Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969. 

====== Plato: Republic Book 6 ======


[484a]

Socrates

“So now, Glaucon,” I said, “our argument after winding1 a long2 and weary way has at last made clear to us who are the philosophers or lovers of wisdom and who are not.” “Yes,” he said, “a shorter way is perhaps not feasible.” “Apparently not,” I said. “I, at any rate, think that the matter would have been made still plainer if we had had nothing but this to speak of, and if there were not so many things left which our purpose3 of discerning the difference between the just and [484b] the unjust life requires us to discuss.” “What, then,” he said, “comes next?” “What else,” said I, “but the next in order? Since the philosophers are those who are capable of apprehending that which is eternal and unchanging,4 while those who are incapable of this but lose themselves and wander5 amid the multiplicities of multifarious things, are not philosophers, which of the two kinds ought to be the leaders in a state?” “What, then,” he said, “would be a fair statement of the matter?” “Whichever,” I said, “appear competent to guard the laws and pursuits of society, [484c] these we should establish as guardians.” “Right” he said. “Is this, then,” said I, “clear, whether the guardian who is to keep watch over anything ought to be blind or keen of sight?” “Of course it is clear,” he said. “Do you think, then, that there is any appreciable difference between the blind6 and those who are veritably deprived of the knowledge of the veritable being of things, those who have no vivid pattern7 in their souls and so cannot, as painters look to their models, fix their eyes8 on the absolute truth, and always with reference to that ideal and in the exactest possible contemplation of it [484d] establish in this world also the laws of the beautiful, the just and the good, when that is needful, or guard and preserve those that are established?” “No, by heaven,” he said, “there is not much difference.” “Shall we, then, appoint these blind souls as our guardians, rather than those who have learned to know the ideal reality of things and who do not fall short of the others in experience9 and are not second to them in any part of virtue?” “It would be strange indeed,” he said, “to choose others than the philosophers, provided they were not deficient in those other respects, for this very knowledge [485a] of the ideal would perhaps be the greatest of superiorities.” “Then what we have to say is how it would be possible for the same persons to have both qualifications, is it not?” “ Quite so.” “Then, as we were saying at the beginning of this discussion, the first thing to understand is the nature that they must have from birth; and I think that if we sufficiently agree on this we shall also agree that the combination of qualities that we seek belongs to the same persons, and that we need no others for guardians of states than these.” “How so?”

“We must accept as agreed this trait of the philosophical nature, [485b] that it is ever enamored of the kind of knowledge which reveals to them something of that essence which is eternal, and is not wandering between the two poles of generation and decay.10” “Let us take that as agreed.” “And, further,” said I, “that their desire is for the whole of it and that they do not willingly renounce a small or a great, a more precious or a less honored, part of it. That was the point of our former illustration11 drawn from lovers and men covetous of honor.” “You are right,” he said. “Consider, then, next whether the men who are to meet our requirements [485c] must not have this further quality in their natures.” “What quality?” “The spirit of truthfulness, reluctance to admit falsehood in any form, the hatred of it and the love of truth.” “It is likely,” he said. “It is not only likely, my friend, but there is every necessity12 that he who is by nature enamored of anything should cherish all that is akin and pertaining to the object of his love.” “Right,” he said. “Could you find anything more akin to wisdom than truth13?” “Impossible,” he said. “Then can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and of falsehood?” [485d] “By no means.” “Then the true lover of knowledge must, from childhood up, be most of all a striver after truth in every form.” “By all means.” “But, again, we surely are aware that when in a man the desires incline strongly to any one thing, they are weakened for other things. It is as if the stream had been diverted into another channel.14 “Surely.” “So, when a man's desires have been taught to flow in the channel of learning and all that sort of thing, they will be concerned, I presume, with the pleasures of the soul in itself, and will be indifferent to those of which the body is the instrument,15 if the man is a true and not a sham16 philosopher.” [485e] “That is quite necessary.” “Such a man will be temperate and by no means greedy for wealth; for the things for the sake of which money and great expenditure are eagerly sought others may take seriously, but not he.” “It is so.” “And there is this further point to be considered in distinguishing [486a] the philosophical from the unphilosophical nature.” “What point?” “You must not overlook any touch of illiberality.17 For nothing can be more contrary than such pettiness to the quality of a soul that is ever to seek integrity and wholeness18 in all things human and divine.” “Most true,” he said. “Do you think that a mind habituated to thoughts of grandeur and the contemplation of all time and all existence19 can deem this life of man a thing of great concern20?” “Impossible,” said he. [486b] “Hence such a man will not suppose death to be terrible?21” “Least of all.” “Then a cowardly and illiberal spirit, it seems, could have no part in genuine philosophy.” “I think not.” “What then? Could a man of orderly spirit, not a lover of money, not illiberal, nor a braggart nor a coward, ever prove unjust, or a driver of hard bargains22?” “Impossible.” “This too, then, is a point that in your discrimination of the philosophic and unphilosophic soul you will observe—whether the man is from youth up just and gentle or unsocial and savage.23” “Assuredly.” “Nor will you overlook this, [486c] I fancy.” “What?” “Whether he is quick or slow to learn. Or do you suppose that anyone could properly love a task which he performed painfully24 and with little result25 from much toil?” “That could not be.” “And if he could not keep what he learned, being steeped in oblivion,26 could he fail to be void of knowledge?” “How could he?” “And so, having all his labor for naught, will he not finally be constrained to loathe himself and that occupation?” [486d] “Of course.” “The forgetful soul, then, we must not list in the roll of competent lovers of wisdom, but we require a good memory.” “By all means.” “But assuredly we should not say that the want of harmony and seemliness in a nature conduces to anything else than the want of measure and proportion.” “Certainly.” “And do you think that truth is akin to measure and proportion or to disproportion?” “To proportion.” “Then in addition to our other requirements we look for a mind endowed with measure and grace, whose native disposition will make it easily guided [486e] to the aspect of the ideal27 reality in all things.” “Assuredly.” “Tell me, then, is there any flaw in the argument? Have we not proved the qualities enumerated to be necessary and compatible28 with one another for the soul that is to have a sufficient and perfect apprehension of reality?” [487a] “Nay, most necessary,” he said. “Is there any fault, then, that you can find with a pursuit which a man could not properly practise unless he were by nature of good memory, quick apprehension, magnificent,29 gracious, friendly and akin to truth, justice, bravery and sobriety?” “Momus30 himself,” he said, “could not find fault with such a combination.” “Well, then,” said I, “when men of this sort are perfected by education and maturity of age, would you not entrust the state solely to them?”

And Adeimantus said, “No one, Socrates, [487b] would be able to controvert these statements of yours. But, all the same, those who occasionally hear you31 argue thus feel in this way32: They think that owing to their inexperience in the game of question and answer33 they are at every question led astray34 a little bit by the argument, and when these bits are accumulated at the conclusion of the discussion mighty is their fall35 and the apparent contradiction of what they at first said36; and that just as by expert draught-players37 the unskilled are finally shut in and cannot make a move, [487c] so they are finally blocked and have their mouths stopped by this other game of draughts played not with counters but with words; yet the truth is not affected by that outcome.38 I say this with reference to the present case, for in this instance one might say that he is unable in words to contend against you at each question, but that when it comes to facts39 he sees that of those who turn to philosophy,40 not merely touching upon it to complete their education41 [487d] and dropping it while still young, but lingering too long42 in the study of it, the majority become cranks,43 not to say rascals, and those accounted the finest spirits among them are still rendered useless44 to society by the pursuit45 which you commend.” And I, on hearing this, said, “Do you think that they are mistaken in saying so?” “I don't know,” said he, [487e] “but I would gladly hear your opinion.” “You may hear, then, that I think that what they say is true.” “How, then,” he replied, “can it be right to say that our cities will never be freed from their evils until the philosophers, whom we admit to be useless to them, become their rulers?” “Your question,” I said, “requires an answer expressed in a comparison or parable.46” “And you,” he said, “of course, are not accustomed to speak in comparisons!”

“So,” said I, “you are making fun of me after driving me into such an impasse of argument. But, all the same, hear my comparison [488a] so that you may still better see how I strain after47 imagery. For so cruel is the condition of the better sort in relation to the state that there is no single thing48 like it in nature. But to find a likeness for it and a defence for them one must bring together many things in such a combination as painters mix when they portray goat-stags49 and similar creatures.50 Conceive this sort of thing happening either on many ships or on one: Picture a shipmaster51 in height and strength surpassing all others on the ship, [488b] but who is slightly deaf52 and of similarly impaired vision, and whose knowledge of navigation is on a par with53 his sight and hearing. Conceive the sailors to be wrangling with one another for control of the helm, each claiming that it is his right to steer though he has never learned the art and cannot point out his teacher54 or any time when he studied it. And what is more, they affirm that it cannot be taught at all,55 but they are ready to make mincemeat of anyone56 who says that it can be taught, [488c] and meanwhile they are always clustered about57 the shipmaster importuning him and sticking at nothing58 to induce him to turn over the helm to them. And sometimes, if they fail and others get his ear, they put the others to death or cast them out59 from the ship, and then, after binding60 and stupefying the worthy shipmaster61 with mandragora or intoxication or otherwise, they take command of the ship, consume its stores and, drinking and feasting, make such a voyage62 of it as is to be expected63 from such, and as if that were not enough, they praise and celebrate as a navigator, [488d] a pilot, a master of shipcraft, the man who is most cunning to lend a hand64 in persuading or constraining the shipmaster to let them rule,65 while the man who lacks this craft66 they censure as useless. They have no suspicions67 that the true pilot must give his attention68 to the time of the year, the seasons, the sky, the winds, the stars, and all that pertains to his art if he is to be a true ruler of a ship, and that he does not believe that there is any art or science of seizing the helm69 [488e] with or without the consent of others, or any possibility of mastering this alleged art70 and the practice of it at the same time with the science of navigation. With such goings-on aboard ship do you not think that the real pilot would in very deed71 be called a star-gazer, an idle babbler, [489a] a useless fellow, by the sailors in ships managed after this fashion?” “Quite so,” said Adeimantus. “You take my meaning, I presume, and do not require us to put the comparison to the proof72 and show that the condition73 we have described is the exact counterpart of the relation of the state to the true philosophers.” “It is indeed,” he said. “To begin with, then, teach this parable74 to the man who is surprised that philosophers are not honored in our cities, and try to convince him that it would be far more surprising [489b] if they were honored.” “I will teach him,”75 he said. “And say to him further: You are right in affirming that the finest spirit among the philosophers are of no service to the multitude. But bid him blame for this uselessness,76 not the finer spirits, but those who do not know how to make use of them. For it is not the natural77 course of things that the pilot should beg the sailors to be ruled by him or that wise men should go to the doors of the rich.78 The author of that epigram79 was a liar. But the true nature of things is that whether the sick man be rich or poor he must needs go to the door of the physician, [489c] and everyone who needs to be governed80 to the door of the man who knows how to govern, not that the ruler should implore his natural subjects to let themselves be ruled, if he is really good for anything.81 But you will make no mistake in likening our present political rulers to the sort of sailors we are just describing, and those whom these call useless and star-gazing ideologists to the true pilots.” “Just so,” he said. “Hence, and under these conditions, we cannot expect that the noblest pursuit should be highly esteemed by those whose way of life is quite the contrary. [489d] But far the greatest and chief disparagement of philosophy is brought upon it by the pretenders82 to that way of life, those whom you had in mind when you affirmed that the accuser of philosophy says that the majority of her followers83 are rascals and the better sort useless, while I admitted84 that what you said was true. Is not that so?” “Yes.”

“Have we not, then, explained the cause of the uselessness of the better sort?” “We have.” “Shall we next set forth the inevitableness of the degeneracy of the majority, and try to show if we can that philosophy [489e] is not to be blamed for this either?” “By all means.” “Let us begin, then, what we have to say and hear by recalling the starting-point of our description of the nature which he who is to be [490a] a scholar and gentleman85 must have from birth. The leader of the choir for him, if you recollect, was truth. That he was to seek always and altogether, on pain of86 being an impostor without part or lot in true philosophy.” “Yes, that was said.” “Is not this one point quite contrary to the prevailing opinion about him?” “It is indeed,” he said. “Will it not be a fair plea in his defence to say that it was the nature of the real lover of knowledge to strive emulously for true being and that he would not linger over [490b] the many particulars that are opined to be real, but would hold on his way, and the edge of his passion would not be blunted nor would his desire fail till he came into touch with87 the nature of each thing in itself by that part of his soul to which it belongs88 to lay hold on that kind of reality—the part akin to it, namely—and through that approaching it, and consorting with reality really, he would beget intelligence and truth, attain to knowledge and truly live and grow,89 and so find surcease from his travail90 of soul, but not before?” “No plea could be fairer.” “Well, then, will such a man love falsehood, [490c] or, quite the contrary, hate it?” “Hate it,” he said. “When truth led the way, no choir91 of evils, we, I fancy, would say, could ever follow in its train.” “How could it?” “But rather a sound and just character, which is accompanied by temperance.” “Right,” he said. “What need, then, of repeating from the beginning our proof of the necessary order of the choir that attends on the philosophical nature? You surely remember that we found pertaining to such a nature courage, grandeur of soul, aptness to learn, memory.92 And when you interposed [490d] the objection that though everybody will be compelled to admit our statements,93 yet, if we abandoned mere words and fixed our eyes on the persons to whom the words referred, everyone would say that he actually saw some of them to be useless and most of them base with all baseness, it was in our search for the cause of this ill-repute that we came to the present question: Why is it that the majority are bad? And, for the sake of this, we took up again the nature of the true philosophers and defined what it must necessarily be?” [490e] “That is so,” he said.

“We have, then,” I said, “to contemplate the causes of the corruption of this nature in the majority, while a small part escapes,94 even those whom men call not bad but useless; and after that in turn [491a] we are to observe those who imitate this nature and usurp its pursuits and see what types of souls they are that thus entering upon a way of life which is too high95 for them and exceeds their powers, by the many discords and disharmonies of their conduct everywhere and among all men bring upon philosophy the repute of which you speak.” “Of what corruptions are you speaking?” “I will try,” I said, “to explain them to you if I can. I think everyone will grant us this point, that a nature such as we just now postulated [491b] for the perfect philosopher is a rare growth among men and is found in only a few. Don't you think so?” “Most emphatically.” “Observe, then, the number and magnitude of the things that operate to destroy these few.” “What are they?” “The most surprising fact of all is that each of the gifts of nature which we praise tends to corrupt the soul of its possessor and divert it from philosophy. I am speaking of bravery, sobriety, and the entire list.96” “That does sound like a paradox,” said he. [491c] “Furthermore,” said I, “all the so-called goods97 corrupt and divert, beauty and wealth and strength of body and powerful family connections in the city and all things akin to them—you get my general meaning?” “I do,” he said, “and I would gladly hear a more precise statement of it.” “Well,” said I, “grasp it rightly as a general proposition and the matter will be clear and the preceding statement will not seem to you so strange.” “How do you bid me proceed?” he said. [491d] “We know it to be universally true of every seed and growth, whether vegetable or animal, that the more vigorous it is the more it falls short of its proper perfection when deprived of the food, the season, the place that suits it. For evil is more opposed to the good than to the not-good.98 “Of course.” “So it is, I take it, natural that the best nature should fare worse99 than the inferior under conditions of nurture unsuited to it.” “It is.” “Then,” said I, “Adeimantus, [491e] shall we not similarly affirm that the best endowed souls become worse than the others under a bad education? Or do you suppose that great crimes and unmixed wickedness spring from a slight nature100 and not from a vigorous one corrupted by its nurture, while a weak nature will never be the cause of anything great, either for good or evil?” “No,” he said, “that is the case.” [492a] “Then the nature which we assumed in the philosopher, if it receives the proper teaching, must needs grow and attain to consummate excellence, but, if it be sown101 and planted and grown in the wrong environment, the outcome will be quite the contrary unless some god comes to the rescue.102 Or are you too one of the multitude who believe that there are young men who are corrupted by the sophists,103 and that there are sophists in private life104 who corrupt to any extent worth mentioning,105 and that it is not rather the very men who talk in this strain [492b] who are the chief sophists and educate most effectively and mould to their own heart's desire young and old, men and women?” “When?” said he. “Why, when,” I said, “the multitude are seated together106 in assemblies or in court-rooms or theaters or camps or any other public gathering of a crowd, and with loud uproar censure some of the things that are said and done and approve others, both in excess, with full-throated clamor [492c] and clapping of hands, and thereto the rocks and the region round about re-echoing redouble the din of the censure and the praise.107 In such case how do you think the young man's heart, as the saying is, is moved within him?108 What private teaching do you think will hold out and not rather be swept away by the torrent of censure and applause, and borne off on its current, so that he will affirm109 the same things that they do to be honorable and base, [492d] and will do as they do, and be even such as they?” “That is quite inevitable, Socrates,” he said.

“And, moreover,” I said, “we have not yet mentioned the chief necessity and compulsion.” “What is it?” said he. “That which these ‘educators’ and sophists impose by action when their words fail to convince. Don't you know that they chastise the recalcitrant with loss of civic rights and fines and death?” “They most emphatically do,” he said. “What other sophist, then, or what private teaching do you think [492e] will prevail in opposition to these?” “None, I fancy,” said he. “No,” said I, “the very attempt110 is the height of folly. For there is not, never has been and never will be,111 a divergent type of character and virtue created by an education running counter to theirs112—humanly speaking, I mean, my friend; for the divine, as the proverb says, all rules fail.113 And you may be sure that, if anything is saved and turns out well [493a] in the present condition of society and government, in saying that the providence of God114 preserves it you will not be speaking ill.” “Neither do I think otherwise,” he said. “Then,” said I, “think this also in addition.” “What?” “Each of these private teachers who work for pay, whom the politicians call sophists and regard as their rivals,115 inculcates nothing else than these opinions of the multitude which they opine when they are assembled and calls this knowledge wisdom. It is as if a man were acquiring the knowledge of the humors and desires of a great strong beast116 which he had in his keeping, [493b] how it is to be approached and touched, and when and by what things it is made most savage or gentle, yes, and the several sounds it is wont to utter on the occasion of each, and again what sounds uttered by another make it tame or fierce, and after mastering this knowledge by living with the creature and by lapse of time should call it wisdom, and should construct thereof a system and art and turn to the teaching of it, knowing nothing in reality about which of these opinions and desires is honorable or base, good or evil, just or unjust, [493c] but should apply all these terms to the judgements of the great beast, calling the things that pleased it good, and the things that vexed it bad, having no other account to render of them, but should call what is necessary just and honorable,117 never having observed how great is the real difference between the necessary and the good, and being incapable of explaining it to another. Do you not think, by heaven, that such a one would be a strange educator?” “I do,” he said. “Do you suppose that there is any difference between such a one and the man who thinks [493d] that it is wisdom to have learned to know the moods and the pleasures of the motley multitude in their assembly, whether about painting or music or, for that matter, politics? For if a man associates with these and offers and exhibits to them his poetry118 or any other product of his craft or any political. service,119 and grants the mob authority over himself more than is unavoidable,120 the proverbial necessity of Diomede121 will compel him to give the public what it likes, but that what it likes is really good and honorable, have you ever heard an attempted proof of this that is not simply ridiculous122?” [493e] “No,” he said, “and I fancy I never shall hear it either.”

“Bearing all this in mind, recall our former question. Can the multitude possibly tolerate or believe in the reality of the beautiful in itself as opposed to the multiplicity of beautiful things, or can they believe in anything conceived in its essence as opposed to the many particulars?” “Not in the least,” he said. “Philosophy, then, the love of wisdom, [494a] is impossible for the multitude.123” “Impossible.” “It is inevitable,124 then, that those who philosophize should be censured by them.” “Inevitable.” “And so likewise by those laymen who, associating with the mob, desire to curry favor125 with it.” “Obviously.” “From this point of view do you see any salvation that will suffer the born philosopher to abide in the pursuit and persevere to the end? Consider it in the light of what we said before. [494b] We agreed126 that quickness in learning, memory, courage and magnificence were the traits of this nature.” “Yes.” “Then even as a boy127 among boys such a one will take the lead in all things, especially if the nature of his body matches the soul.” “How could he fail to do so?” he said. “His kinsmen and fellow-citizens, then, will desire, I presume, to make use of him when he is older for their own affairs.” “Of course.” [494c] “Then they will fawn128 upon him with petitions and honors, anticipating129 and flattering the power that will be his.” “That certainly is the usual way.” “How, then, do you think such a youth will behave in such conditions, especially if it happen that he belongs to a great city and is rich and well-born therein, and thereto handsome and tall? Will his soul not be filled with unbounded ambitious hopes,130 and will he not think himself capable of managing the affairs of both Greeks and barbarians,131 [494d] and thereupon exalt himself, haughty of mien and stuffed with empty pride and void of sense132 “He surely will,” he said. “And if to a man in this state of mind133 someone gently134 comes and tells him what is the truth, that he has no sense and sorely needs it, and that the only way to get it is to work like a slave135 to win it, do you think it will be easy for him to lend an ear136 to the quiet voice in the midst of and in spite of these evil surroundings137 “Far from it,” said he. “And even supposing,” said I, “that owing to a fortunate disposition and his affinity for the words of admonition [494e] one such youth apprehends something and is moved and drawn towards philosophy, what do we suppose will be the conduct of those who think that they are losing his service and fellowship? Is there any word or deed that they will stick at138 to keep him from being persuaded and to incapacitate anyone who attempts it,139 both by private intrigue and public prosecution in the court?” [495a] “That is inevitable,” he said. “Is there any possibility of such a one continuing to philosophize?” “None at all,” he said.

“Do you see, then,” said I,” that we were not wrong in saying that the very qualities that make up the philosophical nature do, in fact, become, when the environment and nurture are bad, in some sort the cause of its backsliding,140 and so do the so-called goods—141 riches and all such instrumentalities142?” “No,” he replied, “it was rightly said.” “Such, my good friend, and so great as regards the noblest pursuit, [495b] is the destruction and corruption143 of the most excellent nature, which is rare enough in any case,144 as we affirm. And it is from men of this type that those spring who do the greatest harm to communities and individuals, and the greatest good when the stream chances to be turned into that channel,145 but a small nature146 never does anything great to a man or a city.” “Most true,” said he. [495c] “Those, then, to whom she properly belongs, thus falling away and leaving philosophy forlorn and unwedded, themselves live an unreal and alien life, while other unworthy wooers147 rush in and defile her as an orphan bereft of her kin,148 and attach to her such reproaches as you say her revilers taunt her with, declaring that some of her consorts are of no account and the many accountable for many evils.” “Why, yes,” he replied, “that is what they do say.” “And plausibly,” said I; “for other mannikins, observing that the place is unoccupied and full of fine terms and pretensions, [495d] just as men escape from prison to take sanctuary in temples, so these gentlemen joyously bound away from the mechanical149 arts to philosophy, those that are most cunning in their little craft.150 For in comparison with the other arts the prestige of philosophy even in her present low estate retains a superior dignity; and this is the ambition and aspiration of that multitude of pretenders unfit by nature, whose souls are bowed and mutilated151 by their vulgar occupations152 [495e] even as their bodies are marred by their arts and crafts. Is not that inevitable?” “Quite so,” he said. “Is not the picture which they present,” I said, “precisely that of a little bald-headed tinker153 who has made money and just been freed from bonds and had a bath and is wearing a new garment and has got himself up like a bridegroom and is about to marry his master's daughter [496a] who has fallen into poverty and abandonment?” “There is no difference at all,” he said. “Of what sort will probably be the offspring of such parents?” “Will they not be bastard154 and base?” “Inevitably.” “And so when men unfit for culture approach philosophy and consort with her unworthily, what sort of ideas and opinions shall we say they beget? Will they not produce what may in very deed be fairly called sophisms, and nothing that is genuine or that partakes of true intelligence155?” “Quite so,” he said.

“There is a very small remnant,156 then, Adeimantus,” I said, [496b] “of those who consort worthily with philosophy, some well-born and well-bred nature, it may be, held in check157 by exile,158 and so in the absence of corrupters remaining true to philosophy, as its quality bids, or it may happen that a great soul born in a little town scorns159 and disregards its parochial affairs; and a small group perhaps might by natural affinity be drawn to it from other arts which they justly disdain; and the bridle of our companion Theages160 also might operate as a restraint. For in the case of Theages all other conditions were at hand [496c] for his backsliding from philosophy, but his sickly habit of body keeping him out of politics holds him back. My own case, the divine sign,161 is hardly worth mentioning—for I suppose it has happened to few or none before me. And those who have been of this little company162 and have tasted the sweetness and blessedness of this possession and who have also come to understand the madness of the multitude sufficiently and have seen that there is nothing, if I may say so, sound or right in any present politics,163 and that there is no ally [496d] with whose aid the champion of justice164 could escape destruction, but that he would be as a man who has fallen among wild beasts,165 unwilling to share their misdeeds166 and unable to hold out singly against the savagery of all, and that he would thus, before he could in any way benefit his friends or the state come to an untimely end without doing any good to himself or others,—for all these reasons I say the philosopher remains quiet, minds his own affair, and, as it were, standing aside under shelter of a wall167 in a storm and blast of dust and sleet and seeing others filled full of lawlessness, is content if in any way [496e] he may keep himself free from iniquity and unholy deeds through this life and take his departure with fair hope,168 serene and well content when the end comes.” “Well,” he said, “that is no very slight thing [497a] to have achieved before taking his departure.” “He would not have accomplished any very great thing either,169” I replied, “if it were not his fortune to live in a state adapted to his nature. In such a state only will he himself rather attain his full stature170 and together with his own preserve the common weal.

“The causes and the injustice of the calumniation of philosophy, I think, have been fairly set forth, unless you have something to add.171” “No,” he said, “I have nothing further to offer on that point. But which of our present governments do you think is suitable for philosophy?” [497b] “None whatever,” I said; “but the very ground of my complaint is that no polity172 of today is worthy of the philosophic nature. This is just the cause of its perversion and alteration; as a foreign seed sown in an alien soil is wont to be overcome and die out173 into the native growth,174 so this kind does not preserve its own quality but falls away and degenerates into an alien type. But if ever [497c] it finds the best polity as it itself is the best, then will it be apparent175 that this was in truth divine and all the others human in their natures and practices. Obviously then you are next, going to ask what is this best form of government.” “Wrong,” he said176 “I was going to ask not that but whether it is this one that we have described in our establishment of a state or another.” “In other respects it is this one,” said I; “but there is one special further point that we mentioned even then, namely that there would always have to be resident in such a state an element [497d] having the same conception of its constitution that you the lawgiver had in framing its laws.177” “That was said,” he replied. “But it was not sufficiently explained,” I said, “from fear of those objections on your part which have shown that the demonstration of it is long and difficult. And apart from that the remainder of the exposition is by no means easy.178” “Just what do you mean?” “The manner in which a state that occupies itself with philosophy can escape destruction. For all great things are precarious and, as the proverb truly says, fine things are hard.179” “All the same,” [497e] he said, “our exposition must be completed by making this plain.” “It will be no lack of will,” I said, “but if anything,180 a lack of ability, that would prevent that. But you shall observe for yourself my zeal. And note again how zealously and recklessly I am prepared to say that the state ought to take up this pursuit in just the reverse of our present fashion.181” “In what way?” “At present,” [498a] said I, “those who do take it up are youths, just out of boyhood,182 who in the interval183 before they engage in business and money-making approach the most difficult part of it, and then drop it—and these are regarded forsooth as the best exemplars of philosophy. By the most difficult part I mean discussion. In later life they think they have done much if, when invited, they deign to listen184 to the philosophic discussions of others. That sort of thing they think should be by-work. And towards old age,185 with few exceptions, their light is quenched more completely [498b] than the sun of Heracleitus,186 inasmuch as it is never rekindled.” “And what should they do?” he said. “Just the reverse. While they are lads and boys they should occupy themselves with an education and a culture suitable to youth, and while their bodies are growing to manhood take right good care of them, thus securing a basis and a support187 for the intellectual life. But with the advance of age, when the soul begins to attain its maturity, they should make its exercises more severe, and when [498c] the bodily strength declines and they are past the age of political and military service, then at last they should be given free range of the pasture188 and do nothing but philosophize,189 except incidentally, if they are to live happily, and, when the end has come, crown the life they have lived with a consonant destiny in that other world.”

“You really seem to be very much in earnest, Socrates,” he said; yet I think most of your hearers are even more earnest in their opposition and will not be in the least convinced, beginning with Thrasymachus.” “Do not try to breed a quarrel between me and Thrasymachus, [498d] who have just become friends and were not enemies before either. For we will spare no effort until we either convince him and the rest or achieve something that will profit them when they come to that life in which they will be born gain190 and meet with such discussions as these.” “A brief time191 your forecast contemplates,” he said. “Nay, nothing at all,” I replied, “as compared with eternity.192 However, the unwillingness of the multitude to believe what you say is nothing surprising. For of the thing here spoken they have never beheld a token,193 [498e] but only the forced and artificial chiming of word and phrase, not spontaneous and accidental as has happened here. But the figure of a man ‘equilibrated’ and ‘assimilated’ to virtue's self perfectly, so far as may be, in word and deed, and holding rule in a city of like quality, that is a thing they have never seen [499a] in one case or in many. Do you think they have?” “By no means.” “Neither, my dear fellow, have they ever seriously inclined to hearken to fair and free discussions whose sole endeavor was to search out the truth194 at any cost for knowledge's sake, and which dwell apart and salute from afar195 all the subtleties and cavils that lead to naught but opinion196 and strife in court-room and in private talk.” “They have not,” he said. [499b] “For this cause and foreseeing this, we then despite our fears197 declared under compulsion of the truth198 that neither city nor polity nor man either will ever be perfected until some chance compels this uncorrupted remnant of philosophers, who now bear the stigma of uselessness, to take charge of the state whether they wish it or not, and constrains the citizens to obey them, or else until by some divine inspiration199 a genuine passion for true philosophy takes possession200 [499c] either of the sons of the men now in power and sovereignty or of themselves. To affirm that either or both of these things cannot possibly come to pass is, I say, quite unreasonable. Only in that case could we be justly ridiculed as uttering things as futile as day-dreams are.201 Is not that so?” “It is.” “If, then, the best philosophical natures have ever been constrained to take charge of the state in infinite time past,202 or now are in some barbaric region203 [499d] far beyond our ken, or shall hereafter be, we are prepared to maintain our contention204 that the constitution we have described has been, is, or will be205 realized206 when this philosophic Muse has taken control of the state.207 It is not a thing impossible to happen, nor are we speaking of impossibilities. That it is difficult we too admit.” “I also think so,” he said. “But the multitude—are you going to say?—does not think so,” said I. “That may be,” he said. “My dear fellow,” [499e] said I, “do not thus absolutely condemn the multitude.208 They will surely be of another mind if in no spirit of contention but soothingly and endeavoring to do away with the dispraise of learning you point out to them whom you mean by philosophers, and define as we recently did their nature [500a] and their pursuits so that the people may not suppose you to mean those of whom they are thinking. Or even if they do look at them in that way, are you still going to deny that they will change their opinion and answer differently? Or do you think that anyone is ungentle to the gentle or grudging to the ungrudging if he himself is ungrudging209 and mild? I will anticipate you and reply that I think that only in some few and not in the mass of mankind is so ungentle or harsh a temper to be found.” “And I, you may be assured,” [500b] he said, “concur.” “And do you not also concur210 in this very point that the blame for this harsh attitude of the many towards philosophy falls on that riotous crew who have burst in211 where they do not belong, wrangling with one another,212 filled with spite213 and always talking about persons,214 a thing least befitting philosophy?” “Least of all, indeed,” he said.

“For surely, Adeimantus, the man whose mind is truly fixed on eternal realities215 has no leisure [500c] to turn his eyes downward upon the petty affairs of men, and so engaging in strife with them to be filled with envy and hate, but he fixes his gaze upon the things of the eternal and unchanging order, and seeing that they neither wrong nor are wronged by one another, but all abide in harmony as reason bids, he will endeavor to imitate them and, as far as may be, to fashion himself in their likeness and assimilate216 himself to them. Or do you think it possible not to imitate the things to which anyone attaches himself with admiration?” “Impossible,” he said. “Then the lover of wisdom [500d] associating with the divine order will himself become orderly and divine in the measure permitted to man.217 But calumny218 is plentiful everywhere.” “Yes, truly.” “If, then,” I said, “some compulsion219 is laid upon him to practise stamping on the plastic matter of human nature in public and private the patterns that he visions there,220 and not merely to mould221 and fashion himself, do you think he will prove a poor craftsman222 of sobriety and justice and all forms of ordinary civic virtue223?” “By no means,” he said. “But if the multitude become aware [500e] that what we are saying of the philosopher is true, will they still be harsh with philosophers, and will they distrust our statement that no city could ever be blessed unless its lineaments were traced224 by artists who used the heavenly model?” “They will not be harsh,” [501a] he said, “if they perceive that. But tell me, what is the manner of that sketch you have in mind?” “They will take the city and the characters of men, as they might a tablet, and first wipe it clean—225 no easy task. But at any rate you know that this would be their first point of difference from ordinary reformers, that they would refuse to take in hand either individual or state or to legislate before they either received a clean slate or themselves made it clean.” “And they would be right,” he said. “And thereafter, do you not think that they would sketch the figure of the constitution?” “Surely.” “And then, [501b] I take it, in the course of the work they would glance226 frequently in either direction, at justice, beauty, sobriety and the like as they are in the nature of things,227 and alternately at that which they were trying to reproduce in mankind, mingling and blending from various pursuits that hue of the flesh, so to speak, deriving their judgement from that likeness of humanity228 which Homer too called when it appeared in men the image and likeness of God.229” “Right,” he said. “And they would erase one touch or stroke and paint in another [501c] until in the measure of the possible230 they had made the characters of men pleasing and dear to God as may be.” “That at any rate231 would be the fairest painting.” “Are we then making any impression on those who you said232 were advancing to attack us with might and main? Can we convince them that such a political artist of character and such a painter exists as the one we then were praising when our proposal to entrust the state to him angered them, and are they now in a gentler mood when they hear what we are now saying?” “Much gentler,” [501d] he said, “if they are reasonable.” “How can they controvert it233? Will they deny that the lovers of wisdom are lovers of reality and truth?” “That would be monstrous,” he said. “Or that their nature as we have portrayed it is akin to the highest and best?” “Not that either.” “Well, then, can they deny that such a nature bred in the pursuits that befit it will be perfectly good and philosophic so far as that can be said of anyone? Or will they rather say it of those whom we have excluded?” [501e] “Surely not.” “Will they, then, any longer be fierce with us when we declare that, until the philosophic class wins control, there will be no surcease of trouble for city or citizens nor will the polity which we fable234 in words be brought to pass in deed?” “They will perhaps be less so,” he said. “Instead of less so, may we not say that they have been altogether tamed and convinced, so that [502a] for very shame, if for no other reason, they may assent?” “Certainly,” said he.

“Let us assume, then,” said I, “that they are won over to this view. Will anyone contend that there is no chance that the offspring of kings and rulers should be born with the philosophic nature?” “Not one,” he said. “And can anyone prove that if so born they must necessarily be corrupted? The difficulty235 of their salvation we too concede; but that in all the course of time [502b] not one of all could be saved,236 will anyone maintain that?” “How could he?” “But surely,” said I, “the occurrence of one such is enough,237 if he has a state which obeys him,238 to realize239 all that now seems so incredible.” “Yes, one is enough,” he said. “For if such a ruler,” I said, “ordains the laws and institutions that we have described it is surely not impossible that the citizens should be content to carry them out.” “By no means.” “Would it, then, be at all strange or impossible for others to come to the opinion to which we have come240?” [502c] “I think not,” said he. “And further that these things are best, if possible, has already, I take it, been sufficiently shown.” “Yes, sufficiently.” “Our present opinion, then, about this legislation is that our plan would be best if it could be realized and that this realization is difficult241 yet not impossible.” “That is the conclusion,” he said.

“This difficulty disposed of, we have next [502d] to speak of what remains, in what way, namely, and as a result of what studies and pursuits, these preservers242 of the constitution will form a part of our state, and at what ages they will severally take up each study.” “Yes, we have to speak of that,” he said. “I gained nothing,” I said, “by my cunning243 in omitting heretofore244 the distasteful topic of the possession of women and procreation of children and the appointment of rulers, because I knew that the absolutely true and right way would provoke censure and is difficult of realization; [502e] for now I am none the less compelled to discuss them. The matter of the women and children has been disposed of,245 but the education of the rulers has to be examined again, I may say, from the starting-point. We were saying, if you recollect, [503a] that they must approve themselves lovers of the state when tested246 in pleasures and pains, and make it apparent that they do not abandon247 this fixed faith248 under stress of labors or fears or any other vicissitude, and that anyone who could not keep that faith must he rejected, while he who always issued from the test pure and intact, like gold tried in the fire,249 is to be established as ruler and to receive honors in life and after death and prizes as well.250 Something of this sort we said while the argument slipped by with veiled face251 [503b] in fear252 of starting253 our present debate.” “Most true,” he said; “I remember.” “We shrank, my friend,” I said, “from uttering the audacities which have now been hazarded. But now let us find courage for the definitive pronouncement that as the most perfect254 guardians we must establish philosophers.” “Yes, assume it to have been said,” said he. “Note, then, that they will naturally be few,255 for the different components of the nature which we said their education presupposed rarely consent to grow in one; but for the most part these qualities are found apart.” [503c] “What do you mean?” he said. “Facility in learning, memory, sagacity, quickness of apprehension and their accompaniments, and youthful spirit and magnificence in soul are qualities, you know, that are rarely combined in human nature with a disposition to live orderly, quiet, and stable lives;256 but such men, by reason of their quickness,257 are driven about just as chance directs, and all steadfastness is gone out of them.” “You speak truly,” he said. “And on the other hand, the steadfast and stable temperaments, whom one could rather trust in use, [503d] and who in war are not easily moved and aroused to fear, are apt to act in the same way258 when confronted with studies. They are not easily aroused, learn with difficulty, as if benumbed,259 and are filled with sleep and yawning when an intellectual task is set them.” “It is so,” he said. “But we affirmed that a man must partake of both temperaments in due and fair combination or else participate in neither the highest260 education nor in honors nor in rule.” “And rightly,” he said. “Do you not think, then, that such a blend will be a rare thing?” [503e] “Of course.” “They must, then, be tested in the toils and fears and pleasures of which we then spoke,261 and we have also now to speak of a point we then passed by, that we must exercise them in many studies, watching them to see whether their nature is capable of enduring the greatest and most difficult studies [504a] or whether it will faint and flinch262 as men flinch in the trials and contests of the body.” “That is certainly the right way of looking at it,” he said. “But what do you understand by the greatest studies?”

“You remember, I presume,” said I, “that after distinguishing three kinds263 in the soul, we established definitions of justice, sobriety, bravery and wisdom severally.” “If I did not remember,” he said, “I should not deserve to hear the rest.” “Do you also remember [504b] what was said before this?” “What?” “We were saying, I believe, that for the most perfect discernment of these things another longer way264 was requisite which would make them plain to one who took it, but that it was possible to add proofs on a par with the preceding discussion. And you said that that was sufficient, and it was on this understanding that what we then said was said, falling short of ultimate precision as it appeared to me, but if it contented you it is for you to say.” “Well,” he said, “it was measurably satisfactory to me, and apparently [504c] to the rest of the company.” “Nay, my friend,” said I, “a measure of such things that in the least degree falls short of reality proves no measure at all. For nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything,265 though some people sometimes think that they have already done enough266 and that there is no need of further inquiry.” “Yes, indeed,” he said, “many experience this because of their sloth.” “An experience,” said I, “that least of all befits the guardians of a state and of its laws.” “That seems likely,” he said. “Then,” said I, “such a one must go around267 [504d] the longer way and must labor no less in studies than in the exercises of the body or else, as we were just saying, he will never come to the end of the greatest study and that which most properly belongs to him.” “Why, are not these things the greatest?” said he; “but is there still something greater than justice and the other virtues we described?” “There is not only something greater,” I said, “but of these very things we need not merely to contemplate an outline268 as now, but we must omit nothing of their most exact elaboration. Or would it not be absurd to strain every nerve269 to attain [504e] to the utmost precision and clarity of knowledge about other things of trifling moment and not to demand the greatest precision for the greatest270 matters?” “It would indeed,271” he said; “but do you suppose that anyone will let you go without asking what is the greatest study and with what you think it is concerned?” “By no means,” said I; “but do you ask the question. You certainly have heard it often, but now you either do not apprehend or again you are minded to make trouble for me [505a] by attacking the argument. I suspect it is rather the latter. For you have often heard272 that the greatest thing to learn is the idea of good273 by reference to which274 just things275 and all the rest become useful and beneficial. And now I am almost sure you know that this is what I am going to speak of and to say further that we have no adequate knowledge of it. And if we do not know it, then, even if without the knowledge of this we should know all other things never so well, you are aware that it would avail us nothing, [505b] just as no possession either is of any avail276 without the possession of the good. Or do you think there is any profit277 in possessing everything except that which is good, or in understanding all things else apart from the good while understanding and knowing nothing that is fair and good278?” “No, by Zeus, I do not,” he said.

“But, furthermore, you know this too, that the multitude believe pleasure279 to be the good, and the finer280 spirits intelligence or knowledge.281” “Certainly.” “And you are also aware, my friend, that those who hold this latter view are not able to point out what knowledge282 it is but are finally compelled to say that it is the knowledge of the good.” “Most absurdly,” he said. “Is it not absurd,” [505c] said I, “if while taunting us with our ignorance of the good they turn about and talk to us as if we knew it? For they say it is the knowledge of the good,283 as if we understood their meaning when they utter284 the word ‘good.'” “Most true,” he said. “Well, are those who define the good as pleasure infected with any less confusion285 of thought than the others? Or are not they in like manner286 compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures287?” “Most assuredly.” “The outcome is, I take it, that they are admitting [505d] the same things to be both good and bad, are they not?” “Certainly.” “Then is it not apparent that there are many and violent disputes288 about it?” “Of course.” “And again, is it not apparent that while in the case of the just and the honorable many would prefer the semblance289 without the reality in action, possession, and opinion, yet when it comes to the good nobody is content with the possession of the appearance but all men seek the reality, and the semblance satisfies nobody here?” [505e] “Quite so,” he said. “That, then, which every soul pursues290 and for its sake does all that it does, with an intuition291 of its reality, but yet baffled292 and unable to apprehend its nature adequately, or to attain to any stable belief about it as about other things,293 and for that reason failing of any possible benefit from other things,— [506a] in a matter of this quality and moment, can we, I ask you, allow a like blindness and obscurity in those best citizens294 to whose hands we are to entrust all things?” “Least of all,” he said. “I fancy, at any rate,” said I, “that the just and the honorable, if their relation and reference to the good is not known,295 will not have secured a guardian296 of much worth in the man thus ignorant, and my surmise is that no one will understand them adequately before he knows this.” “You surmise well,” he said. “Then our constitution [506b] will have its perfect and definitive organization297 only when such a guardian, who knows these things, oversees it.”

“Necessarily,” he said. “But you yourself, Socrates, do you think that knowledge is the good or pleasure or something else and different?” “What a man it is,” said I; “you made it very plain298 long ago that you would not be satisfied with what others think about it.” “Why, it does not seem right to me either, Socrates,” he said, “to be ready to state the opinions of others but not one's own when one has occupied himself with the matter so long.299” [506c] “But then,” said I, “do you think it right to speak as having knowledge about things one does not know?” “By no means,” he said, “as having knowledge, but one ought to be willing to tell as his opinion what he opines.” “Nay,” said I, “have you not observed that opinions divorced from knowledge300 are ugly things? The best of them are blind.301 Or do you think that those who hold some true opinion without intelligence differ appreciably from blind men who go the right way?” “They do not differ at all,” he said. “Is it, then, ugly things that you prefer [506d] to contemplate, things blind and crooked, when you might hear from others what is luminous302 and fair?” “Nay, in heaven's name, Socrates,” said Glaucon, “do not draw back, as it were, at the very goal.303 For it will content us if you explain the good even as you set forth the nature of justice, sobriety, and the other virtues.” “It will right well304 content me, my dear fellow,” I said, “but I fear that my powers may fail and that in my eagerness I may cut a sorry figure and become a laughing-stock.305 Nay, my beloved, [506e] let us dismiss for the time being the nature of the good in itself;306 for to attain to my present surmise of that seems a pitch above the impulse that wings my flight today.307 But of what seems to be the offspring of the good and most nearly made in its likeness308 I am willing to speak if you too wish it, and otherwise to let the matter drop.” “Well, speak on,” he said, “for you will duly pay me the tale of the parent another time.” “I could wish,” [507a] I said, “that I were able to make and you to receive the payment and not merely as now the interest. But at any rate receive this interest309 and the offspring of the good. Have a care, however, lest I deceive you unintentionally with a false reckoning of the interest.” “We will do our best,” he said, “to be on our guard. Only speak on.” “Yes,” I said, “after first coming to an understanding with you and reminding you of what has been said here before and often on other occasions.310” [507b] “What?” said he. “We predicate ‘to be’311 of many beautiful things and many good things, saying of them severally that they are, and so define them in our speech.” “We do.” “And again, we speak of a self-beautiful and of a good that is only and merely good, and so, in the case of all the things that we then posited as many, we turn about and posit each as a single idea or aspect, assuming it to be a unity and call it that which each really is.312 “It is so.” “And the one class of things we say can be seen but not thought, [507c] while the ideas can be thought but not seen.” “By all means.” “With which of the parts of ourselves, with which of our faculties, then, do we see visible things?” “With sight,” he said. “And do we not,” I said, “hear audibles with hearing, and perceive all sensibles with the other senses?” “Surely.” “Have you ever observed,” said I, “how much the greatest expenditure the creator313 of the senses has lavished on the faculty of seeing and being seen?314 “Why, no, I have not,” he said. “Well, look at it thus. Do hearing and voice stand in need of another medium315 so that the one may hear and the other be heard, [507d] in the absence of which third element the one will not hear and the other not be heard?” “They need nothing,” he said. “Neither, I fancy,” said I,” do many others, not to say that none require anything of the sort. Or do you know of any?” “Not I,” he said. “But do you not observe that vision and the visible do have this further need?” “How?” “Though vision may be in the eyes and its possessor may try to use it, and though color be present, yet without [507e] the presence of a third thing316 specifically and naturally adapted to this purpose, you are aware that vision will see nothing and the colors will remain invisible.317” “What318 is this thing of which you speak?” he said. “The thing,” I said, “that you call light.” “You say truly,” he replied. “The bond, then, that yokes together [508a] visibility and the faculty of sight is more precious by no slight form319 that which unites the other pairs, if light is not without honor.” “It surely is far from being so,” he said.

“Which one can you name of the divinities in heaven320 as the author and cause of this, whose light makes our vision see best and visible things to be seen?” “Why, the one that you too and other people mean,” he said; “for your question evidently refers to the sun.321” “Is not this, then, the relation of vision to that divinity?” “What?” “Neither vision itself nor its vehicle, which we call the eye, is identical with the sun.” [508b] “Why, no.” “But it is, I think, the most sunlike322 of all the instruments of sense.” “By far the most.” “And does it not receive the power which it possesses as an influx, as it were, dispensed from the sun?” “Certainly.” “Is it not also true that the sun is not vision, yet as being the cause thereof is beheld by vision itself?” “That is so,” he said. “This, then, you must understand that I meant by the offspring of the good323 which the good [508c] begot to stand in a proportion324 with itself: as the good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision.” “How is that?” he said; “explain further.” “You are aware,” I said, “that when the eyes are no longer turned upon objects upon whose colors the light of day falls but that of the dim luminaries of night, their edge is blunted and they appear almost blind, as if pure vision did not dwell in them.” “Yes, indeed,” he said. “But when, I take it, [508d] they are directed upon objects illumined by the sun, they see clearly, and vision appears to reside in these same eyes.” “Certainly.” “Apply this comparison to the soul also in this way. When it is firmly fixed on the domain where truth and reality shine resplendent325 it apprehends and knows them and appears to possess reason; but when it inclines to that region which is mingled with darkness, the world of becoming and passing away, it opines only and its edge is blunted, and it shifts its opinions hither and thither, and again seems as if it lacked reason.” [508e] “Yes, it does,” “This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the idea326 of good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known.327 Yet fair as they both are, knowledge and truth, in supposing it to be something fairer still328 than these you will think rightly of it. But as for knowledge and truth, even as in our illustration [509a] it is right to deem light and vision sunlike, but never to think that they are the sun, so here it is right to consider these two their counterparts, as being like the good or boniform,329 but to think that either of them is the good330 is not right. Still higher honor belongs to the possession and habit331 of the good.” “An inconceivable beauty you speak of,” he said, “if it is the source of knowledge and truth, and yet itself surpasses them in beauty. For you surely332 cannot mean that it is pleasure.” “Hush,” said I, “but examine [509b] the similitude of it still further in this way.333” “How?” “The sun, I presume you will say, not only furnishes to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides for their generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation.” “Of course not.” “In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still transcends essence334 in dignity and surpassing power.” [509c]

And Glaucon very ludicrously335 said, “Heaven save us, hyperbole336 can no further go.” “The fault is yours,” I said, “for compelling me to utter my thoughts about it.” “And don't desist,” he said, “but at least337 expound the similitude of the sun, if there is anything that you are omitting.” “Why, certainly,” I said, “I am omitting a great deal.” “Well, don't omit the least bit,” he said. “I fancy,” I said, “that I shall have to pass over much, but nevertheless so far as it is at present practicable I shall not willingly leave anything out.” “Do not,” [509d] he said. “Conceive then,” said I, “as we were saying, that there are these two entities, and that one of them is sovereign over the intelligible order and region and the other over the world of the eye-ball, not to say the sky-ball,338 but let that pass. You surely apprehend the two types, the visible and the intelligible.” “I do.” “Represent them then, as it were, by a line divided339 into two unequal340 sections and cut each section again in the same ratio (the section, that is, of the visible and that of the intelligible order), and then as an expression of the ratio of their comparative clearness and obscurity you will have, as one of the sections [509e] of the visible world, images. By images341 I mean, [510a] first, shadows, and then reflections in water and on surfaces of dense, smooth and bright texture, and everything of that kind, if you apprehend.” “I do.” “As the second section assume that of which this is a likeness or an image, that is, the animals about us and all plants and the whole class of objects made by man.” “I so assume it,” he said. “Would you be willing to say,” said I, “that the division in respect of reality and truth or the opposite is expressed by the proportion:342 as is the opinable to the knowable so is the likeness to that [510b] of which it is a likeness?” “I certainly would.” “Consider then again the way in which we are to make the division of the intelligible section.” “In what way?” “By the distinction that there is one section of it which the soul is compelled to investigate by treating as images the things imitated in the former division, and by means of assumptions from which it proceeds not up to a first principle but down to a conclusion, while there is another section in which it advances from its assumption to a beginning or principle that transcends assumption,343 and in which it makes no use of the images employed by the other section, relying on ideas344 only and progressing systematically through ideas.” “I don't fully understand345 what you mean by this,” he said. “Well, I will try again,” [510c] said I,” for you will better understand after this preamble. For I think you are aware that students of geometry and reckoning and such subjects first postulate the odd and the even and the various figures and three kinds of angles and other things akin to these in each branch of science, regard them as known, and, treating them as absolute assumptions, do not deign to render any further account of them346 to themselves or others, taking it for granted that they are obvious to everybody. They take their start [510d] from these, and pursuing the inquiry from this point on consistently, conclude with that for the investigation of which they set out.” “Certainly,” he said, “I know that.” “And do you not also know that they further make use of the visible forms and talk about them, though they are not thinking of them but of those things of which they are a likeness, pursuing their inquiry for the sake of the square as such and the diagonal as such, and not for the sake of the image of it which they draw347? [510e] And so in all cases. The very things which they mould and draw, which have shadows and images of themselves in water, these things they treat in their turn348 as only images, but what they really seek is to get sight of those realities which can be seen [511a] only by the mind.349” “True,” he said.

“This then is the class that I described as intelligible, it is true,350 but with the reservation first that the soul is compelled to employ assumptions in the investigation of it, not proceeding to a first principle because of its inability to extricate itself from and rise above its assumptions, and second, that it uses as images or likenesses the very objects that are themselves copied and adumbrated by the class below them, and that in comparison with these latter351 are esteemed as clear and held in honor.352” “I understand,” [511b] said he, “that you are speaking of what falls under geometry and the kindred arts.” “Understand then,” said I, “that by the other section of the intelligible I mean that which the reason353 itself lays hold of by the power of dialectics,354 treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses,355 underpinnings, footings,356 and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting-point of all,357 and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, [511c] making no use whatever of any object of sense358 but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas.359” “I understand,” he said; “not fully, for it is no slight task that you appear to have in mind, but I do understand that you mean to distinguish the aspect of reality and the intelligible, which is contemplated by the power of dialectic, as something truer and more exact than the object of the so-called arts and sciences whose assumptions are arbitrary starting-points. And though it is true that those who contemplate them are compelled to use their understanding360 and not [511d] their senses, yet because they do not go back to the beginning in the study of them but start from assumptions you do not think they possess true intelligence361 about them although362 the things themselves are intelligibles when apprehended in conjunction with a first principle. And I think you call the mental habit of geometers and their like mind or understanding363 and not reason because you regard understanding as something intermediate between opinion and reason.” “Your interpretation is quite sufficient,” I said; “and now, answering to364 these four sections, assume these four affections occurring in the soul: intellection or reason for the highest, [511e] understanding for the second; assign belief365 to the third, and to the last picture-thinking or conjecture,366 and arrange them in a proportion,367 considering that they participate in clearness and precision in the same degree as their objects partake of truth and reality.” “I understand,” he said; “I concur and arrange them as you bid.”

1 The argument is slightly personified. Cf. on 503 A.

2 It is captious to object that the actual discussion of the philosopher occupies only a few pages.

3 This is the main theme of the Republic, of which Plato never loses sight.

4 For κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος Cf. Phaedo 78 C, Soph. 248 A, Tim. 41 D, 82 B, Epin. 982 B and E.

5 Cf. p. 89, note h, on 505 C.

6 Cf. Luke vi. 39, Matt. xv. 14, John xix. 39-41.

7 Cf. Polit. 277 B, 277 D f., etc., Soph. 226 C, Parmen. 132 D.

8 ἀποβλέποντες belongs to the terminology of the ideas. Cf. 472 C, Cratyl. 389 A, Gorg. 503 E, Tim. 28 A, Prot. 354 C, and my What Plato Said, p. 458 on Euthyph. 6 E.

9 Cf. 539 E, 521 B, Phileb. 62. Cf. Introd. p. xl; Apelt, Republic, p. 490.

10 Lit. “is not made to wander by generation and decay.” Cf. Crat. 411 C, Phaedo 95 E, whence Aristotle took his title. See Class. Phil. xvii. (1922) pp. 334-352.

11 Supra 474 C-D.

12 For similar expressions cf. 519 B, Laws 656 B, 965 C, Symp. 200 A.

13 This and many other passages prove Plato's high regard for the truth. Cf Laws 730 C, 861 D, Crat. 428 D, 382 A. In 389 B he only permits falsehood to the rulers as a drastic remedy to be used with care for edification. Cf. Vol. I. on 382 C and D.

14 For this figure Cf. Laws 844 A and 736 B, Eurip.Suppl. 1111παρεκτρέποντες ὀχετόν, Empedocles, Diels1 195λόγου λόγον ἐξοχετεύωνLucretius ii. 365 “derivare queunt animum”; and for the idea cf. also Laws 643 C-D.

15 Cf. my Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 45-46, esp. n. 330, followed by Apelt, Republic, pp. 490-491. Cf. also Friedlander, Platon, ii. pp. 579-580, 584.

16 For πεπλασμένως Cf. Soph. 216 Cμὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλ᾽ ὄντως φιλόσοφοι.

17 Cf. Theaet. 144 Dχρημάτων ἐλευθεριότητα.

18 Cf. Goethe's “Im Ganzen, Guten, Schönen resolut zu leben.”

19 Cf. Theaet. 174 E, of the philosopher,εἰς ἅπασαν εἰωθὼς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν, and 173 E, 500 B-C. Cf. Marc. Aurel. vii. 35, Livy xxiv. 34 “Archimedes is erat unicus spectator caeli siderumque,” Mayor, Cic. De nat. deor. ii. p. 128. For πᾶς χρόνος cf. infra 498 D, 608 C, Phaedo 107 C, Gorg. 525 C, Apol. 40 E, Tim. 36 E, 47 B, 90 D. Cf. Isoc. i. 11, Pindar, Pyth. i. 46.

20 Cf. Aristot.Eth. Nic. 1123 b 32, the great-souled man,ᾦ γ᾽ οὐδὲν μέγα, Diog. Laert. vii. 128πάντων ὑπεράνω, Cic.De fin. iii. 8 “infra se omnia humana ducens.” Cf. on 500 B-C. For similar pessimistic utterances about human life and mankind cf. 604 B-C, 496 D-E, 500 B-C, 516 D, Laws 803 B. Cf. also Laws 708 E-709 B.

21 Cf. Vol. I. pp. 200 f. on 386 B-C; Laws 727 D, 828 D, 881 A, Gorg. 522 E, Phaedo 77 E, Crito 43 B, Apol. 35 A, 40 C. Cf. Spinoza's “There is nothing of which the free man thinks so little as death.”

22 Cf. supra, Vol. I. on 442 E.

23 Cf. 375 B.

24 Cf. Laches 189 A-Bἀηδῶς μανθάνων

25 Cf. Theaet. 144 B.

26 Cf. Theaet. 144 Bλήθης γέμοντες. Cf. Cleopatra's “Oh, my oblivion is a very Antony” (Ant. and Cleo.I. iii. 90).

27 ἰδέαν is not exactly “idea.” Cf. Cratyl. 389 B, What Plato Said, p. 358 on Euthyph. 6 D, ibid. p. 560 on Rep. 369 A and p. 585 on Parmen. 130 C-D. Cf. Class. Phil. xx. (1925) p. 347.

28 Lit. “following on upon the other.” Cf. Tim. 27 Cἑπομένως, Laws 844 E.

29 μεγαλοπρεπής is frequently ironical in Plato, but not here. For the list of qualities of the ideal student cf. also 503 C, Theaet. 144 A-B, and Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 418. Cf. Laws 709 E on the qualifications of the young tyrant, and Cic.Tusc. v. 24, with Renaissance literature on education.

30 The god of censure, who finds fault with the gods in Lucian's dialogues. Cf. Overbeck, Schriftquellen, p. 208, n. 1091, Otto, p. 227, s. v. Momus. Cf. Callimachus, fr. 70; and Anth. Pal. xvi. 262. 3-4:αὐτὸς ὁ Μῶμος φθέγξεται, Ἄκρητος, Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἡ σοφίη, “Momus himself will cry out ‘Father Zeus, this was perfect skill.'” (L.C.L. translation.) Stallbaum refers to Erasmus, Chiliad, i. 5. 75 and interpreters on Aristaenet.Epist. i. I, p. 239, ed. Boissonade.

31 Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 35 n. 236, and What Plato Said, p. 488 on Crito 48 B. A speaker in Plato may thus refer to any fundamental Platonic doctrine. Wilamowitz' suggested emendation (Platon, ii. p. 205)ἃ ἂν λέγῃς is due to a misunderstanding of this.

32 Alocus classicus for Plato's anticipation of objections. Cf. 475 B, Theaet. 166 A-B, Rep. 609 C, 438-439, and Apelt, Republic, p. 492. Plato does it more tactfully than Isocrates, e.g.Demon. 44.

33 Cf. Apelt, Aufsätze, p. 73, Minto, Logic, Induction and Deduction, pp. 4 ff.; also Gorg. 461 D, 462 A, Soph. 230 B.

34 Cf. Phaedrus 262 B.

35 Cf. 451 A, and Theaet. 166 A, 168 A, 534 Cἀπτῶτι.

36 Cf. Phaedr. 262 B, Cleitophon 410 A, Gorg. 495 A, schol.,τοὺς πρώτους λόγους τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ δηλονότι, Gorg. 457 Eοἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες, and also Agathon in Symp. 201 B.

37 For this figure Cf. Laws 739 A, 820 C-D, 903 D, Eryxias 395 A-B, Hipparchus 220 E, Eurip.Suppl. 409. Aristotle, Soph. El. 165 a 10 ff., borrows the metaphor, but his ψῆφοι are those of book-keeping or reckoning. Cf. also Dem.De cor. 227 f.

38 Cf. Hipp. Minor 369 B-C and Grote ii. p. 64 “Though Hippias admits each successive step he still mistrusts the conclusion” also Apelt, p. 492, 357 A-B and Laws 903 Aβιάζεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις, and also Hipparchus 232 B for the idea that dialectic constrains rather than persuades. In the Ion, 533 C, Ion says he cannot ἀντιλέγειν, but the fact remains that he knows Homer but not other poets. Cf. also 536 D. The passage virtually anticipates Bacon's Novum Organum,App. XIII. “(syllogismus) . . . assensum itaque constringit, non res.” Cf. Cic.De fin. iv. 3, Tusc. i. 8. 16, and the proverbial οὐ γὰρ πείσεις, οὐδ᾽ ἢν πείσῃς,, Aristoph.Plutus 600.

39 See Soph. 234 E for a different application of the same idea. There is no change of opinion. The commonplace Greek contrast of word and deed, theory and fact, is valid against eristic but not against dialectic. See What Plato Said, p. 534 on Phaedo 99 E, and on 473 A; also What Plato Said, p. 625 on Laws 636 A. A favorite formula of Aristotle runs, “This is true in theory and is confirmed by facts.” Cf. Eth. Nic. 1099 b 25, 1123 b 22, 1131 a 13, Pol. 1323 a 39-b 6, 1326 a 25 and 29, 1334 a 5-6.

40 Scholars in politics cut a sorry figure. For this popular view of philosophers Cf. Theaet. 173 C ff., 174 C-D, Gorg. 484-486 C, Phaedo 64 B. Cf. also Isoc. passim, e. g.Antid. 250, 312.

41 The perfect tense is ironical in Crat. 384 B, serious in Laws 670 A-B. In Gorg. 485 A it is replaced by ὅσον παιδείας χάριν.

42 Cf. What Plato Said, p. 506 on Gorg. 484 C.

43 Cf. Euthydem. 306 E, Protag. 346 A, and for the idea without the word, Soph. 216 C.

44 Cf. Eurip.Medea 299, and on 489 B.

45 Cf. 497 A. In Euthydem. 307 B Plato uses both ἐπιτήδευμα and πρᾶγμα

46 Cf. Gory. 517 D, Laws 644 C, Symp. 215 A with Bury's note. Cf. the parable of the great beast 493, and of the many-headed beast, 588-589.

47 The word γλίσχρως is untranslatable, and often misunderstood. In 553 C it means “stingily”; in Cratyl. 414 C it is used of a strained etymology, and so in 435 C, usually misunderstood; in Crito 53 E of clinging to life; Cf. Phaedo 117 A; in Plutarch, De Is. et Osir. 28 of a strained allegory and ibid. 75 of a strained resemblance; in Aristoph.Peace 482 of a dog.

48 Cf. Laws 747 B.

49 Cf. Horace, Ars Poetica, init.; What Plato Said, p. 550 on Phaedr. 229 D-E, and 588 c f. The expression is still used, or revived, in Modern Greek newspapers.

50 The syntax of this famous allegory is anacoluthic and perhaps uncertain: but there need be no doubt about the meaning. Cf. my article in the Classical Review, xx. (1906) p. 247. Huxley commends the Allegory, Methods and Results, p. 313. Cf. also Carlyle's famous metaphor of the ship doubling Cape Horn by ballot. Cf. Class. Phil. ix. (1914) p. 362.

51 The Athenian demos, as portrayed e.g. in Aristophanes’Knights 40 ff. and passim. Cf. Aristot.Rhet. 1406 b 35καὶ ἡ εἰς τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι ὅμοιος ναυκλήρῳ ἰσχυρῷ μὲν ὑποκώφῳ δέ, Polyb.vi. 44ἀεὶ γάρ ποτε τὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον παραπλήσιον εἶναι τοῖς ἀδεσπότοις σκάφεσι, etc. Cf. the old sailor in Joseph Conrad's Chance, chi i. “No ship navigated . . . in the happy-go-lucky manner . . . would ever arrive into port.” For the figure of the ship of state Cf. Polit. 302 A ff., 299 B, Euthydem. 291 D, Aesch.Seven against Thebes 2-3, Theognis 670-685, Horace, Odes i. 15 with my note, Urwick, The Message of Plato, pp. 110-111, Ruskin, Time and Tide, xiii: “That the governing authority should be in the hands of a true and trained pilot is as clear and as constant. In none of these conditions is there any difference between a nation and a boat's company.” Cf. Longfellow's The Building of the Ship, in fine. Cf. Laws 758 A, 945 C. For the criticism of democracy by a figure cf. also Polit. 297 E ff.

52 Cf. Aristoph.Knights 42-44.

53 Cf. 390 C, 426 D, 498 B, Theaetet. 167 B, and Milton's “unknown and like esteemed,” Comus 630.

54 For this and similar checks on pretenders to knowledge Cf. Laches 185 E, 186 A and C, Alc. I. 109 D and Gorg. 514 B-C.

55 Plato of course believed that virtue or the political art can be taught in a reformed state, but practically was not taught at Athens. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 14, on 518 D, What Plato Said, pp. 70 and 511, Newman, Introd. Aristot.Pol. p. 397, Thompson on Meno 70 A.

56 A hint of the fate of Socrates. Cf. 517 A, 494 E and Euthyphro 3 E.

57 The participle περικεχυμένους occurs in Polit. 268 C, but is avoided here by anacoluthon.

58 For the idiom πάντα ποιεῖν Cf. Euthyph. 8 C, 504 D-E, 471 C, 575 E, 494 E, Gorg. 479 C, Phaedr. 252 E, Apol. 39 A, and, slightly varied, Eurip.Heracleidae 841.

59 The word ἐκβάλλοντας helps the obvious allegory, for it also means banish.

60 Here figurative. Cf. Gorg. 482 E, Theaet. 165 E. Infra 615 E it is used literally.

61 Cf. Polit. 297 E. The expression is slightly ironical. Such is frequently the tone of γενναῖος in Plato. Cf. Rep. 454 A, 363 A, 544 C, 348 CHipp. Min. 370 D, Soph. 231 B, Hipp. Maj. 290 , Polit. 274 E.

62 Cf. Polit. 302 A, Laws 906 E, Jebb on Soph.Antig. 189-190.

63 Cf. 407 D with Thucyd. iv. 26, vi 69, vii. 25.

64 Cf. 427 E, Laws 905 C, Eryx. 396 E, Aristoph.Knights 229.

65 Neither here nor in D-E can ὅπως with the future mean “in what way,” and all interpretations based on that refers to getting control. Cf. 338 E, Laws 757 D, 714 C, 962 D-E, Xen.Rep. Lac. 14. 5. Cf. Class. Phil. ix.(1914) pp. 358 and 362.

66 For τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον Cf. Alc.II. 145 C.

67 The ppl. must refer to the sailors; hence the acc. (see crit. note). Whatever the text and the amount of probable anacoluthon in this sentence, the meaning is that the unruly sailors (the mob) have no true conception of the state of mind of the real pilot (the philosophic statesman), and that it is he (adopting Sidgwick's οἰομένῳ for the MS.οἰόμενοι in E) who does not believe that the trick of getting possession of the helm is an art, or that, if it were, he could afford time to practise it. Those who read οἰόμενοι attribute the idea of the incompatibility of the two things to the sailors. But that overlooks the points I have already made about ὅπως, and τέχνη and is in any case improbable, because the sentence as a whole is concerned with the attitude of the true pilot (statesman), which may be represented by the words of Burke to his constituents, “I could hardly serve you as I have done and court you too.” Cf. Sidgwick, “On a Passage in Plato's Republic,“Journal of Philology, v. pp. 274-276, and my notes in A.J.P. xiii. p. 364 and xvi. p. 234.

68 For the force of the article cf. Thucyd. ii. 65τὸ ἐπίφθονον λαμβάνει, and my article in T.A.P.A. 1893, p. 81, n. 6. Cf. also Charm. 156 E and Rep. 496 E.

69 ὅπως . . . κυβερνήσει. Cf. p. 20, note h.

70 The translation gives the right meaning. Cf. 518 D, and the examples collected in my emendation of Gorgias 503 D in Class. Phil. x. (1915) 325-326. The contrast between subjects which do and those which do not admit of constitution as an art and science is ever present to Plato's mind, as appears from the Sophist, Politicus, Gorgias, and Phaedrus. And he would normally express the idea by a genitive with τέχνη. Cf. Protag. 357 A, Phaedrus 260 E, also Class. Rev. xx. (1906) p. 247. See too Cic.De or.I. 4 “neque aliquod praeceptum artis esse arbitrarentur,” and 518 D.

71 τῷ ὄντι verifies the allusion to the charge that Socrates was a babbler and a star-gazer or weather-prophet. Cf. Soph. 225 D, Polit. 299 B, and What Plato Said, p. 527 on Phaedo 70 C; Blaydes on Aristoph.Clouds 1480.

72 Plato like some modern writers is conscious of his own imagery and frequently interprets his own symbols. Cf. 517 A-B, 531 B, 588 B, Gorg. 493 D, 517 D, Phaedo 87 B, Laws 644 C, Meno 72 A-B, Tim. 19 B, Polit. 297 E. Cf. also the cases where he says he cannot tell what it is but only what it is like, e.g.Rep. 506 E, Phaedr. 246 A, Symp. 215 A 5.

73 διάθεσις and ἕξις are not discriminated by Plato as by Aristotle.

74 Cf. 476 D-E.

75 This passage illustrates one of the most interesting characteristics of Plato's style, namely the representation of thought as adventure or action. This procedure is, or was, familiar to modern readers in Matthew Arnold's account in God and the Bible of his quest for the meaning of god, which in turn is imitated in Mr. Updegraff's New World. It lends vivacity and interest to Pascal's Provinciales and many other examples of it can be found in modern literature. The classical instance of it in Plato is Socrates' narrative in the Phaedo of his search for a satisfactory explanation of natural phenomena, 96 A ff. In the Sophist the argument is represented as an effort to track and capture the sophist. And the figure of the hunt is common in the dialogues(Cf. Vol. I. p. 365). Cf. also Rep. 455 A-B, 474 B, 588 C-D, 612 C, Euthyd. 291 A-B, 293 A, Phileb. 24 A ff., 43 A, 44 D, 45 A, Laws 892 D-E, Theaet. 169 D, 180 E, 196 D, Polit. 265 B, etc.

76 Cf. 487 D. Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 3 “I am not sure that I do not think this the fault of our community rather than of the men of culture.”

77 For the idiom φύσιν ἔχει cf. 473 A, Herod. ii. 45, Dem. ii. 26. Similarly ἔχει λόγον, Rep. 378 E, 491 D, 564 A, 610 A, Phaedo 62 B and D, Gorg. 501 A, etc.

78 This saying was attributed to Simonides. Cf. schol. Hermann, Plato, vol. vi. p. 346, Joel, Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates, ii.1 p .81, Aristot.Rhet. 1301 a 8 Cf. Phaedr. 245 Aἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας,Thompson on Phaedr. 233 E, 364 Bἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας, Laws 953 Dἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων καὶ σοφῶν θύρας, and for the idea cf. also 568 A and Theaet. 170 A, Timon of AthensIV iii. 17 “The learned pate ducks to the golden fool.”

79 For Plato's attitude toward the epigrams of the Pre-Socratics Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 68-69.

80 Cf. Theaet. 170 B and 590 C-D.

81 For the idiom with ὄφελος cf. 530 C, 567 B, Euthyphro 4 E, Apol. 36 C, Crito 46 A, Euthydem. 289 A, Soph.O. C. 259, where it is varied.

82 Cf. Theaet. 173 C, why speak of unworthy philosophers? and 495 C ff.

83 Possibly “wooers.” Cf. 347 C, 521 B. Plato frequently employs the language of physical love in speaking of philosophy. Cf. 495-496, 490 B, Theaet. 148 E ff., Pheado 66 E, Meno 60 B, Phaedr. 266 B, etc.

84 Cf. Theaet. 169 D.

85 The quality of the καλὸς κἀγαθός gave rise to the abstraction καλοκἀγαθία used for the moral ideal in the Eudemian Ethics. Cf. Isoc.Demon. 6, 13, and 51, Stewart on Eth. Nic. 1124 a 4 (p. 339) and 1179 b 10 (p. 460).

86 For ἤ= “or else” Cf. Prot. 323 A and C, Phaedr. 237 C, 239 A, 245 D, Gorg. 494 A, Crat. 426 B, etc.

87 Similar metaphors for contact, approach and intercourse with the truth are frequent in Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. For Plato cf. Campbell on Theaet. 150 B and 186 A. Cf. also on 489 D.

88 Cf. Phaedo 65 E f., Symp. 211 E-212 A.

89 Lit. “be nourished.” Cf. Protag. 313 C-D, Soph. 223 E, Phaedr. 248 B.

90 a Platonic and Neoplatonic metaphor. Cf. Theaet. 148 E ff., 151 A, and passim, Symp. 206 E, Epist. ii. 313 A, Epictet.Diss. i. 22. 17.

91 For the figurative use of the word χορός cf. 560 E, 580 B, Euthydem. 279 C, Theaet. 173 B.

92 For the list of virtues Cf. on 487 A.

93 Cf. for the use of the dative Polit. 258 Aσυγχωρεῖς οὖν οἷς λέγει, Phaedo 100 Cτῇ τοιᾷδε αἰτίᾳ συγχωρεῖς, Horace, Sat. ii. 3. 305 “stultum me fateor, liceat concedere veris.”

94 Le petit nombre des élus. Cf. 496 A-B and Phaedo 69 C-D, Matt. xx. 16, xxii. 14.

95 For the Greek double use of ἄξιος and ἀνάξιος Cf. Laws 943 E, Aesch.Ag. 1527. Cf. “How worthily he died who died unworthily” and Wyatt's line “Disdain me not without desert.”

96 Cf. Burton, Anatomy, i. 1 “This St. Austin acknowledgeth of himself in his humble confessions, promptness of wit, memory, eloquence, they were God's good gifts, but he did not use them to his glory.” Cf. Meno 88 A-C, and Seneca, Ep. v. 7 “multa bona nostra nobis nocent.”

97 Cf. What Plato Said, p. 479 on Charm. 158 A. For “goods” Cf. ibid. p. 629 on Laws 697 B. The minor or earlier dialogues constantly lead up to the point that goods are no good divorced from wisdom, or the art to use them rightly, or the political or royal art, or the art that will make us happy. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 71.

98 This is for Plato's purpose a sufficiently clear statement of the distinction between contradictory and contrary opposition. Plato never drew out an Aristotelian or modern logician's table of the opposition of propositions. But it is a misunderstanding of Greek idiom or of his style to say that he never got clear on the matter. He always understood it. Cf. Symp. 202 A-B, and on 437 A-B, What Plato Said, p. 595 on Soph. 257 B, and ibid. p. 563 on Rep. 436 B ff.

99 “Corruptio optimi pessima.” Cf. 495 A-B, Xen.Mem, i. 2. 24, iv. 1. 3-4. Cf. Livy xxxviii. 17 “generosius in sua quidquid sede gignitur: insitum alienae terrae in id quo alitur, natura vertente se, degenerat,” Pausanias vii. 17. 3.

100 Cf. 495 B; La Rochefoucauld, Max. 130 “Ia faiblesse est le seul défaut qu'on ne saurait corriger” and 467 “Ia faiblesse est plus opposée à Ia vertu que le vice.”

101 Cf. 107 B, Tim. 42 D.

102 This is the θεῖα μοῖρα of 493 A and Meno 99 E. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 517.

103 See What Plato Said, pp. 12 ff. and on Meno 93-94. Plato again anticipates many of his modern critics. Cf. Grote's defence of the sophists passim, and Mill, Unity of Religion（Three essays on Religion, pp. 78, 84 ff.).

104 ἰδιωτικούς refers to individual sophists as opposed to the great sophist of public opinion. Cf. 492 D, 493 A, 494 A.

105 For καὶ ἄξιον λόγου Cf. Euthydem 279 C, Laches 192 A, Laws 908 B, 455 C, Thucyd. ii. 54. 5, Aristot.Pol. 1272 b 32, 1302 a 13, De part. an. 654 a 13, Demosth. v. 16, Isoc. vi. 65.

106 Cf. Gorg. 490 B, Emerson, Self-Reliance: “It is easy . . . to brook the rage of the cultivated classes . . . . But . . . when the unintelligent brute force that lies at the bottom of society is made to growl and mow, it needs the habit of magnanimity and religion to treat it godlike as a trifle of no concernment,” Carlyle, French Revolution: “Great is the combined voice of men . . . . He who can resist that has his footing somewhere beyond time.” For the public as the great sophist cf. Brimley, Essays, p. 224 (The Angel in the House): “The miserable view of life and its purposes which society instils into its youth of both sexes, being still, as in Plato's time, the sophist par excellence of which all individual talking and writing sophists are but feeble copies.” Cf. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. 4 II. 1. 601 “Die sophistische Ethik ist seiner Ansicht nach die einfache Konsequenz der Gewöhnlichen.” This is denied by some recent critics. The question is a logomachy. Of course there is more than one sophistic ethics. Cf. Mill, Dissertations and Discussions, iv. pp. 247 ff., 263 ff., 275. For Plato's attitude toward the sophists see also Polit. 303 C, Phaedr, 260 C, What Plato Said, pp. 14-15, 158.

107 Cf. Eurip.Orest. 901, they shouted ὡς καλῶς λέγοι, also Euthydem. 303 Bοἱ κίονες,276 B and D, Shorey on Horace, Odes i.20.7 “datus in theatro cum tibi plausus,” and also the account of the moulding process in Protag. 323-326.

108 What would be his plight, his state of mind; how would he feel? Cf. Shorey in Class. Phil. v. (1910) pp. 220-221, Iliad xxiv. 367, Theognis 748καὶ τίνα θυμὸν ἔχων;Symp. 219 D 3τίνα οἴεσθέ με διάνοιαν ἔχειν; Eurip.I.A. 1173τίν᾽ ἐν δόμοις με καρδίαν ἕξειν δοκεῖς;

109 Adam translates as if it were καὶ φήσει. Cf. my “Platonism and the History of Science,” Amer. Philos. Soc. Proc. lxvi. p. 174 n. See Stallbaum ad loc.

110 Cf. Protag. 317 A-B, Soph. 239 C, Laws 818 D.

111 Cf. Od. xvi. 437. See Friedländer, Platon, ii. 386 n. who says ἀλλοῖον γίγνεσθαι can only =ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, “be made different.”

112 Cf. 429 C for the idiom, and Laws 696 Aοὐ γὰρ μή ποτε γένηται παῖς καὶ ἀνὴρ καὶ γέρων ἐκ ταύτης τῆς τροφῆς διαφέρων πρὸς ἀρετήν.

113 Cf. Symp. 176 C (of Socrates), Phaedr. 242 B, Theaet. 162 D-E.

114 Cf. on 492 A, Apol. 33, Phaedo 58 E, Protag. 328 E, Meno 99 E, Phaedr. 244 C, Laws 642 C, 875 C, Ion 534 C.

115 Cf. Arnold, Preface to Essays in Criticism; Phaedo 60 D, Laws 817 B, On Virtue 376 D.

116 Cf. Epist. v. 321 Dἔστιν γὰρ δή τις φωνὴ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἑκάστης καθάπερεί τινων ζῴων, “each form of government has a sort of voice, as if it were a kind of animal” (tr. L.A. Post). Hackforth says this is a clumsy imitation of the Republic which proves the letter spurious. Cf. Thomas Browne, Religio Medici, ii. 1 “If there be any among those common objects of hatred I do contemn and laugh at, it is that great enemy of reason, virtue, and religion, the multitude . . . one great beast and a monstrosity more prodigious than Hydra,” Horace, Epist. i. 1. 76 “belua multorum es capitum.” Also Hamilton's “Sir, your people is a great beast,” Sidney, Arcadia, bk. ii. “Many-headed multitude,” Wallas, Human Nature in Politics, p. 172 “ . . . like Plato's sophist is learning what the public is and is beginning to understand ‘the passions and desires’ of that ‘huge and powerful brute,'” Shakes.Coriolanus iv. i. 2 “The beast with many heads Butts me away,”ibid. ii. iii. 18 “The many-headed multitude.” For the idea cf. also Gorg. 501 B-C ff., Phaedr. 260 C 260 C,δόξας δὲ πλήθους μεμελετηκώς, “having studied the opinions of the multitude,” Isoc. ii. 49-50.

117 Cf. Class. Phil. ix. (1914) p. 353, n. 1, ibid. xxiii. (1928) p. 361 (Tim. 75 D), What Plato Said, p. 616 on Tim. 47 E, Aristot.Eth. 1120 b 1οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, Emerson, Circle,“Accept the actual for the necessary,” Eurip, I. A. 724καλῶς ἀναγκαίως τε. Mill iv. 299 and Grote iv. 221 miss the meaning. Cf. Bk I. on 347 C, Newman, Aristot.Pol. i. pp. 113-114, Iamblichus, Protrept.Teubner 148 K.ἀγνοοῦντος . . . ὅσον διέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, “not knowing how divergent have always been the good and the necessary.”

118 Cf. Laws 659 B, 701 A, Gorg. 502 B.

119 Cf. 371 C, Gorg. 517 B, 518 B.

120 Plato likes to qualify sweeping statements and allow something to necessity and the weakness of human nature. Cf. Phaedo 64 Eκαθ᾽ ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, 558 D-E, 500 D, 383 C.

121 The scholiast derives this expression from Diomedes' binding Odysseus and driving him back to camp after the latter had attempted to kill him. The schol. on Aristoph.Eccl. 1029 gives a more ingenious explanation. See Frazer, Pausanias, ii. p. 264.

122 καταγέλαστον is a strong word. “Make the very jack-asses laugh” would give the tone. Cf. Carlyle, Past and Present, iv. “impartial persons have to say with a sigh that . . . they have heard no argument advanced for it but such as might make the angels and almost the very jack-asses weep. Cf. also Isoc.Panegyr. 14, Phil. 84, 101, Antid. 247, Peace 36, and καταγέλαστος in Plato passim, e.g.Symp. 189 B.”

123 A commonplace of Plato and all intellectual idealists. Cf. 503 B, Polit. 292 E, 297 B, 300 E. Novotny, Plato's Epistles, p. 87, uses this to support his view that Plato had a secret doctrine. Adam quotes Gorg. 474 Aτοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι, which is not quite relevant. Cf. Renan, Etudes d'histoire relig. p. 403 “La philosophie sera toujours le fait d'une imperceptible minorité,” etc.

124 It is psychologically necessary. Cf. supra, Vol. 1. on 473 E. Cf. 527 A, Laws 655 E, 658 E, 681 C, 687 C, Phaedr. 239 C, 271 B, Crito 49 D.

125 Cf. Gorg. 481 E, 510 D, 513 B.

126 In 487 A.

127 Cf. 386 A. In what follows Plato is probably thinking of Alcibiades. Alc, I, 103 A ff, imitates the passage. Cf. Xen.Mem. i. 2. 24.

128 For ὑποκείσονται Cf. Gorg. 510 C, 576 AὑποπεσόντεςEurip.Orest. 670 ὑποτρέχειν, Theaet. 173 Aὑπελθεῖν.

129 i.e. endeavoring to secure the advantage of it for themselves by winning his favor when he is still young and impressionable.

130 Cf. Alc. I. 104 B-C ff.

131 Cf. Alc. I. 105 B-C.

132 ὑψηλὸν ἐξαρεῖν, etc., seems to be a latent poetic quotation.

133 Or perhaps “subject to these influences.” Adam says it is while he is sinking into this condition.

134 Cf. Vol. I. on 476 E. Cf. 533 D, Protag. 333 E, Phaedo 83 A, Crat. 413 A, Theaet. 154. E.

135 Cf. Phaedo 66 C, Symp. 184 C, Euthydem. 282 B.

136 Cf. Epin. 990 A, Epist. vii. 330 A-B.

137 Cf. Alc. I. 135 E.

138 For πᾶν ἔργον cf. Sophocles, E. 615.

139 Cf. 517 E.

140 For ἐκπεσεῖν cf. 496 C.

141 Cf. on 591 C. p. 32, note a.

142 Cf. Lysis 220 A; Arnold's “machinery,” Aristotle's χορηγία

143 Cf. 491 B-E, Laws 951 Bἀδιάφθαρτος, Xen.Mem. i. 2. 24.

144 For καὶ ἄλλως Cf. Il. ix. 699.

145 Cf. on 485 Dὥσπερ ῥεῦμα.

146 Cf. on 491 E, p. 33, note d.

147 Cf. on 489 D, and Theaet. 173 C.

148 Cf. Taine, à Sainte-Beuve, Aug. 14, 1865: “Comme Claude Bernard, il dépasse sa spécialité et c'est ches des spécialistes comme ceux-là que la malheureuse philosophie livée aux mains gantées et parfumées d'eau bénite va trouver des maris capables de lui faire encore des enfants.” cf. Epictet. iii. 21. 21. The passage is imitated by Lucian 3. 2. 287, 294, 298. For the shame that has befallen philosophy Cf. Euthydem. 304 ff., Epist. vii. 328 E, Isoc.Busiris 48, Plutarch 1091 E, Boethius, Cons. i. 3. There is no probability that this is aimed at Isocrates, who certainly had not deserted the mechanical arts for what he called philosophy. Rohde Kleine Schriften, i. 319, thinks Antisthenes is meant. But Plato as usual is generalizing. See What Plato Said, p. 593 on Soph. 242 C.

149 Cf. the different use of the idea in Protag. 318 E.

150 τεχνίον is a contemptuous diminutive, such as are common in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Cf. also ἀνθρωπίσκοι in C, and ψυχάριον in 519 A.

151 Cf. 611 C-D, Theaet. 173 A-B.

152 For the idea that trade is ungentlemanly and incompatible with philosophy Cf. 522 B and 590 C, Laws 919 C ff., and What Plato Said, p. 663 on Rivals 137 B. Cf. Richard of Bury, Philobiblon,Prologue, “Fitted for the liberal arts, and equally disposed to the contemplation of Scripture, but destitute of the needful aid, they revert, as it were, by a sort of apostasy, to mechanical arts.” Cf also Xen.Mem. iv. 2. 3, and Ecclesiasticus xxxviii. 25 f. “How can he get wisdom that holdeth the plough and glorieth in the goad . . . and whose talk is of bullocks? . . . so every carpenter and workmaster . . . the smith . . . the potter . . . ”

153 For a similar short vivid description Cf. Erastae 134 B, Euthyphro 2 B. Such are common in Plautus, e.g.Mercator 639.

154 It is probably fanciful to see in this an allusion to the half-Thracian Antisthenes. Cf. also Theaet. 150 C, and Symp. 212 A.

155 Cf. Euthydem. 306 D.

156 Cf. Phaedrus 250 Aὀλίγαι δὴ λείπονται, and 404 A and on 490 E.

157 Perhaps “overtaken.” Cf. Goodwin on Dem.De cor. 107.

158 It is possible but unnecessary to conjecture that Plato may be thinking of Anaxagoras or Xenophon or himself or Dion.

159 Cf. Theaet. 173 B, 540 D.

160 This bridle has become proverbial. Cf. Plut.De san. tuenda 126 B, Aelian, Var. Hist. iv. 15. For Theages cf. also Apol. 33 E and the spurious dialogue bearing is name.

161 The enormous fanciful literature on the daimonion does not concern the interpretation of Plato, who consistently treats it as a kind of spiritual tact checking Socrates from any act opposed to his true moral and intellectual interests. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 456-457, on Euthyphro 3 B, Jowett and Campbell, p. 285.

162 For τούτων . . . γενόμενοι cf. Aristoph.Clouds 107τούτων γενοῦ μοι.

163 The irremediable degeneracy of existing governments is the starting-point of Plato's political and social speculations. Cf. 597 B, Laws 832 C f., Epist. vii. 326 A; Byron, apudArnold, Essays in Crit. ii. p. 195 “I have simplified my politics into an utter detestation of all existing governments.” This passage, Apol. 31 E ff. and Gorg. 521-522 may be considered Plato's apology for not engaging in politics Cf. J. V. Novak, Platon u. d. Rhetorik, p. 495 (Schleiermacher, Einl. z. Gorg. pp. 15 f.), Wilamowitz, Platon, i. 441-442 “Wer kann hier die Klage über das eigene Los überhören?” There is no probability that, as an eminent scholar has maintained, the Republic itself was intended as a programme of practical politics for Athens, and that its failure to win popular opinion is the chief cause of the disappointed tone of Plato's later writings. Cf. Erwin Wolff in Jaeger's Neue Phil. Untersuchungen,Heft 6, Platos Apologie, pp. 31-33, who argues that abstinence from politics is proclaimed in the Apology before the Gorgias and that the same doctrine in the seventh Epistle absolutely proves that the Apology is Plato's own. Cf. also Theaet. 173 C ff., Hipp. Maj. 281 C, Euthydem. 306 B,Xen.Mem. i. 6. 15.

164 Cf. 368 b, Apol. 32 Eεἰ . . . ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις and 32 Aμαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου.

165 Cf. Pindar, Ol. i. 64. For the antithetic juxtaposition cf. also εἷς πᾶσιν below; see too 520 B, 374 A, Menex. 241 B, Phaedr. 243 C, Laws 906 D, etc. More in the Utopia（Morley, Ideal Commonwealths, p. 84) paraphrases loosely from memory what he calls “no ill simile by which Plato set forth the unreasonableness of a philosopher's meddling with government”

166 Cf. Democrates fr. 38, Diels ii.3 p. 73καλὸν μὲν τὸν ἀδικέοντα κωλύειν: εἰ δὲ μή, μὴ ξυναδικεῖν, “it is well to prevent anyone from doing wrong, or else not to join in wrongdoing.”

167 Maximus of Tyre 21. 20 comments, “Show me a safe wall.” See Stallbaum ad loc. for references to this passage in later antiquity. Cf. Heracleit. fr. 44, Diels 3 i. 67, J. Stenzel, Platon der Erzieher, p. 114, Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, p. 33, Renan, Souvenirs, xvii., P. E. More, Shelburne Essays, iii. pp. 280-281 Cf. also Epist. vii. 331 D, Eurip.Ion 598-601.

168 Cf. Vol. I on 331 A, 621 C-D, Marc. Aurel. xii. 36 and vi. 30in fine. See my article “Hope” in Hasting's Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.

169 Cf. Aristot.Eth. Nic. 1094 b 9μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελεώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν, “yet the good of the state seems a grander and more perfect thing both to attain and to secure” (tr. F. H. Peters).

170 For αὐξήσεται Cf. Theaet. 163 Cἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ and Newman, Aristot.Pol. i. p. 68 “As the Christian is said to be complete in Christ so the individual is said by Aristotle to be complete in the πόλις” Spencer, Data of Ethics, xv. “Hence it is manifest that we must consider the ideal man as existing in the ideal social state.” Cf. also 592 A-B, 520 A-C and Introd. Vol. I. p. xxvii.

171 An instance of Socrates' Attic courtesy. Cf 430 B, Cratyl. 427 D, Theaet. 183 C, Gorg. 513 C, Phaedr. 235 A. But in Gorg. 462 C it is ironical and perhaps in Hipp. Maj. 291 A.

172 κατάστασις=constitution in both senses. Cf. 414 A, 425 C, 464 A, 493 A, 426 C, 547 B. So also in the Laws. The word is rare elsewhere in Plato.

173 For ἐξίτηλον Cf. Critias 121 A.

174 This need not be a botanical error. in any case the meaning is plain. Cf. Tim. 57 B with my emendation.

175 For the idiom cf.αὐτὸ δείξειPhileb. 20 C, with Stallbaum's note, Theaet. 200 E, Hipp. Maj. 288 B, Aristoph.Wasps 994, Frogs 1261, etc., Pearson on Soph. fr. 388. Cf.αὐτὸ σημανεῖ, Eurip.Bacch. 476, etc.

176 Plato similarly plays in dramatic fashion with the order of the dialogue in 523 B, 528 A, 451 B-C, 458 B.

177 Cf. on 412 A and What Plato Said, p. 647 on Laws 962; 502 D.

178 Cf. Soph. 224 C. See critical note.

179 So Adam. Others take τῷ ὄντι with χαλεπά as part of the proverb. Cf. 435 C, Crat. 384 A-B with schol.

180 For the idiomatic ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ Cf. Parmen. 150 B, Euthydem. 296 B, Thompson on Meno,Excursus 2, pp. 258-264, Aristot.An. Post. 91 b 33, Eth. Nic. 1101 a 12, 1136 b 25, 1155 b 30, 1168 a 12, 1174 a 27, 1180 b 27, Met. 1028 a 24, 1044 a 11, Rhet. 1371 a 16.

181 What Plato here deprecates Callicles in the Gorgias recommends, 484 C-D. For the danger of premature study of dialectic cf. 537 D-E ff. Cf. my Idea of Education in Plato's Republic, p. 11. Milton develops the thought with characteristic exuberance, Of Education: “They present their young unmatriculated novices at first coming with the most intellective abstractions of logic and metaphysics . . . to be tossed an turmoiled with their unballasted wits in fathomless and unquiet deeds of controversy,” etc.

182 Cf. 386 A, 395 C, 413 C, 485 D, 519 A, Demosth. xxi. 154, Xen.Ages. 10.4, Aristot.Eth. Nic. 1103 b 24, 1104 b 11, Isoc. xv. 289.

183 Cf. 450 C.

184 Cf. 475 D, Isoc. xii. 270ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἄλλου δεικνύοντος καὶ πονήσαντος ἠθέλησεν ἀκροατὴς γενέσθαι“would not even be willing to listen to one worked out and submitted by another” (tr. Norlin in L.C.L.).

185 Cf. Antiphon's devotion to horsemanship in the Parmenides, 126 C. For πρὸς τὸ γῆρας cf. 552 D, Laws 653 A.

186 Diels i. 3 p. 78, fr. 6. Cf. Aristot.Meteor. ii. 2. 90, Lucretius v. 662.

187 Cf. 410 C and What Plato Said, p. 496 on Protag. 326 B-C.

188 Like cattle destined for the sacrifice. A favorite figure with Plato. Cf. Laws 635 A, Protag. 320 A. It is used literally in Critias 119 D.

189 Cf. 540 A-B, Newman, Aristot.Pol. i. pp. 329-330. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. 207-208, fancies that 498 C to 502 A is a digression expressing Plato's personal desire to be the philosopher in Athenian politics.

190 A half-playful anticipation of the doctrine of immortality reserved for Bk. x. 608 D ff. It involves no contradiction and justifies no inferences as to the date and composition of the Republic. Cf. Gomprez iii. 335. Cf. Emerson, Experience, in fine,“which in his passage into new worlds he will carry with him.” Bayard Taylor (American Men of Letters, p. 113), who began to study Greek late in life, remarked, Oh, but I expect to use it in the other world.” Even the sober positivist Mill says (Theism, pp. 249-250) “The truth that life is short and art is long is from of old one of the most discouraging facts of our condition: this hope admits the possibility that the art employed in improving and beautifying the soul itself may avail for good in some other life even when seemingly useless in this.”

191 For εἰς here cf. Blaydes on Clouds 1180, Herod. vii. 46, Eurip.Heracleidae 270.

192 Cf. on 486 A. see too Plut.Cons. Apol. 17. 111 C “a thousand, yes, ten thousand years are only an ἀόριστος point, nay, the smallest part of a point, as Simonides says.” Cf. also Lyra Graeca(L. C. L.), ii. p. 338, Anth. Pal. x. 78.

193 γενόμενον . . . λεγόμενον. It is not translating to make no attempt to reproduce Plato's parody of “polyphonic prose.” The allusion here to Isocrates and the Gorgian figure of παρίσωσις and παρομοίωσις is unmistakable. The subtlety of Plato's style treats the “accidental” occurrence of a Gorgian between the artificial style and insincerity of the sophists and the serious truth of his own ideals. Cf. Isoc. x. 18λεγόμενος . . . γενόμενοςWhat Plato Said, p. 544 on Symp. 185 C, F. Reinhardt, De Isocratis aemulis, p. 39, Lucilius, bk. v. init. “hoc ‘nolueris et debueris’ te si minu' delectat, quod τεχνίονIsocrateium est,” etc.

194 As the Platonic dialectic does (Phileb. 58 C-D, Cf. What Plato Said, p. 611) in contrast with the rhetorician, the lawyer (Theaet. 172 D-E) and the eristic (Euthydem. 272 B, Hipp. Maj. 288 D).

195 Cf. Eurip.Hippol. 102, Psalm cxxxviii. 6 “the proud he knoweth afar off.”

196 Cf. Phaedrus 253 D with Theaetet. 187 C, and Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 48.

197 Cf. on 489 A.

198 Cf. Aristot.Met. 984 b 10, 984 a 19.

199 Cf. Laws 757 E. But we must not attribute personal superstition to Plato. See What Plato Said, index, s.v. Superstition.

200 Cf. Laws 711 D, Thuc. vi. 24. 3; so iv. 4. 1ὁρμὴ ἐπέπεσε.

201 We might say, “talking like vain Utopians or idly idealists.” The scholiast says, p. 348, τοῦτο καὶ κενήν φασι μακαρίαν. cf. supra, Vol. I. on 458 A, and for εὐχαί on 450 D, and Novotny on Epist. vii. 331 D.

202 Cf. Laws 782 A, 678 A-B, and What Plato Said, p. 627 on Laws 676 A-B; Also Isoc.Panath. 204-205, seven hundred years seemed a short time.

203 Cf. Phaedo 78 A.

204 For the ellipsis of the first person of the verb Parmen. 137 C, Laches 180 A. The omission of the third person is very frequent.

205 Cf. 492 E, Laws 711 E, 739 C, 888 E.

206 Cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxii, and ibid. on 472 B, and What Plato Said, p. 564, also 540 D, Newman, Aristot.Pol. i. p. 377.

207 This is what I have called the ABA style. Cf. 599 E, Apol. 20 C, Phaedo 57 B, Laches 185 A, Protag. 344 C, Theaet. 185 A, 190 B, etc. It is nearly what Riddell calls binary structure, Apology, pp. 204-217.

208 It is uncritical to find “contradictions” in variations of mood, emphasis, and expression that are broadly human and that no writer can avoid. Any thinker may at one moment and for one purpose defy popular opinion and for another conciliate it; at one time affirm that it doesn't matter what the ignorant people think or say, and at another urge that prudence bids us be discreet. So St. Paul who says (Gal. i. 10) “Do I seek to please men? for if I yet please men I should not be the servant of Christ,” says also (Rom xiv. 16) “Let no then your good be evil spoken of.” Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 646 on Laws 950 B.

209 A recurrence to etymological meaning. Cf.ἄθυμον411 B, Laws 888 A,εὐψυχίαςLaws 791 C, Thompson on Meno 78 E, Aristot.Topics 112 a 32-38, Eurip.Heracleidae 730ἀσθαλῶς, Shakes.Rich. III. v. v. 37 “reduce these bloody days again.”

210 For a similar teasing or playful repetition of a word cf. 517 C, 394 B, 449 C, 470 B-C.

211 For the figure of the κῶμος or revel rout Cf. Theaet. 184A, Aesch.Ag. 1189, Eurip.Ion 1197, and, with a variation of the image, Virgil, Aen. i. 148.

212 Cf. Adam ad loc. and Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. 121.

213 Isoc.Antid. 260 seems to take this term to himself; Cf. Panath. 249, Peace 65,Lysias xxiv. 24πολυπράγμων εἰμὶ καὶ θρασὺς καὶ φιλαπεχθήμωνDemosth, xxiv, 6.

214 i.e. gossip. cf. Aristot.Eth. Nic. 1125 a 5οὐδ᾽ ἀνθρωπολόγος, Epictetus iii. 16. 4. Cf. also Phileb. 59 b, Theaet. 173 D, 174 C.

215 Cf. on 486 A, also Phileb. 58 D, 59 A, Tim. 90 D, and perhaps Tim. 47 A and Phaedo 79. This passage is often supposed to refer to the ideas, and ἐκεῖ in 500 D shows that Plato is in fact there thinking of them, though in Rep. 529 A-B ff. he protests against this identification. And strictly speaking κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα in C would on Platonic principles be true only of the ideas. Nevertheless poets and imitators have rightly felt that the dominating thought of the passage is the effect on the philosopher's mind of the contemplation of the heavens. This confusion or assimilation is, of course, still more natural to Aristotle, who thought the stars unchanging. Cf. Met. 1063 a 16ταὐτὰ δ᾽ αἰεὶ καὶ μεταβολῆς οὐδεμιᾶς κοινωνοῦντα. Cf. also Sophocles, Ajax 669 ff., and Shorey in Sneath, Evolution of Ethics, pp. 261-263, Dio Chrys. xl. (Teubner ii. p. 199), Boethius, Cons. iii. 8 “respicite caeli spatium . . . et aliquando desinite vilia mirari.”

216 ἀφομοιοῦσθαι suggests the ὁμοίωσις θέῳTheaet. 176 B. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 578.

217 Cf. on 493 D, and for the idea 383 C.

218 Cf. HamletIII. i. 141 “thou shalt not escape calumny,” Bacchylides 12 (13). 202-203βροτῶν δὲ μῶμος πάντεσσι μέν ἐστιν ἐπ᾽ ἔγοις.

219 The philosopher unwillingly holds office. Cf. on 345 E.

220 ἐκεῖ is frequently used in Plato of the world of ideas. Cf. Phaedrus 250 A.Phaedo 109 E.

221 For the word πλάττειν used of the lawgiver cf. 377 C, Laws 671 C, 712 B, 746 A, 800 B, Rep. 374 A, 377 c, 420 c, 466 A, 588 C, etc. For the idea that the ruler shapes the state according to the pattern Cf. 540 A-B. Plato apples the language of the theory of ideas to the “social tissue” here exactly as he apples it to the making of a tool in the Cratylus 389 C. In both cases there is a workman, the ideal pattern and the material in which it is more or less perfectly embodied. Such passages are the source of Aristotle's doctrine f matter and form. Cf. Met. 1044 a 25De part. an. 630 b 25-27, 640 b 24 f., 642 a 10 ff., De an. 403 b 3, Seller, Aristot.(Eng.) i. p. 356. Cf. also Gorg. 503 D-E, Polit. 306 C, 309 D and Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 31-32. Cf. Alcinous,Εἰσαγωγή ii. (Teubner vi. p. 153)ἃ κατὰ τὸν θεωρητικὸν βίον ὁρᾶται, μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἤθη.

222 Cf. Aristot.Pol. 1329 a 21ἀρετῆς δημιουργόν. Cf. also 1275 b 29 with Newman, Introd. Aristot.Pol. p. 229. Cf. 395 Cδημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας, Theages 125 Aδημιουργὸν . . . τῆς σοφίας.

223 Cf. Laws 968 Aπρὸς ταῖς δημοσίαις ἀρεταῖς, Phaedo 82 A and supra, Vol. I. on 430 C. Brochard, “La Morale de Platon,”L’Année Philosophique, xvi. (1905) p. 12 “La justice est appelée une vertu populaire.” This is a little misleading, if he means that justice itself is “une vertu populaire.”

224 For διαγράψειαν cf. 387 B and Laws 778 A. See also Stallbaum ad loc.

225 Cf. Vol. I. on 426 B. This is one of the passages that may be used or misused to class Plato with the radicaIs. Cf. Laws 736 A-B, Polit. 293 D, Euthyphro 2 D-3 A. H. W. Schneider, The Puritan Mind, p. 36, says, “Plato claimed that before his Republic could be established the adult population must be killed off.” Cf. however Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxix, What Plato Said, p. 83, and infra, p. 76, note a on 502 B.

226 The theory of ideas frequently employs this image of the artist looking off to his model and back again to his work. Cf. on 484 C, and What Plato Said, p. 458, Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 37.

227 i.e. the idea of justice. For φύσις and the theory of ideas Cf. 597 C, Phaedo 103 b, Parmen. 132 D, Cratyl. 389 C-D, 390 E.

228 For ἀνδρείκελον Cf. Cratyl. 424 E.

229 Il. i. 131, Od. iii. 416. Cf. 589 D, 500 C-D, Laws 818 B-C, and What Plato Said, p. 578 on Theaet. 176 B, Cic.Tusc. i. 26. 65 “divina mallem ad not.” Cf. also Tim. 90 A, Phaedr. 249 C. The modern reader may think of Tennyson, In Mem. cviii. “What find I in place But mine own phantom chanting hymns?” Cf. also Adam ad loc.

230 Cf. 500 D and on 493 D.

231 For γοῦν cf. supra, vol. I. on 334 A.

232 Cf. 474 A.

233 Cf. 591 A. This affirmation of the impossibility of denial or controversy is a motif frequent in the attic orators. Cf. Lysias xxx. 26, xxxi. 24, xiii. 49, vi. 46, etc.

234 Cf. 376 D, Laws 632 E, 841 C, Phaedr. 276 E. Frutiger, Les Mythes de Platon, p. 13, says Plato uses the word μῦθος only once of his own myths, Polit. 268 E.

235 Cf. Laws 711 Dτὸ χαλεπόν, and 495 A-B.

236 Cf. 494 A.

237 Cf. Epist. vii. 328 C and Novotny, Plato's Epistles, p. 170 Plato's apparent radicalism again. Cf. on 501 A. Cf. also Laws 709 E, but note the qualification in 875 C, 713 E-714 A. 691 C-D. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. pp. 381-383 seems to say that the εἷς ἱκανός is the philosopher—Plato.

238 Note the different tone of 565 Eλαβὼν σφόδρα πειθόμενον ὄχλον. Cf. Phaedr. 260 Cλαβὼν πόλιν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν πείθῃ.

239 Cf. on 499 D, and Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, p. 43.

240 Cf. Epist. vii. 327 B-C, viii. 357 B ff.

241 Cf. 502 A, Campbell's not on Theaet. 144 A, and Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 208.

242 Cf. on 412 A-B and 497 C-D, Laws 960 B. 463 B is not quite relevant.

243 For τὸ σοφόν Cf. Euthydem. 293 D, 297 D, Gorg. 493 A, Herod. v. 18τοῦτο οὐδὲν εἶναι σοφόν, Symp. 214 Aτὸ σύφισμα, Laches 183 D.

244 Cf. 423 E.

245 In Bk. V.

246 Cf. 412 D-E, 413 C-414 A, 430 A-B, 537, 540 A, Laws 751 C.

247 Cf. on 412 E, 513 C, Soph. 230 B.

248 τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο is an illogical idiom. The antecedent is only implied. Cf. 373 C, 598 C. See my article in Transactions of the American Phil. Assoc. xlvii., (1916) pp. 205-236.

249 Cf. Theognis 417-318παρατρίβομαι ὥστε μολίβδῳ χρυσός, ibid., 447-452, 1105-1106, Herod. vii. 10, Eurip. fr. 955 (N.). Cf. Zechariah xii. 9 “ . . . will try them as gold is tried,” Job xxiii. 10 “When he hath tried me I shall come forth as Gold.” Cf. also 1Peter i. 7, Psalm xii. 6, lxvi. 10, Isaiah xlviii. 10.

250 The translation preserves the intentional order of the Greek. For the idea cf. 414 A and 465 D-E and for ἆθλα cf. 460 B. Cobet rejects καὶ ἆθλα, but emendations are needless.

251 Cf. Phaedr. 237 A, Epist. vii. 340 A. For the personification of the λόγος Cf. What Plato Said, 500 on Protag. 361 A-B. So too Cic.Tusc. i. 45. 108 “se ita tetra sunt quaedam, ut ea fugiat et reformidet oratio.”

252 Cf. 387 B.

253 Cf. the proverbial μὴ κινεῖν τὰ ἀκίνητα, do not move the immovable, “let sleeping dogs lie,” in Laws 684 D-E, 913 B. Cf. also Phileb. 16 C, and the American idiom “start something.”

254 Cf. 503 D. 341 B, 340 E, 342 D.

255 Cf. on 494 A.

256 The translation is correct. In the Greek the anacoluthon is for right emphasis, and the separation of νεανικοί τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς from the other members of the list is also an intentional feature of Plato's style to avoid the monotony of too long an enumeration. The two things that rarely combine are Plato's two temperaments. The description of the orderly temperament begins with οἷοι and οἱ τοιοῦτοι refers to the preceding description of the active temperament. The MSS. have καὶ before νεανικοί; Heindorf, followed by Wilamowitz, and Adam's minor edition, put it before οἷοι. Burnet follows the MSS. Adam's larger edition puts καὶ νεανικοὶ τε after ἕπεται. The right meaning can be got from any of the texts in a good viva voce reading. Plato's contrast of the two temperaments disregards the possible objection of a psychologist that the adventurous temperament is not necessarily intellectual. Cf. on 375 C, and What Plato Said, p. 573 on Theaet. 144 A-B, Cic.Tusc. v. 24.

257 Cf. Theaet. 144 A ff.

258 A tough of humor in a teacher

259 For the figure Cf. Meno 80 A, 84 B and C.

260 Lit. “most precise.” Cf. Laws 965 Bἀκριβεστέραν παιδείαν.

261 In 412 C ff.

262 Cf. 535 B, Protag. 326 C.

263 For the tripartite soul cf. Vol. I. on 435 A and 436 B, Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 42, What Plato Said, p. 526 on Phaedo 68 C, p. 552 on Phaedr. 246 B, and p. 563 on Rep. 435 B-C.

264 Cf. Vol. I. on 435 C, Phaedr. 274 A, Friedländer, Platon, ii. pp. 376-377, Jowett and Campbell, p. 300 Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, pp. 81 ff., and my Idea of Good in Plato's Republic（Univ. of Chicago Studies in class. Phil. vol. i. p. 190). There is no mysticism and no obscurity. The longer way is the higher education, which will enable the philosopher not only like ordinary citizens to do the right from habit and training, but to understand the reasons for it. The outcome of such an education is described as the vision of the idea of good, which for ethics and politics means a restatement of the provisional psychological definition of the cardinal virtues in terms of the ultimate elements of human welfare. For metaphysics and cosmogony the vision of the idea of good may means teleological interpretation of the universe and the interpretation of all things in terms of benevolent design. That is reserved for poetical and mythical treatment in the Timaeus. The Republic merely glances at the thought from time to time and returns to its own theme. Cf.also Introd. p. xxxv.

265 Cf. Cic.De fin. i. 1 “nec modus est ullus investigandi veri nisi inveneris.” Note not only the edifying tone and the unction of the style but the definite suggestion of Plato's distaste for relativity and imperfection which finds expression in the criticism of the homo mensura in the Theaetetus, in the statement of the Laws 716 C, that God is the measure of all things (What Plato Said, p. 631), and in the contrast in the Politicus 283-294 between measuring things against one another and measuring them by an idea. Cf. 531 A.

266 Cf. Menex. 234 A, Charm. 158 C, Symp. 204 A, Epist. vii. 341 A. From here to the end of this Book the notes are to be used in connection with the Introduction, pp. xxiii-xxxvi, where the idea of good and the divided line are discussed.

267 Cf. Phaedr. 274 A.

268 i.e. sketch, adumbration. The ὑπογραφή is the account of the cardinal virtues in Bk. iv. 428-433.

269 For πᾶν ποιεῖν cf. on 488 C, for συντεινομένουςEuthydem. 288 D.

270 Such juxtaposition of forms of the same word is one of the most common features of Plato's style. Cf. 453 Bἑνα ἕν, 466 Dπάντα πάντῃ, 467 Dπολλὰ πολλοῖς, 496 Cοὐδεὶς οὐδέν, Laws 835 Cμόνῳ μόνος, 958 Bἑκόντα ἑκών. Cf. also Protag. 327 B, Gorg. 523 B, Symp. 217 B, Tim. 92 b, Phaedo 109 B, Apol. 232 C, and Laws passim.

271 The answer is to the sense. Cf. 346 E, Crito 47 C, and D, Laches 195 D, Gorg. 467 E. See critical note.

272 Plato assumed that the reader will understand that the unavailing quest for “the good” in the earlier dialogues is an anticipation of the idea of good. Cf. Vol. I. on 476 A and What Plato Said, p. 71. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 567, does not understand.

273 Cf. 508 E, 517 C, Cratyl. 418 E. Cf. Phileb. 64 E and What Plato Said, p. 534, on Phaedo 99 A. Plato is unwilling to confine his idea of good to a formula and so seems to speak of it as a mystery. It was so regarded throughout antiquity (cf. Diog. Laert. iii. 27), and by a majority of modern scholars. Cf. my Idea of Good in Plato's Republic, pp. 188-189, What Plato Said, pp. 72, 230-231, Introd. Vol. I. pp. xl-xli, and Vol. II. pp. xxvii, xxxiv.

274 Lit. “the use of which,” i.e. a theory of the cardinal virtues is scientific only if deduced from an ultimate sanction or ideal.

275 The omission of the article merely gives a vaguely generalizing color. It makes no difference.

276 For the idiom οὐδὲν ὄφελος Cf. Euthyph. 4 E, Lysis 208 E, 365 B, Charm. 155 E, etc.

277 Cf. 427 A, Phaedr. 275 C, Cratyl. 387 A, Euthyd. 288 E, Laws 751 B, 944 C, etc.

278 καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθόν suggests but does not mean καλοκἀγαθόν in its half-technical sense. The two words fill out the rhythm with Platonic fulness and are virtual synonyms. Cf. Phileb. 65 A and Symp. 210-211 where because of the subject the καλόν is substituted for the ἀγαθόν.

279 So Polus and Callicles in the Gorgias and later the Epicureans and Cyrenaics. Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 131; Eurip.Hippol. 382οἱ δ᾽ ἡδονὴν προθέντες ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, and on 329 A-B. There is no contradiction here with the Philebus. Plato does not himself say that either pleasure or knowledge is the good.

280 κομψοτέροις is very slightly if at all ironical here. Cf. the American “sophisticated” in recent use. See too Theaet. 156 A, Aristot.Eth. Nic 1905 a 18οἱ χαρίεντες.

281 Plato does not distinguish synonyms in the style of Prodicus (Cf. Protag. 337 A ff.) and Aristotle (Cf. Eth. Nic. 1140-1141) when the distinction is irrelevant to his purpose.

282 Cf. Euthyd. 281 D, Theaet. 288 D f., Laws 961 Eὁ περὶ τί νοῦς. See Unity of Plato's Thought, n. 650. The demand for specification is frequent in the dialogues. Cf. Euthyph. 13 D, Laches 192 E, Gorg. 451 A, Charm. 165 C-E, Alc. I. 124 E ff.

283 There is no “the” in the Greek. Emendations are idle. Plato is supremely indifferent to logical precision when it makes no difference for a reasonably intelligent reader. Cf. my note on Phileb. 11 B-C in Class. Phil. vol. iii. (1908) pp. 343-345.

284 φθέγξωνται logically of mere physical utterance (Cf. Theaet. 157 B), not, I think, as Adam says, of high-sounding oracular utterance.

285 Lit. “wandering,” the mark of error. Cf. 484 B, Lysis 213 E, Phaedo 79 C, Soph. 230 B, Phaedr. 263 B, Parmen. 135 E, Laws 962 D.

286 καὶ οὗτοι is an illogical idiom of over-particularization. The sentence begins generally and ends specifically. Plato does not care, since the meaning is clear. Cf. Protag. 336 C, Gorg. 456 C-D, Phaedo 62 A.

287 A distinct reference to Callicles' admission in Gorgias 499 Bτὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους cf. 499 C, Rep. 561 C, and Phileb. 13 Cπάσας ὁμοίας εἶναι. Stenzel's notion (Studien zur Entw. d. Plat. Dialektik, p. 98) that in the PhilebusPlato “ist von dem Standpunkt des Staates 503 C weit entfernt” is uncritical. the Republic merely refers to the GorgiasTo show that the question is disputed and the disputants contradict themselves.

288 ἀμφισβητήσεις is slightly disparaging, Cf. Theaet. 163 C, 158 C, 198 C, Sophist 233 B, 225 B, but less so than ἐρίζειν in Protag. 337 A.

289 Men may deny the reality of the conventional virtues but not of the ultimate sanction, whatever it is. Cf. Theaet. 167 C, 172 A-B, and Shorey in Class. Phil. xvi (1921) pp. 164-168.

290 Cf. Gorg. 468 Bτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες, 505 A-B, Phileb. 20 D, Symp. 206 A, Euthyd. 278 E, Aristot.Eth. Nic. 1173 a, 1094 a οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται, Zeller, Aristot. i. pp. 344-345, 379, Boethius iii. 10, Dante, Purg. xvii. 127-129.

291 Cf. Phileb. 64 Aμαντευτέον. Cf. Arnold's phrase, God and the Bible, chap. i. p. 23 “approximate language thrown out as it were at certain great objects which the human mind augurs and feels after.”

292 As throughout the minor dialogues. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 71.

293 Because, in the language of Platonic metaphysics, it is the παρουσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ that makes them good; but for the practical purpose of ethical theory, because they need the sanction. Cf. Introd. p. xxvii, and Montaigne i. 24 “Toute aultre science est dommageable à celuy qui n'a Ia science de la bonté.”

294 As in the “longer way” Plato is careful not to commit himself to a definition of the ideal or the sanction, but postulates it for his guardians.

295 The personal or ab urbe condita construction. Cf. Theaet. 169 E.

296 the guardians must be able to give a reason, which they can do only by reference to the sanction. For the idea that the statesman must know better than other men. Cf. Laws 968 A, 964 C, 858 C-E, 817 C, Xen Mem. iii. 6. 8.

297 For the effect of the future perfect cf. 457 Bλελέξεται465 Aπροστετάξεται, Eurip.Heracleidae 980πεπράξεται.

298 For the personal construction 348 E, Isoc.To Nic.I. καταφανής is a variation in this idiom for δῆλος. Cf. also Theaet. 189 C, Symp. 221 B, Charm. 162 C, etc.

299 Cf. 367 D-E.

300 This is not a contradiction of Meno 97 B, Theaet. 201 B-C and Phileb. 62 A-B, but simply a different context and emphasis. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 47, nn. 338 and 339.

301 Cf. on 484 C, Phaedr. 270 E.

302 Probably an allusion to the revelation of the mysteries. Cf. Phaedr. 250 C, Phileb. 16 C, rep. 518 C, 478 C, 479 D, 518 A. It is fantastic to see in it a reference to what Cicero calls the lumina orationis of Isocratean style. The rhetoric and synonyms of this passage are not to be pressed.

303 Cf. Phileb. 64 Cἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἤδη προθύροις, “we are now in the vestibule of the good.”

304 καὶ μάλα, “jolly well,” humorous emphasis on the point that it is much easier to “define” the conventional virtues than to explain the “sanction.” Cf. Symp. 189 A, Euthydem. 298 D-E, Herod. viii. 66. It is frequent in the Republic. Ritter gives forty-seven cases. I have fifty-four! But the point that matters is the humorous tone. Cf. e.g. 610 E.

305 Excess of Zeal,προθυμία, seemed laughable to the Greeks. Cf. my interpretation of Iliad i. in fine, Class. Phil. xxii. (1927） pp. 222-223.

306 Cf. More, Principia Ethica, p. 17 “Good, then, is indefinable; and yet, so far as I know, there is only one ethical writer, Professor Henry Sidgwick, who has clearly recognized and stated this fact.”

307 This is not superstitious mysticism but a deliberate refusal to confine in a formula what requires either a volume or a symbol. See Introd. p. xxvii, and my Idea of Good in Plato's Republic, p. 212. τὰ νῦν repeats τὸ νῦν εἶναι(Cf. Tim. 48 C), as the evasive phrase εἰσαῦθις below sometimes lays the topic on the table, never to be taken up again. Cf. 347 E and 430 C.

308 Cf. Laws 897 D-E, Phaedr. 246 A.

309 This playful interlude relieves the monotony of the argument and is a transition to the symbolism.τόκος means both interest and offspring. Cf. 555 E, Polit. 267 A, Aristoph.Clouds 34, Thesm. 845, Pindar, Ol. x. 12. the equivocation, which in other languages became a metaphor, has played a great part in the history of opinion about usury. Cf. the article “Usury” in Hastings's Encyclopaedia of Relig. and Ethics.

310 Cf. 475 E f. Plato as often begins by a restatement of the theory of ideas, i.e. practically of the distinction between the concept and the objects of sense. Cf. Rep. 596 A ff., Phaedo 108 b ff.

311 The modern reader will never understand Plato from translation that talk about “Being.” Cf. What Plato Said, p. 605.

312 ὃ ἔστιν is technical for the reality of the ideas. Cf. Phaedo 75 B, D, 78 D, Parmen. 129 B, Symp. 211 C, Rep. 490 B, 532 A, 597 A.

313 Creator,δημιουργός, God, the gods, and nature, are all virtual synonyms in such passages.

314 Cf. Phaedr. 259 D, Tim. 45 B.

315 This is literature, not science. Plato knew that sound required a medium, Tim. 67 B. But the statement here is true enough to illustrate the thought.

316 Lit. “kind of thing,”γένος. Cf. 507 C-D.

317 Cf. Troland, The Mystery of Mind, p. 82: “In order that there should be vision, it is not sufficient that a physical object should exist before the eyes. there must also be a source of so-called ‘light.’”

318 Plato would not have tried to explain this loose colloquial genitive, and we need not.

319 The loose Herodotean-Thucydidean-Isocratean use of ἰδέα. Cf. Laws 689 Dκαὶ τὸ σμικρότατον εἶδος. “Form” over-translates ἰδέᾳ here, which is little more than a synonym for γένος above. Cf. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 250.

320 Plato was willing to call the stars gods as the barbarians did (Cratyl. 397 D, Aristoph.Peace 406 ff., Herod. iv. 188). Cf. Laws 821 B, 899 B, 950 D, Apol. 26 D, Epinomis 985 B, 988 B.

321 Cf. my Idea of good in Plato's Republic pp. 223-225, Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie, pp. 374-384. Mediaeval writers have much to say of Platos mysterious Tagathon. Aristotle, who rejects the idea of good, uses τἀγαθόν in much the same way. It is naive to take the language of Platonic unction too literally. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 394 ff.

322 Cf. 509 A, Plotinus, Enn. i. 6. 9οὐ γὰρ ἂν πώποτε εἶδεν ὀφθαλμὸς ἥλιον ἡλιοειδὴς μὴ γεγενημένος and vi. 7. 19, Cic.Tusc.. i. 25. 73 in fine “quod si in hoc mundo fieri sine deo non potest, ne in sphaera quidem eosdem motus Archimedes sine divino ingenio potuisset imitare,” Manilius ii. 115: Quis caelum posset nisi caeli munere nosse, Et reperire deum nisi qui pars ipse deorum?

323 i.e. creation was the work of benevolent design. This is one of the few passages in the Republic where the idea of good is considered in relation to the universe, a thesis reserved for poetical or mythical development in the Timaeus. It is idle to construct a systematic metaphysical theology for Plato by identification of τἀγαθόν here either with god or with the ideas as a whole. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p 512.

324 Cf. Gorg. 465 B-C, 510 A-B, 511 E, 530 D, 534 A, 576 C, Phaedo 111 A-B, Tim. 29 C, 32 A-B. For ἀνάλογον in this sense cf. 511 E, 534 A, Phaedo 110 D.

325 Plato's rhetoric is not to be pressed. Truth, being the good, are virtual synonyms. Still, for Plato's ethical and political philosophy the light that makes things intelligible is the idea of good, i.e. the “sanction,” and not, as some commentators insist, the truth.

326 No absolute distinction can be drawn between εἶδος and ἰδέα in Plato. But ἰδέα may be used o carry the notion of “apprehended aspect” which I think is more pertinent here than the metaphysical entity of the idea, though of course Plato would affirm that. Cf. 379 A, Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 35, What Plato Said, p. 585, Class. Phil. xx. (1925) p. 347.

327 The meaning is clear. we really understand and know anything only when we apprehend its purpose, the aspect of the good that it reveals. Cf. Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. the position and case of γιγνωσκομένης are difficult. But no change proposed is any improvement.

328 Plato likes to cap a superlative by a further degree of completeness, a climax beyond the climax. Cf. 405 Bαἴσχιστον . . . αἴσχιον, 578 B, Symp. 180 A-B and Bury ad loc. The same characteristic can be observed in his method, e.g. in the Symposium where Agathon's speech, which seems the climax, is surpassed by that of Socrates: similarly in the Gorgias and the tenth book of the Republic, Cf. Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 174, Introd. p. lxi. This and the next half page belong, I think, to rhetoric rather than to systematic metaphysics. Plato the idealist uses transcendental language of his ideal, and is never willing to admit that expression has done justice to it. But Plato the rationalist distinctly draws the line between his religious language thrown out at an object and his definite logical and practical conclusions. Cf. e.g. Meno 81 D-E.

329 ἀγαθοειδῆ occurs only here in classical Greek literature. Plato quite probably coined it for his purpose.

330 There is no article in the Greek. Plato is not scrupulous to distinguish good and the good here. cf. on 505 C, p. 89, note f.

331 ἕξις is not yet in Plato quite the technical Aristotelian “habit.” However Protag. 344 C approaches it. Cf. also Phileb. 11 D, 41 C, Ritter-Preller, p. 285. Plato used many words in periphrasis with the genitive, e.g.ἕξιςLaws 625 C,γένεσιςLaws 691 B, Tim. 73 B, 76 E,μοῖραPhaedr. 255 B, 274 E, Menex. 249 B,φύσιςPhaedo 109 E, Symp. 186 B, Laws 729 C, 845 D, 944 D, etc. He may have chosen ἕξις here to suggest the ethical aspect of the good as a habit or possession of the soul. The introduction of ἡδονή below supports this view. Some interpreters think it=τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἔχει, which is possible but rather pointless.

332 For οὐ γὰρ δήπου Cf. Apol. 20 C, Gorg. 455 A, Euthyph. 13 A.

333 i.e. not only do we understand a thing when we know its purpose, but a purpose in some mind is the chief cause of its existence, God's mind for the universe, man's mind for political institutions. this, being the only interpretation that makes sense o the passage, is presumably more or less consciously Plato's meaning. Cf. Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. Quite irrelevant are Plato's supposed identification of the ἀγαθόν with the ἕν, one, and Aristotle's statement, Met. 988 a, that the ideas are the cause of other things and the one is the cause of the ideas. the remainder of the paragraph belongs to transcendental rhetoric. It has been endlessly quoted and plays a great part in Neoplatonism, in all philosophies of the unknowable and in all negative and mystic theologies.

334 It is an error to oppose Plato here to the Alexandrians who sometimes said ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος. Plato's sentence would have made ὄντος very inconvenient here. But εἶναι shows that οὐσίας is not distinguished from τοῦ ὄντος here. ἐπέκεινα became technical and a symbol for the transcendental in Neoplatonism and all similar philosophies. cf. Plotinus xvii. 1, Dionysius Areop.De divinis nominibus, ii. 2, Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 87.

335 He is amused at Socrates' emphasis. Fanciful is Wilamowitz' notion (Platon, i. p. 209)that the laughable thing is Glaucon's losing control of himself, for which he compares Aristoph.Birds 61. Cf. the extraordinary comment of Proclus, p. 265. The dramatic humor of Glaucon's surprise is Plato's way of smiling at himself, as he frequently does in the dialogues. Cf. 536 B, 540 B, Lysis 223 B, Protag. 340 E, Charm. 175 E, Cratyl. 426 B, Theaet. 200 B, 197 D, etc. Cf. Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 172 on the Phaedo.

336 “What a comble!” would be nearer the tone of the Greek. There is no good English equivalent for ὑπερβολῆς. Cf. Sir Thomas Browne's remark that “nothing can be said hyperbolically of God.” The banter here relieves the strain, as is Plato's manner.

337 Cf. 502 A, Symp. 222 E, Meno 86 E.

338 Cf. the similar etymological pun in Cratyl. 396 B-C. Here, as often, the translator must choose between over-translating for some tastes, or not translating at all.

339 The meaning is given in the text. Too many commentators lose the meaning in their study of the imagery. Cf. the notes of Adam, Jowett, Campbell, and Apelt. See Introd. p. xxi for my interpretation of the passage.

340 Some modern and ancient critics prefer ἀν᾽ ἴσα. It is a little more plausible to make the sections unequal. But again there is doubt which shall be longer, the higher as the more honorable or the lower as the more multitudinous. Cf. Plut.Plat. Quest. 3.

341 Cf. 402 B, Soph. 266 B-C.

342 Cf. on 508 C, p. 103. note b.

343 Cf. my Idea of good in Plato's republic, pp. 230-234, for the ἀνυπόθετον. Ultimately, the ἀνυπόθετον is the Idea of Good so far as we assume that idea to be attainable either in ethics or in physics. But it is the Idea of Good, not as a transcendental ontological mystery, but in the ethical sense already explained. The ideal dialectician is the man who can, if challenged, run his reasons for any given proposition back, not to some assumed axioma medium, but to its relation to ultimate Good, To call the ἀνυπόθετον the Unconditioned or Absolute introduces metaphysical associations foreign to the passage. Cf. also Introd. pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.

344 The practical meaning of this is independent of the disputed metaphysics. Cf. Introd. pp. xvi-xviii.

345 Cf. Vol. I. p. 79, note c on 347 A and p. 47, not f on 338 D; What Plato Said, p. 503 on Gorg. 463 D.

346 Aristot.top. 100 b 2-3οὐ δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστημονικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπιζητεῖσθαι τὸ διὰ τί, exactly expresses Plato's thought and the truth, though Aristotle may have meant it mainly for the principle of non-contradiction and other first principles of logic. Cf. the mediaeval “contra principium negantem non est disputandum.” A teacher of geometry will refuse to discuss the psychology of the idea of space, a teacher of chemistry will not permit the class to ask whether matter is “real.”

347 Cf. 527 A-B. This explanation of mathematical reasoning does not differ at all from that of Aristotle and Berkely and the moderns who praise Aristotle, except that the metaphysical doctrine of ideas is in the background to be asserted if challenged.

348 i.e. a bronze sphere would be the original of its imitative reflection in water, but it is in turn only the imperfect imitation of the mathematical idea of a sphere.

349 Stenzel, Handbuch, 118 “das er nur mit dem Verstande(διανοίᾳ)sieht” is mistaken. διανοίᾳ is used not in its special sense (“understanding.” See p. 116, note c), but generally for the mind as opposed to the senses. Cf. 511 c.

350 For the concessive μέν cf. 546 E, 529 D, Soph. 225 C.

351 The loosely appended dative ἐκείνοις is virtually a dative absolute. Cf. Phaedo 105 A. Wilamowitz' emendation (Platon, ii. p. 384) to πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ἐκείνοις rests on a misunderstanding of the passage.

352 The translation of this sentence is correct. But cf. Adam ad loc.

353 λόγος here suggests bot the objective personified argument and the subjective faculty.

354 Cf. 533 A.Phileb. 57 E.

355 τῷ ὄντι emphasized the etymological meaning of the word. Similarly ὡς ἀληθῶς in 551 E, Phaedo 80 D, Phileb. 64 E. For hypotheses cf. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, p. 229, Thompson on Meno 86 E. But the thing to note is that the word according to the context may emphasize the arbitrariness of an assumption or the fact that it is the starting-point—ἀπχή—of the inquiry.

356 Cf. Symp. 211 Cὥσπερ ἐπαναβάσμοις, “like steps of a stair.”

357 παντὸς ἀρχήν taken literally leads support to the view that Plato is thinking of an absolute first principle. But in spite of the metaphysical suggestions for practical purposes the παντὸς ἀρχή may be the virtual equivalent of the ἱκανόν of the Phaedo. It is the ἀρχή on which all in the particular case depends and is reached by dialectical agreement, not by arbitrary assumption. Cf. on 510 B, p. 110, note a.

358 This is one of the passages that are misused to attribute to Plato disdain for experience and the perceptions of the senses. Cf. on 530 B, p. 187, note c. The dialectician is able to reason purely in concepts and words without recurring to images. Plato is not here considering how much or little of his knowledge is ultimately derived from experience.

359 The description undoubtedly applies to a metaphysical philosophy that deduces all things from a transcendent first principle. I have never denied that. The point of my interpretation is that it also describes the method which distinguishes the dialectician as such from the man of science, and that this distinction is for practical and educational purposes the chief result of the discussion, as Plato virtually says in the next few lines. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 233-234.

360 διανοίᾳ here as in 511 A is general and not technical.

361 νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν is perhaps intentionally ambiguous. Colloquially the phrase means “have not sense.” for its higher meaning Cf. Meno 99 C, Laws 962 A.

362 Unnecessary difficulties have been raised about καίτοι and μετά here. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 345 mistakenly resorts to emendation. the meaning is plain. Mathematical ideas are ideas or concepts like other ideas; but the mathematician does not deal with them quiet as the dialectician deals with ideas and therefore does not possess νοῦς or reason in the highest sense.

363 Here the word διάνοια is given a technical meaning as a faculty inferior to νοῦς, but, as Plato says, the terminology does not matter. The question has been much and often idly discussed.

364 For ἐπί Cf. Polit. 280 A, Gorg. 463 B.

365 πίστις is of course not “faith” in Plato, but Neoplatonists, Christians, and commentators have confused the two ideas hopelessly.

366 εἰκασία undoubtedly had this connotation for Plato.

367 Cf. on 508 C, p. 103, note b.