisdom would be suitable designations for that.” “Quite so,” he said. “Is it not also true,” I said, [581c] “that the ruling principle121 of men's souls is in some cases this faculty and in others one of the other two, as it may happen?” “That is so,” he said. “And that is why we say that the primary classes122 of men also are three, the philosopher or lover of wisdom, the lover of victory and the lover of gain.” “Precisely so” “And also that there are three forms of pleasure, corresponding respectively to each?” “By all means.” “Are you aware, then” said I, “that if you should choose to ask men of these three classes, each in turn,123 which is the most pleasurable of these lives, each will chiefly commend his own124? The financier [581d] will affirm that in comparison with profit the pleasures of honor or of learning area of no value except in so far as they produce money.” “True,” he said. “And what of the lover of honor125?” I said; “does he not regard the pleasure that comes from money as vulgar126 and low, and again that of learning, save in so far as the knowledge confers honor, mere fume127 and moonshine?” “It is so,” he said. “And what,” said I, “are we to suppose the philosopher thinks of the other pleasures [581e] compared with the delight of knowing the truth128 and the reality, and being always occupied with that while he learns? Will he not think them far removed from true pleasure,129 and call130 them literally131 the pleasures of necessity,132 since he would have no use for them if necessity were not laid upon him?” “We may be sure of that,” he said.

“Since, then, there is contention between the several types of pleasure and the lives themselves, not merely as to which is the more honorable or the more base, or the worse or the better, but which is actually the more pleasurable133 or free from pain, [582a] how could we determine which of them speaks most truly?” “In faith, I cannot tell,” he said. “Well, consider it thus: By what are things to be judged, if they are to be judged134 rightly? Is it not by experience, intelligence and discussion135? Or could anyone name a better criterion than these?” “How could he?” he said. “Observe, then. Of our three types of men, which has had the most experience of all the pleasures we mentioned? Do you think that the lover of gain by study of the very nature of truth has more experience [582b] of the pleasure that knowledge yields than the philosopher has of that which results from gain?” “There is a vast difference,” he said; “for the one, the philosopher, must needs taste of the other two kinds of pleasure from childhood; but the lover of gain is not only under no necessity of tasting or experiencing the sweetness of the pleasure of learning the true natures of things,136 but he cannot easily do so even if he desires and is eager for it.” “The lover of wisdom, then,” said I, “far surpasses the lover of gain in experience of both kinds of pleasure.” [582c] “Yes, far.” “And how does he compare with the lover of honor? Is he more unacquainted with the pleasure of being honored than that other with that which comes from knowledge?” “Nay, honor,” he said, “if they achieve their several objects, attends them all; for the rich man is honored by many and the brave man and the wise, so that all are acquainted with the kind of pleasure that honor brings; but it is impossible for anyone except the lover of wisdom to have savored the delight that the contemplation of true being and reality brings.” [582d] “Then,” said I, “so far as experience goes, he is the best judge of the three.” “By far.” “And again, he is the only one whose experience will have been accompanied137 by intelligence.” “Surely.” “And yet again, that which is the instrument, or ὄργανον, of judgement138 is the instrument, not of the lover of gain or of the lover of honor, but of the lover of wisdom.” “What is that?” “It was by means of words and discussion139 that we said the judgement must be reached; was it not?” “Yes.” “And they are the instrument mainly of the philosopher.” “Of course.” “Now if wealth and profit were the best criteria by which things are judged, [582e] the things praised and censured by the lover of gain would necessarily be truest and most real.” “Quite necessarily.” “And if honor, victory and courage, would it not be the things praised by the lover of honor and victory?” “Obviously.” “But since the tests are experience and wisdom and discussion, what follows?” “Of necessity,” he said, “that the things approved by the lover of wisdom and discussion are most valid and true.” [583a] “There being, then, three kinds of pleasure, the pleasure of that part of the soul whereby we learn is the sweetest, and the life of the man in whom that part dominates is the most pleasurable.” “How could it be otherwise?” he said. “At any rate the man of intelligence speaks with authority when he commends his own life.” “And to what life and to what pleasure,” I said, “does the judge assign the second place?” “Obviously to that of the warrior and honor-loving type, for it is nearer to the first than is the life of the money-maker.” “And so the last place belongs to the lover of gain, as it seems.” “Surely,” said he. [583b]

“That, then, would be two points in succession and two victories for the just man over the unjust. And now for the third in the Olympian fashion to the saviour140 and to Olympian Zeus—observe that other pleasure than that of the intelligence is not altogether even real141 or pure,142 but is a kind of scene-painting,143 as I seem to have heard from some wise man144; and yet145 this would be the greatest and most decisive overthrow.146” “Much the greatest. But what do you mean?” “I shall discover it,” I said, [583c] “if you will answer my questions while I seek.” “Ask, then,” he said. “Tell me, then,” said I, “do we not say that pain is the opposite of pleasure?” “We certainly do.” “And is there not such a thing as a neutral state147” “There is.” “Is it not intermediate between them, and in the mean,148 being a kind of quietude of the soul in these respects? Or is not that your notion of it?” “It is that,” said he. “Do you not recall the things men say in sickness?” “What sort of things?” “Why, that after all there is nothing sweeter than to be well,149 [583d] though they were not aware that it is the highest pleasure before they were Ill.” “I remember,” he said. “And do you not hear men afflicted with severe pain saying that there is no greater pleasure than the cessation of this suffering?” “I do.” “And you perceive, I presume, many similar conditions in which men while suffering pain praise freedom from pain and relief from that as the highest pleasure, and not positive delight.” “Yes,” he said, “for this in such cases is perhaps what is felt as pleasurable and acceptable—peace.” [583e] “And so,” I said, “when a man's delight comes to an end, the cessation of pleasure will be painful.” “It may be so,” he said. “What, then,we just now described as the intermediate state between the two—this quietude—will sometimes be both pain and pleasure.” “It seems so” “Is it really possible for that which is neither to become both150?” “I think not.” “And further, both pleasure and pain arising in the soul are a kind of motion,151 are they not?” [584a] “Yes.” “And did we not just now see that to feel neither pain nor pleasure is a quietude of the soul and an intermediate state between the two?” “Yes, we did.” “How, then, can it be right to think the absence of pain pleasure, or the absence of joy painful?” “In no way.” “This is not a reality, then, but an illusion,” said I; “in such case the quietude in juxtaposition152 with the pain appears pleasure, and in juxtaposition with the pleasure pain. And these illusions have no real bearing153 on the truth of pleasure, but are a kind of jugglery.154” “So at any rate our argument signifies,” he said. “Take a look, then,” [584b] said I, “at pleasures which do not follow on pain, so that you may not haply suppose for the present that it is the nature of pleasure to be a cessation from pain and pain from pleasure.” “Where shall I look,” he said, “and what pleasures do you mean?” “There are many others,” I said, “and especially, if you please to note them, the pleasures connected with smell.155 For these with no antecedent pain156 suddenly attain an indescribable intensity, and their cessation leaves no pain after them.” “Most true,” he said. “Let us not believe, then, [584c] that the riddance of pain is pure pleasure or that of pleasure pain.” “No, we must not.” “Yet, surely,” said I, “the affections that find their way through the body157 to the soul158 and are called pleasures are, we may say, the most and the greatest of them, of this type, in some sort releases from pain.159?” “Yes, they are.” “And is not this also the character of the anticipatory pleasures and pains that precede them and arise from the expectation of them?” “It is.” [584d]

“Do you know, then, what their quality is and what they most resemble?” “What?” he said. “Do you think that there is such a thing in nature160 as up and down and in the middle?” “I do.” “Do you suppose, then, that anyone who is transported from below to the center would have any other opinion than that he was moving upward161? And if he took his stand at the center and looked in the direction from which he had been transported, do you think he would suppose himself to be anywhere but above, never having seen that which is really above?” “No, by Zeus,” he said, “I do not think that such a person would have any other notion.” [584e] “And if he were borne back,” I said, “he would both think himself to be moving downward and would think truly.” “Of course.” “And would not all this happen to him because of his non-acquaintance with the true and real up and down and middle?” “Obviously.” “Would it surprise you, then,” said I, “if similarly men without experience of truth and reality hold unsound opinions about many other matters, and are so disposed towards pleasure and pain and the intermediate neutral condition that, when they are moved in the direction of the painful, [585a] they truly think themselves to be, and really are, in a state of pain, but, when they move from pain to the middle and neutral state, they intensely believe that they are approaching fulfillment and pleasure, and just as if, in ignorance of white, they were comparing grey with black,162 so, being inexperienced in true pleasure, they are deceived by viewing painlessness in its relation to pain?” “No, by Zeus,” he said, “it would not surprise me, but far rather if it were not so.” “In this way, then, consider it.163 Are not hunger and thirst and similar states inanitions or emptinesses164 [585b] of the bodily habit?” “Surely.” “And is not ignorance and folly in turn a kind of emptiness of the habit of the soul?” “It is indeed.” “And he who partakes of nourishment165 and he who gets, wisdom fills the void and is filled?” “Of course.” “And which is the truer filling and fulfillment, that of the less or of the more real being?” “Evidently that of the more real.” “And which of the two groups or kinds do you think has a greater part in pure essence, the class of foods, drinks, and relishes and nourishment generally, or the kind of true opinion,166 [585c] knowledge and reason,167 and, in sum, all the things that are more excellent168? Form your judgement thus. Which do you think more truly is, that which clings to what is ever like itself and immortal and to the truth, and that which is itself of such a nature and is born in a thing of that nature, or that which clings to what is mortal and never the same and is itself such and is born in such a thing?” “That which cleaves to what is ever the same far surpasses,” he said. “Does the essence of that which never abides the same partake of real essence any more than of knowledge?” “By no means.” “Or of truth and reality?” “Not of that, either.” “And if a thing has less of truth has it not also less of real essence or existence?” “Necessarily.” “And is it not generally true [585d] that the kinds concerned with the service of the body partake less of truth and reality than those that serve the soul?” “Much less.” “And do you not think that the same holds of the body itself in comparison with the soul?” “I do.” “Then is not that which is fulfilled of what more truly is, and which itself more truly is, more truly filled and satisfied than that which being itself less real is filled with more unreal things?” “Of course.” “If, then, to be filled with what befits nature is pleasure, then that which is more really filled with real things [585e] would more really and truly cause us to enjoy a true pleasure, while that which partakes of the less truly existent would be less truly and surely filled and would partake of a less trustworthy and less true pleasure.” “Most inevitably,” he said. “Then those who have no experience [586a] of wisdom and virtue but are ever devoted to169 feastings and that sort of thing are swept downward, it seems, and back again to the center, and so sway and roam170 to and fro throughout their lives, but they have never transcended all this and turned their eyes to the true upper region nor been wafted there, nor ever been really filled with real things, nor ever tasted171 stable and pure pleasure, but with eyes ever bent upon the earth172 and heads bowed down over their tables they feast like cattle,173 [586b] grazing and copulating, ever greedy for more of these delights; and in their greed174 kicking and butting one another with horns and hooves of iron they slay one another in sateless avidity, because they are vainly striving to satisfy with things that are not real the unreal and incontinent part175 of their souls.” “You describe in quite oracular style,176 Socrates,” said Glaucon, “the life of the multitude.” “And are not the pleasures with which they dwell inevitably commingled with pains, phantoms of true pleasure, illusions of scene-painting, so colored by contrary juxtaposition177 [586c] as to seem intense in either kind, and to beget mad loves of themselves in senseless souls, and to be fought for,178 as Stesichorus says the wraith of Helen179 was fought for at Troy through ignorance of the truth?” “It is quite inevitable,” he said, “that it should be so.”

“So, again, must not the like hold of the high-spirited element, whenever a man succeeds in satisfying that part of his nature—his covetousness of honor by envy, his love of victory by violence, his ill-temper by indulgence in anger, [586d] pursuing these ends without regard to consideration and reason?” “The same sort of thing,” he said, “must necessarily happen in this case too.” “Then,” said I, “may we not confidently declare that in both the gain-loving and the contentious part of our nature all the desires that wait upon knowledge and reason, and, pursuing their pleasures in conjunction with them,180 take only those pleasures which reason approves,181 will, since they follow truth, enjoy the truest182 pleasures, so far as that is possible for them, and also the pleasures that are proper to them and their own, [586e] if for everything that which is best may be said to be most its ‘own’183?” “But indeed,” he said, “it is most truly its very own.” “Then when the entire soul accepts the guidance of the wisdom-loving part and is not filled with inner dissension,184 the result for each part is that it in all other respects keeps to its own task185 and is just, and likewise that each enjoys its own proper pleasures and the best pleasures and, [587a] so far as such a thing is possible,186 the truest.” “Precisely so.” “And so when one of the other two gets the mastery the result for it is that it does not find its own proper pleasure and constrains the others to pursue an alien pleasure and not the true.” “That is so,” he said. “And would not that which is furthest removed from philosophy and reason be most likely to produce this effect187?” “Quite so,” he said. “And is not that furthest removed from reason which is furthest from law and order?” “Obviously.” “And was it not made plain that the furthest removed are the erotic and tyrannical appetites?” “Quite so.” [587b] “And least so the royal and orderly?” “Yes.” “Then the tyrant's place, I think, will be fixed at the furthest remove188 from true and proper pleasure, and the king's at the least.” “Necessarily.” “Then the tyrant's life will be least pleasurable and the king's most.” “There is every necessity of that.” “Do you know, then,” said I, “how much less pleasurably the tyrant lives than the king?” “I’ll know if you tell me,189” he said. “There being as it appears three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious, [587c] the tyrant in his flight from law and reason crosses the border beyond190 the spurious, cohabits with certain slavish, mercenary pleasures, and the measure of his inferiority is not easy to express except perhaps thus.” “How?” he said. “The tyrant, I believe, we found at the third remove from the oligarch, for the democrat came between.” “Yes.” “And would he not also dwell with a phantom of pleasure in respect of reality three stages removed from that other, if all that we have said is true?” “That is so.” “And the oligarch in turn is at the third remove from the royal man [587d] if we assume the identity of the aristocrat and the king.191” “Yes, the third.” “Three times three, then, by numerical measure is the interval that separates the tyrant from true pleasure.” “Apparently.” “The phantom192 of the tyrant's pleasure is then by longitudinal mensuration a plane number.” “Quite so.” “But by squaring and cubing it is clear what the interval of this separation becomes.” “It is clear,” he said, “to a reckoner.” “Then taking it the other way about, [587e] if one tries to express the extent of the interval between the king and the tyrant in respect of true pleasure he will find on completion of the multiplication that he lives 729 times as happily and that the tyrant's life is more painful by the same distance.193” “An overwhelming194 and baffling calculation,” he said, “of the difference195 between the just and [588a] the unjust man in respect of pleasure and pain!” “And what is more, it is a true number and pertinent to the lives of men if days and nights and months and years pertain to them.” “They certainly do,” he said. “Then if in point of pleasure the victory of the good and just man over the bad and unjust is so great as this, he will surpass him inconceivably in decency and beauty of life and virtue.” “Inconceivably indeed, by Zeus,” he said.

“Very good,” said I. “And now that we have come to this point in the argument, [588b] let us take up again the statement with which we began and that has brought us to this pass.196 It was, I believe, averred that injustice is profitable to the completely unjust197 man who is reputed just. Was not that the proposition?” “Yes, that.” “Let us, then, reason with its proponent now that we have agreed on the essential nature of injustice and just conduct.” “How?” he said. “By fashioning in our discourse a symbolic image of the soul, that the maintainer of that proposition may see precisely what it is that he was saying.” [588c] “What sort of an image?” he said. “One of those natures that the ancient fables tell of,” said I, “as that of the Chimaera198 or Scylla199 or Cerberus,200 and the numerous other examples that are told of many forms grown together in one.” “Yes, they do tell of them.” “Mould, then, a single shape of a manifold and many-headed beast201 that has a ring of heads of tame and wild beasts and can change them and cause to spring forth from itself all such growths.” [588d] “It is the task of a cunning artist,202” he said, “but nevertheless, since speech is more plastic than wax203 and other such media, assume that it has been so fashioned.” “Then fashion one other form of a lion and one of a man and let the first be far the largest204 and the second second in size.” “That is easier,” he said, “and is done.” “Join the three in one, then, so as in some sort to grow together.” “They are so united,” he said. “Then mould about them outside the likeness of one, that of the man, so that to anyone who is unable [588e] to look within205 but who can see only the external sheath it appears to be one living creature, the man.” “The sheath is made fast about him,” he said. “Let us, then say to the speaker who avers that it pays this man to be unjust, and that to do justice is not for his advantage, that he is affirming nothing else than that it profits him to feast and make strong the multifarious beast and the lion and all that pertains to the lion, [589a] but to starve the man206 and so enfeeble him that he can be pulled about207 whithersoever either of the others drag him, and not to familiarize or reconcile with one another the two creatures but suffer them to bite and fight and devour one another.208” “Yes,” he said, “that is precisely what the panegyrist of injustice will be found to say.” “And on the other hand he who says that justice is the more profitable affirms that all our actions and words should tend to give the man within us209 [589b] complete domination210 over the entire man and make him take charge211 of the many-headed beast—like a farmer212 who cherishes and trains the cultivated plants but checks the growth of the wild—and he will make an ally213 of the lion's nature, and caring for all the beasts alike will first make them friendly to one another and to himself, and so foster their growth.” “Yes, that in turn is precisely the meaning of the man who commends justice.” “From every point of view, then, the panegyrist of justice [589c] speaks truly and the panegyrist of injustice falsely. For whether we consider pleasure, reputation, or profit, he who commends justice speaks the truth, while there is no soundness or real knowledge of what he censures in him who disparages it.” “None whatever, I think,” said he. “Shall we, then, try to persuade him gently,214 for he does not willingly err,215 by questioning him thus: Dear friend, should we not also say that the things which law and custom deem fair or foul have been accounted so for a like reason— [589d] the fair and honorable things being those that subject the brutish part of our nature to that which is human in us, or rather, it may be, to that which is divine,216 while the foul and base are the things that enslave the gentle nature to the wild? Will he assent or not?” “He will if he is counselled by me.” “Can it profit any man in the light of this thought to accept gold unjustly if the result is to be that by the acceptance he enslaves the best part of himself to the worst? [589e] Or is it conceivable that, while, if the taking of the gold enslaved his son or daughter and that too to fierce and evil men, it would not profit him,217 no matter how large the sum, yet that, if the result is to be the ruthless enslavement of the divinest part of himself to the most despicable and godless part, he is not to be deemed wretched [590a] and is not taking the golden bribe much more disastrously than Eriphyle218 did when she received the necklace as the price219 of her husband's life?” “Far more,” said Glaucon, “for I will answer you in his behalf.”

“And do you not think that the reason for the old objection to licentiousness is similarly because that sort of thing emancipates that dread,220 that huge and manifold beast overmuch?” “Obviously,” he said. “And do we not censure self-will221 [590b] and irascibility when they foster and intensify disproportionately the element of the lion and the snake222 in us?” “By all means.” “And do we not reprobate luxury and effeminacy for their loosening and relaxation of this same element when they engender cowardice in it?” “Surely.” “And flattery and illiberality when they reduce this same high-spirited element under the rule of the mob-like beast and habituate it for the sake of wealth and the unbridled lusts of the beast to endure all manner of contumely from youth up and become an ape223 instead of a lion?” [590c] “Yes, indeed,” he said. “And why do you suppose that ‘base mechanic’224 handicraft is a term of reproach? Shall we not say that it is solely when the best part is naturally weak in a man so that it cannot govern and control the brood of beasts within him but can only serve them and can learn nothing but the ways of flattering them?” “So it seems,” he said. “Then is it not in order that such an one may have a like government with the best man that we say he ought to be the slave [590d] of that best man225 who has within himself the divine governing principle, not because we suppose, as Thrasymachus226 did in the case of subjects, that the slave should be governed for his own harm, but on the ground that it is better for everyone to be governed by the divine and the intelligent, preferably indwelling and his own, but in default of that imposed from without, in order that we all so far as possible may be akin and friendly because our governance and guidance are the same?” “Yes, and rightly so,” he said. [590e] “And it is plain,” I said, “that this is the purpose of the law, which is the ally of all classes in the state, and this is the aim of our control of children,227 our not leaving them free before we have established, so to speak, a constitutional government within them228 and, by fostering the best element in them [591a] with the aid of the like in ourselves, have set up in its place a similar guardian and ruler in the child, and then, and then only, we leave it free.” “Yes, that is plain,” he said. “In what way,229 then, Glaucon, and on what principle, shall we say that it profits a man to be unjust or licentious or do any shameful thing that will make him a worse man, but otherwise will bring him more wealth or power?” “In no way,” he said. “And how that it pays him to escape detection in wrongdoing and not pay the penalty230? [591b] Or is it not true that he who evades detection becomes a still worse man, while in the one who is discovered and chastened the brutish part is lulled and tamed and the gentle part liberated, and the entire soul, returning to its nature at the best, attains to a much more precious condition in acquiring sobriety and righteousness together with wisdom, than the body231 does when it gains strength and beauty conjoined with health, even as the soul is more precious than the body?” “Most assuredly,” he said. [591c] “Then the wise man will bend all his endeavors232 to this end throughout his life; he will, to begin with, prize the studies that will give this quality to his soul and disprize the others.” “Clearly,” he said. “And then,” I said, “he not only will not abandon the habit and nurture of his body to the brutish and irrational pleasure and live with his face set in that direction, but he will not even make health his chief aim,233 nor give the first place to the ways of becoming strong or healthy or beautiful unless these things are likely to bring with them soberness of spirit, [591d] but he will always be found attuning the harmonies of his body for the sake of the concord in his soul.234” “By all means,” he replied, “if he is to be a true musician.235” “And will he not deal likewise with the ordering and harmonizing of his possessions? He will not let himself be dazzled236 by the felicitations of the multitude and pile up the mass237 of his wealth without measure,238 involving himself in measureless ills.” “No, I think not,” he said. [591e] “He will rather,” I said, “keep his eyes fixed on the constitution in his soul,239 and taking care and watching lest he disturb anything there either by excess or deficiency of wealth,240 will so steer his course and add to or detract from his wealth on this principle, so far as may be.” “Precisely so,” he said. “And in the matter of honors and office too this will be his guiding principle: [592a] He will gladly take part in and enjoy those which he thinks will make him a better man, but in public and private life he will shun those that may overthrow the established habit241 of his soul.” “Then, if that is his chief concern,” he said, “he will not willingly take part in politics.242” “Yes, by the dog,243” said I, “in his own city he certainly will, yet perhaps not in the city of his birth, except in some providential conjuncture.244” “I understand,” he said; “you mean the city whose establishment we have described, the city whose home is in the ideal;245 [592b] for I think that it can be found nowhere on earth.246” “Well,” said I, “perhaps there is a pattern247 of it laid up in heaven for him who wishes to contemplate it and so beholding to constitute himself its citizen.248 But it makes no difference whether it exists now or ever will come into being.249 The politics of this city only will be his and of none other.” “That seems probable,” he said.

1 For ἐν καλῷ cf. Soph. El. 348, Eurip.Heracleid. 971, Aristoph.Eccl. 321, Thesm. 292.

2 Cf. on 558 D.

3 For κολαζόμεναι cf. on 559 B, p. 293, note c.

4 Cf. Aristot.Eth. Nic. 102 b 5 ff.ὁ δ᾽ ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ᾽ ὕπνον, etc.; also his Problem. 957 a 21 ff. Cic.De divin. i. 29 translates this passage. Cf. further Herod. vi. 107, Soph.O.T. 981-982. Hazlitt writes “We are not hypocrites in our sleep,” a modern novelist, “In sleep all barriers are down.” The Freudians have at last discovered Plato's anticipation of their main thesis. Cf. Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War. p. 74: “It has been perhaps Freud's most remarkable thesis that dreams are manifestations of this emergence of desires and memories from the unconscious into the conscious field.” “The barriers of the Freudian unconscious are less tightly closed during sleep” sententiously observes an eminent modern psychologist. Cf. Valentine, The New Psychology of the Unconscious, p. xiii. and ibid. p. 93: “Freud refers to Plato's view that the virtuous man does in actual life, but I believe he nowhere shows a knowledge of the following passage in the Republic. . . . ” Cf. ibid. p. 95: “The germ of several aspects of the Freudian view of dreams, including the characteristic doctrine of the censor, was to be found in Plato. The Freudian view becomes at once distinctly more respectable.” Many of the ancients, like some superstitious moderns, exalted the unconscious which reveals itself in dreams, and made it the source of prophecy. Cf. commentators on Aesch.Eumen. 104, Pindar, fr. 131 (96) Loeb, p. 589:εὕδει δὲ πρασσόντων μελέων, ἀτὰρ εὑδόντεσσιν ἐν πολλοῖς ὀνείροις|δείκνυσι τέρπνων ἐφέρποισαν χαλεπῶν τε κρίσιν, “but it sleepeth while the limbs are active; yet to them that sleep, in many a dream it giveth presage of a decision of things delightful or doleful. (Sandys, Loeb tr.) Cf. Pausan. ix. 23, Cic.De div. i. 30, Sir Thomas Browne, Religio Medici, pp. 105-107 (ed. J. A. Symonds). Plato did not share these superstitions. Cf. the irony of Tim. 71 D-E, and my review of Stewart's “Myths of Plato,”Journal of Philos. Psychol. and Scientific Methods, vol. iii., 1906, pp. 495-498.

5 The Greeks had no good word for instinct, but there are passages in Plato where this translation is justified by the context for ἦθος, φύσις and such words.

6 For the idiom οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει cf. Soph.Trach. 90, Demosth. liv. 34. Cf. also 602 D and on 593 A, p. 200, note b.

7 Cf. Browning, Bishop Blougram's Apology, “And body gets its sop and holds its noise.” Plato was no ascetic, as some have inferred from passages in the Republic, Laws, Gorgias, and Phaedo. Cf. Herbert L. Stewart, “Was Plato an Ascetic?”Philos. Re., 1915, pp. 603-613; Dean Inge, Christian Ethics, p. 90: “The asceticism of the true Platonist has always been sane moderate; the hallmark of Platonism is a combination of self-restraint and simplicity with humanism.”

8 Cf. Ephesians iv. 26 “Let not the sun go down upon your wrath.”

9 ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ: cf. 382 B, 465 A, 470 C, 492 C, 590 A, Lysis 212 C, Laws 625 D.

10 This sentence contains 129 words. George Moore says, “Pater's complaint that Plato's sentences are long may be regarded as Pater's single excursion into humor.” But Pater is in fact justifying his own long sentences by Plato's example. He calls this passage Plato's evening prayer.

11 Plato always returns to the point after a digression. Cf. 543 C, 471 C, 544 B, 568 D, 588 B, Phaedo 78 B, Theaet. 177 C, Protag. 359 A, Crat. 438 A, Polit. 287 A-B, 263 C, 302 B, Laws 682 E, 697 C, 864 C, and many other passages. Cf. also Lysias ii. 61ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐξήχθην, Demosth.De cor. 211, Aristot.De an. 403 b 16, also p. 193, note i, and Plato's carefulness in keeping to the point under discussion in 353 C, Theaet. 182 C, 206 C, Meno 93 A-B, Gorg. 479 D-E, 459 C-D, etc.

12 For the irony of the expression Cf. Laws 693 D, Aesch.Eumen. 373.

13 Cf. 559 D f.

14 εἰς μέσον: cf. p. 249, note f.

15 Ironical.δή. See p. 300, note a. Cf. modern satire on “moderate” drinking and “moderate” preparedness.

16 ὡς ᾤετο is another ironical formula like ἵνα δή, ὡς ἄρα, etc.

17 θές: Cf. Theaet. 191 C, Phileb. 33 D.

18 This is the αὖ of the succession of the generations. Cf. p. 247, note f.

19 Cf. 559 E.

20 An overlooked reference to the Magi who set up the false Smerdis. Cf. Herod. iii. 61 ff.

21 Cf. Symp. 205 D.

22 προστάτην: cf. 562 D and 565 C-D.

23 For τὰ ἕτοιμα cf. 552 B, Symp. 200 D and E, and Horace, Odes i. 31. 17 “frui paratis.”

24 Cf. Alc. I. 135 Eἔρωτα ὑπόπτερον and the fragment of Eubulus (fr. 41, Kock ii. p. 178): τίς ἦν ὁ γράψας πρῶτος ἀνθρώπων ἄρα ἢ κηροπλαστήσας Ἔρωθ᾽ ὑπόπτερον

25 Cf. 564 D.

26 Cf. Phaedrus 253 E.

27 For οἰστρᾷ Cf. Phaedr. 240 D.

28 For ποιουμένας in this sense cf. 538 C, 498 A, 574 D.

29 Cf. on 560 D, p. 299, note c.

30 ἐπακτοῦ: cf. 405 B, Pindar, Pyth. vi. 10, Aesch.Seven against Thebes 583, Soph.Trach. 259.

31 Cf. 573 D, Eurip.Hippol. 538, Andromeda, fr. 136 (Nauck)θεῶν τύραννε . . . Ἔρως, and What Plato Said, p. 546 on Symp. 197 B.

32 For drunkenness as a tyrannical mood Cf. Laws 649 B, 671 B, Phaedr, 238 B.

33 Cf. Adam ad loc., who insists it means his origin as well as that of others, and says his character is still to be described. But it has been in C and before.

34 Cf. Phileb. 25 B and perhaps Rep. 427 E with 449 D. The slight jest is a commonplace today. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 351, says it is a fragment of an elegy. He forgets the Philebus.

35 Cf. Vol. I. p 160, note a on 373 A. Emendations are superfluous.

36 ὦν ἄν: cf. 441 D-Eὅτου, etc., 583 A ἐν ᾧ and my review of Jowett and Campbell, A.J.P. xvi. p. 237.

37 Cf. Phaedr. 238 B-C.

38 For παραιρέσεις cf. Thuc. i. 122. 1, Aristot.Pol. 1311 a 12, 1315 a 38.

39 ἐννενεοττευμένας Cf. AIc. I. 135 E, Laws 776 A, 949 C, Aristoph.Birds 699, 1108.

40 Cf. Aesch.Eumen. 544.

41 Cf. Gorg. 494 Aἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας.

42 Cf. Vol. I. 349 B f.

43 The word ἀναγκαῖαν means both “necessary” and “akin.” Cf. Eurip.Androm. 671τοιαῦτα λάσκεις τοὺς ἀναγκαίους φίλους.

44 For the idiom πληγαῖς . . . δοῦναι Cf. Phaedr. 254 Eὀδύναις ἔδωκεν with Thompson's note. Cf. 566 Cθανάτῳ δέδοται. For striking his father cf. 569 B, Laws 880 E ff., Aristoph.Clouds 1375 ff., 1421 ff.

45 For ἐπιλείπῃ cf. 568 E, 573 E.

46 Cf. Meno 72 A, Cratyl. 401 E, Blaydes on Aristoph.Clouds 297.

47 He becomes a τοιχωρύχος or a λωποδύτης (Aristoph.Frogs 772-773, Birds 497, Clouds 1327). Cf. 575 B, Laws 831 E.

48 νεωκορήσει is an ironical litotes. So ἐφάψεται in the preceding line.

49 For ποιουμένας cf. 573 B. for the thought cf 538 C.

50 Cf. 567 E.

51 Cf. on 591 E.

52 τὸν ἔχοντα: Cf. Phaedr. 239 C, Laws 837 B, Soph.Antig. 790 and also Rep. 610 C and E.

53 For the tyrant's companions cf. Newman, i. p. 274, note 1.

54 Cf. the similar lists of crimes in Gorg. 508 E, Xen.Mem. i. 2. 62.

55 So Shaw and other moderns argue in a somewhat different tone that crimes of this sort are an unimportant matter.

56 οὐδ᾽ ἴκταρ βάλλει was proverbial, “doesn't strike near,” “doesn't come within range.” Cf. Aelian, N.A. xv. 29. Cf. also οὐδ᾽ ἐγγύς, Symp. 198 B, 221 D, Herod. ii. 121, Demosth.De cor. 97.

57 In the Greek the apodosis is suppressed. Cf. Protag. 325 D. Adam refers to Herwerden, Mn. xix. pp. 338 f.

58 So also the Hindus of Bengal, The Nation,July 13, 1911, p. 28. Cf. Isoc. iv. 25πατρίδα καὶ μητέρα, Lysias ii. 18μητέρα καὶ πατρίδα, Plut. 792 E (An seni resp.）ἡ δὲ πατρὶς καὶ μητρὶς ὡς Κρῆτες καλοῦσι. Vol. I. p. 303, note e, on 414 E, Menex. 239 A.

59 Cf. the accidental coincidence of Swinburne's refrain, “This is the end of every man's desire” (Ballad of Burdens).

60 ὑποπεσόντες: cf. on 494 Cὑποκείσονται.

61 σχήματα was often used for the figures of dancing. Cf. Laws 669 D, Aristoph.Peace 323, Xen.Symp. 7. 5, Eurip.Cyclops 221. Isoc.Antid. 183 uses it of gymnastics.

62 Cf. Phaedr. 241 Aἄλλος γεγονώς, Demosth. xxxiv. 13ἕτερος ἤδη . . . καὶ οὐχ ὁ αὐτός.

63 Cf. Lucian, Nigrinus 15ἄγευστος μὲν ἐλευθερίας, ἀπείρατος δὲ παρρησίαςAristot.Eth. Nic. 1176 b 19, 1179 b 15.

64 Cf. Laws 730 C, 705 A.

65 Cf. Phaedr. 239 Dἓν κεφάλαιον

66 Cf. Gorgias 473 C-E.

67 Cf. the defiance of 473 A and 579 Dκἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ, Phaedr. 277 Eοὐδὲ ἂν ὁ πᾶς ὄχλος αὐτὸ ἐπαινέσῃ, and Phileb. 67 B, also Gorg. 473 E “you say what nobody else would say,” and perhaps 500 Dδιαβολὴ δ᾽ ἐν πᾶσι πολλή. Cf. Schopenhauer's “The public has a great many bees in its bonnet.”

68 Cf. Tim. 75 D, Rep. 555 A, Parmen. 133 A. For the analogy of individual and state cf. on 591 E.

69 Cf. 577 A, 591 D, 619 Aἀνέκπληκτος, Crat. 394 B, Gorg. 523 D, Protag. 355 B. Cf. also Epictet. iii. 22. 28ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας περιλαμπομένοις, and Shelley, “ . . . accursed thing to gaze on prosperous tyrants with a dazzled eye.”

70 εἴ τινες: Cf. Gorg. 521 Bἐάν τι ἔχω.

71 For the contrast of tyranny and kingdom cf. 587 B, Polit. 276 E. It became a commonplace in later orations on the true king. Cf. Dümmler, Prolegomena, pp. 38-39.

72 The word προστάσεως is frequent in Polybius. Cf. also Boethius iv. chap. 2. Cf. 1Maccabees xv. 32, “When he saw the glory of Simon, and the cupboard of gold and silver plate, and his great attendance [παράστασιν].” Cf. also Isoc. ii. 32ὄψιν, and Shakes.Measure for MeasureII. ii. 59 “ceremony that to great ones ’longs,”Henry V.IV. i. 280 “farced title running ’fore the king.”

73 For σχηματίζονται cf. Xen.Oecon. 2. 4.σὸν σχῆμα ὁ σὺ περιβέβλησαι, Dio Cass. iii.fr. 13. 2σχηματίσας . . . ἑαυτόν and σχηματισμός, Rep. 425 B, 494 D.

74 It is easy conjecture that Plato is thinking of himself and Dionysius I. Cf. Laws 711 A.

75 Cf. Thackeray on Ludovicus and Ludovicus rex, Hazlitt, “Strip it of its externals and what is it but a jest?” also Gory. 523 E, Xen.Hiero 2. 4, Lucian, Somnium seu Gallus 24ἢν δὲ ὑποκύψας ἴδῃς τὰ γ᾽ ἔνδον . . . , Boethius, Cons. iii. chap. 8 (Loeb, p. 255), and for the thought Herod. i. 99.

76 Cf. Longinus, On the Sublime 7τὸ ἔξωθεν προστραγῳδούμενον, and Dümmler, Akademika p. 5.

77 In Menex. 238 E Plato says that other states are composed of slaves and master, but Athens of equals.

78 For τάξιν cf. 618 Bψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν.

79 γέμειν: cf. 544 C, 559 C, Gorg. 522 E, 525 A.

80 Cf. 445 B, Gorg. 467 B, where a verbal distinction is drawn with which Plato does not trouble himself here. In Laws 661 Bἐπιθυμῇ is used. Cf. ibid. 688 Bτἀναντία ταῖς βουλήσεσιν, and Herod. iii. 80.

81 Cf. Cratyl. 392 Cὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν γένος.

82 Cf. Julian, Or. ii. 50 C. In the Stoic philosophy the stultus repents, and “omnis stultitia fastidio laborat sui.” Cf. also Seneca, De benef. iv. 34 “non mutat sapiens consilium . . . ideo numquam illum poenitentia subit,” Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag. iii. 147. 21, 149. 20 and 33, Stob.Ec. ii. 113. 5, 102. 22, and my emendation of Eclogues ii. 104. 6 W. in Class. Phil. xi. p. 338.

83 Cf. Laws 832 Aπεινῶσι τὴν ψυχήν, Xen.Symp. 4. 36πεινῶσι χρημάτων, Oecon. xiii. 9πεινῶσι γὰρ τοῦ ἐπαίνου, Aristot.Pol. 1277 a 24 “Jason said he was hungry when he was not a tyrant,” Shakes.TempestI. ii. 112 “so dry he was for sway.” Cf. Novotny, p. 1902, on Epist. vii. 335 B, also Max. Tyr.Diss. iv. 4τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη πενέστερον ἀνδρὸς ἐπιθυμοῦντος διηνεκῶς . . . ; Julian, Or. ii. 85 B, Teles (Hense), pp. 32-33. for the thought see also Gorg. 493-494. cf. also 521 A with 416 E, Phaedr. 279 C, and Epist. 355 C.

84 Cf. on 508 E, p. 104, note c.

85 Cf. Protag. 355 A, Alc. I. 104 E, 579 C.

86 Stallbaum quotes Plut.De virtut. et vit. p. 101 D, Lucian, Herm. 67ἰδιώτην βίον ζῆν, Philo, Vit. Mos. 3.

87 Adam ad loc. emends τῷ τοιούτῳ to τῶ τοιοῦτω, insisting that the MS. reading cannot be satisfactorily explained.

88 Cf. Vol. I. p. 71, note f on 344 D-E, and What Plato Said, p. 484, on Laches 185 A.

89 Cf. Polit. 259 B. But Plato is not concerned with the question of size or numbers here.

90 Plato's imaginary illustration is one of his many anticipations of later history, and suggests to an American many analogies.

91 Cf. Critias, fr. 37 Diels ii.3 p. 324, on Sparta's fear of her slaves.

92 For ἐν παντί cf. 579 B, Symp. 194 Aἐν παντὶ εἴης, Euthyd. 301 Aἐν παντὶ ἐγενόμην ὑπὸ ἀπορίας, Xen.Hell. v. 4. 29, Thucyd. vii. 55, Isoc. xiii. 20ἐν πᾶσιν . . κακοῖς. Cf.παντοῖος εἶναι（γίννεσθαι) Herod. ix. 109, vii. 10. 3, iii. 124, Lucian, Pro lapsu 1.

93 For the idiom οὐδὲν δεόμενος cf. 581 E, 367 A-B, 410 B, 405 C, Prot. 331 C, and Shorey in Class. Journ. ii. p. 171.

94 For ancient denials of the justice of slavery cf. Newman, Aristot.Pol. i. pp. 140 ff., Philemon, fr. 95 (Kock ii. p. 508)κἂν δοῦλος ἐστί, σάρκα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει, φύσει γὰρ οὐδεὶς δοῦλος ἐγενήθη ποτέ. ἡ δ᾽ αὖ τύχη τὸ σῶμα κατεδουλώσατο, and Anth. Pal. vii. 553 with Mackail's note, p. 415.

95 Cf. p. 360, note a. For the tyrant's terrors cf. Menander,Ἀσπίς（fr. 74, Kock iii p. 24), Tacitus, Ann. vi. 6, 579 E and Xen.Hiero 6.8. The tyrant sees enemies everywhere.

96 Cf. Xen.Hiero 1. 12 οἱ δὲ τύραννοι οὐ μάλα ἀμφὶ θεωρίας ἔχουσιν: οὔτε γὰρ ἰέναι αὐτοῖς ἀσφαλές. Cf. Crito 52 Bἐπὶ θεωρίαν.

97 Cf. Laws 781 C, Gorg. 485 D.

98 τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς is the measure of the excess of the unhappiness of the actual tyrant over that of the tyrannical soul in private life. Cf. my review of Jowett, A.J.P. xiii. p. 366.

99 Cf. 580 C and What Plato Said, p. 506, on Gorg. 491 D.

100 For the analogy of soul and body cf. 591 B and on 564 D, p. 313, note g.

101 Cf. Soph. 252 Cὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀληθές.

102 Cf. on 576 C, p. 354, note b.

103 Cf. 576 B-C.

104 πανδοκεύς is a host or inn-keeper; Cf. Laws 918 B. Here the word is used figuratively. Cf. Aristoph.Wasps 35φάλαινα πανδοκεύτρια, “an all-receptive grampus” (Rogers).

105 On the wretched lot of the tyrant cf. Xen.Hiero passim, e.g. 4. 11, 6. 4, 8, 15. the Hiero is Xenophon's rendering of the Socratico-Platonic conception of the unhappy tyrant. Cf. 1. 2-3. See too Gerhard Heintzeler, Das Bild des Tyrannen bei Platon, esp. pp. 43 ff. and 76 f.; Cic.De amicit. 15, Isoc.Nic. 4-5, Peace 112, Hel. 32 ff. But in Euag. 40 Isocrates says all men would admit that tyranny “is the greatest and noblest and most coveted of all good things, both human and divine.” In Epist. 6. 11. ff. he agrees with Plato that the life of a private citizen is better than the tyrant's But in 2. 4 he treats this as a thesis which many maintain. Cf. further Gorg. 473 E, Alc. I. 135 B, Phaedr. 248 E, Symp. 182 C, Eurip.Ion 621 ff., Suppl. 429 ff., Medea 119 ff., I.A. 449-450, Herodotus iii. 80, Soph.Ajax 1350 “not easy for a tyrant to be pious”; also Dio Chrys.Or. iii. 58 f., Anon. Iambl.fr. 7. 12, DieIs ii.3 p. 333, J. A. K. Thomson, Greek and Barbarian, pp. 111 ff., Dümmler, Prolegomena, p. 31, Baudrillart, J. Bodin et son temps, p. 292-293 “Bodin semble . . . se souvenir de Platon flétrissant le tyran. . . . ”

106 Adam has an exhaustive technical note on this.

107 Cf. Phileb. 66 Aὑπό τε ἀγγέλων πέμπων, etc., Eurip.Alc. 737κηρύκων ὕπο. Grote and other liberals are offended by the intensity of Plato's moral conviction. See What Plato Said, p. 364, Laws 662-663, Unity of Plato's Thought, p.25.

108 Plato puns on the name Ariston. For other such puns Cf. Gorg. 463 E, 481 D, 513 B, Rep. 600 B, 614 B, Symp. 174 B, 185 C, 198 C.

109 Cf. Laws 664 B-C.

110 Cf. on 570 C, p. 367, note a.

111 Cf. 367 E, 427 D, 445 A, 612 B.

112 Cf. 435 B-C ff.

113 Practically all editors reject τὸ λογιστικόν. But Apelt, p. 525, insists that δέξεται cannot be used without a subject on the analogy of 453 Dἔοικεν, 497 Cδηλώσει and δείξει, hence we must retain λογιστικόν, in the sense of “ability to reckon,” and he compares Charm. 174 B and the double sense of λογιστικόν in Rep. 525 B, 587 D, 602 E. He says it is a mild mathematical joke, like Polit. 257 A.

114 Cf. Phileb. 26 Cτὸ . . . πλῆθος. Cf. Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 492, n. 2.

115 Here again the concept is implied (Cf. on 564 B, p. 313, note e and Introd. pp. x-xi). Cf. Parmen. 132 C, 135 B, Phileb. 16 D, 18 C-D, 23 E, 25 C, Aristot.Eth. Nic. 1130 b 2ἑνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν, and εἰς ἓν κεφάλαιον ἀπερειδοίμεθα, 581 A, Schleiermacher's interpretation of which, “so würden wir uns in der Erklärung doch auf ein Hauptstück stützen,” approved by Stallbaum, misses the point. For the point that there is no one name for it Cf. What Plato Said, p. 596, on Soph. 267 D.

116 Vol. I. 439 D.

117 Cf. Vol. I. p. 380, note b.

118 Since there is no one specific name for the manifold forms of this part (580 D-E), a makeshift term is to be used for convenience' sake. See also p. 371, note e.

119 Or “is bent on,”τέταται. Cf. 499 Aζητεῖν . . . τὸ ἀληθὲς συντεταμένως, Symp. 222 A and Bury ad loc., Symp. 186 Bἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει. For the thought cf. also Phileb. 58 D.

120 Cf. Phaedo 67 Bτοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς.

121 Cf. 338 D, 342 C.

122 Cf. my review of Jowett in A.J.P. xiii. p. 366, which Adam quotes and follows and Jowett and Campbell (Republic) adopt. For the three types of men cf. also Phaedo 68 C, 82 C. Stewart, Aristot. Eth. Nic. p. 60 (1095 b 17), says, “The three lives mentioned by Aristotle here answer to the three classes of men distinguished by Plato (Rep. 581). . . . Michelet and Grant point out that this threefold division occurs in a metaphor attributed to Pythagoras by Heracleides Ponticus (apudCic.Tusc. v. 3). . . . “ Cf. Aristot.Eth. Nic. 1097 a-b (i. 5. 1), also Diog. L. vii. 130 on Stoics, Plutarch, De liber. educ. x. (8 A), Renan, Avenir de Ia science, p. 8. Isoc.Antid. 217 characteristically recognizes only the three motives, pleasure, gain, and honor. For the entire argument cf. Aristot.Eth. Nic. 1176 a 31, 1177 a 10, and supra,Introd. pp. liv-lv.

123 For ἐν μέρει cf. 468 B, 520 C and D, 577 C, 615 A, Gorg. 496 B, Laws 876 B, 943 A, 947 C, Polit. 265 A; Contrasted with ἐν τῷ μέρει, Meno 92 E, Gorg. 462 A, 474 A. The two expressions, similar in appearance, illustrate how a slight change alters an idiom. So e.g.καινὸν οὐδέν（Gorg. 448 A) has nothing to do with the idiom οὐδὲν καινόν（Phaedo 100 B);τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα（Rep. 612 C) is different from λόγου ἕνεκα（Theaet. 191 C—dicis causa);πάντα τἀγαθά（Laws 631 B) has no connection with the idiomatic πάντ᾽ ἀγαθά（Rep. 471 C, Cf. supra ad loc.); nor Pindar's πόλλ᾽ ἄνω τὰ δ᾽ αὖ κάτω（Ol. xii. 6) with ἄνω κάτω as used in Phaedo 96 B, Gorg. 481 D, etc. Cf. also ἐν τέχνῃProt. 319 C with ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ317 C,νῷ ἔχεινRep. 490 A with ἐν νῷ ἔχειν344 D, etc.,τοῦ παντὸς ἡμάρτηκενPhaedr. 235 E with παντὸς ἁμαρτάνειν237 C. The same is true of words—to confuse καλλίχορος with καλλίχοιρος would be unfortunate; and the medieval debates about ὁμοουσία and ὁμοιουσία were perhaps not quite as ridiculous as they are generally considered.

124 Cf. Laws 658 on judging different kinds of literature.

125 Cf. p. 255, note f, on 549 A. Xenophon is the typical φιλότιμος. In Mem. iii. 3. 13 he says that the Athenians “excel others in love of honor, which is the strongest incentive to deeds of honor and renown” (Marchant, Loeb tr.). Cf. Epist. 320 A, Symp. 178 D, and also Xen.Cyrop. i. 2. 1, Mem. iii. i. 10.

126 Cf. Aristot.Eth. Nic. 1095 b 16, and on 528 E.

127 Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph.Clouds 920, and Turgeniev's novel, Smoke.

128 Cf. Phileb. 58 C on dialectic.

129 Cf. 598 B, Epist. iii. 315 C, Marc. Aurel. viii. 1πόρρω φιλοσοφίας. Hermann's text or something like it is the only idiomatic one, and τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω must express the philosopher's opinion of the pleasurableness of the lower pleasures as compared with the higher. Cf. A.J.P. xiii. p. 366.

130 For the infinitive cf. 492 Cκαὶ φήσειν, 530 Bκαὶ ζητεῖν.

131 τῷ ὄντι marks the etymological use of ἀναγκαίας. Cf. on 511 B and 551 E, p. 266, note a.

132 Cf. 558 D f.

133 This anticipates Laws 663 A, 733 A-B, 734 A-B.

134 i.e. what is the criterion? Cf. 582 Dδι᾽ οὗ, Sext. Empir. Bekker, p. 60 (Pyrrh. Hypotyp. ii. 13-14) and p. 197 (Adv. Math. vii. 335). Cf. Diog. L.Prologue 21, and Laches 184 E. For the idea that the better judge cf. also Laws 663 C, Aristot.Eth. Nic. 1176 a 16-19.

135 Cf. 582 D, On Virtue 373 D, Xen.Mem. iii. 3. 11.

136 The force of οὐ extends through the sentence. Cf. Class. Phil. vi. (1911) p. 218, and my note on Tim. 77 a in A.J.P. p. 74. Cf. Il. v. 408, xxii, 283, Pindar, Nem. iii. 15, Hymn Dem. 157.

137 For the periphrasis γεγονὼς ἔσται Cf. Charm. 174 Dἀπολελοιπὸς ἔσται.

138 Cf. 508 B, 518 C, 527 D.

139 Cf. on 582 A, p. 376, note d.

140 The third cup of wine was always dedicated to Zeus the Saviour, and τρίτος σωτήρ became proverbial. Cf. Charm. 167 A, Phileb. 66 D, Laws 692 A, 960 C, Epist. vii. 334 D, 340 A. Cf. Hesychius s.v.τρίτος κρατήρ. Brochard, La Morale de Platon, missing the point, says, “Voici enfin un troisième argument qui paraît à Platon le plus décisif puisqu'il l'appelle une vicoire vraiment olympique.” For the idea of a contest Cf. Phileb. passim.

141 Cf. Phileb. 36 C, 44 Dἡδοναὶ ἀληθεῖς. For the unreality of the lower pleasures Cf. Phileb. 36 A ff. and esp. 44 C-D, Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 23-25, What Plato Said, pp. 322-323 and 609-610, Introd. pp. lvi-lix, Rodier, Remarques sur le Philèbe, p. 281.

142 Cf. Phileb. 52 Cκαθαρὰς ἡδονάς, and 53 Cκαθαρὰ λύπης.

143 Cf. Laws 663 C, Phaedo 69 B, 365 C, 523 B, 602 D, 586 B, Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 266.

144 One of Plato's evasions. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 513, on Meno 81 A, Phileb. 44 B. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 266 misses the point and says that by the wise man Plato means himself.

145 For this rhetorical καίτοι cf. 360 C, 376 B, 433 B, 440 D, Gorg. 452 E, Laws 663 E, 690 C.

146 Cf. Phileb. 22 E, Aesch.Prom. 919, Soph.Antig. 1046.

147 If any inference could he drawn from the fact that in the Philebus 42 D ff. and 32 E the reality of the neutral state has to be proved, it would be that the Philebus is earlier, which it is not.

148 For ἐν μέσῳ Cf. Phileb. 35 E.

149 Cf. perhaps Phileb. 45 B, Aristot.Eth. Nic. 1095 a 24, and Heracleit.fr. 111, Diels i.3 p. 99νοῦσος ὑγιείην ἐποίησεν ἡδύ.

150 Cf. Phileb. 43 E, Hipp. Maj. 300 B f.

151 Aristotle attacks this doctrine with captious dialectic in his Topics and De anima.

152 Cf. 586 C, and Phileb. 42 B and 41 E.

153 For οὐδὲν ὑγιές in this sense cf. on 523 B.

154 Cf. Phileb. 44 C-D, Xen.Oecon. 1. 20προσποιούμεναι ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, etc.

155 For the idea that smells are not conditioned by pain Cf. Tim. 65 A, Phileb. 51 B and E, and Siebeck, Platon als Kritiker Aristotelischer Ansichten, p. 161.

156 Cf. Gorg. 493-494, Phileb. 42 C ff., and Phaedr. 258 E, which Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 267 overlooks.

157 Cf. Phaedo 65 A, Phaedr. 258 E, Vol. I. p. 8, note a, on 328 D, and p. 8, note b.

158 Cf. Tim. 45 D (of sensations)μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς, Laws 673 A, Rep. 462 Cπρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη. Cf. also Phileb. 33 D-E, 34, 43 B-C, and What Plato Said, p. 608.

159 Cf. Phileb. 44 B, 44 Cλυπῶν . . . ἀποφυγάς, Protag. 354 B.

160 For ἐν τῇ φύσει Cf. Parmen. 132 D.

161 For the purposes of his illustration Plato takes the popular view of up and down, which is corrected in Tim. 62 C-D and perhaps by the ironical δή in Phaedo 112 C. Cf. Zeller, Aristotle(Eng.)i. p. 428.

162 Cf. Aristot.Met. 1011 b 30-31 and Eth. Nic. 1154 a 30διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι.

163 The argument from the parallel of body and mind here belongs to what we have called confirmation. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 528, on Phaedo 78 B, The figurative use of repletion and nutrition is not to be pressed in proof of contradictions with the Philebus or Gorgias. Cf. Matthew v. 6 “Hunger and thirst after righteousness.”

164 For κενώσεις Cf. Phileb. 35 B, 42 C-D, Tim. 65 A.

165 For the figure of nourishment of the soul Cf. Protag. 313 D, Phaedr. 248 B, and Soph. 223 E.

166 Cf. What Plato Said, p. 517, on Meno 98 A-B.

167 Different kinds of intelligence are treated as synonyms because for the present purpose their distinctions are irrelevant. Cf. 511 A, C, and Dδιάνοια. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 43 and p. 47, n. 339. Plato does not distinguish synonyms nor virtual synonyms for their own sake as Prodicus did. Cf. Protag. 358 A-B.

168 Cf. Symp. 209 Aφρόνησίν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν

169 For ξυνόντες see Blaydes on Aristoph.Clouds 1404.

170 Cf. What Plato Said, p. 528, on Phaedo 79 C for πλανάω of error in thought. This is rather the errare of Lucretius ii. 10 and the post-Aristotelian schools.

171 Cf. on 576 Aἄγευστος, and for the thought of the whole sentence cf. Dio Chrys.Or. xiii., Teubner, vol. i. p. 240.

172 Cf. Milton, Comus,“Ne'er looks to heaven amid its gorgeous feast,” Rossetti, “Nineveh,”in fine,“That set gaze never on the sky,” etc. Cf. S. O. Dickermann, De Argumentis quibusdam ap. Xenophontem, Platonem, Aristotelem obviis e structura hominis et animalium petitis,Halle, 1909, who lists Plato's Symp. 190 A, Rep. 586 A, Cratyl. 396 B, 409 C, Tim. 90 A, 91 E, and many other passages.

173 Cf. Aristot.Eth. Nic. 1095 b 20βοσκημάτων βίον. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 611, on Phileb., in fine.

174 Cf. 373 E, Phaedo 66 C ff., Berkeley, Siris 330 “For these things men fight, cheat, and scramble.”

175 τὸ στέγον: Cf. Gorg. 493 B, Laws 714 A.

176 Plato laughs at himself. Cf. 509 C and 540 B-C. The picturesque, allegorical style of oracles was proverbial. For χρησμῳδεῖν Cf. Crat. 396 D, Apol. 39 C, Laws 712 A.

177 Cf. on 584 A, p. 384, note a.

178 For περιμαχήτους cf. Aristot.Eth. Nic. 1168 b 19, Eth. Eud. 1248 b 27, and on 521 A, p. 145, note e.

179 For the Stesichorean legend that the real Helen remained in Egypt while only her phantom went to Troy Cf. Phaedr. 243 A-B, Eurip.Hel. 605 ff., Elect. 1282-1283, Isoc.Hel. 64, and Philologus 55, pp. 634 ff. Dümmler, Akademika p. 55, thinks this passage a criticism of Isoc.Helena 40. Cf. also Teichmüller, Lit. Fehden, i. pp. 113 ff. So Milton, Reason of Church Government,“A lawny resemblance of her like that air-born Helena in the fables.” For the ethical symbolism cf. 520 C-D.

180 Cf. Phaedo 69 B, and Theaet. 176 Bμετὰ φρονήσεως.

181 ἐξηγῆται has a religious tone. See on ἐξηγητής427 C. Cf. 604 B.

182 Cf. on 583 B, p. 380, note b.

183 Cf. What Plato Said, p. 491, on Lysis 221 E.

184 Cf. 352 A, 440 B and E, 442 D, 560 A, Phaedr. 237 E.

185 Cf. What Plato Said, p. 480 on Charm. 161 B.

186 For εἰς τὸ δυνατόν cf. 500 D, 381 C, Laws 795 D, 830 B, 862 B, 900 C.

187 What follows (587 B-588 A) is not to be taken too seriously. It illustrates the method of procedure by minute links, the satisfaction of Plato's feelings by confirmations and analogies, and his willingness to play with mathematical symbolism. Cf. 546 B f. and William Temple, Plato and Christianity, p. 55: “Finally the whole thing is a satire on the humbug of mystical number, but I need not add that the German commentators are seriously exercised. . . . “ See however A. G. Laird in Class. Phil. xi. (1916) pp. 465-468.

188 Cf. Polit. 257 Bἀφεστᾶσιν

189 Cf. Vil. I. p. 282, note a, on 408 D and p. 344, note b, on 573 D.

190 For εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα Cf. Phaedo 112 B and 509 B.

191 Cf. Vol. I. p. 422, note b, on 445 D and Menex. 238 D.

192 Cf. Phaedo 66 Cεἰδώλων, where Olympiodorus (Norvin, p. 36) takes it of the unreality of the lower pleasures.

193 Cf. Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 14 “Hence estimating life by multiplying its length into its breadth.” For the mathematical jest Cf. Polit. 257 A-B.

194 Humorous as in 509 Cὑπερβολῆς.

195 Cf. Phileb. 13 A, 14 A, Parmen. 141 C, Theaet. 209 A and D.

196 Plato keeps to the point. Cf. 472 B, Phileb. 27 C, and p. 339 note e, on 572 B.

197 Cf. 348 B, 361 A.

198 Cf. Homer, Il. vi. 179-182, Phaedr. 229 D.

199 Od. xii. 85 ff.

200 Hesiod, Theog. 311-312.

201 Stallbaum ad loc. gives a long list of writers who imitated this passage. Hesiod, Theog. 823 f., portrays a similar monster in Typhoeus, who had a hundred serpent-heads. For the animal in man c.Tim. 70 E, Charm. 155 D-E, Phaedr. 230 A, 246 A ff., Boethius, Cons. iv. 2-3, Horace Epist. i. 1. 76, Iamblichus, Protrept. chap. iii.

202 Cf. 596 C.

203 Cf. Cic.De or. iii. 45 “sicut mollissimam ceram . . . fingimus.” Otto, 80, says it is a proverb. For the development of this figure cf. Pliny, Epist. vii. 9 “ut laus est cerae, mollis cedensque sequatur.” For the idea that word is more precise or easy than deed Cf. 473 A, Phaedo 99 E, Laws 636 A, 736 B, Tim. 19 E.

204 Cf. 442 A.

205 Cf. 577 A.

206 The whole passage illustrates the psychology of 440 B ff.

207 Cf. Protag. 352 Cπεριελκομένης, with Aristot.Eth. Nic. 1145 b 24.

208 Perhaps a latent allusion to Hesiod, Works and Days 278.

209 Cf. “the inward man,”Romans vii. 22, 2 Cor. iv. 16, Ephes. iii. 16.

210 Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 10 “Religion says: ‘The kingdom of God is within you’; and culture, in like manner, places human perfection in an internal condition, in the growth and predominance of our humanity proper, as distinguished from our animality.”

211 Cf. Gorg. 516 A-B.

212 Cf. Theaet. 167 B-C, and What Plato Said, p. 456, on Euthyphro 2 D.

213 Cf. 441 A.

214 πράως: cf. the use of ἠρέμα476 E, 494 D.

215 Plato always maintains that wrong-doing is involuntary and due to ignorance. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 640 on Laws 860 D.

216 Cf. 501 B, Tennyson, “Locksley Hall Sixty Years after,”in fine,“The highest Human Nature is divine.”

217 Cf. Matt. xvi.26, Mark viii. 36, “What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?” A typical argumentum ex contrario. Cf. 445 A-B and Vol. I. p. 40, note c. On the supreme value of the soul Cf. Laws 726-728, 743 E, 697 B, 913 B, 959 A-B. Cf. 585 D.

218 Cf. Od. xi. 326, Frazer on Apollodorus iii. 6. 2 (Loeb). Stallbaum refers also to Pindar, Nem. ix. 37 ff, and Pausan. x. 29. 7.

219 For ἐπί in this sense cf. Thompson on Meno 90 D. Cf. Apol. 41 Aἐπὶ πόσῳ, Demosth. xlv. 66.

220 See Adam ad loc. on the asyndeton.

221 αὐθάδεια: Cf. 548 E.

222 Not mentioned before, but, as Schleiermacher says, might be included in τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα. Cf. Adam ad loc. Or Plato may be thinking of the chimaera (Il. vi. 181 ).

223 Cf. 620 C.

224 Cf. p. 49, note e.

225 For the idea that it is better to be ruled by a better man Cf. Alc. I. 135 B-C, Polit. 296 B-C, Democr.fr. 75 (Diels ii.3 p. 77), Xen.Mem. i. 5. 5δουλεύοντα δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἡδοναῖς ἱκετευτέον τοὺς θεοὺς δεσποτῶν ἀγαθῶν τυχεῖν, Xen.Cyr. viii. 1. 40βελτίονας εἶναι. Cf. also Laws 713 D-714 A, 627 E, Phaedo 62 D-E, and Laws 684 C. Cf. Ruskin, Queen of the Air, p. 210 (Brantwood ed., 1891): “The first duty of every man in the world is to find his true master, and, for his own good, submit to him; and to find his true inferior, and, for that inferior's good, conquer him.” Inge, Christian Ethics, p. 252: “It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be free.” Carlyle (apud M. Barton and O. Sitwell, Victoriana): “Surely of all the rights of man the right of the ignorant man to be guided by the wiser, to be gently or forcibly held in the true course by him, is the indisputablest.” Plato's idea is perhaps a source of Aristotle's theory of slavery, though differently expressed. Cf. Aristot.Pol. 1254 b 16 f., Newman i. pp. 109-110, 144 f., 378-379, ii. p. 107. Cf. also Polit. 309 A f., Epist. vii. 335 D, and Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, iii. p. 106.

226 Cf. 343 B-C.

227 Cf. Lysis 207 E f., Laws 808 D, Isoc.xv. 290, Antiphon, fr. 61 (Diels ii.3 p. 303).

228 Cf. on 591 E, p. 412, note d.

229 Cf. on 501 D, p. 74, note a.

230 The paradoxes of the Gorgias are here seriously reaffirmed. Cf. especially Gorg. 472 E ff., 480 A-B, 505 A-B, 509 A f. Cf. also Vol. I. p. 187, 380 Bοἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο κολαζόμενοι, and Laws 728 C; and for the purpose of punishment, What Plato Said, p. 495, on Protag. 324 A-B.

231 The a fortiori argument from health of body to health of soul is one of the chief refutations of the immoralists. Cf. 445 D-E f., Gorg. 479 B, Crito 47 D-E. For the supreme importance of the soul cf. on 589 E.

232 Cf. Gorg. 507 D, Isoc.Epist. vi. 9, Xen.Ages. 7. 1.

233 Health in the familiar skolion (Cf. Gorg. 451 E, Laws 631 C, 661 A, 728 D-E, Euthydem. 279 A-B, Meno 87 E, Soph.frag. 356) is proverbially the highest of ordinary goods. Cf. Gorg. 452 A-B, Crito 47 D, Eryxias 393 C. In fact, for Plato as for modern “scientific” ethics, health in the higher sense—the health of the soul—may be said to be the ultimate sanction. Cf. Vol. I. Introd. pp. xvi and xxi, Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 26, Idea of Good in Plato's Republic, pp. 192-194 f. But an idealistic ethics sometimes expresses itself in the paradox that “not even health,” highest of earthly goods, is of any value compared with the true interests of the soul. Cf. Laws 661 C-E ff., 728 D-E, 744 A, 960 D, Laches 195 C; and Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 17 “Bodily health and vigor . . . have a more real and essential value . . . but only as they are more intimately connected with a perfect spiritual condition than wealth and population are.” This idea may be the source of the story from which the Christian Fathers and the Middle Ages derived much edification, that Plato intentionally chose an unhealthy site for the Academy in order to keep down the flesh. Cf. Aelian, Var. Hist. ix. 10, perhaps the first mention, Porphyry, De abstinentia i. 36, Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. ii. 1.4 416, n. 2; Camden on Cambridge, Gosse, Gossip in a Library, p. 23, and Himerius, Ecl. iii. 18 (Diels ii.3 p. 18)ἑκὼν δὲ ἐνόσει σῶμα Δημόκριτος, ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ τὰ κρείττονα.

234 Cf. What Plato Said, p. 485, on Laches 188 D.

235 Cf. Phaedo 61 A.

236 Cf. p. 355, note d, on 576 D.

237 ὄγκον: cf. Horace's use of acervus,Shorey on Odes ii. 2. 24.

238 Cf. Vol. I. p. 163, note g, Newman i. p. 136. For the evils of wealth Cf. Laws 831 C ff., 870 B-C, Rep. 434 B, 550 D ff., etc.

239 This analogy pervades the Republic. Cf. 570 C and p. 240, note b, on 544 D-E, Introd. Vol. I. p. xxxv. Cf.ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει590 E, 605 B. For the subordination of everything to the moral life cf. also 443 D and p. 509, note d, on 618 C.

240 As in the state, extremes of wealth and poverty are to be avoided. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 645, on Laws 915 B.

241 Almost Aristotle's use of ἕξις.

242 Cf. pp. 52-55 on 496 D-E. The later schools debated the question whether the “sage” would take part in politics. Cf. Seneca, De otio. xxx. 2 f. and Von Arnim, Stoic Vet. Frag. i. p. 62. 22 f.: “Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam (sapiens), nisi si quid impedierit;”ibid. iii. p. 158. 31 ff.: “consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rempublicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos;”ibid. p. 174. 32: “negant nostri sapientem ad quamlibet rempublicam accessurum;”ibid. 37 ff.: “praeterea, cum sapienti rempublicam ipso dignam dedimus, id est mundum, non est extra rempublicam, etiamsi recesserit;ibid. iii. p. 157. 40 ff.ἑπόμενον δὲ τούτοις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πολιτείαις ταῖς ἐμφαινούσαις τινὰ προκοπὴν πρὸς τὰς τελείας πολιτείας ibid. p. 172. 18 f.δεύτερον δὲ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτείας, πολιτεύεσθαι γὰρ κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον. . . ;ibid. 173. 19 ff.ἔφαμεν δ᾽ ὅτι καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον οἷον ἐστι. μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ ἐάν τι <κωλύῃ> καὶ μάλιστ᾽ <ἂν> μηδὲν ὠφφελεῖν μέλλη τὴν πατρίδα, κινδύνους δὲ παρακολουθεῖν ὑπολαμβάνῃ μεγάλους καὶ χαλεποὺς ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας; ibid. p. 175. 3 f.πολιτεύεσθαι φασὶ τὸν σοφὸν ἂν μή τι κωλύη, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ βίων; ibid. 6 ff.Χρύσιππος δὲ πάλιν ἐν τῷ Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς γράφων, οὕτω ῥντορεύσειν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφόν, ὡς καὶ τοῦ πλούτου ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ τῆς δόξης καὶ τῆς ὑγείας

243 Cf. on 399 E, Phaedr. 228 B, Gorg. 466 C, 461 A, 482 B, Phaedo 98 E, 567 E.

244 θεία . . . τύχη. So θεῖα μοῖρα is often used to account for an exception, e.g.493 A, Laws 875 C, 642 C, Meno 99 E, etc. Cf.θεῖον . . . ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου492 E.

245 Lit. “in words.” This is one of the most famous passages in Plato, and a source of the idea of the City of God among both Stoics and Christians. Cf. Marc. Aurel. ix. 29μηδὲ τὴν Πλάτωνος πολιτείαν ἔλπιζε, Justin Martyr's επὶ γῆς διατρίβουσιν ἀλλ᾽ ἐν οὐρανῷ πολιτεύονται, which recalls Philippians iii. 20ἡμῶν δὲ τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει and also Heb. xii. 22, xi. 10 and 16, xiii. 14, Eph. ii. 19, Gal. iv. 26, Rev. iii. 12 and xxi. 2 ff. Ackermann, Das Christliche bei Platon, p. 24, compares Luke xvii. 21 “the kingdom of God is within you.” Cf. also John xviii. 36. Havet, Le Christianisme et ses origines, p. 207, says, “Platon dit de sa République précisément ce qu'on a dit plus tard du royaume de Dieu, qu'elle n'est pas de ce monde.” Cf. also Caird, Evolution of Theology in Greek Philosophy, ii. p. 170, Harnack, Hist. of Dogma(tr. Buchanan), vol. i. p. 332, ii. pp. 73-74 and 338, Proclus, Comm. 352 (Kroll i. 16); Pater, Marius the Epicurean, p. 212 “Marcus Aurelius speaks often of that City on high, of which all other cities are but single habitations . . . ,” p. 213 “ . . . the vision of a reasonable, a divine order, not in nature, but in the condition of human affairs, that unseen Celestial City, Uranopolis, Callipolis . . . “;ibid. p. 158 “thou hast been a citizen in this wide city,” and pp. 192-193. Cf. further Inge, Christian Ethics, pp. 104=105, “let us fly hence to our dear country, as the disciples of Plato have repeated one after another. There are a few people who are so well adjusted to their environment that they do not feel, or rarely feel, this nostalgia for the infinite . . . “ Somewhat different is the Stoic idea of a world state and of the sage as citizen of the world, e.g. Marc. Aurel. iv. 4, Sen.De otio 31, Cic.Nat. deor. ii. 62 (154). Cf. Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p. 92; also ibid. pp. 87-88. For the identification of the πόλις with philosophy cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 15 and vii. 40, Lucian, Hermotim. 22, Sale of Lives 17, Ver. Hist. 17, Proclus i. 16 (Kroll). Diogenes Laertius, ii. 7, reports that, when Anaxagoras was reproached for not concerning himself with the affairs of his country, he replied, “Indeed, I am greatly concerned with my country,” and pointed to heaven.

246 Cf. 499 C-D.

247 Cf. Theaet. 176 E, which Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 179 says must refer to the Republic, Laws 739 D-E, 746 B, and What Plato Said, p. 458 on Euthyphro 6 E.

248 ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν: Adam “found a city in himself.” See his note ad loc. Cf. Jebb on Soph.Oed. Col. 1004.

249 Cf. 499 C-D, 472 B-E, and What Plato Said, p. 564.